| Message ID | 20170608034349.31876-2-matt@nmatt.com (mailing list archive) |
|---|---|
| State | New, archived |
| Headers | show |
Matt, I really didn't intend to comment on this further, but I just happened to notice: On Wed, Jun 07, 2017 at 11:43:49PM -0400, Matt Brown wrote: > +static int tpe_check(struct file *file, char *method) > +{ > + struct inode *inode; > + struct inode *file_inode; > + struct dentry *dir; > + const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); > + char *reason1 = NULL; > + char *reason2 = NULL; > + > + dir = dget_parent(file->f_path.dentry); > + inode = d_backing_inode(dir); > + file_inode = d_backing_inode(file->f_path.dentry); > + > + if (!tpe_enabled) > + return 0; You have many return statements in tpe_check(), where it is already past dget_parent() and thus must have reached: > +end: > + dput(dir); You'll probably want to move the dget_parent() and the following two lines to be below the first few checks where you may just return, and then be careful not to ever use a return statement anymore. Alexander
On 6/8/17 9:05 AM, Solar Designer wrote: > Matt, > > I really didn't intend to comment on this further, but I just happened > to notice: > > On Wed, Jun 07, 2017 at 11:43:49PM -0400, Matt Brown wrote: >> +static int tpe_check(struct file *file, char *method) >> +{ >> + struct inode *inode; >> + struct inode *file_inode; >> + struct dentry *dir; >> + const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); >> + char *reason1 = NULL; >> + char *reason2 = NULL; >> + >> + dir = dget_parent(file->f_path.dentry); >> + inode = d_backing_inode(dir); >> + file_inode = d_backing_inode(file->f_path.dentry); >> + >> + if (!tpe_enabled) >> + return 0; > > You have many return statements in tpe_check(), where it is already past > dget_parent() and thus must have reached: > crap, you're right. Will fix this in v3. >> +end: >> + dput(dir); > > You'll probably want to move the dget_parent() and the following two > lines to be below the first few checks where you may just return, and > then be careful not to ever use a return statement anymore. > > Alexander >
On Wed, Jun 7, 2017 at 8:43 PM, Matt Brown <matt@nmatt.com> wrote: > This patch was modified from Brad Spengler's Trusted Path Execution (TPE) > feature. It also adds features and config options that were found in Corey > Henderson's tpe-lkm project. > > Modifications from Brad Spengler's implementation of TPE were made to > turn it into a stackable LSM using the existing LSM hook bprm_set_creds. > Also, a new denial logging function was used to simplify printing messages > to the kernel log. Additionally, mmap and mprotect restrictions were > taken from Corey Henderson's tpe-lkm project and implemented using the > LSM hooks mmap_file and file_mprotect. > > Trusted Path Execution is not a new idea: > > http://phrack.org/issues/52/6.html#article > > | A trusted path is one that is inside a root owned directory that > | is not group or world writable. /bin, /usr/bin, /usr/local/bin, are > | (under normal circumstances) considered trusted. Any non-root > | users home directory is not trusted, nor is /tmp. > > To be clear, Trusted Path Execution is no replacement for a MAC system > like SELinux, SMACK, or AppArmor. This LSM is designed to be good enough > without requiring a userland utility to configure policies. The fact > that TPE only requires the user to turn on a few sysctl options lowers > the barrier to implementing a security framework substantially. > > Threat Models: > > 1. Attacker on system executing exploit on system vulnerability > > * If attacker uses a binary as a part of their system exploit, TPE can > frustrate their efforts > > * This protection can be more effective when an attacker does not yet > have an interactive shell on a system > > * Issues: > * Can be bypassed by interpreted languages such as python. You can run > malicious code by doing: python -c 'evil code' What's the recommendation for people interested in using TPE but having interpreters installed? > > 2. Attacker on system replaces binary used by a privileged user with a > malicious one > > * This situation arises when the administrator of a system leaves a > binary as world writable. > > * TPE is very effective against this threat model > > This Trusted Path Execution implementation introduces the following > Kconfig options and sysctls. The Kconfig text and sysctl options are > taken heavily from Brad Spengler's implementation. Some extra sysctl > options were taken from Corey Henderson's implementation. > > CONFIG_SECURITY_TPE (sysctl=kernel.tpe.enabled) > > default: n > > This option enables Trusted Path Execution. TPE blocks *untrusted* > users from executing files that meet the following conditions: > > * file is not in a root-owned directory > * file is writable by a user other than root > > NOTE: By default root is not restricted by TPE. > > CONFIG_SECURITY_TPE_GID (sysctl=kernel.tpe.gid) > > default: 0 > > This option defines a group id that, by default, is the trusted group. > If a user is not trusted then it has the checks described in > CONFIG_SECURITY_TPE applied. Otherwise, the user is trusted and the > checks are not applied. You can disable the trusted gid option by > setting it to 0. This makes all non-root users untrusted. > > CONFIG_SECURITY_TPE_STRICT (sysctl=kernel.tpe.strict) > > default: n > > This option applies another set of restrictions to all non-root users > even if they are trusted. This only allows execution under the > following conditions: > > * file is in a directory owned by the user that is not group or > world-writable > * file is in a directory owned by root and writable only by root > > CONFIG_SECURITY_TPE_RESTRICT_ROOT (sysctl=kernel.tpe.restrict_root) > > default: n > > This option applies all enabled TPE restrictions to root. > > CONFIG_SECURITY_TPE_INVERT_GID (sysctl=kernel.tpe.invert_gid) > > default: n > > This option reverses the trust logic of the gid option and makes > kernel.tpe.gid into the untrusted group. This means that all other groups > become trusted. This sysctl is helpful when you want TPE restrictions > to be limited to a small subset of users. > > Signed-off-by: Matt Brown <matt@nmatt.com> > --- > Documentation/security/tpe.txt | 59 +++++++++++ > MAINTAINERS | 5 + > include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 5 + > security/Kconfig | 1 + > security/Makefile | 2 + > security/security.c | 1 + > security/tpe/Kconfig | 64 ++++++++++++ > security/tpe/Makefile | 3 + > security/tpe/tpe_lsm.c | 218 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ > 9 files changed, 358 insertions(+) > create mode 100644 Documentation/security/tpe.txt > create mode 100644 security/tpe/Kconfig > create mode 100644 security/tpe/Makefile > create mode 100644 security/tpe/tpe_lsm.c > > diff --git a/Documentation/security/tpe.txt b/Documentation/security/tpe.txt > new file mode 100644 > index 0000000..226afcc > --- /dev/null > +++ b/Documentation/security/tpe.txt > @@ -0,0 +1,59 @@ > [...] Yes, docs! I love it. :) One suggestion, though, all of the per-LSM docs were moved in -next from .txt to .rst files, and had index entries added, etc: https://patchwork.kernel.org/patch/9725165/ Namely, move to Documentation/admin-guide/LSM/, add an entry to index.rst and format it using ReST: https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/doc-guide/sphinx.html#writing-documentation > diff --git a/security/tpe/Kconfig b/security/tpe/Kconfig > new file mode 100644 > index 0000000..a1b8f17 > --- /dev/null > +++ b/security/tpe/Kconfig > @@ -0,0 +1,64 @@ > +config SECURITY_TPE > + bool "Trusted Path Execution (TPE)" > + default n > + help > + If you say Y here, you will be able to choose a gid to add to the > + supplementary groups of users you want to mark as "trusted." > + Untrusted users will not be able to execute any files that are not in > + root-owned directories writable only by root. If the sysctl option > + is enabled, a sysctl option with name "tpe.enabled" is created. > + > +config SECURITY_TPE_GID > + int > + default SECURITY_TPE_TRUSTED_GID if (SECURITY_TPE && !SECURITY_TPE_INVERT_GID) > + default SECURITY_TPE_UNTRUSTED_GID if (SECURITY_TPE && SECURITY_TPE_INVERT_GID) I think this should have "depends on SECURITY_TPE" (like all the others). > [...] > diff --git a/security/tpe/tpe_lsm.c b/security/tpe/tpe_lsm.c > new file mode 100644 > index 0000000..fda811a > --- /dev/null > +++ b/security/tpe/tpe_lsm.c > @@ -0,0 +1,218 @@ > +/* > + * Trusted Path Execution Security Module > + * > + * Copyright (C) 2017 Matt Brown > + * Copyright (C) 2001-2014 Bradley Spengler, Open Source Security, Inc. > + * http://www.grsecurity.net spender@grsecurity.net > + * Copyright (C) 2011 Corey Henderson > + * > + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or > + * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 > + * as published by the Free Software Foundation. > + * > + * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, > + * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of > + * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the > + * GNU General Public License for more details. > + * > + */ > +#include <linux/kernel.h> > +#include <linux/uidgid.h> > +#include <linux/ratelimit.h> > +#include <linux/limits.h> > +#include <linux/cred.h> > +#include <linux/slab.h> > +#include <linux/lsm_hooks.h> > +#include <linux/sysctl.h> > +#include <linux/binfmts.h> > +#include <linux/string_helpers.h> > +#include <linux/dcache.h> > +#include <uapi/asm-generic/mman-common.h> > + > +#define global_root(x) uid_eq((x), GLOBAL_ROOT_UID) > +#define global_nonroot(x) (!uid_eq((x), GLOBAL_ROOT_UID)) > +#define global_root_gid(x) (gid_eq((x), GLOBAL_ROOT_GID)) > +#define global_nonroot_gid(x) (!gid_eq((x), GLOBAL_ROOT_GID)) > + > +static int tpe_enabled __read_mostly = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_TPE); > +static kgid_t tpe_gid __read_mostly = KGIDT_INIT(CONFIG_SECURITY_TPE_GID); > +static int tpe_invert_gid __read_mostly = > + IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_TPE_INVERT_GID); > +static int tpe_strict __read_mostly = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_TPE_STRICT); > +static int tpe_restrict_root __read_mostly = > + IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_TPE_RESTRICT_ROOT); > + > +int print_tpe_error(struct file *file, char *reason1, char *reason2, > + char *method) I think these char * can all be const char *. > +{ > + char *filepath; > + > + filepath = kstrdup_quotable_file(file, GFP_KERNEL); > + > + if (!filepath) > + return -ENOMEM; > + > + pr_warn_ratelimited("TPE: Denied %s of %s Reason: %s%s%s\n", method, > + (IS_ERR(filepath) ? "failed fetching file path" : filepath), > + reason1, reason2 ? " and " : "", reason2 ?: ""); > + kfree(filepath); > + return -EPERM; > +} > + > +static int tpe_check(struct file *file, char *method) This char * can be const char *. > +{ > + struct inode *inode; > + struct inode *file_inode; > + struct dentry *dir; > + const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); > + char *reason1 = NULL; > + char *reason2 = NULL; Perhaps check file argument for NULL here instead of each caller? > + > + dir = dget_parent(file->f_path.dentry); > + inode = d_backing_inode(dir); > + file_inode = d_backing_inode(file->f_path.dentry); > + > + if (!tpe_enabled) > + return 0; > + > + /* never restrict root unless restrict_root sysctl is 1*/ > + if (global_root(cred->uid) && !tpe_restrict_root) > + return 0; > + > + if (!tpe_strict) > + goto general_tpe_check; This kind of use of goto tells me the code sections need to be separate functions. i.e. tpe_check_strict() for the bit below before general_tpe_check: > + > + /* TPE_STRICT: restrictions enforced even if the gid is trusted */ > + if (global_nonroot(inode->i_uid) && !uid_eq(inode->i_uid, cred->uid)) > + reason1 = "directory not owned by user"; > + else if (inode->i_mode & 0002) > + reason1 = "file in world-writable directory"; > + else if ((inode->i_mode & 0020) && global_nonroot_gid(inode->i_gid)) > + reason1 = "file in group-writable directory"; > + else if (file_inode->i_mode & 0002) > + reason1 = "file is world-writable"; > + > + if (reason1) > + goto end; struct tpe_rationale { const char *reason1; const char *reason2; }; bool tpe_check_strict(...) { if (!tpe_strict); return false; ... return rationale->reason1 != NULL; } static int tpe_check(...) { ... struct tpe_rationale rationale= { }; if (tpe_check_strict(inode, cred, &rationale)) goto end; ... > +general_tpe_check: > + /* determine if group is trusted */ > + if (global_root_gid(tpe_gid)) > + goto next_check; > + if (!tpe_invert_gid && !in_group_p(tpe_gid)) > + reason2 = "not in trusted group"; > + else if (tpe_invert_gid && in_group_p(tpe_gid)) > + reason2 = "in untrusted group"; > + else > + return 0; (This return 0 currently leaks the dget that is put at the end label. Ah, yes, already pointed out I see now in later reply in thread.) if (tpe_check_general(inode, cred, &rationale)) goto end; bool tpe_check_general(...) { if (!global_root_gid(tpe_gid)) { rationale->reason1 = NULL; return true; } ... } > + > +next_check: > + /* main TPE checks */ > + if (global_nonroot(inode->i_uid)) > + reason1 = "file in non-root-owned directory"; > + else if (inode->i_mode & 0002) > + reason1 = "file in world-writable directory"; > + else if ((inode->i_mode & 0020) && global_nonroot_gid(inode->i_gid)) > + reason1 = "file in group-writable directory"; > + else if (file_inode->i_mode & 0002) > + reason1 = "file is world-writable"; tpe_check_main(inode, cred, &rationale); > + > +end: > + dput(dir); > + if (reason1) > + return print_tpe_error(file, reason1, reason2, method); > + else > + return 0; And the end part above stays. > +} > + > +int tpe_mmap_file(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot, > + unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags) > +{ > + if (!file || !(prot & PROT_EXEC)) > + return 0; > + > + return tpe_check(file, "mmap"); > +} > + > +int tpe_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long reqprot, > + unsigned long prot) > +{ > + if (!vma->vm_file) No examination of reqprot vs prot here? > + return 0; > + return tpe_check(vma->vm_file, "mprotect"); > +} > + > +static int tpe_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm) > +{ > + if (!bprm->file) > + return 0; > + return tpe_check(bprm->file, "exec"); > + > +} > + > +static struct security_hook_list tpe_hooks[] = { > + LSM_HOOK_INIT(mmap_file, tpe_mmap_file), > + LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_mprotect, tpe_file_mprotect), > + LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_set_creds, tpe_bprm_set_creds), > +}; > + > +#ifdef CONFIG_SYSCTL > +struct ctl_path tpe_sysctl_path[] = { > + { .procname = "kernel", }, > + { .procname = "tpe", }, > + { } > +}; > + > +static struct ctl_table tpe_sysctl_table[] = { > + { > + .procname = "enabled", > + .data = &tpe_enabled, > + .maxlen = sizeof(int), > + .mode = 0600, > + .proc_handler = proc_dointvec, > + }, > + { > + .procname = "gid", > + .data = &tpe_gid, > + .maxlen = sizeof(int), > + .mode = 0600, > + .proc_handler = proc_dointvec, > + }, > + { > + .procname = "invert_gid", > + .data = &tpe_invert_gid, > + .maxlen = sizeof(int), > + .mode = 0600, > + .proc_handler = proc_dointvec, > + }, > + { > + .procname = "strict", > + .data = &tpe_strict, > + .maxlen = sizeof(int), > + .mode = 0600, > + .proc_handler = proc_dointvec, > + }, > + { > + .procname = "restrict_root", > + .data = &tpe_restrict_root, > + .maxlen = sizeof(int), > + .mode = 0600, > + .proc_handler = proc_dointvec, > + }, > + { } > +}; > +static void __init tpe_init_sysctl(void) > +{ > + if (!register_sysctl_paths(tpe_sysctl_path, tpe_sysctl_table)) > + panic("TPE: sysctl registration failed.\n"); > +} > +#else > +static inline void tpe_init_sysctl(void) { } > +#endif /* CONFIG_SYSCTL */ > + > +void __init tpe_add_hooks(void) > +{ > + pr_info("TPE: securing systems like it's 1998\n"); :) > + security_add_hooks(tpe_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(tpe_hooks), "tpe"); > + tpe_init_sysctl(); > +} > -- > 2.10.2 > -Kees
On 06/08/2017 10:38 PM, Kees Cook wrote: > On Wed, Jun 7, 2017 at 8:43 PM, Matt Brown <matt@nmatt.com> wrote: >> This patch was modified from Brad Spengler's Trusted Path Execution (TPE) >> feature. It also adds features and config options that were found in Corey >> Henderson's tpe-lkm project. >> >> Modifications from Brad Spengler's implementation of TPE were made to >> turn it into a stackable LSM using the existing LSM hook bprm_set_creds. >> Also, a new denial logging function was used to simplify printing messages >> to the kernel log. Additionally, mmap and mprotect restrictions were >> taken from Corey Henderson's tpe-lkm project and implemented using the >> LSM hooks mmap_file and file_mprotect. >> >> Trusted Path Execution is not a new idea: >> >> http://phrack.org/issues/52/6.html#article >> >> | A trusted path is one that is inside a root owned directory that >> | is not group or world writable. /bin, /usr/bin, /usr/local/bin, are >> | (under normal circumstances) considered trusted. Any non-root >> | users home directory is not trusted, nor is /tmp. >> >> To be clear, Trusted Path Execution is no replacement for a MAC system >> like SELinux, SMACK, or AppArmor. This LSM is designed to be good enough >> without requiring a userland utility to configure policies. The fact >> that TPE only requires the user to turn on a few sysctl options lowers >> the barrier to implementing a security framework substantially. >> >> Threat Models: >> >> 1. Attacker on system executing exploit on system vulnerability >> >> * If attacker uses a binary as a part of their system exploit, TPE can >> frustrate their efforts >> >> * This protection can be more effective when an attacker does not yet >> have an interactive shell on a system >> >> * Issues: >> * Can be bypassed by interpreted languages such as python. You can run >> malicious code by doing: python -c 'evil code' > > What's the recommendation for people interested in using TPE but > having interpreters installed? > If you don't need a given interpreter installed, uninstall it. While this is common sense system hardening it especially would make a difference under the TPE threat model. I don't have a knock down answer for this. Interpreters are a hard problem for TPE. >> >> 2. Attacker on system replaces binary used by a privileged user with a >> malicious one >> >> * This situation arises when the administrator of a system leaves a >> binary as world writable. >> >> * TPE is very effective against this threat model >> >> This Trusted Path Execution implementation introduces the following >> Kconfig options and sysctls. The Kconfig text and sysctl options are >> taken heavily from Brad Spengler's implementation. Some extra sysctl >> options were taken from Corey Henderson's implementation. >> >> CONFIG_SECURITY_TPE (sysctl=kernel.tpe.enabled) >> >> default: n >> >> This option enables Trusted Path Execution. TPE blocks *untrusted* >> users from executing files that meet the following conditions: >> >> * file is not in a root-owned directory >> * file is writable by a user other than root >> >> NOTE: By default root is not restricted by TPE. >> >> CONFIG_SECURITY_TPE_GID (sysctl=kernel.tpe.gid) >> >> default: 0 >> >> This option defines a group id that, by default, is the trusted group. >> If a user is not trusted then it has the checks described in >> CONFIG_SECURITY_TPE applied. Otherwise, the user is trusted and the >> checks are not applied. You can disable the trusted gid option by >> setting it to 0. This makes all non-root users untrusted. >> >> CONFIG_SECURITY_TPE_STRICT (sysctl=kernel.tpe.strict) >> >> default: n >> >> This option applies another set of restrictions to all non-root users >> even if they are trusted. This only allows execution under the >> following conditions: >> >> * file is in a directory owned by the user that is not group or >> world-writable >> * file is in a directory owned by root and writable only by root >> >> CONFIG_SECURITY_TPE_RESTRICT_ROOT (sysctl=kernel.tpe.restrict_root) >> >> default: n >> >> This option applies all enabled TPE restrictions to root. >> >> CONFIG_SECURITY_TPE_INVERT_GID (sysctl=kernel.tpe.invert_gid) >> >> default: n >> >> This option reverses the trust logic of the gid option and makes >> kernel.tpe.gid into the untrusted group. This means that all other groups >> become trusted. This sysctl is helpful when you want TPE restrictions >> to be limited to a small subset of users. >> >> Signed-off-by: Matt Brown <matt@nmatt.com> >> --- >> Documentation/security/tpe.txt | 59 +++++++++++ >> MAINTAINERS | 5 + >> include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 5 + >> security/Kconfig | 1 + >> security/Makefile | 2 + >> security/security.c | 1 + >> security/tpe/Kconfig | 64 ++++++++++++ >> security/tpe/Makefile | 3 + >> security/tpe/tpe_lsm.c | 218 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ >> 9 files changed, 358 insertions(+) >> create mode 100644 Documentation/security/tpe.txt >> create mode 100644 security/tpe/Kconfig >> create mode 100644 security/tpe/Makefile >> create mode 100644 security/tpe/tpe_lsm.c >> >> diff --git a/Documentation/security/tpe.txt b/Documentation/security/tpe.txt >> new file mode 100644 >> index 0000000..226afcc >> --- /dev/null >> +++ b/Documentation/security/tpe.txt >> @@ -0,0 +1,59 @@ >> [...] > > Yes, docs! I love it. :) One suggestion, though, all of the per-LSM > docs were moved in -next from .txt to .rst files, and had index > entries added, etc: > https://patchwork.kernel.org/patch/9725165/ > > Namely, move to Documentation/admin-guide/LSM/, add an entry to > index.rst and format it using ReST: > https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/doc-guide/sphinx.html#writing-documentation > Will do :) >> diff --git a/security/tpe/Kconfig b/security/tpe/Kconfig >> new file mode 100644 >> index 0000000..a1b8f17 >> --- /dev/null >> +++ b/security/tpe/Kconfig >> @@ -0,0 +1,64 @@ >> +config SECURITY_TPE >> + bool "Trusted Path Execution (TPE)" >> + default n >> + help >> + If you say Y here, you will be able to choose a gid to add to the >> + supplementary groups of users you want to mark as "trusted." >> + Untrusted users will not be able to execute any files that are not in >> + root-owned directories writable only by root. If the sysctl option >> + is enabled, a sysctl option with name "tpe.enabled" is created. >> + >> +config SECURITY_TPE_GID >> + int >> + default SECURITY_TPE_TRUSTED_GID if (SECURITY_TPE && !SECURITY_TPE_INVERT_GID) >> + default SECURITY_TPE_UNTRUSTED_GID if (SECURITY_TPE && SECURITY_TPE_INVERT_GID) > > I think this should have "depends on SECURITY_TPE" (like all the others). > >> [...] >> diff --git a/security/tpe/tpe_lsm.c b/security/tpe/tpe_lsm.c >> new file mode 100644 >> index 0000000..fda811a >> --- /dev/null >> +++ b/security/tpe/tpe_lsm.c >> @@ -0,0 +1,218 @@ >> +/* >> + * Trusted Path Execution Security Module >> + * >> + * Copyright (C) 2017 Matt Brown >> + * Copyright (C) 2001-2014 Bradley Spengler, Open Source Security, Inc. >> + * http://www.grsecurity.net spender@grsecurity.net >> + * Copyright (C) 2011 Corey Henderson >> + * >> + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or >> + * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 >> + * as published by the Free Software Foundation. >> + * >> + * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, >> + * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of >> + * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the >> + * GNU General Public License for more details. >> + * >> + */ >> +#include <linux/kernel.h> >> +#include <linux/uidgid.h> >> +#include <linux/ratelimit.h> >> +#include <linux/limits.h> >> +#include <linux/cred.h> >> +#include <linux/slab.h> >> +#include <linux/lsm_hooks.h> >> +#include <linux/sysctl.h> >> +#include <linux/binfmts.h> >> +#include <linux/string_helpers.h> >> +#include <linux/dcache.h> >> +#include <uapi/asm-generic/mman-common.h> >> + >> +#define global_root(x) uid_eq((x), GLOBAL_ROOT_UID) >> +#define global_nonroot(x) (!uid_eq((x), GLOBAL_ROOT_UID)) >> +#define global_root_gid(x) (gid_eq((x), GLOBAL_ROOT_GID)) >> +#define global_nonroot_gid(x) (!gid_eq((x), GLOBAL_ROOT_GID)) >> + >> +static int tpe_enabled __read_mostly = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_TPE); >> +static kgid_t tpe_gid __read_mostly = KGIDT_INIT(CONFIG_SECURITY_TPE_GID); >> +static int tpe_invert_gid __read_mostly = >> + IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_TPE_INVERT_GID); >> +static int tpe_strict __read_mostly = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_TPE_STRICT); >> +static int tpe_restrict_root __read_mostly = >> + IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_TPE_RESTRICT_ROOT); >> + >> +int print_tpe_error(struct file *file, char *reason1, char *reason2, >> + char *method) > > I think these char * can all be const char *. > >> +{ >> + char *filepath; >> + >> + filepath = kstrdup_quotable_file(file, GFP_KERNEL); >> + >> + if (!filepath) >> + return -ENOMEM; >> + >> + pr_warn_ratelimited("TPE: Denied %s of %s Reason: %s%s%s\n", method, >> + (IS_ERR(filepath) ? "failed fetching file path" : filepath), >> + reason1, reason2 ? " and " : "", reason2 ?: ""); >> + kfree(filepath); >> + return -EPERM; >> +} >> + >> +static int tpe_check(struct file *file, char *method) > > This char * can be const char *. > >> +{ >> + struct inode *inode; >> + struct inode *file_inode; >> + struct dentry *dir; >> + const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); >> + char *reason1 = NULL; >> + char *reason2 = NULL; > > Perhaps check file argument for NULL here instead of each caller? > >> + >> + dir = dget_parent(file->f_path.dentry); >> + inode = d_backing_inode(dir); >> + file_inode = d_backing_inode(file->f_path.dentry); >> + >> + if (!tpe_enabled) >> + return 0; >> + >> + /* never restrict root unless restrict_root sysctl is 1*/ >> + if (global_root(cred->uid) && !tpe_restrict_root) >> + return 0; >> + >> + if (!tpe_strict) >> + goto general_tpe_check; > > This kind of use of goto tells me the code sections need to be > separate functions. i.e. tpe_check_strict() for the bit below before > general_tpe_check: > >> + >> + /* TPE_STRICT: restrictions enforced even if the gid is trusted */ >> + if (global_nonroot(inode->i_uid) && !uid_eq(inode->i_uid, cred->uid)) >> + reason1 = "directory not owned by user"; >> + else if (inode->i_mode & 0002) >> + reason1 = "file in world-writable directory"; >> + else if ((inode->i_mode & 0020) && global_nonroot_gid(inode->i_gid)) >> + reason1 = "file in group-writable directory"; >> + else if (file_inode->i_mode & 0002) >> + reason1 = "file is world-writable"; >> + >> + if (reason1) >> + goto end; > > struct tpe_rationale { > const char *reason1; > const char *reason2; > }; > > bool tpe_check_strict(...) > { > if (!tpe_strict); > return false; > ... > return rationale->reason1 != NULL; > } > > static int tpe_check(...) > { > ... > struct tpe_rationale rationale= { }; > > if (tpe_check_strict(inode, cred, &rationale)) > goto end; > ... > >> +general_tpe_check: >> + /* determine if group is trusted */ >> + if (global_root_gid(tpe_gid)) >> + goto next_check; >> + if (!tpe_invert_gid && !in_group_p(tpe_gid)) >> + reason2 = "not in trusted group"; >> + else if (tpe_invert_gid && in_group_p(tpe_gid)) >> + reason2 = "in untrusted group"; >> + else >> + return 0; > > (This return 0 currently leaks the dget that is put at the end label. > Ah, yes, already pointed out I see now in later reply in thread.) > > if (tpe_check_general(inode, cred, &rationale)) > goto end; > > bool tpe_check_general(...) > { > if (!global_root_gid(tpe_gid)) { > rationale->reason1 = NULL; > return true; > } > ... > } > >> + >> +next_check: >> + /* main TPE checks */ >> + if (global_nonroot(inode->i_uid)) >> + reason1 = "file in non-root-owned directory"; >> + else if (inode->i_mode & 0002) >> + reason1 = "file in world-writable directory"; >> + else if ((inode->i_mode & 0020) && global_nonroot_gid(inode->i_gid)) >> + reason1 = "file in group-writable directory"; >> + else if (file_inode->i_mode & 0002) >> + reason1 = "file is world-writable"; > > tpe_check_main(inode, cred, &rationale); > >> + >> +end: >> + dput(dir); >> + if (reason1) >> + return print_tpe_error(file, reason1, reason2, method); >> + else >> + return 0; > > And the end part above stays. > >> +} >> + >> +int tpe_mmap_file(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot, >> + unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags) >> +{ >> + if (!file || !(prot & PROT_EXEC)) >> + return 0; >> + >> + return tpe_check(file, "mmap"); >> +} >> + >> +int tpe_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long reqprot, >> + unsigned long prot) >> +{ >> + if (!vma->vm_file) > > No examination of reqprot vs prot here? > opps you're right. Would I just need to check (reqprot & PROT_EXEC) or do I need to check (prot & PROT_EXEC) as well? Would the kernel ever try to set PROT_EXEC if the application didn't ask for it? >> + return 0; >> + return tpe_check(vma->vm_file, "mprotect"); >> +} >> + >> +static int tpe_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm) >> +{ >> + if (!bprm->file) >> + return 0; >> + return tpe_check(bprm->file, "exec"); >> + >> +} >> + >> +static struct security_hook_list tpe_hooks[] = { >> + LSM_HOOK_INIT(mmap_file, tpe_mmap_file), >> + LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_mprotect, tpe_file_mprotect), >> + LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_set_creds, tpe_bprm_set_creds), >> +}; >> + >> +#ifdef CONFIG_SYSCTL >> +struct ctl_path tpe_sysctl_path[] = { >> + { .procname = "kernel", }, >> + { .procname = "tpe", }, >> + { } >> +}; >> + >> +static struct ctl_table tpe_sysctl_table[] = { >> + { >> + .procname = "enabled", >> + .data = &tpe_enabled, >> + .maxlen = sizeof(int), >> + .mode = 0600, >> + .proc_handler = proc_dointvec, >> + }, >> + { >> + .procname = "gid", >> + .data = &tpe_gid, >> + .maxlen = sizeof(int), >> + .mode = 0600, >> + .proc_handler = proc_dointvec, >> + }, >> + { >> + .procname = "invert_gid", >> + .data = &tpe_invert_gid, >> + .maxlen = sizeof(int), >> + .mode = 0600, >> + .proc_handler = proc_dointvec, >> + }, >> + { >> + .procname = "strict", >> + .data = &tpe_strict, >> + .maxlen = sizeof(int), >> + .mode = 0600, >> + .proc_handler = proc_dointvec, >> + }, >> + { >> + .procname = "restrict_root", >> + .data = &tpe_restrict_root, >> + .maxlen = sizeof(int), >> + .mode = 0600, >> + .proc_handler = proc_dointvec, >> + }, >> + { } >> +}; >> +static void __init tpe_init_sysctl(void) >> +{ >> + if (!register_sysctl_paths(tpe_sysctl_path, tpe_sysctl_table)) >> + panic("TPE: sysctl registration failed.\n"); >> +} >> +#else >> +static inline void tpe_init_sysctl(void) { } >> +#endif /* CONFIG_SYSCTL */ >> + >> +void __init tpe_add_hooks(void) >> +{ >> + pr_info("TPE: securing systems like it's 1998\n"); > > :) > >> + security_add_hooks(tpe_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(tpe_hooks), "tpe"); >> + tpe_init_sysctl(); >> +} >> -- >> 2.10.2 >> > > -Kees > I agree with all the suggested changes above and will have them soon in v3. Thanks for the review, Matt
On Thu, 2017-06-08 at 23:50 -0400, Matt Brown wrote: > >> > >> * Issues: > >> * Can be bypassed by interpreted languages such as python. You can run > >> malicious code by doing: python -c 'evil code' > > > > What's the recommendation for people interested in using TPE but > > having interpreters installed? > > > > If you don't need a given interpreter installed, uninstall it. While > this is common sense system hardening it especially would make a > difference under the TPE threat model. > > I don't have a knock down answer for this. Interpreters are a hard > problem for TPE. You might be interested in the minor LSM named "shebang", that I posted as a proof of concept back in January, which restricts the python interactive prompt/interpreter, but allows the scripts themselves to be executed. Mimi
On Fri, Jun 9, 2017 at 3:18 AM, Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> wrote: > On Thu, 2017-06-08 at 23:50 -0400, Matt Brown wrote: >> >> >> >> * Issues: >> >> * Can be bypassed by interpreted languages such as python. You can run >> >> malicious code by doing: python -c 'evil code' >> > >> > What's the recommendation for people interested in using TPE but >> > having interpreters installed? >> > >> >> If you don't need a given interpreter installed, uninstall it. While >> this is common sense system hardening it especially would make a >> difference under the TPE threat model. >> >> I don't have a knock down answer for this. Interpreters are a hard >> problem for TPE. > > You might be interested in the minor LSM named "shebang", that I > posted as a proof of concept back in January, which restricts the > python interactive prompt/interpreter, but allows the scripts > themselves to be executed. https://patchwork.kernel.org/patch/9547405/ Maybe these could be merged and the interpreter string could be made into a configurable list? -Kees
On 6/9/17 8:55 AM, Kees Cook wrote: > On Fri, Jun 9, 2017 at 3:18 AM, Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> wrote: >> On Thu, 2017-06-08 at 23:50 -0400, Matt Brown wrote: >>>>> >>>>> * Issues: >>>>> * Can be bypassed by interpreted languages such as python. You can run >>>>> malicious code by doing: python -c 'evil code' >>>> >>>> What's the recommendation for people interested in using TPE but >>>> having interpreters installed? >>>> >>> >>> If you don't need a given interpreter installed, uninstall it. While >>> this is common sense system hardening it especially would make a >>> difference under the TPE threat model. >>> >>> I don't have a knock down answer for this. Interpreters are a hard >>> problem for TPE. >> >> You might be interested in the minor LSM named "shebang", that I >> posted as a proof of concept back in January, which restricts the >> python interactive prompt/interpreter, but allows the scripts >> themselves to be executed. > > https://patchwork.kernel.org/patch/9547405/ > > Maybe these could be merged and the interpreter string could be made > into a configurable list? > Yes this looks promising. I'll look into integrating this. Matt
On Fri, 2017-06-09 at 05:55 -0700, Kees Cook wrote: > On Fri, Jun 9, 2017 at 3:18 AM, Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> wrote: > > On Thu, 2017-06-08 at 23:50 -0400, Matt Brown wrote: > >> >> > >> >> * Issues: > >> >> * Can be bypassed by interpreted languages such as python. You can run > >> >> malicious code by doing: python -c 'evil code' > >> > > >> > What's the recommendation for people interested in using TPE but > >> > having interpreters installed? > >> > > >> > >> If you don't need a given interpreter installed, uninstall it. While > >> this is common sense system hardening it especially would make a > >> difference under the TPE threat model. > >> > >> I don't have a knock down answer for this. Interpreters are a hard > >> problem for TPE. > > > > You might be interested in the minor LSM named "shebang", that I > > posted as a proof of concept back in January, which restricts the > > python interactive prompt/interpreter, but allows the scripts > > themselves to be executed. > > https://patchwork.kernel.org/patch/9547405/ > > Maybe these could be merged and the interpreter string could be made > into a configurable list? I updated shebang, but didn't bother to post it, as nobody seemed to be interested at the time. The updated version already has support for the configurable list. Re-posting ... Mimi
On 6/9/17 9:16 AM, Mimi Zohar wrote: > On Fri, 2017-06-09 at 05:55 -0700, Kees Cook wrote: >> On Fri, Jun 9, 2017 at 3:18 AM, Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> wrote: >>> On Thu, 2017-06-08 at 23:50 -0400, Matt Brown wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> * Issues: >>>>>> * Can be bypassed by interpreted languages such as python. You can run >>>>>> malicious code by doing: python -c 'evil code' >>>>> >>>>> What's the recommendation for people interested in using TPE but >>>>> having interpreters installed? >>>>> >>>> >>>> If you don't need a given interpreter installed, uninstall it. While >>>> this is common sense system hardening it especially would make a >>>> difference under the TPE threat model. >>>> >>>> I don't have a knock down answer for this. Interpreters are a hard >>>> problem for TPE. >>> >>> You might be interested in the minor LSM named "shebang", that I >>> posted as a proof of concept back in January, which restricts the >>> python interactive prompt/interpreter, but allows the scripts >>> themselves to be executed. >> >> https://patchwork.kernel.org/patch/9547405/ >> >> Maybe these could be merged and the interpreter string could be made >> into a configurable list? > > I updated shebang, but didn't bother to post it, as nobody seemed to > be interested at the time. The updated version already has support > for the configurable list. Re-posting ... > That would be awesome. I think it's the perfect complement to TPE as it protects a key hole in its current threat model. Matt
On Fri, 2017-06-09 at 09:18 -0400, Matt Brown wrote: > On 6/9/17 9:16 AM, Mimi Zohar wrote: > > On Fri, 2017-06-09 at 05:55 -0700, Kees Cook wrote: > >> On Fri, Jun 9, 2017 at 3:18 AM, Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> wrote: > >>> On Thu, 2017-06-08 at 23:50 -0400, Matt Brown wrote: > >>>>>> > >>>>>> * Issues: > >>>>>> * Can be bypassed by interpreted languages such as python. You can run > >>>>>> malicious code by doing: python -c 'evil code' > >>>>> > >>>>> What's the recommendation for people interested in using TPE but > >>>>> having interpreters installed? > >>>>> > >>>> > >>>> If you don't need a given interpreter installed, uninstall it. While > >>>> this is common sense system hardening it especially would make a > >>>> difference under the TPE threat model. > >>>> > >>>> I don't have a knock down answer for this. Interpreters are a hard > >>>> problem for TPE. > >>> > >>> You might be interested in the minor LSM named "shebang", that I > >>> posted as a proof of concept back in January, which restricts the > >>> python interactive prompt/interpreter, but allows the scripts > >>> themselves to be executed. > >> > >> https://patchwork.kernel.org/patch/9547405/ > >> > >> Maybe these could be merged and the interpreter string could be made > >> into a configurable list? > > > > I updated shebang, but didn't bother to post it, as nobody seemed to > > be interested at the time. The updated version already has support > > for the configurable list. Re-posting ... > > > > That would be awesome. I think it's the perfect complement to TPE as it > protects a key hole in its current threat model. Hm, I hadn't looked at it in since January. It still needs to be cleaned up and expanded a bit. The original version used a pathname for identifying the interpreter. This version converts the list of pathnames to a set of inodes, which is better, but now requires a method for updating the inode number after a software update. Please feel free to expand on it or re-use whatever you like. Mimi
Matt, I removed most CC's like before, as I don't want my voice on this to be too loud. On Thu, Jun 08, 2017 at 11:50:32PM -0400, Matt Brown wrote: > On 06/08/2017 10:38 PM, Kees Cook wrote: > >On Wed, Jun 7, 2017 at 8:43 PM, Matt Brown <matt@nmatt.com> wrote: > >>* Issues: > >> * Can be bypassed by interpreted languages such as python. You can run > >> malicious code by doing: python -c 'evil code' > > > >What's the recommendation for people interested in using TPE but > >having interpreters installed? > > If you don't need a given interpreter installed, uninstall it. While > this is common sense system hardening it especially would make a > difference under the TPE threat model. > > I don't have a knock down answer for this. Interpreters are a hard > problem for TPE. Interpreters are only a tip of the iceberg. With TPE, every program invocation becomes similar to a SUID/SGID one as it relates to TPE's newly introduced security barrier. However, the dynamic linker and libc have no idea of this, and will happily grant arbitrary code execution in context of those programs via LD_PRELOAD and such. Even if this is somehow dealt with (how would you do that in the kernel alone? filter typical env var names? it quickly becomes way too hackish and blacklistish, thus imperfect), then there's still: I think many, and maybe most, binaries on a system will contain buffer overflows and such that also allow for arbitrary code execution. Those programs were not written as carefully as SUID/SGID ones are supposed to be. They don't treat their input and environment as untrusted. Closer to the topic of interpreters, there's also this old trick: $ strace -e execve /lib/ld-linux.so.2 /bin/uname -ms execve("/lib/ld-linux.so.2", ["/lib/ld-linux.so.2", "/bin/uname", "-ms"], [/* 28 vars */]) = 0 Linux i686 +++ exited with 0 +++ As you can see, the only execve(2) is of the dynamic linker. Will /lib or/and /lib64 be among trusted paths in a typical setup? Well, maybe not, although not including them will break ldd(1) on the more security conscious distros, where it uses a similar trick of invoking the dynamic linker explicitly (rather than the historical unsafe way of invoking the binary being ldd'ed with some env vars set to tell its dynamic linker to do the magic rather than proceed to execute the program). But this last one is relatively minor. The real big issue is that TPE is either inherently fairly easily bypassable (and should be documented as such) via many of the installed programs (by far not just explicit interpreters, but also any programs containing "weird machines", which is probably most non-trivial programs out there, and some trivial ones), or it relies on all programs in the trusted paths being written as if they were SUID/SGID (unrealistic for non-trivial systems). Just so that you know what you're getting into, and so that you don't mislead your users. Alexander
On 13/06/2017 23:27, Solar Designer wrote: > Matt, > > I removed most CC's like before, as I don't want my voice on this to be > too loud. > > On Thu, Jun 08, 2017 at 11:50:32PM -0400, Matt Brown wrote: >> On 06/08/2017 10:38 PM, Kees Cook wrote: >>> On Wed, Jun 7, 2017 at 8:43 PM, Matt Brown <matt@nmatt.com> wrote: >>>> * Issues: >>>> * Can be bypassed by interpreted languages such as python. You can run >>>> malicious code by doing: python -c 'evil code' >>> >>> What's the recommendation for people interested in using TPE but >>> having interpreters installed? >> >> If you don't need a given interpreter installed, uninstall it. While >> this is common sense system hardening it especially would make a >> difference under the TPE threat model. >> >> I don't have a knock down answer for this. Interpreters are a hard >> problem for TPE. > > Interpreters are only a tip of the iceberg. > > With TPE, every program invocation becomes similar to a SUID/SGID one as > it relates to TPE's newly introduced security barrier. However, the > dynamic linker and libc have no idea of this, and will happily grant > arbitrary code execution in context of those programs via LD_PRELOAD and > such. Even if this is somehow dealt with (how would you do that in the > kernel alone? filter typical env var names? it quickly becomes way too > hackish and blacklistish, thus imperfect), then there's still: What about using the AT_SECURE auxv (cf. security_bprm_secureexec)? > > I think many, and maybe most, binaries on a system will contain buffer > overflows and such that also allow for arbitrary code execution. Those Enforcing W^X (cf. tpe.memory xattr) mitigate this threat. > programs were not written as carefully as SUID/SGID ones are supposed to > be. They don't treat their input and environment as untrusted. Sure, but perfect is the enemy of good. Having a kernel enforcing TPE is a good argument to convince userland to be hardened against untrusted input. ;) For example, thanks to PaX, the Gentoo Hardened community patched a lot of userland programs to make them compatible with PIE and other security features. > > Closer to the topic of interpreters, there's also this old trick: > > $ strace -e execve /lib/ld-linux.so.2 /bin/uname -ms > execve("/lib/ld-linux.so.2", ["/lib/ld-linux.so.2", "/bin/uname", "-ms"], [/* 28 vars */]) = 0 > Linux i686 > +++ exited with 0 +++ > > As you can see, the only execve(2) is of the dynamic linker. Will /lib > or/and /lib64 be among trusted paths in a typical setup? Well, maybe > not, although not including them will break ldd(1) on the more security > conscious distros, where it uses a similar trick of invoking the dynamic > linker explicitly (rather than the historical unsafe way of invoking the > binary being ldd'ed with some env vars set to tell its dynamic linker to > do the magic rather than proceed to execute the program). > > But this last one is relatively minor. The real big issue is that TPE > is either inherently fairly easily bypassable (and should be documented > as such) via many of the installed programs (by far not just explicit > interpreters, but also any programs containing "weird machines", which > is probably most non-trivial programs out there, and some trivial ones), > or it relies on all programs in the trusted paths being written as if > they were SUID/SGID (unrealistic for non-trivial systems). Right, this is the most complex part, but we should start somewhere. :) This kind of machine can not be constrain by the kernel, only by the programs themselves. We need them to honor the AT_SECURE. > > Just so that you know what you're getting into, and so that you don't > mislead your users. > > Alexander >
On Wed, Jun 14, 2017 at 01:53:56AM +0200, Micka??l Sala??n wrote: > On 13/06/2017 23:27, Solar Designer wrote: > > Interpreters are only a tip of the iceberg. > > > > With TPE, every program invocation becomes similar to a SUID/SGID one as > > it relates to TPE's newly introduced security barrier. However, the > > dynamic linker and libc have no idea of this, and will happily grant > > arbitrary code execution in context of those programs via LD_PRELOAD and > > such. Even if this is somehow dealt with (how would you do that in the > > kernel alone? filter typical env var names? it quickly becomes way too > > hackish and blacklistish, thus imperfect), then there's still: > > What about using the AT_SECURE auxv (cf. security_bprm_secureexec)? You're right, I was wrong. For kernel/ld.so/libc communication, this case is no different from fscaps. So no need for hacks and blacklists, and AT_SECURE will work just as well (or as poorly, if a userspace component on a given system does the old-fashioned euid and egid check only, like some third-party libraries do before trusting env vars). So it's not a TPE-specific issue, and the TPE patch or module may take care of it as you suggest. So this is something Matt will want to implement. I see that Alan also brought up the LD_PRELOAD argument, and this would address it. > > I think many, and maybe most, binaries on a system will contain buffer > > overflows and such that also allow for arbitrary code execution. Those > > Enforcing W^X (cf. tpe.memory xattr) mitigate this threat. Mitigates yes, eliminates no. > > programs were not written as carefully as SUID/SGID ones are supposed to > > be. They don't treat their input and environment as untrusted. > > Sure, but perfect is the enemy of good. Having a kernel enforcing TPE is > a good argument to convince userland to be hardened against untrusted > input. ;) For example, thanks to PaX, the Gentoo Hardened community > patched a lot of userland programs to make them compatible with PIE and > other security features. If TPE results in some programs becoming more robust (have we seen it happening because of TPE specifically? I think not), that would be a good thing on its own. However, I doubt that non-trivial Linux distros/installs will ever have a shortage of TPE bypasses. > > The real big issue is that TPE > > is either inherently fairly easily bypassable (and should be documented > > as such) via many of the installed programs (by far not just explicit > > interpreters, but also any programs containing "weird machines", which > > is probably most non-trivial programs out there, and some trivial ones), > > or it relies on all programs in the trusted paths being written as if > > they were SUID/SGID (unrealistic for non-trivial systems). > > Right, this is the most complex part, but we should start somewhere. :) > This kind of machine can not be constrain by the kernel, only by the > programs themselves. We need them to honor the AT_SECURE. For many libraries, yes, we need them to honor AT_SECURE, although the current way to achieve that appears to be to have glibc export its __libc_enable_secure and to have it tested by other libraries like OpenSSL's. That's what we did in Owl years ago. Another way would be for Linux libc's to provide OpenBSD's issetugid(), like musl already does. This would make some portable projects like OpenSSL pick it up. As to all programs honoring AT_SECURE, I think that's too much to ask, and is unreasonable. Alexander
On Tue, Jun 13, 2017 at 11:27 PM, Solar Designer <solar@openwall.com> wrote: > Matt, > > I removed most CC's like before, as I don't want my voice on this to be > too loud. > > On Thu, Jun 08, 2017 at 11:50:32PM -0400, Matt Brown wrote: >> On 06/08/2017 10:38 PM, Kees Cook wrote: >> >On Wed, Jun 7, 2017 at 8:43 PM, Matt Brown <matt@nmatt.com> wrote: >> >>* Issues: >> >> * Can be bypassed by interpreted languages such as python. You can run >> >> malicious code by doing: python -c 'evil code' >> > >> >What's the recommendation for people interested in using TPE but >> >having interpreters installed? >> >> If you don't need a given interpreter installed, uninstall it. While >> this is common sense system hardening it especially would make a >> difference under the TPE threat model. >> >> I don't have a knock down answer for this. Interpreters are a hard >> problem for TPE. > > Interpreters are only a tip of the iceberg. Some random related issues: Scripts with shebang lines like "#!/usr/bin/env python" probably wouldn't work anymore, at least not without special-case logic, because in this case, env has to invoke python. ssh and ssh-agent can load libraries from paths passed on the command line, by design. The alsa client library loads libraries from paths specified in user-owned config files. If you can use dd (or anything else that permits writing to a specific position in a file), you should be able to directly overwrite the memory of a process using something like "dd of=/proc/self/mem bs=1 seek=$STARTADDRESS < new_data". I think one way to do this remotely is to use SFTP. Bash has a built-in named "enable" that can load shared libraries directly into the shell. These are just some random examples I came up with relatively quickly, there are probably more.
On Wed, Jun 14, 2017 at 03:15:22PM +0200, Jann Horn wrote: > Some random related issues: > > Scripts with shebang lines like "#!/usr/bin/env python" probably wouldn't > work anymore, at least not without special-case logic, because in this case, > env has to invoke python. Why would this break? If both env and python are in trusted paths, it should work with TPE just fine. (But then TPE is rather ineffective.) > ssh and ssh-agent can load libraries from paths passed on the command > line, by design. > The alsa client library loads libraries from paths specified in user-owned > config files. > > If you can use dd (or anything else that permits writing to a specific > position in a > file), you should be able to directly overwrite the memory of a > process using something like > "dd of=/proc/self/mem bs=1 seek=$STARTADDRESS < new_data". > I think one way to do this remotely is to use SFTP. IIRC, /proc/self/mem requires mmap() and won't work with dd's write(). > Bash has a built-in named "enable" that can load shared libraries directly > into the shell. > > These are just some random examples I came up with relatively quickly, > there are probably more. Thanks. The ssh, alsa, and bash "enable" examples are probably valid. Alexander
On Wed, Jun 14, 2017 at 4:28 PM, Solar Designer <solar@openwall.com> wrote: > On Wed, Jun 14, 2017 at 03:15:22PM +0200, Jann Horn wrote: >> Some random related issues: >> >> Scripts with shebang lines like "#!/usr/bin/env python" probably wouldn't >> work anymore, at least not without special-case logic, because in this case, >> env has to invoke python. > > Why would this break? If both env and python are in trusted paths, it > should work with TPE just fine. (But then TPE is rather ineffective.) I think somewhere in this thread, or a related one, it was suggested to have some mechanism to only prevent execution of e.g. python as an interpreter, not direct execution. >> ssh and ssh-agent can load libraries from paths passed on the command >> line, by design. >> The alsa client library loads libraries from paths specified in user-owned >> config files. >> >> If you can use dd (or anything else that permits writing to a specific >> position in a >> file), you should be able to directly overwrite the memory of a >> process using something like >> "dd of=/proc/self/mem bs=1 seek=$STARTADDRESS < new_data". >> I think one way to do this remotely is to use SFTP. > > IIRC, /proc/self/mem requires mmap() and won't work with dd's write(). That's definitely not true. You can't mmap() /proc/*/mem on Linux, and reading/writing to/from it works. With older kernel versions, only the ptrace parent was permitted to use /proc/*/mem for non-self processes, but in newer kernel versions, that restriction is gone. For an example, see: http://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2014/Oct/35 (I think the mitigation added in OpenSSH 6.7 doesn't really work properly anymore on newer kernels.) >> Bash has a built-in named "enable" that can load shared libraries directly >> into the shell. >> >> These are just some random examples I came up with relatively quickly, >> there are probably more. > > Thanks. The ssh, alsa, and bash "enable" examples are probably valid. > > Alexander
On Wed, Jun 14, 2017 at 4:33 PM, Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> wrote: > On Wed, Jun 14, 2017 at 4:28 PM, Solar Designer <solar@openwall.com> wrote: >> On Wed, Jun 14, 2017 at 03:15:22PM +0200, Jann Horn wrote: >>> Some random related issues: >>> >>> Scripts with shebang lines like "#!/usr/bin/env python" probably wouldn't >>> work anymore, at least not without special-case logic, because in this case, >>> env has to invoke python. >> >> Why would this break? If both env and python are in trusted paths, it >> should work with TPE just fine. (But then TPE is rather ineffective.) > > I think somewhere in this thread, or a related one, it was suggested to have > some mechanism to only prevent execution of e.g. python as an interpreter, > not direct execution. s/prevent/permit/
On 6/13/17 5:27 PM, Solar Designer wrote: > Matt, > > I removed most CC's like before, as I don't want my voice on this to be > too loud. > I really appreciate your feedback and feel like it will only go to making TPE better in the end. > On Thu, Jun 08, 2017 at 11:50:32PM -0400, Matt Brown wrote: >> On 06/08/2017 10:38 PM, Kees Cook wrote: >>> On Wed, Jun 7, 2017 at 8:43 PM, Matt Brown <matt@nmatt.com> wrote: >>>> * Issues: >>>> * Can be bypassed by interpreted languages such as python. You can run >>>> malicious code by doing: python -c 'evil code' >>> >>> What's the recommendation for people interested in using TPE but >>> having interpreters installed? >> >> If you don't need a given interpreter installed, uninstall it. While >> this is common sense system hardening it especially would make a >> difference under the TPE threat model. >> >> I don't have a knock down answer for this. Interpreters are a hard >> problem for TPE. > > Interpreters are only a tip of the iceberg. > > With TPE, every program invocation becomes similar to a SUID/SGID one as > it relates to TPE's newly introduced security barrier. However, the > dynamic linker and libc have no idea of this, and will happily grant > arbitrary code execution in context of those programs via LD_PRELOAD and > such. Even if this is somehow dealt with (how would you do that in the > kernel alone? filter typical env var names? it quickly becomes way too > hackish and blacklistish, thus imperfect), then there's still: > FYI Mimi Zohar has posted this LSM that aims to restrict interpreters: http://kernsec.org/pipermail/linux-security-module-archive/2017-June/001758.html That conversation is relevant here and I am thinking about merging some of those concepts into TPE. > I think many, and maybe most, binaries on a system will contain buffer > overflows and such that also allow for arbitrary code execution. Those > programs were not written as carefully as SUID/SGID ones are supposed to > be. They don't treat their input and environment as untrusted. > Sure but there are other protections that can be put in place to mitigate memory corruption exploits. e.g.: https://wiki.gentoo.org/wiki/Hardened/Toolchain Even if these buffer overflows do exist, TPE still raises the bar for the attacker to execute on their objective. > Closer to the topic of interpreters, there's also this old trick: > > $ strace -e execve /lib/ld-linux.so.2 /bin/uname -ms > execve("/lib/ld-linux.so.2", ["/lib/ld-linux.so.2", "/bin/uname", "-ms"], [/* 28 vars */]) = 0 > Linux i686 > +++ exited with 0 +++ > This is blocked with the current patch because I'm checking the mmap LSM hook for any untrusted files being mmap'ed with the exec bit set. Dmesg log from TPE after testing the strace trick above: TPE: Denied mmap of /vuln/ls Reason: file in world-writable directory and not in trusted group > As you can see, the only execve(2) is of the dynamic linker. Will /lib > or/and /lib64 be among trusted paths in a typical setup? Well, maybe > not, although not including them will break ldd(1) on the more security > conscious distros, where it uses a similar trick of invoking the dynamic > linker explicitly (rather than the historical unsafe way of invoking the > binary being ldd'ed with some env vars set to tell its dynamic linker to > do the magic rather than proceed to execute the program). > > But this last one is relatively minor. The real big issue is that TPE > is either inherently fairly easily bypassable (and should be documented > as such) via many of the installed programs (by far not just explicit > interpreters, but also any programs containing "weird machines", which > is probably most non-trivial programs out there, and some trivial ones), > or it relies on all programs in the trusted paths being written as if > they were SUID/SGID (unrealistic for non-trivial systems). I suppose I can make my documentation more clear that I don't believe TPE is a replacement for a mandatory access control system. I believe that the "selling point" of TPE is that it has a zero/low setup effort that makes it viable to a certain category of user that will never put in the effort to setup SELinux, RBAC, SMACK, or AppArmor. I do believe with the conversation that is going on about Mimi Zohar's Shebang LSM that we can use that work to plug up some of the current holes in TPE Matt
Hi Matt,
[auto build test WARNING on security/next]
[also build test WARNING on v4.12-rc5 next-20170615]
[if your patch is applied to the wrong git tree, please drop us a note to help improve the system]
url: https://github.com/0day-ci/linux/commits/Matt-Brown/Add-Trusted-Path-Execution-as-a-stackable-LSM/20170609-115004
base: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security.git next
reproduce:
# apt-get install sparse
make ARCH=x86_64 allmodconfig
make C=1 CF=-D__CHECK_ENDIAN__
sparse warnings: (new ones prefixed by >>)
>> security/tpe/tpe_lsm.c:45:5: sparse: symbol 'print_tpe_error' was not declared. Should it be static?
>> security/tpe/tpe_lsm.c:128:5: sparse: symbol 'tpe_mmap_file' was not declared. Should it be static?
>> security/tpe/tpe_lsm.c:137:5: sparse: symbol 'tpe_file_mprotect' was not declared. Should it be static?
>> security/tpe/tpe_lsm.c:160:17: sparse: symbol 'tpe_sysctl_path' was not declared. Should it be static?
Please review and possibly fold the followup patch.
---
0-DAY kernel test infrastructure Open Source Technology Center
https://lists.01.org/pipermail/kbuild-all Intel Corporation
diff --git a/Documentation/security/tpe.txt b/Documentation/security/tpe.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..226afcc --- /dev/null +++ b/Documentation/security/tpe.txt @@ -0,0 +1,59 @@ +Trusted Path Execution is a Linux Security Module that generally requires +programs to be run from a trusted path. A trusted path is one that is owned by +root and is not group/world writable. This prevents an attacker from executing +their own malicious binaries from an unprivileged user on the system. This +feature is enabled with CONFIG_SECURITY_TPE. When enabled, a set of sysctls +are created in /proc/sys/kernel/tpe. + +--------------------------------------------------------------------------- + +Trusted Path Execution introduces the following Kconfig options and sysctls. + +CONFIG_SECURITY_TPE (sysctl=kernel.tpe.enabled) + +default: n + +This option enables Trusted Path Execution. TPE blocks *untrusted* +users from executing files that meet the following conditions: + +* file is not in a root-owned directory +* file is writable by a user other than root + +NOTE: By default root is not restricted by TPE. + +CONFIG_SECURITY_TPE_GID (sysctl=kernel.tpe.gid) + +default: 0 + +This option defines a group id that, by default, is the trusted group. +If a user is not trusted then it has the checks described in +CONFIG_SECURITY_TPE applied. Otherwise, the user is trusted and the +checks are not applied. You can disable the trusted gid option by +setting it to 0. This makes all non-root users untrusted. + +CONFIG_SECURITY_TPE_STRICT (sysctl=kernel.tpe.strict) + +default: n + +This option applies another set of restrictions to all non-root users +even if they are trusted. This only allows execution under the +following conditions: + +* file is in a directory owned by the user that is not group or + world-writable +* file is in a directory owned by root and writable only by root + +CONFIG_SECURITY_TPE_RESTRICT_ROOT (sysctl=kernel.tpe.restrict_root) + +default: n + +This option applies TPE restrictions to root. + +CONFIG_SECURITY_TPE_INVERT_GID (sysctl=kernel.tpe.invert_gid) + +default: n + +This option reverses the trust logic of the gid option and makes +kernel.tpe.gid into the untrusted group. This means that all other groups +become trusted. This sysctl is helpful when you want TPE restrictions +to be limited to a small subset of users. diff --git a/MAINTAINERS b/MAINTAINERS index 9e98464..67e10c8 100644 --- a/MAINTAINERS +++ b/MAINTAINERS @@ -11574,6 +11574,11 @@ T: git git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux.git yama/tip S: Supported F: security/yama/ +TPE SECURITY MODULE +M: Matt Brown <matt@nmatt.com> +S: Supported +F: security/tpe/ + SENSABLE PHANTOM M: Jiri Slaby <jirislaby@gmail.com> S: Maintained diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h index 080f34e..4c165ce 100644 --- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h +++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h @@ -1946,5 +1946,10 @@ void __init loadpin_add_hooks(void); #else static inline void loadpin_add_hooks(void) { }; #endif +#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_TPE +void __init tpe_add_hooks(void); +#else +static inline void tpe_add_hooks(void) { }; +#endif #endif /* ! __LINUX_LSM_HOOKS_H */ diff --git a/security/Kconfig b/security/Kconfig index bdcbb92..58c4216 100644 --- a/security/Kconfig +++ b/security/Kconfig @@ -195,6 +195,7 @@ source security/tomoyo/Kconfig source security/apparmor/Kconfig source security/loadpin/Kconfig source security/yama/Kconfig +source security/tpe/Kconfig source security/integrity/Kconfig diff --git a/security/Makefile b/security/Makefile index f2d71cd..f8b5197 100644 --- a/security/Makefile +++ b/security/Makefile @@ -9,6 +9,7 @@ subdir-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_TOMOYO) += tomoyo subdir-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR) += apparmor subdir-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_YAMA) += yama subdir-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_LOADPIN) += loadpin +subdir-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_TPE) += tpe # always enable default capabilities obj-y += commoncap.o @@ -24,6 +25,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_TOMOYO) += tomoyo/ obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR) += apparmor/ obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_YAMA) += yama/ obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_LOADPIN) += loadpin/ +obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_TPE) += tpe/ obj-$(CONFIG_CGROUP_DEVICE) += device_cgroup.o # Object integrity file lists diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c index 38316bb..36137a3 100644 --- a/security/security.c +++ b/security/security.c @@ -70,6 +70,7 @@ int __init security_init(void) capability_add_hooks(); yama_add_hooks(); loadpin_add_hooks(); + tpe_add_hooks(); /* * Load all the remaining security modules. diff --git a/security/tpe/Kconfig b/security/tpe/Kconfig new file mode 100644 index 0000000..a1b8f17 --- /dev/null +++ b/security/tpe/Kconfig @@ -0,0 +1,64 @@ +config SECURITY_TPE + bool "Trusted Path Execution (TPE)" + default n + help + If you say Y here, you will be able to choose a gid to add to the + supplementary groups of users you want to mark as "trusted." + Untrusted users will not be able to execute any files that are not in + root-owned directories writable only by root. If the sysctl option + is enabled, a sysctl option with name "tpe.enabled" is created. + +config SECURITY_TPE_GID + int + default SECURITY_TPE_TRUSTED_GID if (SECURITY_TPE && !SECURITY_TPE_INVERT_GID) + default SECURITY_TPE_UNTRUSTED_GID if (SECURITY_TPE && SECURITY_TPE_INVERT_GID) + +config SECURITY_TPE_TRUSTED_GID + int "GID for TPE-trusted users" + depends on SECURITY_TPE && !SECURITY_TPE_INVERT_GID + default 0 + help + Setting this GID determines what group TPE restrictions will be + *disabled* for. If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option + with name "tpe.gid" is created. + +config SECURITY_TPE_UNTRUSTED_GID + int "GID for TPE-untrusted users" + depends on SECURITY_TPE && SECURITY_TPE_INVERT_GID + default 0 + help + Setting this GID determines what group TPE restrictions will be + *enabled* for. If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option + with name "tpe.gid" is created. + +config SECURITY_TPE_INVERT_GID + bool "Invert GID option" + depends on SECURITY_TPE + help + If you say Y here, the group you specify in the TPE configuration will + decide what group TPE restrictions will be *enabled* for. This + option is useful if you want TPE restrictions to be restricted to a + small subset of users. If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option + with name "tpe.invert_gid" is created. + +config SECURITY_TPE_STRICT + bool "Partially restrict all non-root users" + depends on SECURITY_TPE + help + If you say Y here, all non-root users will be covered under + a weaker TPE restriction. This is separate from, and in addition to, + the main TPE options that you have selected elsewhere. Thus, if a + "trusted" GID is chosen, this restriction applies to even that GID. + Under this restriction, all non-root users will only be allowed to + execute files in directories they own that are not group or + world-writable, or in directories owned by root and writable only by + root. If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option with name + "tpe.strict" is created. + +config SECURITY_TPE_RESTRICT_ROOT + bool "Restrict root" + depends on SECURITY_TPE + help + If you say Y here, root will be marked as untrusted. This will require + root to pass all the same checks as any other untrusted user. + diff --git a/security/tpe/Makefile b/security/tpe/Makefile new file mode 100644 index 0000000..e1bd8ef --- /dev/null +++ b/security/tpe/Makefile @@ -0,0 +1,3 @@ +obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_TPE) := tpe_lsm.o + +tpe-y := tpe_lsm.o diff --git a/security/tpe/tpe_lsm.c b/security/tpe/tpe_lsm.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..fda811a --- /dev/null +++ b/security/tpe/tpe_lsm.c @@ -0,0 +1,218 @@ +/* + * Trusted Path Execution Security Module + * + * Copyright (C) 2017 Matt Brown + * Copyright (C) 2001-2014 Bradley Spengler, Open Source Security, Inc. + * http://www.grsecurity.net spender@grsecurity.net + * Copyright (C) 2011 Corey Henderson + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or + * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 + * as published by the Free Software Foundation. + * + * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, + * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of + * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the + * GNU General Public License for more details. + * + */ +#include <linux/kernel.h> +#include <linux/uidgid.h> +#include <linux/ratelimit.h> +#include <linux/limits.h> +#include <linux/cred.h> +#include <linux/slab.h> +#include <linux/lsm_hooks.h> +#include <linux/sysctl.h> +#include <linux/binfmts.h> +#include <linux/string_helpers.h> +#include <linux/dcache.h> +#include <uapi/asm-generic/mman-common.h> + +#define global_root(x) uid_eq((x), GLOBAL_ROOT_UID) +#define global_nonroot(x) (!uid_eq((x), GLOBAL_ROOT_UID)) +#define global_root_gid(x) (gid_eq((x), GLOBAL_ROOT_GID)) +#define global_nonroot_gid(x) (!gid_eq((x), GLOBAL_ROOT_GID)) + +static int tpe_enabled __read_mostly = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_TPE); +static kgid_t tpe_gid __read_mostly = KGIDT_INIT(CONFIG_SECURITY_TPE_GID); +static int tpe_invert_gid __read_mostly = + IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_TPE_INVERT_GID); +static int tpe_strict __read_mostly = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_TPE_STRICT); +static int tpe_restrict_root __read_mostly = + IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_TPE_RESTRICT_ROOT); + +int print_tpe_error(struct file *file, char *reason1, char *reason2, + char *method) +{ + char *filepath; + + filepath = kstrdup_quotable_file(file, GFP_KERNEL); + + if (!filepath) + return -ENOMEM; + + pr_warn_ratelimited("TPE: Denied %s of %s Reason: %s%s%s\n", method, + (IS_ERR(filepath) ? "failed fetching file path" : filepath), + reason1, reason2 ? " and " : "", reason2 ?: ""); + kfree(filepath); + return -EPERM; +} + +static int tpe_check(struct file *file, char *method) +{ + struct inode *inode; + struct inode *file_inode; + struct dentry *dir; + const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); + char *reason1 = NULL; + char *reason2 = NULL; + + dir = dget_parent(file->f_path.dentry); + inode = d_backing_inode(dir); + file_inode = d_backing_inode(file->f_path.dentry); + + if (!tpe_enabled) + return 0; + + /* never restrict root unless restrict_root sysctl is 1*/ + if (global_root(cred->uid) && !tpe_restrict_root) + return 0; + + if (!tpe_strict) + goto general_tpe_check; + + /* TPE_STRICT: restrictions enforced even if the gid is trusted */ + if (global_nonroot(inode->i_uid) && !uid_eq(inode->i_uid, cred->uid)) + reason1 = "directory not owned by user"; + else if (inode->i_mode & 0002) + reason1 = "file in world-writable directory"; + else if ((inode->i_mode & 0020) && global_nonroot_gid(inode->i_gid)) + reason1 = "file in group-writable directory"; + else if (file_inode->i_mode & 0002) + reason1 = "file is world-writable"; + + if (reason1) + goto end; + +general_tpe_check: + /* determine if group is trusted */ + if (global_root_gid(tpe_gid)) + goto next_check; + if (!tpe_invert_gid && !in_group_p(tpe_gid)) + reason2 = "not in trusted group"; + else if (tpe_invert_gid && in_group_p(tpe_gid)) + reason2 = "in untrusted group"; + else + return 0; + +next_check: + /* main TPE checks */ + if (global_nonroot(inode->i_uid)) + reason1 = "file in non-root-owned directory"; + else if (inode->i_mode & 0002) + reason1 = "file in world-writable directory"; + else if ((inode->i_mode & 0020) && global_nonroot_gid(inode->i_gid)) + reason1 = "file in group-writable directory"; + else if (file_inode->i_mode & 0002) + reason1 = "file is world-writable"; + +end: + dput(dir); + if (reason1) + return print_tpe_error(file, reason1, reason2, method); + else + return 0; +} + +int tpe_mmap_file(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot, + unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags) +{ + if (!file || !(prot & PROT_EXEC)) + return 0; + + return tpe_check(file, "mmap"); +} + +int tpe_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long reqprot, + unsigned long prot) +{ + if (!vma->vm_file) + return 0; + return tpe_check(vma->vm_file, "mprotect"); +} + +static int tpe_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm) +{ + if (!bprm->file) + return 0; + return tpe_check(bprm->file, "exec"); + +} + +static struct security_hook_list tpe_hooks[] = { + LSM_HOOK_INIT(mmap_file, tpe_mmap_file), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_mprotect, tpe_file_mprotect), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_set_creds, tpe_bprm_set_creds), +}; + +#ifdef CONFIG_SYSCTL +struct ctl_path tpe_sysctl_path[] = { + { .procname = "kernel", }, + { .procname = "tpe", }, + { } +}; + +static struct ctl_table tpe_sysctl_table[] = { + { + .procname = "enabled", + .data = &tpe_enabled, + .maxlen = sizeof(int), + .mode = 0600, + .proc_handler = proc_dointvec, + }, + { + .procname = "gid", + .data = &tpe_gid, + .maxlen = sizeof(int), + .mode = 0600, + .proc_handler = proc_dointvec, + }, + { + .procname = "invert_gid", + .data = &tpe_invert_gid, + .maxlen = sizeof(int), + .mode = 0600, + .proc_handler = proc_dointvec, + }, + { + .procname = "strict", + .data = &tpe_strict, + .maxlen = sizeof(int), + .mode = 0600, + .proc_handler = proc_dointvec, + }, + { + .procname = "restrict_root", + .data = &tpe_restrict_root, + .maxlen = sizeof(int), + .mode = 0600, + .proc_handler = proc_dointvec, + }, + { } +}; +static void __init tpe_init_sysctl(void) +{ + if (!register_sysctl_paths(tpe_sysctl_path, tpe_sysctl_table)) + panic("TPE: sysctl registration failed.\n"); +} +#else +static inline void tpe_init_sysctl(void) { } +#endif /* CONFIG_SYSCTL */ + +void __init tpe_add_hooks(void) +{ + pr_info("TPE: securing systems like it's 1998\n"); + security_add_hooks(tpe_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(tpe_hooks), "tpe"); + tpe_init_sysctl(); +}
This patch was modified from Brad Spengler's Trusted Path Execution (TPE) feature. It also adds features and config options that were found in Corey Henderson's tpe-lkm project. Modifications from Brad Spengler's implementation of TPE were made to turn it into a stackable LSM using the existing LSM hook bprm_set_creds. Also, a new denial logging function was used to simplify printing messages to the kernel log. Additionally, mmap and mprotect restrictions were taken from Corey Henderson's tpe-lkm project and implemented using the LSM hooks mmap_file and file_mprotect. Trusted Path Execution is not a new idea: http://phrack.org/issues/52/6.html#article | A trusted path is one that is inside a root owned directory that | is not group or world writable. /bin, /usr/bin, /usr/local/bin, are | (under normal circumstances) considered trusted. Any non-root | users home directory is not trusted, nor is /tmp. To be clear, Trusted Path Execution is no replacement for a MAC system like SELinux, SMACK, or AppArmor. This LSM is designed to be good enough without requiring a userland utility to configure policies. The fact that TPE only requires the user to turn on a few sysctl options lowers the barrier to implementing a security framework substantially. Threat Models: 1. Attacker on system executing exploit on system vulnerability * If attacker uses a binary as a part of their system exploit, TPE can frustrate their efforts * This protection can be more effective when an attacker does not yet have an interactive shell on a system * Issues: * Can be bypassed by interpreted languages such as python. You can run malicious code by doing: python -c 'evil code' 2. Attacker on system replaces binary used by a privileged user with a malicious one * This situation arises when the administrator of a system leaves a binary as world writable. * TPE is very effective against this threat model This Trusted Path Execution implementation introduces the following Kconfig options and sysctls. The Kconfig text and sysctl options are taken heavily from Brad Spengler's implementation. Some extra sysctl options were taken from Corey Henderson's implementation. CONFIG_SECURITY_TPE (sysctl=kernel.tpe.enabled) default: n This option enables Trusted Path Execution. TPE blocks *untrusted* users from executing files that meet the following conditions: * file is not in a root-owned directory * file is writable by a user other than root NOTE: By default root is not restricted by TPE. CONFIG_SECURITY_TPE_GID (sysctl=kernel.tpe.gid) default: 0 This option defines a group id that, by default, is the trusted group. If a user is not trusted then it has the checks described in CONFIG_SECURITY_TPE applied. Otherwise, the user is trusted and the checks are not applied. You can disable the trusted gid option by setting it to 0. This makes all non-root users untrusted. CONFIG_SECURITY_TPE_STRICT (sysctl=kernel.tpe.strict) default: n This option applies another set of restrictions to all non-root users even if they are trusted. This only allows execution under the following conditions: * file is in a directory owned by the user that is not group or world-writable * file is in a directory owned by root and writable only by root CONFIG_SECURITY_TPE_RESTRICT_ROOT (sysctl=kernel.tpe.restrict_root) default: n This option applies all enabled TPE restrictions to root. CONFIG_SECURITY_TPE_INVERT_GID (sysctl=kernel.tpe.invert_gid) default: n This option reverses the trust logic of the gid option and makes kernel.tpe.gid into the untrusted group. This means that all other groups become trusted. This sysctl is helpful when you want TPE restrictions to be limited to a small subset of users. Signed-off-by: Matt Brown <matt@nmatt.com> --- Documentation/security/tpe.txt | 59 +++++++++++ MAINTAINERS | 5 + include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 5 + security/Kconfig | 1 + security/Makefile | 2 + security/security.c | 1 + security/tpe/Kconfig | 64 ++++++++++++ security/tpe/Makefile | 3 + security/tpe/tpe_lsm.c | 218 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 9 files changed, 358 insertions(+) create mode 100644 Documentation/security/tpe.txt create mode 100644 security/tpe/Kconfig create mode 100644 security/tpe/Makefile create mode 100644 security/tpe/tpe_lsm.c