| Message ID | 1484572984-13388-2-git-send-email-djalal@gmail.com (mailing list archive) |
|---|---|
| State | New, archived |
| Headers | show |
On Mon, Jan 16, 2017 at 5:23 AM, Djalal Harouni <tixxdz@gmail.com> wrote: > From: Lafcadio Wluiki <wluikil@gmail.com> > > Previously, the hidepid parameter was checked by comparing literal > integers 0, 1, 2. Let's add a proper enum for this, to make the checking > more expressive: > > 0 → HIDEPID_OFF > 1 → HIDEPID_NO_ACCESS > 2 → HIDEPID_INVISIBLE > > This changes the internal labelling only, the userspace-facing interface > remains unmodified, and still works with literal integers 0, 1, 2. > > No functional changes. > > Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> > Acked-by: Djalal Harouni <tixxdz@gmail.com> > Signed-off-by: Lafcadio Wluiki <wluikil@gmail.com> Andrew, can you take this? It's a sensible cleanup to drop literals in favor of defines. -Kees > --- > fs/proc/base.c | 8 ++++---- > fs/proc/inode.c | 2 +- > fs/proc/root.c | 3 ++- > include/linux/pid_namespace.h | 6 ++++++ > 4 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) > > diff --git a/fs/proc/base.c b/fs/proc/base.c > index 8e7e61b..cd8dd15 100644 > --- a/fs/proc/base.c > +++ b/fs/proc/base.c > @@ -729,11 +729,11 @@ static int proc_pid_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask) > task = get_proc_task(inode); > if (!task) > return -ESRCH; > - has_perms = has_pid_permissions(pid, task, 1); > + has_perms = has_pid_permissions(pid, task, HIDEPID_NO_ACCESS); > put_task_struct(task); > > if (!has_perms) { > - if (pid->hide_pid == 2) { > + if (pid->hide_pid == HIDEPID_INVISIBLE) { > /* > * Let's make getdents(), stat(), and open() > * consistent with each other. If a process > @@ -1725,7 +1725,7 @@ int pid_getattr(struct vfsmount *mnt, struct dentry *dentry, struct kstat *stat) > stat->gid = GLOBAL_ROOT_GID; > task = pid_task(proc_pid(inode), PIDTYPE_PID); > if (task) { > - if (!has_pid_permissions(pid, task, 2)) { > + if (!has_pid_permissions(pid, task, HIDEPID_INVISIBLE)) { > rcu_read_unlock(); > /* > * This doesn't prevent learning whether PID exists, > @@ -3179,7 +3179,7 @@ int proc_pid_readdir(struct file *file, struct dir_context *ctx) > iter.tgid += 1, iter = next_tgid(ns, iter)) { > char name[PROC_NUMBUF]; > int len; > - if (!has_pid_permissions(ns, iter.task, 2)) > + if (!has_pid_permissions(ns, iter.task, HIDEPID_INVISIBLE)) > continue; > > len = snprintf(name, sizeof(name), "%d", iter.tgid); > diff --git a/fs/proc/inode.c b/fs/proc/inode.c > index 842a5ff..5d9bafb 100644 > --- a/fs/proc/inode.c > +++ b/fs/proc/inode.c > @@ -106,7 +106,7 @@ static int proc_show_options(struct seq_file *seq, struct dentry *root) > > if (!gid_eq(pid->pid_gid, GLOBAL_ROOT_GID)) > seq_printf(seq, ",gid=%u", from_kgid_munged(&init_user_ns, pid->pid_gid)); > - if (pid->hide_pid != 0) > + if (pid->hide_pid != HIDEPID_OFF) > seq_printf(seq, ",hidepid=%u", pid->hide_pid); > > return 0; > diff --git a/fs/proc/root.c b/fs/proc/root.c > index 1988440..b90da88 100644 > --- a/fs/proc/root.c > +++ b/fs/proc/root.c > @@ -58,7 +58,8 @@ int proc_parse_options(char *options, struct pid_namespace *pid) > case Opt_hidepid: > if (match_int(&args[0], &option)) > return 0; > - if (option < 0 || option > 2) { > + if (option < HIDEPID_OFF || > + option > HIDEPID_INVISIBLE) { > pr_err("proc: hidepid value must be between 0 and 2.\n"); > return 0; > } > diff --git a/include/linux/pid_namespace.h b/include/linux/pid_namespace.h > index 34cce96..c2a989d 100644 > --- a/include/linux/pid_namespace.h > +++ b/include/linux/pid_namespace.h > @@ -21,6 +21,12 @@ struct pidmap { > > struct fs_pin; > > +enum { /* definitions for pid_namespace's hide_pid field */ > + HIDEPID_OFF = 0, > + HIDEPID_NO_ACCESS = 1, > + HIDEPID_INVISIBLE = 2, > +}; > + > struct pid_namespace { > struct kref kref; > struct pidmap pidmap[PIDMAP_ENTRIES]; > -- > 2.5.5 >
On Mon, 13 Feb 2017 14:16:30 -0800 Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> wrote: > On Mon, Jan 16, 2017 at 5:23 AM, Djalal Harouni <tixxdz@gmail.com> wrote: > > From: Lafcadio Wluiki <wluikil@gmail.com> > > > > Previously, the hidepid parameter was checked by comparing literal > > integers 0, 1, 2. Let's add a proper enum for this, to make the checking > > more expressive: > > > > 0 ___ HIDEPID_OFF > > 1 ___ HIDEPID_NO_ACCESS > > 2 ___ HIDEPID_INVISIBLE > > > > This changes the internal labelling only, the userspace-facing interface > > remains unmodified, and still works with literal integers 0, 1, 2. > > > > No functional changes. > > > > Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> > > Acked-by: Djalal Harouni <tixxdz@gmail.com> > > Signed-off-by: Lafcadio Wluiki <wluikil@gmail.com> > > Andrew, can you take this? It's a sensible cleanup to drop literals in > favor of defines. Sure. Djalal, I converted your acked-by into a signed-off-by, as described in Documentation/SubmittingPatches (soon to become Documentation/process/submitting-patches.rst).
On Wed, Feb 15, 2017 at 1:34 AM, Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> wrote: > On Mon, 13 Feb 2017 14:16:30 -0800 Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> wrote: > >> On Mon, Jan 16, 2017 at 5:23 AM, Djalal Harouni <tixxdz@gmail.com> wrote: >> > From: Lafcadio Wluiki <wluikil@gmail.com> >> > >> > Previously, the hidepid parameter was checked by comparing literal >> > integers 0, 1, 2. Let's add a proper enum for this, to make the checking >> > more expressive: >> > >> > 0 ___ HIDEPID_OFF >> > 1 ___ HIDEPID_NO_ACCESS >> > 2 ___ HIDEPID_INVISIBLE >> > >> > This changes the internal labelling only, the userspace-facing interface >> > remains unmodified, and still works with literal integers 0, 1, 2. >> > >> > No functional changes. >> > >> > Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> >> > Acked-by: Djalal Harouni <tixxdz@gmail.com> >> > Signed-off-by: Lafcadio Wluiki <wluikil@gmail.com> >> >> Andrew, can you take this? It's a sensible cleanup to drop literals in >> favor of defines. > > Sure. > > Djalal, I converted your acked-by into a signed-off-by, as described in > Documentation/SubmittingPatches (soon to become > Documentation/process/submitting-patches.rst). Thank you Andrew!
diff --git a/fs/proc/base.c b/fs/proc/base.c index 8e7e61b..cd8dd15 100644 --- a/fs/proc/base.c +++ b/fs/proc/base.c @@ -729,11 +729,11 @@ static int proc_pid_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask) task = get_proc_task(inode); if (!task) return -ESRCH; - has_perms = has_pid_permissions(pid, task, 1); + has_perms = has_pid_permissions(pid, task, HIDEPID_NO_ACCESS); put_task_struct(task); if (!has_perms) { - if (pid->hide_pid == 2) { + if (pid->hide_pid == HIDEPID_INVISIBLE) { /* * Let's make getdents(), stat(), and open() * consistent with each other. If a process @@ -1725,7 +1725,7 @@ int pid_getattr(struct vfsmount *mnt, struct dentry *dentry, struct kstat *stat) stat->gid = GLOBAL_ROOT_GID; task = pid_task(proc_pid(inode), PIDTYPE_PID); if (task) { - if (!has_pid_permissions(pid, task, 2)) { + if (!has_pid_permissions(pid, task, HIDEPID_INVISIBLE)) { rcu_read_unlock(); /* * This doesn't prevent learning whether PID exists, @@ -3179,7 +3179,7 @@ int proc_pid_readdir(struct file *file, struct dir_context *ctx) iter.tgid += 1, iter = next_tgid(ns, iter)) { char name[PROC_NUMBUF]; int len; - if (!has_pid_permissions(ns, iter.task, 2)) + if (!has_pid_permissions(ns, iter.task, HIDEPID_INVISIBLE)) continue; len = snprintf(name, sizeof(name), "%d", iter.tgid); diff --git a/fs/proc/inode.c b/fs/proc/inode.c index 842a5ff..5d9bafb 100644 --- a/fs/proc/inode.c +++ b/fs/proc/inode.c @@ -106,7 +106,7 @@ static int proc_show_options(struct seq_file *seq, struct dentry *root) if (!gid_eq(pid->pid_gid, GLOBAL_ROOT_GID)) seq_printf(seq, ",gid=%u", from_kgid_munged(&init_user_ns, pid->pid_gid)); - if (pid->hide_pid != 0) + if (pid->hide_pid != HIDEPID_OFF) seq_printf(seq, ",hidepid=%u", pid->hide_pid); return 0; diff --git a/fs/proc/root.c b/fs/proc/root.c index 1988440..b90da88 100644 --- a/fs/proc/root.c +++ b/fs/proc/root.c @@ -58,7 +58,8 @@ int proc_parse_options(char *options, struct pid_namespace *pid) case Opt_hidepid: if (match_int(&args[0], &option)) return 0; - if (option < 0 || option > 2) { + if (option < HIDEPID_OFF || + option > HIDEPID_INVISIBLE) { pr_err("proc: hidepid value must be between 0 and 2.\n"); return 0; } diff --git a/include/linux/pid_namespace.h b/include/linux/pid_namespace.h index 34cce96..c2a989d 100644 --- a/include/linux/pid_namespace.h +++ b/include/linux/pid_namespace.h @@ -21,6 +21,12 @@ struct pidmap { struct fs_pin; +enum { /* definitions for pid_namespace's hide_pid field */ + HIDEPID_OFF = 0, + HIDEPID_NO_ACCESS = 1, + HIDEPID_INVISIBLE = 2, +}; + struct pid_namespace { struct kref kref; struct pidmap pidmap[PIDMAP_ENTRIES];