| Message ID | 20170620030112.GA140256@beast (mailing list archive) |
|---|---|
| State | New, archived |
| Headers | show |
On 06/19/2017 08:01 PM, Kees Cook wrote: > This SLUB free list pointer obfuscation code is modified from Brad > Spengler/PaX Team's code in the last public patch of grsecurity/PaX based > on my understanding of the code. Changes or omissions from the original > code are mine and don't reflect the original grsecurity/PaX code. > > This adds a per-cache random value to SLUB caches that is XORed with > their freelist pointers. This adds nearly zero overhead and frustrates the > very common heap overflow exploitation method of overwriting freelist > pointers. A recent example of the attack is written up here: > http://cyseclabs.com/blog/cve-2016-6187-heap-off-by-one-exploit > > This is based on patches by Daniel Micay, and refactored to avoid lots > of #ifdef code. > > Suggested-by: Daniel Micay <danielmicay@gmail.com> > Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> > --- > include/linux/slub_def.h | 4 ++++ > init/Kconfig | 10 ++++++++++ > mm/slub.c | 32 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++----- > 3 files changed, 41 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) > > diff --git a/include/linux/slub_def.h b/include/linux/slub_def.h > index 07ef550c6627..0258d6d74e9c 100644 > --- a/include/linux/slub_def.h > +++ b/include/linux/slub_def.h > @@ -93,6 +93,10 @@ struct kmem_cache { > #endif > #endif > > +#ifdef CONFIG_SLAB_HARDENED > + unsigned long random; > +#endif > + > #ifdef CONFIG_NUMA > /* > * Defragmentation by allocating from a remote node. > diff --git a/init/Kconfig b/init/Kconfig > index 1d3475fc9496..eb91082546bf 100644 > --- a/init/Kconfig > +++ b/init/Kconfig > @@ -1900,6 +1900,16 @@ config SLAB_FREELIST_RANDOM > security feature reduces the predictability of the kernel slab > allocator against heap overflows. > > +config SLAB_HARDENED > + bool "Harden slab cache infrastructure" > + default y > + depends on SLAB_FREELIST_RANDOM && SLUB> + help > + Many kernel heap attacks try to target slab cache metadata and > + other infrastructure. This options makes minor performance > + sacrifies to harden the kernel slab allocator against common > + exploit methods. > + Going to bikeshed on SLAB_HARDENED unless this is intended to be used for more things. Perhaps SLAB_FREELIST_HARDENED? What's the reason for the dependency on SLAB_FREELIST_RANDOM? > config SLUB_CPU_PARTIAL > default y > depends on SLUB && SMP > diff --git a/mm/slub.c b/mm/slub.c > index 57e5156f02be..ffede2e0c5c1 100644 > --- a/mm/slub.c > +++ b/mm/slub.c > @@ -34,6 +34,7 @@ > #include <linux/stacktrace.h> > #include <linux/prefetch.h> > #include <linux/memcontrol.h> > +#include <linux/random.h> > > #include <trace/events/kmem.h> > > @@ -238,30 +239,50 @@ static inline void stat(const struct kmem_cache *s, enum stat_item si) > * Core slab cache functions > *******************************************************************/ > > +#ifdef CONFIG_SLAB_HARDENED > +# define initialize_random(s) \ > + do { \ > + s->random = get_random_long(); \ > + } while (0) > +# define FREEPTR_VAL(ptr, ptr_addr, s) \ > + (void *)((unsigned long)(ptr) ^ s->random ^ (ptr_addr)) > +#else > +# define initialize_random(s) do { } while (0) > +# define FREEPTR_VAL(ptr, addr, s) ((void *)(ptr)) > +#endif > +#define FREELIST_ENTRY(ptr_addr, s) \ > + FREEPTR_VAL(*(unsigned long *)(ptr_addr), \ > + (unsigned long)ptr_addr, s) > + > static inline void *get_freepointer(struct kmem_cache *s, void *object) > { > - return *(void **)(object + s->offset); > + return FREELIST_ENTRY(object + s->offset, s); > } > > static void prefetch_freepointer(const struct kmem_cache *s, void *object) > { > - prefetch(object + s->offset); > + if (object) > + prefetch(FREELIST_ENTRY(object + s->offset, s)); > } > > static inline void *get_freepointer_safe(struct kmem_cache *s, void *object) > { > + unsigned long freepointer_addr; > void *p; > > if (!debug_pagealloc_enabled()) > return get_freepointer(s, object); > > - probe_kernel_read(&p, (void **)(object + s->offset), sizeof(p)); > - return p; > + freepointer_addr = (unsigned long)object + s->offset; > + probe_kernel_read(&p, (void **)freepointer_addr, sizeof(p)); > + return FREEPTR_VAL(p, freepointer_addr, s); > } > > static inline void set_freepointer(struct kmem_cache *s, void *object, void *fp) > { > - *(void **)(object + s->offset) = fp; > + unsigned long freeptr_addr = (unsigned long)object + s->offset; > + > + *(void **)freeptr_addr = FREEPTR_VAL(fp, freeptr_addr, s); > } > > /* Loop over all objects in a slab */ > @@ -3536,6 +3557,7 @@ static int kmem_cache_open(struct kmem_cache *s, unsigned long flags) > { > s->flags = kmem_cache_flags(s->size, flags, s->name, s->ctor); > s->reserved = 0; > + initialize_random(s); > > if (need_reserve_slab_rcu && (s->flags & SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU)) > s->reserved = sizeof(struct rcu_head); >
On Tue, Jun 20, 2017 at 11:05 AM, Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com> wrote: > On 06/19/2017 08:01 PM, Kees Cook wrote: >> This SLUB free list pointer obfuscation code is modified from Brad >> Spengler/PaX Team's code in the last public patch of grsecurity/PaX based >> on my understanding of the code. Changes or omissions from the original >> code are mine and don't reflect the original grsecurity/PaX code. >> >> This adds a per-cache random value to SLUB caches that is XORed with >> their freelist pointers. This adds nearly zero overhead and frustrates the >> very common heap overflow exploitation method of overwriting freelist >> pointers. A recent example of the attack is written up here: >> http://cyseclabs.com/blog/cve-2016-6187-heap-off-by-one-exploit >> >> This is based on patches by Daniel Micay, and refactored to avoid lots >> of #ifdef code. >> >> Suggested-by: Daniel Micay <danielmicay@gmail.com> >> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> >> --- >> include/linux/slub_def.h | 4 ++++ >> init/Kconfig | 10 ++++++++++ >> mm/slub.c | 32 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++----- >> 3 files changed, 41 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) >> >> diff --git a/include/linux/slub_def.h b/include/linux/slub_def.h >> index 07ef550c6627..0258d6d74e9c 100644 >> --- a/include/linux/slub_def.h >> +++ b/include/linux/slub_def.h >> @@ -93,6 +93,10 @@ struct kmem_cache { >> #endif >> #endif >> >> +#ifdef CONFIG_SLAB_HARDENED >> + unsigned long random; >> +#endif >> + >> #ifdef CONFIG_NUMA >> /* >> * Defragmentation by allocating from a remote node. >> diff --git a/init/Kconfig b/init/Kconfig >> index 1d3475fc9496..eb91082546bf 100644 >> --- a/init/Kconfig >> +++ b/init/Kconfig >> @@ -1900,6 +1900,16 @@ config SLAB_FREELIST_RANDOM >> security feature reduces the predictability of the kernel slab >> allocator against heap overflows. >> >> +config SLAB_HARDENED >> + bool "Harden slab cache infrastructure" >> + default y >> + depends on SLAB_FREELIST_RANDOM && SLUB> + help >> + Many kernel heap attacks try to target slab cache metadata and >> + other infrastructure. This options makes minor performance >> + sacrifies to harden the kernel slab allocator against common >> + exploit methods. >> + > > Going to bikeshed on SLAB_HARDENED unless this is intended to be used for > more things. Perhaps SLAB_FREELIST_HARDENED? Daniel's tree has a bunch of changes attached to that config name, but it's unclear to me how many would be accepted upstream. I would be fine with SLAB_FREELIST_HARDENED. > What's the reason for the dependency on SLAB_FREELIST_RANDOM? Looking at it again, I suspect the idea was to collect other configs under SLAB_HARDENED. It should likely be either be a select or just dropped. -Kees
diff --git a/include/linux/slub_def.h b/include/linux/slub_def.h index 07ef550c6627..0258d6d74e9c 100644 --- a/include/linux/slub_def.h +++ b/include/linux/slub_def.h @@ -93,6 +93,10 @@ struct kmem_cache { #endif #endif +#ifdef CONFIG_SLAB_HARDENED + unsigned long random; +#endif + #ifdef CONFIG_NUMA /* * Defragmentation by allocating from a remote node. diff --git a/init/Kconfig b/init/Kconfig index 1d3475fc9496..eb91082546bf 100644 --- a/init/Kconfig +++ b/init/Kconfig @@ -1900,6 +1900,16 @@ config SLAB_FREELIST_RANDOM security feature reduces the predictability of the kernel slab allocator against heap overflows. +config SLAB_HARDENED + bool "Harden slab cache infrastructure" + default y + depends on SLAB_FREELIST_RANDOM && SLUB + help + Many kernel heap attacks try to target slab cache metadata and + other infrastructure. This options makes minor performance + sacrifies to harden the kernel slab allocator against common + exploit methods. + config SLUB_CPU_PARTIAL default y depends on SLUB && SMP diff --git a/mm/slub.c b/mm/slub.c index 57e5156f02be..ffede2e0c5c1 100644 --- a/mm/slub.c +++ b/mm/slub.c @@ -34,6 +34,7 @@ #include <linux/stacktrace.h> #include <linux/prefetch.h> #include <linux/memcontrol.h> +#include <linux/random.h> #include <trace/events/kmem.h> @@ -238,30 +239,50 @@ static inline void stat(const struct kmem_cache *s, enum stat_item si) * Core slab cache functions *******************************************************************/ +#ifdef CONFIG_SLAB_HARDENED +# define initialize_random(s) \ + do { \ + s->random = get_random_long(); \ + } while (0) +# define FREEPTR_VAL(ptr, ptr_addr, s) \ + (void *)((unsigned long)(ptr) ^ s->random ^ (ptr_addr)) +#else +# define initialize_random(s) do { } while (0) +# define FREEPTR_VAL(ptr, addr, s) ((void *)(ptr)) +#endif +#define FREELIST_ENTRY(ptr_addr, s) \ + FREEPTR_VAL(*(unsigned long *)(ptr_addr), \ + (unsigned long)ptr_addr, s) + static inline void *get_freepointer(struct kmem_cache *s, void *object) { - return *(void **)(object + s->offset); + return FREELIST_ENTRY(object + s->offset, s); } static void prefetch_freepointer(const struct kmem_cache *s, void *object) { - prefetch(object + s->offset); + if (object) + prefetch(FREELIST_ENTRY(object + s->offset, s)); } static inline void *get_freepointer_safe(struct kmem_cache *s, void *object) { + unsigned long freepointer_addr; void *p; if (!debug_pagealloc_enabled()) return get_freepointer(s, object); - probe_kernel_read(&p, (void **)(object + s->offset), sizeof(p)); - return p; + freepointer_addr = (unsigned long)object + s->offset; + probe_kernel_read(&p, (void **)freepointer_addr, sizeof(p)); + return FREEPTR_VAL(p, freepointer_addr, s); } static inline void set_freepointer(struct kmem_cache *s, void *object, void *fp) { - *(void **)(object + s->offset) = fp; + unsigned long freeptr_addr = (unsigned long)object + s->offset; + + *(void **)freeptr_addr = FREEPTR_VAL(fp, freeptr_addr, s); } /* Loop over all objects in a slab */ @@ -3536,6 +3557,7 @@ static int kmem_cache_open(struct kmem_cache *s, unsigned long flags) { s->flags = kmem_cache_flags(s->size, flags, s->name, s->ctor); s->reserved = 0; + initialize_random(s); if (need_reserve_slab_rcu && (s->flags & SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU)) s->reserved = sizeof(struct rcu_head);
This SLUB free list pointer obfuscation code is modified from Brad Spengler/PaX Team's code in the last public patch of grsecurity/PaX based on my understanding of the code. Changes or omissions from the original code are mine and don't reflect the original grsecurity/PaX code. This adds a per-cache random value to SLUB caches that is XORed with their freelist pointers. This adds nearly zero overhead and frustrates the very common heap overflow exploitation method of overwriting freelist pointers. A recent example of the attack is written up here: http://cyseclabs.com/blog/cve-2016-6187-heap-off-by-one-exploit This is based on patches by Daniel Micay, and refactored to avoid lots of #ifdef code. Suggested-by: Daniel Micay <danielmicay@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> --- include/linux/slub_def.h | 4 ++++ init/Kconfig | 10 ++++++++++ mm/slub.c | 32 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++----- 3 files changed, 41 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)