| Message ID | 1502808237-2035-6-git-send-email-zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com (mailing list archive) |
|---|---|
| State | New, archived |
| Headers | show |
On Tue, Aug 15, 2017 at 5:43 PM, Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> wrote: > Permit normally denied access/execute permission for files in policy > on IMA unsupported filesystems. This patch defines the "dont_failsafe" > policy action rule. > > Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> > > --- > Changelog v3: > - include dont_failsafe rule when displaying policy > - fail attempt to add dont_failsafe rule when appending to the policy > > Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy | 3 ++- > security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 1 + > security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 12 +++++++++++- > security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 29 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- > 4 files changed, 42 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) > > diff --git a/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy b/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy > index e76432b9954d..f271207743e5 100644 > --- a/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy > +++ b/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy > @@ -17,7 +17,8 @@ Description: > > rule format: action [condition ...] > > - action: measure | dont_measure | appraise | dont_appraise | audit > + action: measure | dont_meaure | appraise | dont_appraise | > + audit | dont_failsafe > condition:= base | lsm [option] > base: [[func=] [mask=] [fsmagic=] [fsuuid=] [uid=] > [euid=] [fowner=]] > diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h > index d52b487ad259..c5f34f7c5b0f 100644 > --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h > +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h > @@ -224,6 +224,7 @@ void *ima_policy_start(struct seq_file *m, loff_t *pos); > void *ima_policy_next(struct seq_file *m, void *v, loff_t *pos); > void ima_policy_stop(struct seq_file *m, void *v); > int ima_policy_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v); > +void set_failsafe(bool flag); > > /* Appraise integrity measurements */ > #define IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE 0x01 > diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c > index d23dfe6ede18..b00186914df8 100644 > --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c > +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c > @@ -38,6 +38,12 @@ int ima_appraise; > int ima_hash_algo = HASH_ALGO_SHA1; > static int hash_setup_done; > > +static bool ima_failsafe = 1; > +void set_failsafe(bool flag) > +{ > + ima_failsafe = flag; > +} > + > static int __init hash_setup(char *str) > { > struct ima_template_desc *template_desc = ima_template_desc_current(); > @@ -260,8 +266,12 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, char *buf, loff_t size, > __putname(pathbuf); > out: > inode_unlock(inode); > - if ((rc && must_appraise) && (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE)) > + if ((rc && must_appraise) && (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE)) { > + if (!ima_failsafe && rc == -EBADF) > + return 0; > + By default IMA is failsafe. ima_failsafe is true. Return 0 is needed in failsafe mode. right? But in this logic it will happen if ima_failsafe is false. meaning it is not failsafe. Is it a typo? > return -EACCES; > + } > return 0; > } > > diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c > index 95209a5f8595..43b85a4fb8e8 100644 > --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c > +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c > @@ -40,12 +40,14 @@ > #define APPRAISE 0x0004 /* same as IMA_APPRAISE */ > #define DONT_APPRAISE 0x0008 > #define AUDIT 0x0040 > +#define DONT_FAILSAFE 0x0400 > > #define INVALID_PCR(a) (((a) < 0) || \ > (a) >= (FIELD_SIZEOF(struct integrity_iint_cache, measured_pcrs) * 8)) > > int ima_policy_flag; > static int temp_ima_appraise; > +static bool temp_failsafe = 1; > > #define MAX_LSM_RULES 6 > enum lsm_rule_types { LSM_OBJ_USER, LSM_OBJ_ROLE, LSM_OBJ_TYPE, > @@ -513,6 +515,9 @@ void ima_update_policy(void) > if (ima_rules != policy) { > ima_policy_flag = 0; > ima_rules = policy; > + > + /* Only update on initial policy replacement, not append */ > + set_failsafe(temp_failsafe); > } > ima_update_policy_flag(); > } > @@ -529,7 +534,7 @@ enum { > Opt_uid_gt, Opt_euid_gt, Opt_fowner_gt, > Opt_uid_lt, Opt_euid_lt, Opt_fowner_lt, > Opt_appraise_type, Opt_permit_directio, > - Opt_pcr > + Opt_pcr, Opt_dont_failsafe > }; > > static match_table_t policy_tokens = { > @@ -560,6 +565,7 @@ static match_table_t policy_tokens = { > {Opt_appraise_type, "appraise_type=%s"}, > {Opt_permit_directio, "permit_directio"}, > {Opt_pcr, "pcr=%s"}, > + {Opt_dont_failsafe, "dont_failsafe"}, > {Opt_err, NULL} > }; > > @@ -630,6 +636,11 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry) > if ((*p == '\0') || (*p == ' ') || (*p == '\t')) > continue; > token = match_token(p, policy_tokens, args); > + if (entry->action == DONT_FAILSAFE) { > + /* no args permitted, force invalid rule */ > + token = Opt_dont_failsafe; > + } > + > switch (token) { > case Opt_measure: > ima_log_string(ab, "action", "measure"); > @@ -671,6 +682,19 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry) > > entry->action = AUDIT; > break; > + case Opt_dont_failsafe: > + ima_log_string(ab, "action", "dont_failsafe"); > + > + if (entry->action != UNKNOWN) > + result = -EINVAL; > + > + /* Permit on initial policy replacement only */ > + if (ima_rules != &ima_policy_rules) > + temp_failsafe = 0; > + else > + result = -EINVAL; > + entry->action = DONT_FAILSAFE; > + break; > case Opt_func: > ima_log_string(ab, "func", args[0].from); > > @@ -949,6 +973,7 @@ void ima_delete_rules(void) > int i; > > temp_ima_appraise = 0; > + temp_failsafe = 1; > list_for_each_entry_safe(entry, tmp, &ima_temp_rules, list) { > for (i = 0; i < MAX_LSM_RULES; i++) > kfree(entry->lsm[i].args_p); > @@ -1040,6 +1065,8 @@ int ima_policy_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v) > seq_puts(m, pt(Opt_dont_appraise)); > if (entry->action & AUDIT) > seq_puts(m, pt(Opt_audit)); > + if (entry->action & DONT_FAILSAFE) > + seq_puts(m, pt(Opt_dont_failsafe)); > > seq_puts(m, " "); > > -- > 2.7.4 > > -- > To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-security-module" in > the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org > More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
On Tue, 2017-08-22 at 13:07 +0300, Dmitry Kasatkin wrote: > On Tue, Aug 15, 2017 at 5:43 PM, Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> wrote: > > Permit normally denied access/execute permission for files in policy > > on IMA unsupported filesystems. This patch defines the "dont_failsafe" > > policy action rule. > > > > Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> > > > > --- > > Changelog v3: > > - include dont_failsafe rule when displaying policy > > - fail attempt to add dont_failsafe rule when appending to the policy > > > > Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy | 3 ++- > > security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 1 + > > security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 12 +++++++++++- > > security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 29 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- > > 4 files changed, 42 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) > > > > diff --git a/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy b/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy > > index e76432b9954d..f271207743e5 100644 > > --- a/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy > > +++ b/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy > > @@ -17,7 +17,8 @@ Description: > > > > rule format: action [condition ...] > > > > - action: measure | dont_measure | appraise | dont_appraise | audit > > + action: measure | dont_meaure | appraise | dont_appraise | > > + audit | dont_failsafe > > condition:= base | lsm [option] > > base: [[func=] [mask=] [fsmagic=] [fsuuid=] [uid=] > > [euid=] [fowner=]] > > diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h > > index d52b487ad259..c5f34f7c5b0f 100644 > > --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h > > +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h > > @@ -224,6 +224,7 @@ void *ima_policy_start(struct seq_file *m, loff_t *pos); > > void *ima_policy_next(struct seq_file *m, void *v, loff_t *pos); > > void ima_policy_stop(struct seq_file *m, void *v); > > int ima_policy_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v); > > +void set_failsafe(bool flag); > > > > /* Appraise integrity measurements */ > > #define IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE 0x01 > > diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c > > index d23dfe6ede18..b00186914df8 100644 > > --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c > > +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c > > @@ -38,6 +38,12 @@ int ima_appraise; > > int ima_hash_algo = HASH_ALGO_SHA1; > > static int hash_setup_done; > > > > +static bool ima_failsafe = 1; > > +void set_failsafe(bool flag) > > +{ > > + ima_failsafe = flag; > > +} > > + > > static int __init hash_setup(char *str) > > { > > struct ima_template_desc *template_desc = ima_template_desc_current(); > > @@ -260,8 +266,12 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, char *buf, loff_t size, > > __putname(pathbuf); > > out: > > inode_unlock(inode); > > - if ((rc && must_appraise) && (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE)) > > + if ((rc && must_appraise) && (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE)) { > > + if (!ima_failsafe && rc == -EBADF) > > + return 0; > > + > > By default IMA is failsafe. ima_failsafe is true. > Return 0 is needed in failsafe mode. right? > But in this logic it will happen if ima_failsafe is false. meaning it > is not failsafe. > > Is it a typo? No, the default, as you pointed out above, is failsafe mode. Only when we are not in failsafe mode, do we allow the file access/execute for file's that we could not appraise. Mimi
On Tue, Aug 22, 2017 at 3:54 PM, Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> wrote: > On Tue, 2017-08-22 at 13:07 +0300, Dmitry Kasatkin wrote: >> On Tue, Aug 15, 2017 at 5:43 PM, Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> wrote: >> > Permit normally denied access/execute permission for files in policy >> > on IMA unsupported filesystems. This patch defines the "dont_failsafe" >> > policy action rule. >> > >> > Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> >> > >> > --- >> > Changelog v3: >> > - include dont_failsafe rule when displaying policy >> > - fail attempt to add dont_failsafe rule when appending to the policy >> > >> > Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy | 3 ++- >> > security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 1 + >> > security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 12 +++++++++++- >> > security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 29 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- >> > 4 files changed, 42 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) >> > >> > diff --git a/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy b/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy >> > index e76432b9954d..f271207743e5 100644 >> > --- a/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy >> > +++ b/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy >> > @@ -17,7 +17,8 @@ Description: >> > >> > rule format: action [condition ...] >> > >> > - action: measure | dont_measure | appraise | dont_appraise | audit >> > + action: measure | dont_meaure | appraise | dont_appraise | >> > + audit | dont_failsafe >> > condition:= base | lsm [option] >> > base: [[func=] [mask=] [fsmagic=] [fsuuid=] [uid=] >> > [euid=] [fowner=]] >> > diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h >> > index d52b487ad259..c5f34f7c5b0f 100644 >> > --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h >> > +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h >> > @@ -224,6 +224,7 @@ void *ima_policy_start(struct seq_file *m, loff_t *pos); >> > void *ima_policy_next(struct seq_file *m, void *v, loff_t *pos); >> > void ima_policy_stop(struct seq_file *m, void *v); >> > int ima_policy_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v); >> > +void set_failsafe(bool flag); >> > >> > /* Appraise integrity measurements */ >> > #define IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE 0x01 >> > diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c >> > index d23dfe6ede18..b00186914df8 100644 >> > --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c >> > +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c >> > @@ -38,6 +38,12 @@ int ima_appraise; >> > int ima_hash_algo = HASH_ALGO_SHA1; >> > static int hash_setup_done; >> > >> > +static bool ima_failsafe = 1; >> > +void set_failsafe(bool flag) >> > +{ >> > + ima_failsafe = flag; >> > +} >> > + >> > static int __init hash_setup(char *str) >> > { >> > struct ima_template_desc *template_desc = ima_template_desc_current(); >> > @@ -260,8 +266,12 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, char *buf, loff_t size, >> > __putname(pathbuf); >> > out: >> > inode_unlock(inode); >> > - if ((rc && must_appraise) && (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE)) >> > + if ((rc && must_appraise) && (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE)) { >> > + if (!ima_failsafe && rc == -EBADF) >> > + return 0; >> > + >> >> By default IMA is failsafe. ima_failsafe is true. >> Return 0 is needed in failsafe mode. right? >> But in this logic it will happen if ima_failsafe is false. meaning it >> is not failsafe. >> >> Is it a typo? > > No, the default, as you pointed out above, is failsafe mode. Only when we are not in failsafe mode, do we allow the file access/execute for file's that we could not appraise. > > Mimi > So in your language "failsafe" means IMA must fail/return with error on failure.. Ok. then logic is correct and OK with me.
diff --git a/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy b/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy index e76432b9954d..f271207743e5 100644 --- a/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy +++ b/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy @@ -17,7 +17,8 @@ Description: rule format: action [condition ...] - action: measure | dont_measure | appraise | dont_appraise | audit + action: measure | dont_meaure | appraise | dont_appraise | + audit | dont_failsafe condition:= base | lsm [option] base: [[func=] [mask=] [fsmagic=] [fsuuid=] [uid=] [euid=] [fowner=]] diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h index d52b487ad259..c5f34f7c5b0f 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h @@ -224,6 +224,7 @@ void *ima_policy_start(struct seq_file *m, loff_t *pos); void *ima_policy_next(struct seq_file *m, void *v, loff_t *pos); void ima_policy_stop(struct seq_file *m, void *v); int ima_policy_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v); +void set_failsafe(bool flag); /* Appraise integrity measurements */ #define IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE 0x01 diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c index d23dfe6ede18..b00186914df8 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c @@ -38,6 +38,12 @@ int ima_appraise; int ima_hash_algo = HASH_ALGO_SHA1; static int hash_setup_done; +static bool ima_failsafe = 1; +void set_failsafe(bool flag) +{ + ima_failsafe = flag; +} + static int __init hash_setup(char *str) { struct ima_template_desc *template_desc = ima_template_desc_current(); @@ -260,8 +266,12 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, char *buf, loff_t size, __putname(pathbuf); out: inode_unlock(inode); - if ((rc && must_appraise) && (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE)) + if ((rc && must_appraise) && (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE)) { + if (!ima_failsafe && rc == -EBADF) + return 0; + return -EACCES; + } return 0; } diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c index 95209a5f8595..43b85a4fb8e8 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c @@ -40,12 +40,14 @@ #define APPRAISE 0x0004 /* same as IMA_APPRAISE */ #define DONT_APPRAISE 0x0008 #define AUDIT 0x0040 +#define DONT_FAILSAFE 0x0400 #define INVALID_PCR(a) (((a) < 0) || \ (a) >= (FIELD_SIZEOF(struct integrity_iint_cache, measured_pcrs) * 8)) int ima_policy_flag; static int temp_ima_appraise; +static bool temp_failsafe = 1; #define MAX_LSM_RULES 6 enum lsm_rule_types { LSM_OBJ_USER, LSM_OBJ_ROLE, LSM_OBJ_TYPE, @@ -513,6 +515,9 @@ void ima_update_policy(void) if (ima_rules != policy) { ima_policy_flag = 0; ima_rules = policy; + + /* Only update on initial policy replacement, not append */ + set_failsafe(temp_failsafe); } ima_update_policy_flag(); } @@ -529,7 +534,7 @@ enum { Opt_uid_gt, Opt_euid_gt, Opt_fowner_gt, Opt_uid_lt, Opt_euid_lt, Opt_fowner_lt, Opt_appraise_type, Opt_permit_directio, - Opt_pcr + Opt_pcr, Opt_dont_failsafe }; static match_table_t policy_tokens = { @@ -560,6 +565,7 @@ static match_table_t policy_tokens = { {Opt_appraise_type, "appraise_type=%s"}, {Opt_permit_directio, "permit_directio"}, {Opt_pcr, "pcr=%s"}, + {Opt_dont_failsafe, "dont_failsafe"}, {Opt_err, NULL} }; @@ -630,6 +636,11 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry) if ((*p == '\0') || (*p == ' ') || (*p == '\t')) continue; token = match_token(p, policy_tokens, args); + if (entry->action == DONT_FAILSAFE) { + /* no args permitted, force invalid rule */ + token = Opt_dont_failsafe; + } + switch (token) { case Opt_measure: ima_log_string(ab, "action", "measure"); @@ -671,6 +682,19 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry) entry->action = AUDIT; break; + case Opt_dont_failsafe: + ima_log_string(ab, "action", "dont_failsafe"); + + if (entry->action != UNKNOWN) + result = -EINVAL; + + /* Permit on initial policy replacement only */ + if (ima_rules != &ima_policy_rules) + temp_failsafe = 0; + else + result = -EINVAL; + entry->action = DONT_FAILSAFE; + break; case Opt_func: ima_log_string(ab, "func", args[0].from); @@ -949,6 +973,7 @@ void ima_delete_rules(void) int i; temp_ima_appraise = 0; + temp_failsafe = 1; list_for_each_entry_safe(entry, tmp, &ima_temp_rules, list) { for (i = 0; i < MAX_LSM_RULES; i++) kfree(entry->lsm[i].args_p); @@ -1040,6 +1065,8 @@ int ima_policy_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v) seq_puts(m, pt(Opt_dont_appraise)); if (entry->action & AUDIT) seq_puts(m, pt(Opt_audit)); + if (entry->action & DONT_FAILSAFE) + seq_puts(m, pt(Opt_dont_failsafe)); seq_puts(m, " ");
Permit normally denied access/execute permission for files in policy on IMA unsupported filesystems. This patch defines the "dont_failsafe" policy action rule. Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> --- Changelog v3: - include dont_failsafe rule when displaying policy - fail attempt to add dont_failsafe rule when appending to the policy Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy | 3 ++- security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 1 + security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 12 +++++++++++- security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 29 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- 4 files changed, 42 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)