| Message ID | 1459949826-11840-3-git-send-email-tudor-dan.ambarus@nxp.com (mailing list archive) |
|---|---|
| State | Changes Requested |
| Delegated to: | Herbert Xu |
| Headers | show |
Am Mittwoch, 6. April 2016, 16:37:05 schrieb Tudor Ambarus: Hi Tudor, > Dedicated to RSA (hardware) implementations that want to use > raw integers instead of MPI keys. > > Signed-off-by: Tudor Ambarus <tudor-dan.ambarus@nxp.com> > --- > crypto/rsa.c | 15 ---- > crypto/rsa_helper.c | 182 > ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ include/crypto/internal/rsa.h | > 28 +++++++ > 3 files changed, 210 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-) > > diff --git a/crypto/rsa.c b/crypto/rsa.c > index 7cb0153..37ac189 100644 > --- a/crypto/rsa.c > +++ b/crypto/rsa.c > @@ -235,21 +235,6 @@ err_free_m: > return ret; > } > > -static int rsa_check_key_length(unsigned int len) > -{ > - switch (len) { > - case 512: > - case 1024: > - case 1536: > - case 2048: > - case 3072: > - case 4096: > - return 0; > - } > - > - return -EINVAL; > -} > - > static int rsa_set_pub_key(struct crypto_akcipher *tfm, const void *key, > unsigned int keylen) > { > diff --git a/crypto/rsa_helper.c b/crypto/rsa_helper.c > index 0149ed3..df1f480 100644 > --- a/crypto/rsa_helper.c > +++ b/crypto/rsa_helper.c > @@ -14,6 +14,9 @@ > #include <linux/export.h> > #include <linux/err.h> > #include <linux/fips.h> > +#include <linux/slab.h> > +#include <linux/dma-mapping.h> > +#include <linux/device.h> > #include <crypto/internal/rsa.h> > #include "rsapubkey-asn1.h" > #include "rsaprivkey-asn1.h" > @@ -239,3 +242,182 @@ error: > return ret; > } > EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(rsa_parse_mpi_priv_key); > + > +int rsa_check_key_length(unsigned int len) > +{ > + switch (len) { > + case 512: > + case 1024: > + case 1536: > + case 2048: > + case 3072: > + case 4096: > + return 0; > + } > + > + return -EINVAL; > +} > +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(rsa_check_key_length); I assume we can remove that length check in the future and you just ported it to be en-par with the feature set of the current implementation? > + > +void raw_rsa_free_key(struct rsa_raw_key *key) > +{ > + kzfree(key->d); > + key->d = NULL; > + > + kfree(key->e); > + key->e = NULL; > + > + kfree(key->n); > + key->n = NULL; > + > + key->n_sz = 0; > + key->e_sz = 0; > +} > +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(raw_rsa_free_key); > + > +void raw_rsa_free_coherent_key(struct device *dev, struct rsa_raw_key *key) > +{ > + if (key->d) { > + memset(key->d, '\0', key->n_sz); memzero_explicit, please > + dma_free_coherent(dev, key->n_sz, key->d, key->dma_d); > + key->d = NULL; > + } > + > + if (key->e) { > + dma_free_coherent(dev, key->n_sz, key->e, key->dma_e); > + key->e = NULL; > + } > + > + if (key->n) { > + dma_free_coherent(dev, key->n_sz, key->n, key->dma_n); > + key->n = NULL; > + } > + > + key->n_sz = 0; > + key->e_sz = 0; > +} > +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(raw_rsa_free_coherent_key); > + > +int raw_rsa_get_n(void *context, const void *value, size_t vlen) > +{ > + struct rsa_raw_ctx *ctx = context; > + struct rsa_raw_key *key = &ctx->key; > + const char *ptr = value; > + int ret = -EINVAL; > + > + while (!*ptr && vlen) { > + ptr++; > + vlen--; > + } > + > + key->n_sz = vlen; > + /* In FIPS mode only allow key size 2K & 3K */ Again, this only excludes 4k as this should be done in a subsequent patch, right? > + if (fips_enabled && (key->n_sz != 256 && key->n_sz != 384)) { > + dev_err(ctx->dev, "RSA: key size not allowed in FIPS mode\n"); > + goto err; > + } > + /* invalid key size provided */ > + ret = rsa_check_key_length(key->n_sz << 3); > + if (ret) > + goto err; > + > + if (key->is_coherent) > + key->n = kzalloc(key->n_sz, key->flags); > + else > + key->n = dma_zalloc_coherent(ctx->dev, key->n_sz, &key->dma_n, > + key->flags); > + > + if (!key->n) { > + ret = -ENOMEM; > + goto err; > + } > + > + memcpy(key->n, ptr, key->n_sz); > + > + return 0; > +err: > + key->n_sz = 0; > + key->n = NULL; > + return ret; > +} > +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(raw_rsa_get_n); > + > +int raw_rsa_get_e(void *context, const void *value, size_t vlen) > +{ > + struct rsa_raw_ctx *ctx = context; > + struct rsa_raw_key *key = &ctx->key; > + const char *ptr = value; > + size_t offset = 0; > + > + while (!*ptr && vlen) { > + ptr++; > + vlen--; > + } > + > + key->e_sz = vlen; > + > + if (!key->n_sz || !vlen || vlen > key->n_sz) { > + key->e = NULL; > + return -EINVAL; > + } > + > + if (key->is_coherent) { > + key->e = kzalloc(key->e_sz, key->flags); > + } else { > + key->e = dma_zalloc_coherent(ctx->dev, key->n_sz, &key->dma_e, > + key->flags); > + offset = key->n_sz - vlen; > + } > + > + if (!key->e) > + return -ENOMEM; > + > + memcpy(key->e + offset, ptr, vlen); > + > + return 0; > +} > +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(raw_rsa_get_e); > + > +int raw_rsa_get_d(void *context, const void *value, size_t vlen) > +{ > + struct rsa_raw_ctx *ctx = context; > + struct rsa_raw_key *key = &ctx->key; > + const char *ptr = value; > + size_t offset = 0; > + int ret = -EINVAL; > + > + while (!*ptr && vlen) { > + ptr++; > + vlen--; > + } > + > + if (!key->n_sz || !vlen || vlen > key->n_sz) > + goto err; > + > + /* In FIPS mode only allow key size 2K & 3K */ > + if (fips_enabled && (vlen != 256 && vlen != 384)) { > + dev_err(ctx->dev, "RSA: key size not allowed in FIPS mode\n"); > + goto err; > + } > + > + if (key->is_coherent) { > + key->d = kzalloc(key->n_sz, key->flags); > + } else { > + key->d = dma_zalloc_coherent(ctx->dev, key->n_sz, &key->dma_d, > + key->flags); > + offset = key->n_sz - vlen; > + } > + > + if (!key->d) { > + ret = -ENOMEM; > + goto err; > + } > + > + memcpy(key->d + offset, ptr, vlen); > + > + return 0; > +err: > + key->d = NULL; > + return ret; > +} > +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(raw_rsa_get_d); > diff --git a/include/crypto/internal/rsa.h b/include/crypto/internal/rsa.h > index f8ef7b1..854b9b7 100644 > --- a/include/crypto/internal/rsa.h > +++ b/include/crypto/internal/rsa.h > @@ -31,11 +31,30 @@ struct rsa_mpi_key { > MPI d; > }; > > +struct rsa_raw_key { > + u8 *n; > + u8 *e; > + u8 *d; > + dma_addr_t dma_n; > + dma_addr_t dma_e; > + dma_addr_t dma_d; > + size_t n_sz; > + size_t e_sz; > + bool is_coherent; > + gfp_t flags; > +}; > + > struct rsa_ctx { > const struct rsa_asn1_action *action; > struct rsa_mpi_key key; > }; > > +struct rsa_raw_ctx { > + const struct rsa_asn1_action *action; > + struct rsa_raw_key key; > + struct device *dev; > +}; > + > int rsa_get_mpi_n(void *context, const void *value, size_t vlen); > int rsa_get_mpi_e(void *context, const void *value, size_t vlen); > int rsa_get_mpi_d(void *context, const void *value, size_t vlen); > @@ -47,5 +66,14 @@ int rsa_parse_mpi_pub_key(struct rsa_ctx *ctx, const void > *key, int rsa_parse_mpi_priv_key(struct rsa_ctx *ctx, const void *key, > unsigned int key_len); > > +int rsa_check_key_length(unsigned int len); > + > +void raw_rsa_free_key(struct rsa_raw_key *key); > +void raw_rsa_free_coherent_key(struct device *dev, struct rsa_raw_key > *key); + > +int raw_rsa_get_n(void *context, const void *value, size_t vlen); > +int raw_rsa_get_e(void *context, const void *value, size_t vlen); > +int raw_rsa_get_d(void *context, const void *value, size_t vlen); > + > extern struct crypto_template rsa_pkcs1pad_tmpl; > #endif Ciao Stephan -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-crypto" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
> +int rsa_check_key_length(unsigned int len) > +{ > + switch (len) { > + case 512: > + case 1024: > + case 1536: > + case 2048: > + case 3072: > + case 4096: > + return 0; > + } > + > + return -EINVAL; > +} That's an unusual restriction. > + key->n_sz = vlen; > + /* In FIPS mode only allow key size 2K & 3K */ > + if (fips_enabled && (key->n_sz != 256 && key->n_sz != 384)) { > + dev_err(ctx->dev, "RSA: key size not allowed in FIPS mode\n"); > + goto err; > + } That's an unusual restriction, too. As far as I know, FIPS does not place that restriction. Jeff -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-crypto" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
Am Freitag, 8. April 2016, 12:54:10 schrieb Jeffrey Walton: Hi Jeffrey, > > +int rsa_check_key_length(unsigned int len) > > +{ > > + switch (len) { > > + case 512: > > + case 1024: > > + case 1536: > > + case 2048: > > + case 3072: > > + case 4096: > > + return 0; > > + } > > + > > + return -EINVAL; > > +} > > That's an unusual restriction. > > > + key->n_sz = vlen; > > + /* In FIPS mode only allow key size 2K & 3K */ > > + if (fips_enabled && (key->n_sz != 256 && key->n_sz != 384)) { > > + dev_err(ctx->dev, "RSA: key size not allowed in FIPS > > mode\n"); + goto err; > > + } > > That's an unusual restriction, too. As far as I know, FIPS does not > place that restriction. It does, see SP80-131A and the requirements on CAVS. Very lately they added 4k too, hence my question. > > Jeff Ciao Stephan -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-crypto" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
On Fri, Apr 8, 2016 at 12:55 PM, Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de> wrote: > Am Freitag, 8. April 2016, 12:54:10 schrieb Jeffrey Walton: > > Hi Jeffrey, > >> > +int rsa_check_key_length(unsigned int len) >> > +{ >> > + switch (len) { >> > + case 512: >> > + case 1024: >> > + case 1536: >> > + case 2048: >> > + case 3072: >> > + case 4096: >> > + return 0; >> > + } >> > + >> > + return -EINVAL; >> > +} >> >> That's an unusual restriction. >> >> > + key->n_sz = vlen; >> > + /* In FIPS mode only allow key size 2K & 3K */ >> > + if (fips_enabled && (key->n_sz != 256 && key->n_sz != 384)) { >> > + dev_err(ctx->dev, "RSA: key size not allowed in FIPS >> > mode\n"); + goto err; >> > + } >> >> That's an unusual restriction, too. As far as I know, FIPS does not >> place that restriction. > > It does, see SP80-131A and the requirements on CAVS. I believe the controlling document is SP800-56B. SP800-131 is just a guide, and it digests the information from SP800-56B. For current FIPS 140 requirements (SP800-56B), RSA is a Finite Filed (FF) system, and the requirement is |N| >= 2048. Also, I did not see the restriction listed in SP800-131A Rev 1. Cf., http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/drafts/800-131A/sp800-131a_r1_draft.pdf. Jeff -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-crypto" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
Am Freitag, 8. April 2016, 13:09:02 schrieb Jeffrey Walton: Hi Jeffrey, > On Fri, Apr 8, 2016 at 12:55 PM, Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de> wrote: > > Am Freitag, 8. April 2016, 12:54:10 schrieb Jeffrey Walton: > > > > Hi Jeffrey, > > > >> > +int rsa_check_key_length(unsigned int len) > >> > +{ > >> > + switch (len) { > >> > + case 512: > >> > + case 1024: > >> > + case 1536: > >> > + case 2048: > >> > + case 3072: > >> > + case 4096: > >> > + return 0; > >> > + } > >> > + > >> > + return -EINVAL; > >> > +} > >> > >> That's an unusual restriction. > >> > >> > + key->n_sz = vlen; > >> > + /* In FIPS mode only allow key size 2K & 3K */ > >> > + if (fips_enabled && (key->n_sz != 256 && key->n_sz != 384)) { > >> > + dev_err(ctx->dev, "RSA: key size not allowed in FIPS > >> > mode\n"); + goto err; > >> > + } > >> > >> That's an unusual restriction, too. As far as I know, FIPS does not > >> place that restriction. > > > > It does, see SP80-131A and the requirements on CAVS. > > I believe the controlling document is SP800-56B. SP800-131 is just a > guide, and it digests the information from SP800-56B. For current FIPS > 140 requirements (SP800-56B), RSA is a Finite Filed (FF) system, and > the requirement is |N| >= 2048. To be clear, SP800-131A requires that only 2k or higher is allowed. The second constraint comes in with CAVS: you can only test 2k and 3k (and lately 4k) RSA. As the requirement is to have CAVS certs, you can therefore only get 2k/3k/4k CAVS certs. > > Also, I did not see the restriction listed in SP800-131A Rev 1. Cf., > http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/drafts/800-131A/sp800-131a_r1_draft.pdf. > > Jeff Ciao Stephan -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-crypto" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
Hi Stephan, I was out of office, sorry for the delay. > Am Mittwoch, 6. April 2016, 16:37:05 schrieb Tudor Ambarus: > > > +int rsa_check_key_length(unsigned int len) > > +{ > > + switch (len) { > > + case 512: > > + case 1024: > > + case 1536: > > + case 2048: > > + case 3072: > > + case 4096: > > + return 0; > > + } > > + > > + return -EINVAL; > > +} > > +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(rsa_check_key_length); > > I assume we can remove that length check in the future and you just ported > it > to be en-par with the feature set of the current implementation? Yes, this is how we agreed. Removing this limitation is a fix for the current implementation and should be treated in an explicit patch. It's not in the scope of this patch set, we will do it later. > > +void raw_rsa_free_coherent_key(struct device *dev, struct rsa_raw_key > *key) > > +{ > > + if (key->d) { > > + memset(key->d, '\0', key->n_sz); > > memzero_explicit, please I don't think this is really needed. memzero_explicit is used only on stack variables that get cleared just before they go out of scope. > > > + dma_free_coherent(dev, key->n_sz, key->d, key->dma_d); > > + key->d = NULL; > > + } > > + > > + if (key->e) { > > + dma_free_coherent(dev, key->n_sz, key->e, key->dma_e); > > + key->e = NULL; > > + } > > + > > + if (key->n) { > > + dma_free_coherent(dev, key->n_sz, key->n, key->dma_n); > > + key->n = NULL; > > + } > > + > > + key->n_sz = 0; > > + key->e_sz = 0; > > +} > > +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(raw_rsa_free_coherent_key); > > + > > +int raw_rsa_get_n(void *context, const void *value, size_t vlen) > > +{ > > + struct rsa_raw_ctx *ctx = context; > > + struct rsa_raw_key *key = &ctx->key; > > + const char *ptr = value; > > + int ret = -EINVAL; > > + > > + while (!*ptr && vlen) { > > + ptr++; > > + vlen--; > > + } > > + > > + key->n_sz = vlen; > > + /* In FIPS mode only allow key size 2K & 3K */ > > Again, this only excludes 4k as this should be done in a subsequent patch, > right? Yes, this will be addressed in an explicit patch. It's an update that is not in the scope of this patch set. Stephan, thank you for the review! ta -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-crypto" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
Am Donnerstag, 14. April 2016, 15:25:17 schrieb Tudor-Dan Ambarus: Hi Tudor, > > > > > +{ > > > + if (key->d) { > > > + memset(key->d, '\0', key->n_sz); > > > > memzero_explicit, please > > I don't think this is really needed. memzero_explicit is used only on stack > variables that get cleared just before they go out of scope. Are you so sure that a compiler is not getting smart on seeing a memset followed by a free without marking the pointer as volatile? You free the pointer immediately after memset(). I would not want to bet anything that a compiler would leave the memset for non-volatile pointers. Besides, memzero_expicit does not cost anything -- it does not add any instruction but convinces the compiler to not optimize it away. Ciao Stephan -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-crypto" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
On Thu, Apr 14, 2016 at 05:38:08PM +0200, Stephan Mueller wrote: > > > I don't think this is really needed. memzero_explicit is used only on stack > > variables that get cleared just before they go out of scope. > > Are you so sure that a compiler is not getting smart on seeing a memset > followed by a free without marking the pointer as volatile? You free the > pointer immediately after memset(). I would not want to bet anything that a > compiler would leave the memset for non-volatile pointers. > > Besides, memzero_expicit does not cost anything -- it does not add any > instruction but convinces the compiler to not optimize it away. memzero_explicit is only meant for stack pointers, so there is no need to use it here. Cheers,
diff --git a/crypto/rsa.c b/crypto/rsa.c index 7cb0153..37ac189 100644 --- a/crypto/rsa.c +++ b/crypto/rsa.c @@ -235,21 +235,6 @@ err_free_m: return ret; } -static int rsa_check_key_length(unsigned int len) -{ - switch (len) { - case 512: - case 1024: - case 1536: - case 2048: - case 3072: - case 4096: - return 0; - } - - return -EINVAL; -} - static int rsa_set_pub_key(struct crypto_akcipher *tfm, const void *key, unsigned int keylen) { diff --git a/crypto/rsa_helper.c b/crypto/rsa_helper.c index 0149ed3..df1f480 100644 --- a/crypto/rsa_helper.c +++ b/crypto/rsa_helper.c @@ -14,6 +14,9 @@ #include <linux/export.h> #include <linux/err.h> #include <linux/fips.h> +#include <linux/slab.h> +#include <linux/dma-mapping.h> +#include <linux/device.h> #include <crypto/internal/rsa.h> #include "rsapubkey-asn1.h" #include "rsaprivkey-asn1.h" @@ -239,3 +242,182 @@ error: return ret; } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(rsa_parse_mpi_priv_key); + +int rsa_check_key_length(unsigned int len) +{ + switch (len) { + case 512: + case 1024: + case 1536: + case 2048: + case 3072: + case 4096: + return 0; + } + + return -EINVAL; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(rsa_check_key_length); + +void raw_rsa_free_key(struct rsa_raw_key *key) +{ + kzfree(key->d); + key->d = NULL; + + kfree(key->e); + key->e = NULL; + + kfree(key->n); + key->n = NULL; + + key->n_sz = 0; + key->e_sz = 0; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(raw_rsa_free_key); + +void raw_rsa_free_coherent_key(struct device *dev, struct rsa_raw_key *key) +{ + if (key->d) { + memset(key->d, '\0', key->n_sz); + dma_free_coherent(dev, key->n_sz, key->d, key->dma_d); + key->d = NULL; + } + + if (key->e) { + dma_free_coherent(dev, key->n_sz, key->e, key->dma_e); + key->e = NULL; + } + + if (key->n) { + dma_free_coherent(dev, key->n_sz, key->n, key->dma_n); + key->n = NULL; + } + + key->n_sz = 0; + key->e_sz = 0; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(raw_rsa_free_coherent_key); + +int raw_rsa_get_n(void *context, const void *value, size_t vlen) +{ + struct rsa_raw_ctx *ctx = context; + struct rsa_raw_key *key = &ctx->key; + const char *ptr = value; + int ret = -EINVAL; + + while (!*ptr && vlen) { + ptr++; + vlen--; + } + + key->n_sz = vlen; + /* In FIPS mode only allow key size 2K & 3K */ + if (fips_enabled && (key->n_sz != 256 && key->n_sz != 384)) { + dev_err(ctx->dev, "RSA: key size not allowed in FIPS mode\n"); + goto err; + } + /* invalid key size provided */ + ret = rsa_check_key_length(key->n_sz << 3); + if (ret) + goto err; + + if (key->is_coherent) + key->n = kzalloc(key->n_sz, key->flags); + else + key->n = dma_zalloc_coherent(ctx->dev, key->n_sz, &key->dma_n, + key->flags); + + if (!key->n) { + ret = -ENOMEM; + goto err; + } + + memcpy(key->n, ptr, key->n_sz); + + return 0; +err: + key->n_sz = 0; + key->n = NULL; + return ret; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(raw_rsa_get_n); + +int raw_rsa_get_e(void *context, const void *value, size_t vlen) +{ + struct rsa_raw_ctx *ctx = context; + struct rsa_raw_key *key = &ctx->key; + const char *ptr = value; + size_t offset = 0; + + while (!*ptr && vlen) { + ptr++; + vlen--; + } + + key->e_sz = vlen; + + if (!key->n_sz || !vlen || vlen > key->n_sz) { + key->e = NULL; + return -EINVAL; + } + + if (key->is_coherent) { + key->e = kzalloc(key->e_sz, key->flags); + } else { + key->e = dma_zalloc_coherent(ctx->dev, key->n_sz, &key->dma_e, + key->flags); + offset = key->n_sz - vlen; + } + + if (!key->e) + return -ENOMEM; + + memcpy(key->e + offset, ptr, vlen); + + return 0; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(raw_rsa_get_e); + +int raw_rsa_get_d(void *context, const void *value, size_t vlen) +{ + struct rsa_raw_ctx *ctx = context; + struct rsa_raw_key *key = &ctx->key; + const char *ptr = value; + size_t offset = 0; + int ret = -EINVAL; + + while (!*ptr && vlen) { + ptr++; + vlen--; + } + + if (!key->n_sz || !vlen || vlen > key->n_sz) + goto err; + + /* In FIPS mode only allow key size 2K & 3K */ + if (fips_enabled && (vlen != 256 && vlen != 384)) { + dev_err(ctx->dev, "RSA: key size not allowed in FIPS mode\n"); + goto err; + } + + if (key->is_coherent) { + key->d = kzalloc(key->n_sz, key->flags); + } else { + key->d = dma_zalloc_coherent(ctx->dev, key->n_sz, &key->dma_d, + key->flags); + offset = key->n_sz - vlen; + } + + if (!key->d) { + ret = -ENOMEM; + goto err; + } + + memcpy(key->d + offset, ptr, vlen); + + return 0; +err: + key->d = NULL; + return ret; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(raw_rsa_get_d); diff --git a/include/crypto/internal/rsa.h b/include/crypto/internal/rsa.h index f8ef7b1..854b9b7 100644 --- a/include/crypto/internal/rsa.h +++ b/include/crypto/internal/rsa.h @@ -31,11 +31,30 @@ struct rsa_mpi_key { MPI d; }; +struct rsa_raw_key { + u8 *n; + u8 *e; + u8 *d; + dma_addr_t dma_n; + dma_addr_t dma_e; + dma_addr_t dma_d; + size_t n_sz; + size_t e_sz; + bool is_coherent; + gfp_t flags; +}; + struct rsa_ctx { const struct rsa_asn1_action *action; struct rsa_mpi_key key; }; +struct rsa_raw_ctx { + const struct rsa_asn1_action *action; + struct rsa_raw_key key; + struct device *dev; +}; + int rsa_get_mpi_n(void *context, const void *value, size_t vlen); int rsa_get_mpi_e(void *context, const void *value, size_t vlen); int rsa_get_mpi_d(void *context, const void *value, size_t vlen); @@ -47,5 +66,14 @@ int rsa_parse_mpi_pub_key(struct rsa_ctx *ctx, const void *key, int rsa_parse_mpi_priv_key(struct rsa_ctx *ctx, const void *key, unsigned int key_len); +int rsa_check_key_length(unsigned int len); + +void raw_rsa_free_key(struct rsa_raw_key *key); +void raw_rsa_free_coherent_key(struct device *dev, struct rsa_raw_key *key); + +int raw_rsa_get_n(void *context, const void *value, size_t vlen); +int raw_rsa_get_e(void *context, const void *value, size_t vlen); +int raw_rsa_get_d(void *context, const void *value, size_t vlen); + extern struct crypto_template rsa_pkcs1pad_tmpl; #endif
Dedicated to RSA (hardware) implementations that want to use raw integers instead of MPI keys. Signed-off-by: Tudor Ambarus <tudor-dan.ambarus@nxp.com> --- crypto/rsa.c | 15 ---- crypto/rsa_helper.c | 182 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ include/crypto/internal/rsa.h | 28 +++++++ 3 files changed, 210 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)