| Message ID | 1491734530-25002-3-git-send-email-tixxdz@gmail.com (mailing list archive) |
|---|---|
| State | New, archived |
| Headers | show |
On 4/9/2017 3:42 AM, Djalal Harouni wrote: > This adds the ModAutoRestrict Linux Security Module. The new module > is a stackable LSM that has been tested with Yama and SELinux, all > the three modules running. > > The module applies restrictions on automatic module loading operations. > If it is selected, every request to use a kernel feature that is implemented > by modules that are not loaded will first have to satisfy the access rules > of ModAutoRestrict LSM. If the access is authorized then the module will > be automatically loaded. Furthermore, this allows system administrators > or sandbox mechanisms to prevent loading unneeded modules or abuse the > interface. > > The settings can be applied globally using a sysctl interface which > completes the core kernel interface "modules_disable" that works only > on two modes: allow or deny, ignoring that module loading can be either > an explicit operation or an implicit one via automatic loading. The > CAP_SYS_MODULE capability can be used to restrict explicit operations, > however implicit module loading is in general not subject to permission > checks which allows unprivileged to insert modules. > > Using the new ModAutoRestrict settings allow to control if implicit > operations are allowed or denied. > This behaviour was inspired from grsecurity's GRKERNSEC_MODHARDEN option. > > The feature is also available as a prctl() interface. This allows to > apply restrictions when sandboxing processes. On embedded Linux systems, > or containers where only some containers/processes should have the > right privileges to load modules, this allows to restrict those > processes from inserting modules through the autoload feature, only > privileged processes can be allowed to perform so. A more restrictive > access can be applied where the module autoload feature is completely > disabled. > In this schema the access rules are per-process and inherited by > children created by fork(2) and clone(2), and preserved across execve(2). > > Current interface: > > *) The per-process prctl() settings are: > > prctl(PR_MOD_AUTO_RESTRICT_OPTS, PR_SET_MOD_AUTO_RESTRICT, value, 0, 0) > > Where value means: > > 0 - Classic module auto-load permissions, nothing changes. > > 1 - The current process must have CAP_SYS_MODULE to be able to > auto-load modules. CAP_NET_ADMIN should allow to auto-load > modules with a 'netdev-%s' alias. > > 2 - Current process can not auto-load modules. Once set, this prctl > value can not be changed. > > The per-process value may only be increased, never decreased, thus ensuring > that once applied, processes can never relaxe their setting. > > *) The global sysctl setting can be set by writting an integer value to > '/proc/sys/kernel/modautorestrict/autoload' > > The valid values are: > > 0 - Classic module auto-load permissions, nothing changes. > > 1 - Processes must have CAP_SYS_MODULE to be able to auto-load modules. > CAP_NET_ADMIN should allow to auto-load modules with a 'netdev-%s' > alias. > > 2 - Processes can not auto-load modules. Once set, this sysctl value > can not be changed. > > *) Access rules: > First the prctl() settings are checked, if the access is not denied > then the global sysctl settings are checked. > > Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> > Cc: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com> > Cc: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> > Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> > Signed-off-by: Djalal Harouni <tixxdz@gmail.com> > --- > MAINTAINERS | 7 + > include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 5 + > include/uapi/linux/prctl.h | 5 + > security/Kconfig | 1 + > security/Makefile | 16 +- > security/modautorestrict/Kconfig | 15 ++ > security/modautorestrict/Makefile | 3 + > security/modautorestrict/modauto_lsm.c | 372 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ > security/security.c | 1 + > 9 files changed, 418 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) > create mode 100644 security/modautorestrict/Kconfig > create mode 100644 security/modautorestrict/Makefile > create mode 100644 security/modautorestrict/modauto_lsm.c > > diff --git a/MAINTAINERS b/MAINTAINERS > index c45c02b..38d17cd 100644 > --- a/MAINTAINERS > +++ b/MAINTAINERS > @@ -11326,6 +11326,13 @@ T: git git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux.git yama/tip > S: Supported > F: security/yama/ > > +MODAUTORESTRICT SECURITY MODULE > +M: Djalal Harouni <tixxdz@gmail.com> > +L: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com > +L: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org > +S: Supported > +F: security/modautorestrict/ > + > SENSABLE PHANTOM > M: Jiri Slaby <jirislaby@gmail.com> > S: Maintained > diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h > index ca19cdb..679800c 100644 > --- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h > +++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h > @@ -1950,6 +1950,11 @@ void __init loadpin_add_hooks(void); > #else > static inline void loadpin_add_hooks(void) { }; > #endif > +#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_MODAUTORESTRICT > +extern void modautorestrict_init(void); > +#else > +static inline void __init modautorestrict_init(void) { } > +#endif > > /* > * Per "struct task_struct" security blob is managed using index numbers. > diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/prctl.h b/include/uapi/linux/prctl.h > index a8d0759..e561ca3 100644 > --- a/include/uapi/linux/prctl.h > +++ b/include/uapi/linux/prctl.h > @@ -197,4 +197,9 @@ struct prctl_mm_map { > # define PR_CAP_AMBIENT_LOWER 3 > # define PR_CAP_AMBIENT_CLEAR_ALL 4 > > +/* Control ModAutoRestrict LSM options */ > +#define PR_MOD_AUTO_RESTRICT_OPTS 48 > +# define PR_SET_MOD_AUTO_RESTRICT 1 > +# define PR_GET_MOD_AUTO_RESTRICT 2 > + > #endif /* _LINUX_PRCTL_H */ > diff --git a/security/Kconfig b/security/Kconfig > index 3ff1bf9..1e181c3 100644 > --- a/security/Kconfig > +++ b/security/Kconfig > @@ -204,6 +204,7 @@ source security/tomoyo/Kconfig > source security/apparmor/Kconfig > source security/loadpin/Kconfig > source security/yama/Kconfig > +source security/modautorestrict/Kconfig > > source security/integrity/Kconfig > > diff --git a/security/Makefile b/security/Makefile > index f2d71cd..4c120f7 100644 > --- a/security/Makefile > +++ b/security/Makefile > @@ -2,13 +2,14 @@ > # Makefile for the kernel security code > # > > -obj-$(CONFIG_KEYS) += keys/ > -subdir-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX) += selinux > -subdir-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK) += smack > -subdir-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_TOMOYO) += tomoyo > -subdir-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR) += apparmor > -subdir-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_YAMA) += yama > -subdir-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_LOADPIN) += loadpin > +obj-$(CONFIG_KEYS) += keys/ > +subdir-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX) += selinux > +subdir-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK) += smack > +subdir-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_TOMOYO) += tomoyo > +subdir-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR) += apparmor > +subdir-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_YAMA) += yama > +subdir-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_LOADPIN) += loadpin > +subdir-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_MODAUTORESTRICT) += modautorestrict > > # always enable default capabilities > obj-y += commoncap.o > @@ -24,6 +25,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_TOMOYO) += tomoyo/ > obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR) += apparmor/ > obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_YAMA) += yama/ > obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_LOADPIN) += loadpin/ > +obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_MODAUTORESTRICT) += modautorestrict/ > obj-$(CONFIG_CGROUP_DEVICE) += device_cgroup.o > > # Object integrity file lists > diff --git a/security/modautorestrict/Kconfig b/security/modautorestrict/Kconfig > new file mode 100644 > index 0000000..9678106 > --- /dev/null > +++ b/security/modautorestrict/Kconfig > @@ -0,0 +1,15 @@ > +config SECURITY_MODAUTORESTRICT > + bool "Automatic Module Loading Restriction" > + depends on SECURITY > + default n > + help > + This selects ModAutoRestrict Linux Security Module which applies > + restrictions on automatic module loading operations. If this > + option is selected, a request to use a kernel feature that is > + implemented by an unloaded module will first have to satisfy the > + access rules of MODAUTORESTRICT. Furthermore, this allows system > + administrators or sandbox mechanisms to prevent loading unneeded > + modules. > + Further information can be found in Documentation/security/ModAutoRestrict.txt. > + > + If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N. > diff --git a/security/modautorestrict/Makefile b/security/modautorestrict/Makefile > new file mode 100644 > index 0000000..a0656a5 > --- /dev/null > +++ b/security/modautorestrict/Makefile > @@ -0,0 +1,3 @@ > +obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_MODAUTORESTRICT) := modautorestrict.o > + > +modautorestrict-y := modauto_lsm.o > diff --git a/security/modautorestrict/modauto_lsm.c b/security/modautorestrict/modauto_lsm.c > new file mode 100644 > index 0000000..b3a83b8e > --- /dev/null > +++ b/security/modautorestrict/modauto_lsm.c > @@ -0,0 +1,372 @@ > +/* > + * ModAutoRestrict Linux Security Module > + * > + * Author: Djalal Harouni > + * > + * Copyright (C) 2017 Djalal Harouni > + * Copyright (C) 2017 Endocode AG. > + * > + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify > + * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2, as > + * published by the Free Software Foundation. > + * > + */ > + > +#include <linux/errno.h> > +#include <linux/lsm_hooks.h> > +#include <linux/prctl.h> > +#include <linux/refcount.h> > +#include <linux/types.h> > +#include <linux/sched/mm.h> > +#include <linux/sched/task.h> > +#include <linux/sysctl.h> > + > +enum { > + MOD_AUTOLOAD_ALLOWED = 0, > + MOD_AUTOLOAD_PRIVILEGED = 1, > + MOD_AUTOLOAD_DENIED = 2, > +}; > + > +struct modautoload_task { > + bool usage; > + u8 flags; > +}; > + > +static int autoload_restrict; > + > +static int zero; > +static int max_autoload_restrict = MOD_AUTOLOAD_DENIED; > + > +/* Index number of per "struct task_struct" blob for ModAutoRestrict. */ > +u16 modautorestrict_task_security_index __ro_after_init; > + > +static inline int modautoload_task_set_flag(struct modautoload_task *modtask, > + unsigned long value) > +{ > + int ret = 0; > + > + if (value > MOD_AUTOLOAD_DENIED) > + ret = -EINVAL; > + else if (modtask->flags > value) > + ret = -EPERM; > + else if (modtask->flags < value) > + modtask->flags = value; > + > + return ret; > +} > + > +static inline struct modautoload_task *modautoload_task_security(struct task_struct *tsk) > +{ > + struct modautoload_task *modtask; > + > + modtask = task_security(tsk, modautorestrict_task_security_index); > + if (modtask->usage) > + return modtask; > + > + return NULL; > +} > + > +static inline struct modautoload_task *init_modautoload_task(struct task_struct *tsk, > + unsigned long flags) > +{ > + struct modautoload_task *modtask; > + > + modtask = task_security(tsk, modautorestrict_task_security_index); > + > + modtask->flags = (u8)flags; I don't think you want to do this cast. > + modtask->usage = true; > + > + return modtask; > +} > + > +static inline void clear_modautoload_task(struct task_struct *tsk) > +{ > + struct modautoload_task *modtask; > + > + modtask = modautoload_task_security(tsk); > + if (modtask) { > + modtask->usage = false; > + modtask->flags = MOD_AUTOLOAD_ALLOWED; > + } > +} > + > +/* > + * Return 0 if CAP_SYS_MODULE or if CAP_NET_ADMIN and the module is > + * a netdev-%s module. Otherwise -EPERM is returned. > + */ > +static int modautoload_privileged_access(const char *name) > +{ > + int ret = -EPERM; > + > + if (capable(CAP_SYS_MODULE)) > + ret = 0; > + else if (name && strstr(name, "netdev-") && capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN)) > + ret = 0; > + > + return ret; > +} > + > +static int modautoload_sysctl_perm(unsigned long op, const char *name) > +{ > + int ret = -EINVAL; > + struct mm_struct *mm = NULL; > + > + if (op != PR_GET_MOD_AUTO_RESTRICT) > + return ret; > + > + switch (autoload_restrict) { > + case MOD_AUTOLOAD_ALLOWED: > + ret = 0; > + break; > + case MOD_AUTOLOAD_PRIVILEGED: > + /* > + * Are we allowed to sleep here ? > + * Also improve this check here > + */ > + ret = -EPERM; > + mm = get_task_mm(current); > + if (mm) { > + ret = modautoload_privileged_access(name); > + mmput(mm); > + } > + break; > + case MOD_AUTOLOAD_DENIED: > + ret = -EPERM; > + break; > + default: > + break; > + } > + > + return ret; > +} > + > +static int modautoload_task_perm(struct modautoload_task *mtask, > + char *kmod_name) > +{ > + int ret = -EINVAL; > + > + switch (mtask->flags) { > + case MOD_AUTOLOAD_ALLOWED: > + ret = 0; > + break; > + case MOD_AUTOLOAD_PRIVILEGED: > + ret = modautoload_privileged_access(kmod_name); > + break; > + case MOD_AUTOLOAD_DENIED: > + ret = -EPERM; > + break; > + default: > + break; > + } > + > + return ret; > +} > + > +/* Set the given option in a modautorestrict task */ > +static int modautoload_set_op_value(struct task_struct *tsk, > + unsigned long value) > +{ > + int ret = -EINVAL; > + struct modautoload_task *modtask; > + > + if (value > MOD_AUTOLOAD_DENIED) > + return ret; > + > + modtask = modautoload_task_security(tsk); > + if (!modtask) { > + modtask = init_modautoload_task(tsk, value); > + return 0; > + } > + > + return modautoload_task_set_flag(modtask, value); > +} > + > +static int modautoload_get_op_value(struct task_struct *tsk) > +{ > + struct modautoload_task *modtask; > + > + modtask = modautoload_task_security(tsk); > + if (!modtask) > + return -EINVAL; > + > + return modtask->flags; > +} > + > +/* Copy modautorestrict context from parent to child */ > +int modautoload_task_alloc(struct task_struct *tsk, unsigned long clone_flags) > +{ > + struct modautoload_task *modparent; > + > + modparent = modautoload_task_security(current); > + > + /* Parent has a modautorestrict context */ > + if (modparent) > + init_modautoload_task(tsk, modparent->flags); > + > + return 0; > +} > + > +/* > + * Return 0 on success, -error on error. -ENOSYS is returned when modautorestrict > + * does not handle the given option, or -EINVAL if the passed arguments are not > + * valid. > + */ > +int modautoload_task_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3, > + unsigned long arg4, unsigned long arg5) > +{ > + int ret = -EINVAL; > + struct task_struct *myself = current; > + > + if (option != PR_MOD_AUTO_RESTRICT_OPTS) > + return -ENOSYS; > + > + get_task_struct(myself); > + > + switch (arg2) { > + case PR_SET_MOD_AUTO_RESTRICT: > + if (arg4 || arg5) > + goto out; > + > + ret = modautoload_set_op_value(myself, arg3); > + break; > + case PR_GET_MOD_AUTO_RESTRICT: > + if (arg3 || arg4 || arg5) > + goto out; > + > + ret = modautoload_get_op_value(myself); > + break; > + default: > + break; > + } > + > +out: > + put_task_struct(myself); > + return ret; > +} > + > +void modautoload_task_free(struct task_struct *tsk) > +{ > + clear_modautoload_task(tsk); > +} > + > +/* > + * TODO: > + * if this is covered entirely by CAP_SYS_MODULE then we should removed it. > + */ > +static int modautoload_kernel_module_file(struct file *file) > +{ > + int ret = 0; > + struct modautoload_task *modtask; > + struct task_struct *myself = current; > + > + /* First check if the task allows that */ > + modtask = modautoload_task_security(myself); > + if (modtask) { > + ret = modautoload_task_perm(modtask, NULL); > + if (ret < 0) > + return ret; > + } > + > + return modautoload_sysctl_perm(PR_GET_MOD_AUTO_RESTRICT, NULL); > +} > + > +static int modautoload_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name) > +{ > + int ret = 0; > + struct modautoload_task *modtask; > + struct task_struct *myself = current; > + > + /* First check if the task allows that */ > + modtask = modautoload_task_security(myself); > + if (modtask) { > + ret = modautoload_task_perm(modtask, kmod_name); > + if (ret < 0) > + return ret; > + } > + > + return modautoload_sysctl_perm(PR_GET_MOD_AUTO_RESTRICT, kmod_name); > +} > + > +/* > + * TODO: > + * if this is covered entirely by CAP_SYS_MODULE then we should removed it. > + */ > +static int modautoload_kernel_read_file(struct file *file, > + enum kernel_read_file_id id) > +{ > + int ret = 0; > + > + switch (id) { > + case READING_MODULE: > + ret = modautoload_kernel_module_file(file); > + break; > + default: > + break; > + } > + > + return ret; > +} > + > +static struct security_hook_list modautoload_hooks[] = { > + LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_module_request, modautoload_kernel_module_request), > + LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_read_file, modautoload_kernel_read_file), > + LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_alloc, modautoload_task_alloc), > + LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_prctl, modautoload_task_prctl), > + LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_free, modautoload_task_free), > +}; > + > +#ifdef CONFIG_SYSCTL > +static int modautoload_dointvec_minmax(struct ctl_table *table, int write, > + void __user *buffer, size_t *lenp, > + loff_t *ppos) > +{ > + struct ctl_table table_copy; > + > + if (write && !capable(CAP_SYS_MODULE)) > + return -EPERM; > + > + table_copy = *table; > + if (*(int *)table_copy.data == *(int *)table_copy.extra2) While it's probably doing what you want, I find this sort of casting disturbing. > + table_copy.extra1 = table_copy.extra2; > + > + return proc_dointvec_minmax(&table_copy, write, buffer, lenp, ppos); > +} > + > +struct ctl_path modautoload_sysctl_path[] = { > + { .procname = "kernel", }, > + { .procname = "modautorestrict", }, > + { } > +}; > + > +static struct ctl_table modautoload_sysctl_table[] = { > + { > + .procname = "autoload", > + .data = &autoload_restrict, > + .maxlen = sizeof(int), > + .mode = 0644, > + .proc_handler = modautoload_dointvec_minmax, > + .extra1 = &zero, > + .extra2 = &max_autoload_restrict, > + }, > + { } > +}; > + > +static void __init modautoload_init_sysctl(void) > +{ > + if (!register_sysctl_paths(modautoload_sysctl_path, modautoload_sysctl_table)) > + panic("modautorestrict: sysctl registration failed.\n"); > +} > +#else > +static inline void modautoload_init_sysctl(void) { } > +#endif /* CONFIG_SYSCTL */ > + > +void __init modautorestrict_init(void) > +{ > + modautorestrict_task_security_index = > + security_reserve_task_blob_index(sizeof(struct modautoload_task)); > + security_add_hooks(modautoload_hooks, > + ARRAY_SIZE(modautoload_hooks), "modautorestrict"); > + > + modautoload_init_sysctl(); > + pr_info("ModAutoRestrict LSM: Initialized\n"); > +} > diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c > index 4dc6bca..d8852fe 100644 > --- a/security/security.c > +++ b/security/security.c > @@ -70,6 +70,7 @@ int __init security_init(void) > capability_add_hooks(); > yama_add_hooks(); > loadpin_add_hooks(); > + modautorestrict_init(); This should be modautorestrict_add_hooks() if this were a "minor" module, but as it's using a blob it is a "major" module. Either way, this is not right. > > /* > * Load all the remaining security modules. -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-security-module" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
On Mon, Apr 10, 2017 at 5:42 PM, Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> wrote: > On 4/9/2017 3:42 AM, Djalal Harouni wrote: [...] >> + >> +static inline struct modautoload_task *init_modautoload_task(struct task_struct *tsk, >> + unsigned long flags) >> +{ >> + struct modautoload_task *modtask; >> + >> + modtask = task_security(tsk, modautorestrict_task_security_index); >> + >> + modtask->flags = (u8)flags; > > I don't think you want to do this cast. Will fix it. Thanks! [...] >> + >> +#ifdef CONFIG_SYSCTL >> +static int modautoload_dointvec_minmax(struct ctl_table *table, int write, >> + void __user *buffer, size_t *lenp, >> + loff_t *ppos) >> +{ >> + struct ctl_table table_copy; >> + >> + if (write && !capable(CAP_SYS_MODULE)) >> + return -EPERM; >> + >> + table_copy = *table; >> + if (*(int *)table_copy.data == *(int *)table_copy.extra2) > > While it's probably doing what you want, I find this > sort of casting disturbing. Ok will try to improve it. >> + table_copy.extra1 = table_copy.extra2; >> + >> + return proc_dointvec_minmax(&table_copy, write, buffer, lenp, ppos); >> +} >> + >> +struct ctl_path modautoload_sysctl_path[] = { >> + { .procname = "kernel", }, >> + { .procname = "modautorestrict", }, >> + { } >> +}; >> + >> +static struct ctl_table modautoload_sysctl_table[] = { >> + { >> + .procname = "autoload", >> + .data = &autoload_restrict, >> + .maxlen = sizeof(int), >> + .mode = 0644, >> + .proc_handler = modautoload_dointvec_minmax, >> + .extra1 = &zero, >> + .extra2 = &max_autoload_restrict, >> + }, >> + { } >> +}; >> + >> +static void __init modautoload_init_sysctl(void) >> +{ >> + if (!register_sysctl_paths(modautoload_sysctl_path, modautoload_sysctl_table)) >> + panic("modautorestrict: sysctl registration failed.\n"); >> +} >> +#else >> +static inline void modautoload_init_sysctl(void) { } >> +#endif /* CONFIG_SYSCTL */ >> + >> +void __init modautorestrict_init(void) >> +{ >> + modautorestrict_task_security_index = >> + security_reserve_task_blob_index(sizeof(struct modautoload_task)); >> + security_add_hooks(modautoload_hooks, >> + ARRAY_SIZE(modautoload_hooks), "modautorestrict"); >> + >> + modautoload_init_sysctl(); >> + pr_info("ModAutoRestrict LSM: Initialized\n"); >> +} >> diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c >> index 4dc6bca..d8852fe 100644 >> --- a/security/security.c >> +++ b/security/security.c >> @@ -70,6 +70,7 @@ int __init security_init(void) >> capability_add_hooks(); >> yama_add_hooks(); >> loadpin_add_hooks(); >> + modautorestrict_init(); > > This should be modautorestrict_add_hooks() if this were > a "minor" module, but as it's using a blob it is a "major" > module. Either way, this is not right. Do you mean that if I'm using a blob, it should go with the rest LSMs in do_security_initcalls() ? >> >> /* >> * Load all the remaining security modules. > Thanks for the comments!
On 4/10/2017 11:27 AM, Djalal Harouni wrote: > On Mon, Apr 10, 2017 at 5:42 PM, Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> wrote: >> On 4/9/2017 3:42 AM, Djalal Harouni wrote: > [...] >>> + >>> +static inline struct modautoload_task *init_modautoload_task(struct task_struct *tsk, >>> + unsigned long flags) >>> +{ >>> + struct modautoload_task *modtask; >>> + >>> + modtask = task_security(tsk, modautorestrict_task_security_index); >>> + >>> + modtask->flags = (u8)flags; >> I don't think you want to do this cast. > Will fix it. Thanks! > > > [...] >>> + >>> +#ifdef CONFIG_SYSCTL >>> +static int modautoload_dointvec_minmax(struct ctl_table *table, int write, >>> + void __user *buffer, size_t *lenp, >>> + loff_t *ppos) >>> +{ >>> + struct ctl_table table_copy; >>> + >>> + if (write && !capable(CAP_SYS_MODULE)) >>> + return -EPERM; >>> + >>> + table_copy = *table; >>> + if (*(int *)table_copy.data == *(int *)table_copy.extra2) >> While it's probably doing what you want, I find this >> sort of casting disturbing. > Ok will try to improve it. > > >>> + table_copy.extra1 = table_copy.extra2; >>> + >>> + return proc_dointvec_minmax(&table_copy, write, buffer, lenp, ppos); >>> +} >>> + >>> +struct ctl_path modautoload_sysctl_path[] = { >>> + { .procname = "kernel", }, >>> + { .procname = "modautorestrict", }, >>> + { } >>> +}; >>> + >>> +static struct ctl_table modautoload_sysctl_table[] = { >>> + { >>> + .procname = "autoload", >>> + .data = &autoload_restrict, >>> + .maxlen = sizeof(int), >>> + .mode = 0644, >>> + .proc_handler = modautoload_dointvec_minmax, >>> + .extra1 = &zero, >>> + .extra2 = &max_autoload_restrict, >>> + }, >>> + { } >>> +}; >>> + >>> +static void __init modautoload_init_sysctl(void) >>> +{ >>> + if (!register_sysctl_paths(modautoload_sysctl_path, modautoload_sysctl_table)) >>> + panic("modautorestrict: sysctl registration failed.\n"); >>> +} >>> +#else >>> +static inline void modautoload_init_sysctl(void) { } >>> +#endif /* CONFIG_SYSCTL */ >>> + >>> +void __init modautorestrict_init(void) >>> +{ >>> + modautorestrict_task_security_index = >>> + security_reserve_task_blob_index(sizeof(struct modautoload_task)); >>> + security_add_hooks(modautoload_hooks, >>> + ARRAY_SIZE(modautoload_hooks), "modautorestrict"); >>> + >>> + modautoload_init_sysctl(); >>> + pr_info("ModAutoRestrict LSM: Initialized\n"); >>> +} >>> diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c >>> index 4dc6bca..d8852fe 100644 >>> --- a/security/security.c >>> +++ b/security/security.c >>> @@ -70,6 +70,7 @@ int __init security_init(void) >>> capability_add_hooks(); >>> yama_add_hooks(); >>> loadpin_add_hooks(); >>> + modautorestrict_init(); >> This should be modautorestrict_add_hooks() if this were >> a "minor" module, but as it's using a blob it is a "major" >> module. Either way, this is not right. > Do you mean that if I'm using a blob, it should go with the rest LSMs > in do_security_initcalls() ? Right. Today you have coincidental non-interference because no one else is using the task blob. As you're aware, TOMOYO is going to start using it, and I believe the AppArmor has plans for it as well. There are parts of the Smack cred blob that should probably go in the task blob as they aren't used in access decisions. I haven't looked closely enough, but that's possible for SELinux, too. So even though it's a new blob, the major/minor rules apply. > >>> /* >>> * Load all the remaining security modules. > Thanks for the comments! > > -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-security-module" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
On Mon, Apr 10, 2017 at 9:04 PM, Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> wrote: > On 4/10/2017 11:27 AM, Djalal Harouni wrote: >> On Mon, Apr 10, 2017 at 5:42 PM, Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> wrote: >>> On 4/9/2017 3:42 AM, Djalal Harouni wrote: [...] >>>> --- a/security/security.c >>>> +++ b/security/security.c >>>> @@ -70,6 +70,7 @@ int __init security_init(void) >>>> capability_add_hooks(); >>>> yama_add_hooks(); >>>> loadpin_add_hooks(); >>>> + modautorestrict_init(); >>> This should be modautorestrict_add_hooks() if this were >>> a "minor" module, but as it's using a blob it is a "major" >>> module. Either way, this is not right. >> Do you mean that if I'm using a blob, it should go with the rest LSMs >> in do_security_initcalls() ? > > Right. Today you have coincidental non-interference because > no one else is using the task blob. As you're aware, TOMOYO > is going to start using it, and I believe the AppArmor has > plans for it as well. There are parts of the Smack cred blob > that should probably go in the task blob as they aren't used > in access decisions. I haven't looked closely enough, but that's > possible for SELinux, too. So even though it's a new blob, the > major/minor rules apply. > Ok, point taken. Thanks!
diff --git a/MAINTAINERS b/MAINTAINERS index c45c02b..38d17cd 100644 --- a/MAINTAINERS +++ b/MAINTAINERS @@ -11326,6 +11326,13 @@ T: git git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux.git yama/tip S: Supported F: security/yama/ +MODAUTORESTRICT SECURITY MODULE +M: Djalal Harouni <tixxdz@gmail.com> +L: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com +L: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org +S: Supported +F: security/modautorestrict/ + SENSABLE PHANTOM M: Jiri Slaby <jirislaby@gmail.com> S: Maintained diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h index ca19cdb..679800c 100644 --- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h +++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h @@ -1950,6 +1950,11 @@ void __init loadpin_add_hooks(void); #else static inline void loadpin_add_hooks(void) { }; #endif +#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_MODAUTORESTRICT +extern void modautorestrict_init(void); +#else +static inline void __init modautorestrict_init(void) { } +#endif /* * Per "struct task_struct" security blob is managed using index numbers. diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/prctl.h b/include/uapi/linux/prctl.h index a8d0759..e561ca3 100644 --- a/include/uapi/linux/prctl.h +++ b/include/uapi/linux/prctl.h @@ -197,4 +197,9 @@ struct prctl_mm_map { # define PR_CAP_AMBIENT_LOWER 3 # define PR_CAP_AMBIENT_CLEAR_ALL 4 +/* Control ModAutoRestrict LSM options */ +#define PR_MOD_AUTO_RESTRICT_OPTS 48 +# define PR_SET_MOD_AUTO_RESTRICT 1 +# define PR_GET_MOD_AUTO_RESTRICT 2 + #endif /* _LINUX_PRCTL_H */ diff --git a/security/Kconfig b/security/Kconfig index 3ff1bf9..1e181c3 100644 --- a/security/Kconfig +++ b/security/Kconfig @@ -204,6 +204,7 @@ source security/tomoyo/Kconfig source security/apparmor/Kconfig source security/loadpin/Kconfig source security/yama/Kconfig +source security/modautorestrict/Kconfig source security/integrity/Kconfig diff --git a/security/Makefile b/security/Makefile index f2d71cd..4c120f7 100644 --- a/security/Makefile +++ b/security/Makefile @@ -2,13 +2,14 @@ # Makefile for the kernel security code # -obj-$(CONFIG_KEYS) += keys/ -subdir-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX) += selinux -subdir-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK) += smack -subdir-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_TOMOYO) += tomoyo -subdir-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR) += apparmor -subdir-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_YAMA) += yama -subdir-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_LOADPIN) += loadpin +obj-$(CONFIG_KEYS) += keys/ +subdir-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX) += selinux +subdir-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK) += smack +subdir-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_TOMOYO) += tomoyo +subdir-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR) += apparmor +subdir-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_YAMA) += yama +subdir-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_LOADPIN) += loadpin +subdir-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_MODAUTORESTRICT) += modautorestrict # always enable default capabilities obj-y += commoncap.o @@ -24,6 +25,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_TOMOYO) += tomoyo/ obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR) += apparmor/ obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_YAMA) += yama/ obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_LOADPIN) += loadpin/ +obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_MODAUTORESTRICT) += modautorestrict/ obj-$(CONFIG_CGROUP_DEVICE) += device_cgroup.o # Object integrity file lists diff --git a/security/modautorestrict/Kconfig b/security/modautorestrict/Kconfig new file mode 100644 index 0000000..9678106 --- /dev/null +++ b/security/modautorestrict/Kconfig @@ -0,0 +1,15 @@ +config SECURITY_MODAUTORESTRICT + bool "Automatic Module Loading Restriction" + depends on SECURITY + default n + help + This selects ModAutoRestrict Linux Security Module which applies + restrictions on automatic module loading operations. If this + option is selected, a request to use a kernel feature that is + implemented by an unloaded module will first have to satisfy the + access rules of MODAUTORESTRICT. Furthermore, this allows system + administrators or sandbox mechanisms to prevent loading unneeded + modules. + Further information can be found in Documentation/security/ModAutoRestrict.txt. + + If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N. diff --git a/security/modautorestrict/Makefile b/security/modautorestrict/Makefile new file mode 100644 index 0000000..a0656a5 --- /dev/null +++ b/security/modautorestrict/Makefile @@ -0,0 +1,3 @@ +obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_MODAUTORESTRICT) := modautorestrict.o + +modautorestrict-y := modauto_lsm.o diff --git a/security/modautorestrict/modauto_lsm.c b/security/modautorestrict/modauto_lsm.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..b3a83b8e --- /dev/null +++ b/security/modautorestrict/modauto_lsm.c @@ -0,0 +1,372 @@ +/* + * ModAutoRestrict Linux Security Module + * + * Author: Djalal Harouni + * + * Copyright (C) 2017 Djalal Harouni + * Copyright (C) 2017 Endocode AG. + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify + * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2, as + * published by the Free Software Foundation. + * + */ + +#include <linux/errno.h> +#include <linux/lsm_hooks.h> +#include <linux/prctl.h> +#include <linux/refcount.h> +#include <linux/types.h> +#include <linux/sched/mm.h> +#include <linux/sched/task.h> +#include <linux/sysctl.h> + +enum { + MOD_AUTOLOAD_ALLOWED = 0, + MOD_AUTOLOAD_PRIVILEGED = 1, + MOD_AUTOLOAD_DENIED = 2, +}; + +struct modautoload_task { + bool usage; + u8 flags; +}; + +static int autoload_restrict; + +static int zero; +static int max_autoload_restrict = MOD_AUTOLOAD_DENIED; + +/* Index number of per "struct task_struct" blob for ModAutoRestrict. */ +u16 modautorestrict_task_security_index __ro_after_init; + +static inline int modautoload_task_set_flag(struct modautoload_task *modtask, + unsigned long value) +{ + int ret = 0; + + if (value > MOD_AUTOLOAD_DENIED) + ret = -EINVAL; + else if (modtask->flags > value) + ret = -EPERM; + else if (modtask->flags < value) + modtask->flags = value; + + return ret; +} + +static inline struct modautoload_task *modautoload_task_security(struct task_struct *tsk) +{ + struct modautoload_task *modtask; + + modtask = task_security(tsk, modautorestrict_task_security_index); + if (modtask->usage) + return modtask; + + return NULL; +} + +static inline struct modautoload_task *init_modautoload_task(struct task_struct *tsk, + unsigned long flags) +{ + struct modautoload_task *modtask; + + modtask = task_security(tsk, modautorestrict_task_security_index); + + modtask->flags = (u8)flags; + modtask->usage = true; + + return modtask; +} + +static inline void clear_modautoload_task(struct task_struct *tsk) +{ + struct modautoload_task *modtask; + + modtask = modautoload_task_security(tsk); + if (modtask) { + modtask->usage = false; + modtask->flags = MOD_AUTOLOAD_ALLOWED; + } +} + +/* + * Return 0 if CAP_SYS_MODULE or if CAP_NET_ADMIN and the module is + * a netdev-%s module. Otherwise -EPERM is returned. + */ +static int modautoload_privileged_access(const char *name) +{ + int ret = -EPERM; + + if (capable(CAP_SYS_MODULE)) + ret = 0; + else if (name && strstr(name, "netdev-") && capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN)) + ret = 0; + + return ret; +} + +static int modautoload_sysctl_perm(unsigned long op, const char *name) +{ + int ret = -EINVAL; + struct mm_struct *mm = NULL; + + if (op != PR_GET_MOD_AUTO_RESTRICT) + return ret; + + switch (autoload_restrict) { + case MOD_AUTOLOAD_ALLOWED: + ret = 0; + break; + case MOD_AUTOLOAD_PRIVILEGED: + /* + * Are we allowed to sleep here ? + * Also improve this check here + */ + ret = -EPERM; + mm = get_task_mm(current); + if (mm) { + ret = modautoload_privileged_access(name); + mmput(mm); + } + break; + case MOD_AUTOLOAD_DENIED: + ret = -EPERM; + break; + default: + break; + } + + return ret; +} + +static int modautoload_task_perm(struct modautoload_task *mtask, + char *kmod_name) +{ + int ret = -EINVAL; + + switch (mtask->flags) { + case MOD_AUTOLOAD_ALLOWED: + ret = 0; + break; + case MOD_AUTOLOAD_PRIVILEGED: + ret = modautoload_privileged_access(kmod_name); + break; + case MOD_AUTOLOAD_DENIED: + ret = -EPERM; + break; + default: + break; + } + + return ret; +} + +/* Set the given option in a modautorestrict task */ +static int modautoload_set_op_value(struct task_struct *tsk, + unsigned long value) +{ + int ret = -EINVAL; + struct modautoload_task *modtask; + + if (value > MOD_AUTOLOAD_DENIED) + return ret; + + modtask = modautoload_task_security(tsk); + if (!modtask) { + modtask = init_modautoload_task(tsk, value); + return 0; + } + + return modautoload_task_set_flag(modtask, value); +} + +static int modautoload_get_op_value(struct task_struct *tsk) +{ + struct modautoload_task *modtask; + + modtask = modautoload_task_security(tsk); + if (!modtask) + return -EINVAL; + + return modtask->flags; +} + +/* Copy modautorestrict context from parent to child */ +int modautoload_task_alloc(struct task_struct *tsk, unsigned long clone_flags) +{ + struct modautoload_task *modparent; + + modparent = modautoload_task_security(current); + + /* Parent has a modautorestrict context */ + if (modparent) + init_modautoload_task(tsk, modparent->flags); + + return 0; +} + +/* + * Return 0 on success, -error on error. -ENOSYS is returned when modautorestrict + * does not handle the given option, or -EINVAL if the passed arguments are not + * valid. + */ +int modautoload_task_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3, + unsigned long arg4, unsigned long arg5) +{ + int ret = -EINVAL; + struct task_struct *myself = current; + + if (option != PR_MOD_AUTO_RESTRICT_OPTS) + return -ENOSYS; + + get_task_struct(myself); + + switch (arg2) { + case PR_SET_MOD_AUTO_RESTRICT: + if (arg4 || arg5) + goto out; + + ret = modautoload_set_op_value(myself, arg3); + break; + case PR_GET_MOD_AUTO_RESTRICT: + if (arg3 || arg4 || arg5) + goto out; + + ret = modautoload_get_op_value(myself); + break; + default: + break; + } + +out: + put_task_struct(myself); + return ret; +} + +void modautoload_task_free(struct task_struct *tsk) +{ + clear_modautoload_task(tsk); +} + +/* + * TODO: + * if this is covered entirely by CAP_SYS_MODULE then we should removed it. + */ +static int modautoload_kernel_module_file(struct file *file) +{ + int ret = 0; + struct modautoload_task *modtask; + struct task_struct *myself = current; + + /* First check if the task allows that */ + modtask = modautoload_task_security(myself); + if (modtask) { + ret = modautoload_task_perm(modtask, NULL); + if (ret < 0) + return ret; + } + + return modautoload_sysctl_perm(PR_GET_MOD_AUTO_RESTRICT, NULL); +} + +static int modautoload_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name) +{ + int ret = 0; + struct modautoload_task *modtask; + struct task_struct *myself = current; + + /* First check if the task allows that */ + modtask = modautoload_task_security(myself); + if (modtask) { + ret = modautoload_task_perm(modtask, kmod_name); + if (ret < 0) + return ret; + } + + return modautoload_sysctl_perm(PR_GET_MOD_AUTO_RESTRICT, kmod_name); +} + +/* + * TODO: + * if this is covered entirely by CAP_SYS_MODULE then we should removed it. + */ +static int modautoload_kernel_read_file(struct file *file, + enum kernel_read_file_id id) +{ + int ret = 0; + + switch (id) { + case READING_MODULE: + ret = modautoload_kernel_module_file(file); + break; + default: + break; + } + + return ret; +} + +static struct security_hook_list modautoload_hooks[] = { + LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_module_request, modautoload_kernel_module_request), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_read_file, modautoload_kernel_read_file), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_alloc, modautoload_task_alloc), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_prctl, modautoload_task_prctl), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_free, modautoload_task_free), +}; + +#ifdef CONFIG_SYSCTL +static int modautoload_dointvec_minmax(struct ctl_table *table, int write, + void __user *buffer, size_t *lenp, + loff_t *ppos) +{ + struct ctl_table table_copy; + + if (write && !capable(CAP_SYS_MODULE)) + return -EPERM; + + table_copy = *table; + if (*(int *)table_copy.data == *(int *)table_copy.extra2) + table_copy.extra1 = table_copy.extra2; + + return proc_dointvec_minmax(&table_copy, write, buffer, lenp, ppos); +} + +struct ctl_path modautoload_sysctl_path[] = { + { .procname = "kernel", }, + { .procname = "modautorestrict", }, + { } +}; + +static struct ctl_table modautoload_sysctl_table[] = { + { + .procname = "autoload", + .data = &autoload_restrict, + .maxlen = sizeof(int), + .mode = 0644, + .proc_handler = modautoload_dointvec_minmax, + .extra1 = &zero, + .extra2 = &max_autoload_restrict, + }, + { } +}; + +static void __init modautoload_init_sysctl(void) +{ + if (!register_sysctl_paths(modautoload_sysctl_path, modautoload_sysctl_table)) + panic("modautorestrict: sysctl registration failed.\n"); +} +#else +static inline void modautoload_init_sysctl(void) { } +#endif /* CONFIG_SYSCTL */ + +void __init modautorestrict_init(void) +{ + modautorestrict_task_security_index = + security_reserve_task_blob_index(sizeof(struct modautoload_task)); + security_add_hooks(modautoload_hooks, + ARRAY_SIZE(modautoload_hooks), "modautorestrict"); + + modautoload_init_sysctl(); + pr_info("ModAutoRestrict LSM: Initialized\n"); +} diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c index 4dc6bca..d8852fe 100644 --- a/security/security.c +++ b/security/security.c @@ -70,6 +70,7 @@ int __init security_init(void) capability_add_hooks(); yama_add_hooks(); loadpin_add_hooks(); + modautorestrict_init(); /* * Load all the remaining security modules.
This adds the ModAutoRestrict Linux Security Module. The new module is a stackable LSM that has been tested with Yama and SELinux, all the three modules running. The module applies restrictions on automatic module loading operations. If it is selected, every request to use a kernel feature that is implemented by modules that are not loaded will first have to satisfy the access rules of ModAutoRestrict LSM. If the access is authorized then the module will be automatically loaded. Furthermore, this allows system administrators or sandbox mechanisms to prevent loading unneeded modules or abuse the interface. The settings can be applied globally using a sysctl interface which completes the core kernel interface "modules_disable" that works only on two modes: allow or deny, ignoring that module loading can be either an explicit operation or an implicit one via automatic loading. The CAP_SYS_MODULE capability can be used to restrict explicit operations, however implicit module loading is in general not subject to permission checks which allows unprivileged to insert modules. Using the new ModAutoRestrict settings allow to control if implicit operations are allowed or denied. This behaviour was inspired from grsecurity's GRKERNSEC_MODHARDEN option. The feature is also available as a prctl() interface. This allows to apply restrictions when sandboxing processes. On embedded Linux systems, or containers where only some containers/processes should have the right privileges to load modules, this allows to restrict those processes from inserting modules through the autoload feature, only privileged processes can be allowed to perform so. A more restrictive access can be applied where the module autoload feature is completely disabled. In this schema the access rules are per-process and inherited by children created by fork(2) and clone(2), and preserved across execve(2). Current interface: *) The per-process prctl() settings are: prctl(PR_MOD_AUTO_RESTRICT_OPTS, PR_SET_MOD_AUTO_RESTRICT, value, 0, 0) Where value means: 0 - Classic module auto-load permissions, nothing changes. 1 - The current process must have CAP_SYS_MODULE to be able to auto-load modules. CAP_NET_ADMIN should allow to auto-load modules with a 'netdev-%s' alias. 2 - Current process can not auto-load modules. Once set, this prctl value can not be changed. The per-process value may only be increased, never decreased, thus ensuring that once applied, processes can never relaxe their setting. *) The global sysctl setting can be set by writting an integer value to '/proc/sys/kernel/modautorestrict/autoload' The valid values are: 0 - Classic module auto-load permissions, nothing changes. 1 - Processes must have CAP_SYS_MODULE to be able to auto-load modules. CAP_NET_ADMIN should allow to auto-load modules with a 'netdev-%s' alias. 2 - Processes can not auto-load modules. Once set, this sysctl value can not be changed. *) Access rules: First the prctl() settings are checked, if the access is not denied then the global sysctl settings are checked. Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com> Cc: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Djalal Harouni <tixxdz@gmail.com> --- MAINTAINERS | 7 + include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 5 + include/uapi/linux/prctl.h | 5 + security/Kconfig | 1 + security/Makefile | 16 +- security/modautorestrict/Kconfig | 15 ++ security/modautorestrict/Makefile | 3 + security/modautorestrict/modauto_lsm.c | 372 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ security/security.c | 1 + 9 files changed, 418 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) create mode 100644 security/modautorestrict/Kconfig create mode 100644 security/modautorestrict/Makefile create mode 100644 security/modautorestrict/modauto_lsm.c