| Message ID | 1442433764-80826-7-git-send-email-seth.forshee@canonical.com (mailing list archive) |
|---|---|
| State | New, archived |
| Headers | show |
On 9/16/2015 1:02 PM, Seth Forshee wrote: > Security labels from unprivileged mounts cannot be trusted. > Ideally for these mounts we would assign the objects in the > filesystem the same label as the inode for the backing device > passed to mount. Unfortunately it's currently impossible to > determine which inode this is from the LSM mount hooks, so we > settle for the label of the process doing the mount. > > This label is assigned to s_root, and also to smk_default to > ensure that new inodes receive this label. The transmute property > is also set on s_root to make this behavior more explicit, even > though it is technically not necessary. > > If a filesystem has existing security labels, access to inodes is > permitted if the label is the same as smk_root, otherwise access > is denied. The SMACK64EXEC xattr is completely ignored. > > Explicit setting of security labels continues to require > CAP_MAC_ADMIN in init_user_ns. > > Altogether, this ensures that filesystem objects are not > accessible to subjects which cannot already access the backing > store, that MAC is not violated for any objects in the fileystem > which are already labeled, and that a user cannot use an > unprivileged mount to gain elevated MAC privileges. > > sysfs, tmpfs, and ramfs are already mountable from user > namespaces and support security labels. We can't rule out the > possibility that these filesystems may already be used in mounts > from user namespaces with security lables set from the init > namespace, so failing to trust lables in these filesystems may > introduce regressions. It is safe to trust labels from these > filesystems, since the unprivileged user does not control the > backing store and thus cannot supply security labels, so an > explicit exception is made to trust labels from these > filesystems. > > Signed-off-by: Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com> One coding comment below, otherwise looking good. > --- > security/smack/smack.h | 6 ++++++ > security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 35 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------- > 2 files changed, 33 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) > > diff --git a/security/smack/smack.h b/security/smack/smack.h > index fff0c612bbb7..070223960a2c 100644 > --- a/security/smack/smack.h > +++ b/security/smack/smack.h > @@ -91,8 +91,14 @@ struct superblock_smack { > struct smack_known *smk_hat; > struct smack_known *smk_default; > int smk_initialized; > + int smk_flags; How about deleting smk_initialized and using a bit in smk_flags. A whole int for each seems excessive. The smk_initialized field is only used in two places, both in smack_set_mnt_opts. > }; > > +/* > + * Superblock flags > + */ > +#define SMK_SB_UNTRUSTED 0x01 + #define SMK_SB_INITIALIZED 0x02 > + > struct socket_smack { > struct smack_known *smk_out; /* outbound label */ > struct smack_known *smk_in; /* inbound label */ > diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c > index 996c88956438..cdfd67b61534 100644 > --- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c > +++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c > @@ -793,6 +793,17 @@ static int smack_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb, > skp = smk_of_current(); > sp->smk_root = skp; > sp->smk_default = skp; > + /* > + * For a handful of fs types with no user-controlled > + * backing store it's okay to trust security labels > + * in the filesystem. The rest are untrusted. > + */ > + if (sb->s_user_ns != &init_user_ns && > + sb->s_magic != SYSFS_MAGIC && sb->s_magic != TMPFS_MAGIC && > + sb->s_magic != RAMFS_MAGIC) { > + transmute = 1; > + sp->smk_flags |= SMK_SB_UNTRUSTED; > + } > } > > /* > @@ -1175,6 +1186,7 @@ static int smack_inode_rename(struct inode *old_inode, > */ > static int smack_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask) > { > + struct superblock_smack *sbsp = inode->i_sb->s_security; > struct smk_audit_info ad; > int no_block = mask & MAY_NOT_BLOCK; > int rc; > @@ -1186,6 +1198,11 @@ static int smack_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask) > if (mask == 0) > return 0; > > + if (sbsp->smk_flags & SMK_SB_UNTRUSTED) { > + if (smk_of_inode(inode) != sbsp->smk_root) > + return -EACCES; > + } > + > /* May be droppable after audit */ > if (no_block) > return -ECHILD; > @@ -3475,14 +3492,16 @@ static void smack_d_instantiate(struct dentry *opt_dentry, struct inode *inode) > if (rc >= 0) > transflag = SMK_INODE_TRANSMUTE; > } > - /* > - * Don't let the exec or mmap label be "*" or "@". > - */ > - skp = smk_fetch(XATTR_NAME_SMACKEXEC, inode, dp); > - if (IS_ERR(skp) || skp == &smack_known_star || > - skp == &smack_known_web) > - skp = NULL; > - isp->smk_task = skp; > + if (!(sbsp->smk_flags & SMK_SB_UNTRUSTED)) { > + /* > + * Don't let the exec or mmap label be "*" or "@". > + */ > + skp = smk_fetch(XATTR_NAME_SMACKEXEC, inode, dp); > + if (IS_ERR(skp) || skp == &smack_known_star || > + skp == &smack_known_web) > + skp = NULL; > + isp->smk_task = skp; > + } > > skp = smk_fetch(XATTR_NAME_SMACKMMAP, inode, dp); > if (IS_ERR(skp) || skp == &smack_known_star || -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-fsdevel" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
On Wed, Sep 16, 2015 at 01:33:50PM -0700, Casey Schaufler wrote: > On 9/16/2015 1:02 PM, Seth Forshee wrote: > > Security labels from unprivileged mounts cannot be trusted. > > Ideally for these mounts we would assign the objects in the > > filesystem the same label as the inode for the backing device > > passed to mount. Unfortunately it's currently impossible to > > determine which inode this is from the LSM mount hooks, so we > > settle for the label of the process doing the mount. > > > > This label is assigned to s_root, and also to smk_default to > > ensure that new inodes receive this label. The transmute property > > is also set on s_root to make this behavior more explicit, even > > though it is technically not necessary. > > > > If a filesystem has existing security labels, access to inodes is > > permitted if the label is the same as smk_root, otherwise access > > is denied. The SMACK64EXEC xattr is completely ignored. > > > > Explicit setting of security labels continues to require > > CAP_MAC_ADMIN in init_user_ns. > > > > Altogether, this ensures that filesystem objects are not > > accessible to subjects which cannot already access the backing > > store, that MAC is not violated for any objects in the fileystem > > which are already labeled, and that a user cannot use an > > unprivileged mount to gain elevated MAC privileges. > > > > sysfs, tmpfs, and ramfs are already mountable from user > > namespaces and support security labels. We can't rule out the > > possibility that these filesystems may already be used in mounts > > from user namespaces with security lables set from the init > > namespace, so failing to trust lables in these filesystems may > > introduce regressions. It is safe to trust labels from these > > filesystems, since the unprivileged user does not control the > > backing store and thus cannot supply security labels, so an > > explicit exception is made to trust labels from these > > filesystems. > > > > Signed-off-by: Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com> > > One coding comment below, otherwise looking good. > > > --- > > security/smack/smack.h | 6 ++++++ > > security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 35 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------- > > 2 files changed, 33 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) > > > > diff --git a/security/smack/smack.h b/security/smack/smack.h > > index fff0c612bbb7..070223960a2c 100644 > > --- a/security/smack/smack.h > > +++ b/security/smack/smack.h > > @@ -91,8 +91,14 @@ struct superblock_smack { > > struct smack_known *smk_hat; > > struct smack_known *smk_default; > > int smk_initialized; > > + int smk_flags; > > How about deleting smk_initialized and using a bit > in smk_flags. A whole int for each seems excessive. > The smk_initialized field is only used in two places, > both in smack_set_mnt_opts. Sure, I can do that. Thanks, Seth -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-fsdevel" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
diff --git a/security/smack/smack.h b/security/smack/smack.h index fff0c612bbb7..070223960a2c 100644 --- a/security/smack/smack.h +++ b/security/smack/smack.h @@ -91,8 +91,14 @@ struct superblock_smack { struct smack_known *smk_hat; struct smack_known *smk_default; int smk_initialized; + int smk_flags; }; +/* + * Superblock flags + */ +#define SMK_SB_UNTRUSTED 0x01 + struct socket_smack { struct smack_known *smk_out; /* outbound label */ struct smack_known *smk_in; /* inbound label */ diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c index 996c88956438..cdfd67b61534 100644 --- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c +++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c @@ -793,6 +793,17 @@ static int smack_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb, skp = smk_of_current(); sp->smk_root = skp; sp->smk_default = skp; + /* + * For a handful of fs types with no user-controlled + * backing store it's okay to trust security labels + * in the filesystem. The rest are untrusted. + */ + if (sb->s_user_ns != &init_user_ns && + sb->s_magic != SYSFS_MAGIC && sb->s_magic != TMPFS_MAGIC && + sb->s_magic != RAMFS_MAGIC) { + transmute = 1; + sp->smk_flags |= SMK_SB_UNTRUSTED; + } } /* @@ -1175,6 +1186,7 @@ static int smack_inode_rename(struct inode *old_inode, */ static int smack_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask) { + struct superblock_smack *sbsp = inode->i_sb->s_security; struct smk_audit_info ad; int no_block = mask & MAY_NOT_BLOCK; int rc; @@ -1186,6 +1198,11 @@ static int smack_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask) if (mask == 0) return 0; + if (sbsp->smk_flags & SMK_SB_UNTRUSTED) { + if (smk_of_inode(inode) != sbsp->smk_root) + return -EACCES; + } + /* May be droppable after audit */ if (no_block) return -ECHILD; @@ -3475,14 +3492,16 @@ static void smack_d_instantiate(struct dentry *opt_dentry, struct inode *inode) if (rc >= 0) transflag = SMK_INODE_TRANSMUTE; } - /* - * Don't let the exec or mmap label be "*" or "@". - */ - skp = smk_fetch(XATTR_NAME_SMACKEXEC, inode, dp); - if (IS_ERR(skp) || skp == &smack_known_star || - skp == &smack_known_web) - skp = NULL; - isp->smk_task = skp; + if (!(sbsp->smk_flags & SMK_SB_UNTRUSTED)) { + /* + * Don't let the exec or mmap label be "*" or "@". + */ + skp = smk_fetch(XATTR_NAME_SMACKEXEC, inode, dp); + if (IS_ERR(skp) || skp == &smack_known_star || + skp == &smack_known_web) + skp = NULL; + isp->smk_task = skp; + } skp = smk_fetch(XATTR_NAME_SMACKMMAP, inode, dp); if (IS_ERR(skp) || skp == &smack_known_star ||
Security labels from unprivileged mounts cannot be trusted. Ideally for these mounts we would assign the objects in the filesystem the same label as the inode for the backing device passed to mount. Unfortunately it's currently impossible to determine which inode this is from the LSM mount hooks, so we settle for the label of the process doing the mount. This label is assigned to s_root, and also to smk_default to ensure that new inodes receive this label. The transmute property is also set on s_root to make this behavior more explicit, even though it is technically not necessary. If a filesystem has existing security labels, access to inodes is permitted if the label is the same as smk_root, otherwise access is denied. The SMACK64EXEC xattr is completely ignored. Explicit setting of security labels continues to require CAP_MAC_ADMIN in init_user_ns. Altogether, this ensures that filesystem objects are not accessible to subjects which cannot already access the backing store, that MAC is not violated for any objects in the fileystem which are already labeled, and that a user cannot use an unprivileged mount to gain elevated MAC privileges. sysfs, tmpfs, and ramfs are already mountable from user namespaces and support security labels. We can't rule out the possibility that these filesystems may already be used in mounts from user namespaces with security lables set from the init namespace, so failing to trust lables in these filesystems may introduce regressions. It is safe to trust labels from these filesystems, since the unprivileged user does not control the backing store and thus cannot supply security labels, so an explicit exception is made to trust labels from these filesystems. Signed-off-by: Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com> --- security/smack/smack.h | 6 ++++++ security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 35 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------- 2 files changed, 33 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)