Message ID | 20180207160638.98872-5-brijesh.singh@amd.com (mailing list archive) |
---|---|
State | New, archived |
Headers | show |
On 07/02/2018 17:06, Brijesh Singh wrote: > AMD EPYC processors support memory encryption feature. The feature > is reported through CPUID 8000_001F[EAX]. > > Fn8000_001F [EAX]: > Bit 0 Secure Memory Encryption (SME) supported > Bit 1 Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) supported > Bit 2 Page flush MSR supported > Bit 3 Ecrypted State (SEV-ES) support > > when memory encryption feature is reported, CPUID 8000_001F[EBX] should > provide additional information regarding the feature (such as which page > table bit is used to mark pages as encrypted etc). The information in EBX > and ECX may vary from one family to another hence we use the host cpuid > to populate the EBX information. > > The details for memory encryption CPUID is available in AMD APM > (https://support.amd.com/TechDocs/24594.pdf) Section E.4.17 > > Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> > Cc: Richard Henderson <rth@twiddle.net> > Cc: Eduardo Habkost <ehabkost@redhat.com> > Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com> > --- > target/i386/cpu.c | 36 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ > target/i386/cpu.h | 6 ++++++ > 2 files changed, 42 insertions(+) > > diff --git a/target/i386/cpu.c b/target/i386/cpu.c > index a49d2221adc9..4147eb6e18a9 100644 > --- a/target/i386/cpu.c > +++ b/target/i386/cpu.c > @@ -234,6 +234,7 @@ static void x86_cpu_vendor_words2str(char *dst, uint32_t vendor1, > #define TCG_EXT4_FEATURES 0 > #define TCG_SVM_FEATURES 0 > #define TCG_KVM_FEATURES 0 > +#define TCG_MEM_ENCRYPT_FEATURES 0 > #define TCG_7_0_EBX_FEATURES (CPUID_7_0_EBX_SMEP | CPUID_7_0_EBX_SMAP | \ > CPUID_7_0_EBX_BMI1 | CPUID_7_0_EBX_BMI2 | CPUID_7_0_EBX_ADX | \ > CPUID_7_0_EBX_PCOMMIT | CPUID_7_0_EBX_CLFLUSHOPT | \ > @@ -545,6 +546,20 @@ static FeatureWordInfo feature_word_info[FEATURE_WORDS] = { > .cpuid_reg = R_EDX, > .tcg_features = ~0U, > }, > + [FEAT_MEM_ENCRYPT] = { > + .feat_names = { > + "sme", "sev", "page-flush-msr", "sev-es", Why would sme ever be on in a guest? That is, would a guest care about whether SME is on in the host? Paolo > + NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, > + NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, > + NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, > + NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, > + NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, > + NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, > + NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, > + }, > + .cpuid_eax = 0x8000001F, .cpuid_reg = R_EAX, > + .tcg_features = TCG_MEM_ENCRYPT_FEATURES, > + } > }; > > typedef struct X86RegisterInfo32 { > @@ -1965,6 +1980,9 @@ static X86CPUDefinition builtin_x86_defs[] = { > CPUID_XSAVE_XGETBV1, > .features[FEAT_6_EAX] = > CPUID_6_EAX_ARAT, > + /* Missing: SEV_ES */ > + .features[FEAT_MEM_ENCRYPT] = > + CPUID_8000_001F_EAX_SME | CPUID_8000_001F_EAX_SEV, > .xlevel = 0x8000000A, > .model_id = "AMD EPYC Processor", > }, > @@ -3589,6 +3607,19 @@ void cpu_x86_cpuid(CPUX86State *env, uint32_t index, uint32_t count, > *edx = 0; > } > break; > + case 0x8000001F: > + if (env->features[FEAT_MEM_ENCRYPT] & CPUID_8000_001F_EAX_SEV) { > + *eax = env->features[FEAT_MEM_ENCRYPT]; > + host_cpuid(0x8000001F, 0, NULL, ebx, NULL, NULL); > + *ecx = 0; > + *edx = 0; > + } else { > + *eax = 0; > + *ebx = 0; > + *ecx = 0; > + *edx = 0; > + } > + break; > case 0xC0000000: > *eax = env->cpuid_xlevel2; > *ebx = 0; > @@ -4036,10 +4067,15 @@ static void x86_cpu_expand_features(X86CPU *cpu, Error **errp) > x86_cpu_adjust_feat_level(cpu, FEAT_C000_0001_EDX); > x86_cpu_adjust_feat_level(cpu, FEAT_SVM); > x86_cpu_adjust_feat_level(cpu, FEAT_XSAVE); > + x86_cpu_adjust_feat_level(cpu, FEAT_MEM_ENCRYPT); > /* SVM requires CPUID[0x8000000A] */ > if (env->features[FEAT_8000_0001_ECX] & CPUID_EXT3_SVM) { > x86_cpu_adjust_level(cpu, &env->cpuid_min_xlevel, 0x8000000A); > } > + /* SEV requires CPUID[0x8000001F] */ > + if ((env->features[FEAT_MEM_ENCRYPT] & CPUID_8000_001F_EAX_SEV)) { > + x86_cpu_adjust_level(cpu, &env->cpuid_min_xlevel, 0x8000001F); > + } > } > > /* Set cpuid_*level* based on cpuid_min_*level, if not explicitly set */ > diff --git a/target/i386/cpu.h b/target/i386/cpu.h > index f91e37d25dea..f7a0ab20fdd1 100644 > --- a/target/i386/cpu.h > +++ b/target/i386/cpu.h > @@ -483,6 +483,7 @@ typedef enum FeatureWord { > FEAT_6_EAX, /* CPUID[6].EAX */ > FEAT_XSAVE_COMP_LO, /* CPUID[EAX=0xd,ECX=0].EAX */ > FEAT_XSAVE_COMP_HI, /* CPUID[EAX=0xd,ECX=0].EDX */ > + FEAT_MEM_ENCRYPT, /* CPUID[8000_001F].EAX */ > FEATURE_WORDS, > } FeatureWord; > > @@ -679,6 +680,11 @@ typedef uint32_t FeatureWordArray[FEATURE_WORDS]; > > #define CPUID_6_EAX_ARAT (1U << 2) > > +#define CPUID_8000_001F_EAX_SME (1U << 0) /* SME */ > +#define CPUID_8000_001F_EAX_SEV (1U << 1) /* SEV */ > +#define CPUID_8000_001F_EAX_PAGE_FLUSH_MSR (1U << 2) /* Page flush MSR */ > +#define CPUID_8000_001F_EAX_SEV_ES (1U << 3) /* SEV-ES */ > + > /* CPUID[0x80000007].EDX flags: */ > #define CPUID_APM_INVTSC (1U << 8) > >
On 02/07/2018 10:54 AM, Paolo Bonzini wrote: > On 07/02/2018 17:06, Brijesh Singh wrote: >> AMD EPYC processors support memory encryption feature. The feature >> is reported through CPUID 8000_001F[EAX]. >> >> Fn8000_001F [EAX]: >> Bit 0 Secure Memory Encryption (SME) supported >> Bit 1 Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) supported >> Bit 2 Page flush MSR supported >> Bit 3 Ecrypted State (SEV-ES) support >> >> when memory encryption feature is reported, CPUID 8000_001F[EBX] should >> provide additional information regarding the feature (such as which page >> table bit is used to mark pages as encrypted etc). The information in EBX >> and ECX may vary from one family to another hence we use the host cpuid >> to populate the EBX information. >> >> The details for memory encryption CPUID is available in AMD APM >> (https://support.amd.com/TechDocs/24594.pdf) Section E.4.17 >> >> Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> >> Cc: Richard Henderson <rth@twiddle.net> >> Cc: Eduardo Habkost <ehabkost@redhat.com> >> Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com> >> --- >> target/i386/cpu.c | 36 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ >> target/i386/cpu.h | 6 ++++++ >> 2 files changed, 42 insertions(+) >> >> diff --git a/target/i386/cpu.c b/target/i386/cpu.c >> index a49d2221adc9..4147eb6e18a9 100644 >> --- a/target/i386/cpu.c >> +++ b/target/i386/cpu.c >> @@ -234,6 +234,7 @@ static void x86_cpu_vendor_words2str(char *dst, uint32_t vendor1, >> #define TCG_EXT4_FEATURES 0 >> #define TCG_SVM_FEATURES 0 >> #define TCG_KVM_FEATURES 0 >> +#define TCG_MEM_ENCRYPT_FEATURES 0 >> #define TCG_7_0_EBX_FEATURES (CPUID_7_0_EBX_SMEP | CPUID_7_0_EBX_SMAP | \ >> CPUID_7_0_EBX_BMI1 | CPUID_7_0_EBX_BMI2 | CPUID_7_0_EBX_ADX | \ >> CPUID_7_0_EBX_PCOMMIT | CPUID_7_0_EBX_CLFLUSHOPT | \ >> @@ -545,6 +546,20 @@ static FeatureWordInfo feature_word_info[FEATURE_WORDS] = { >> .cpuid_reg = R_EDX, >> .tcg_features = ~0U, >> }, >> + [FEAT_MEM_ENCRYPT] = { >> + .feat_names = { >> + "sme", "sev", "page-flush-msr", "sev-es", > > Why would sme ever be on in a guest? That is, would a guest care about > whether SME is on in the host? Guest does not need the SME feature bit exposed and it does not care whether SME is enabled on the host. Since I was defining the bit fields from 8000_001F EAX hence I tried to list them all. In next version, I will update the MEM_ENCRYPT feature to expose just SEV. Thanks
diff --git a/target/i386/cpu.c b/target/i386/cpu.c index a49d2221adc9..4147eb6e18a9 100644 --- a/target/i386/cpu.c +++ b/target/i386/cpu.c @@ -234,6 +234,7 @@ static void x86_cpu_vendor_words2str(char *dst, uint32_t vendor1, #define TCG_EXT4_FEATURES 0 #define TCG_SVM_FEATURES 0 #define TCG_KVM_FEATURES 0 +#define TCG_MEM_ENCRYPT_FEATURES 0 #define TCG_7_0_EBX_FEATURES (CPUID_7_0_EBX_SMEP | CPUID_7_0_EBX_SMAP | \ CPUID_7_0_EBX_BMI1 | CPUID_7_0_EBX_BMI2 | CPUID_7_0_EBX_ADX | \ CPUID_7_0_EBX_PCOMMIT | CPUID_7_0_EBX_CLFLUSHOPT | \ @@ -545,6 +546,20 @@ static FeatureWordInfo feature_word_info[FEATURE_WORDS] = { .cpuid_reg = R_EDX, .tcg_features = ~0U, }, + [FEAT_MEM_ENCRYPT] = { + .feat_names = { + "sme", "sev", "page-flush-msr", "sev-es", + NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, + NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, + NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, + NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, + NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, + NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, + NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, + }, + .cpuid_eax = 0x8000001F, .cpuid_reg = R_EAX, + .tcg_features = TCG_MEM_ENCRYPT_FEATURES, + } }; typedef struct X86RegisterInfo32 { @@ -1965,6 +1980,9 @@ static X86CPUDefinition builtin_x86_defs[] = { CPUID_XSAVE_XGETBV1, .features[FEAT_6_EAX] = CPUID_6_EAX_ARAT, + /* Missing: SEV_ES */ + .features[FEAT_MEM_ENCRYPT] = + CPUID_8000_001F_EAX_SME | CPUID_8000_001F_EAX_SEV, .xlevel = 0x8000000A, .model_id = "AMD EPYC Processor", }, @@ -3589,6 +3607,19 @@ void cpu_x86_cpuid(CPUX86State *env, uint32_t index, uint32_t count, *edx = 0; } break; + case 0x8000001F: + if (env->features[FEAT_MEM_ENCRYPT] & CPUID_8000_001F_EAX_SEV) { + *eax = env->features[FEAT_MEM_ENCRYPT]; + host_cpuid(0x8000001F, 0, NULL, ebx, NULL, NULL); + *ecx = 0; + *edx = 0; + } else { + *eax = 0; + *ebx = 0; + *ecx = 0; + *edx = 0; + } + break; case 0xC0000000: *eax = env->cpuid_xlevel2; *ebx = 0; @@ -4036,10 +4067,15 @@ static void x86_cpu_expand_features(X86CPU *cpu, Error **errp) x86_cpu_adjust_feat_level(cpu, FEAT_C000_0001_EDX); x86_cpu_adjust_feat_level(cpu, FEAT_SVM); x86_cpu_adjust_feat_level(cpu, FEAT_XSAVE); + x86_cpu_adjust_feat_level(cpu, FEAT_MEM_ENCRYPT); /* SVM requires CPUID[0x8000000A] */ if (env->features[FEAT_8000_0001_ECX] & CPUID_EXT3_SVM) { x86_cpu_adjust_level(cpu, &env->cpuid_min_xlevel, 0x8000000A); } + /* SEV requires CPUID[0x8000001F] */ + if ((env->features[FEAT_MEM_ENCRYPT] & CPUID_8000_001F_EAX_SEV)) { + x86_cpu_adjust_level(cpu, &env->cpuid_min_xlevel, 0x8000001F); + } } /* Set cpuid_*level* based on cpuid_min_*level, if not explicitly set */ diff --git a/target/i386/cpu.h b/target/i386/cpu.h index f91e37d25dea..f7a0ab20fdd1 100644 --- a/target/i386/cpu.h +++ b/target/i386/cpu.h @@ -483,6 +483,7 @@ typedef enum FeatureWord { FEAT_6_EAX, /* CPUID[6].EAX */ FEAT_XSAVE_COMP_LO, /* CPUID[EAX=0xd,ECX=0].EAX */ FEAT_XSAVE_COMP_HI, /* CPUID[EAX=0xd,ECX=0].EDX */ + FEAT_MEM_ENCRYPT, /* CPUID[8000_001F].EAX */ FEATURE_WORDS, } FeatureWord; @@ -679,6 +680,11 @@ typedef uint32_t FeatureWordArray[FEATURE_WORDS]; #define CPUID_6_EAX_ARAT (1U << 2) +#define CPUID_8000_001F_EAX_SME (1U << 0) /* SME */ +#define CPUID_8000_001F_EAX_SEV (1U << 1) /* SEV */ +#define CPUID_8000_001F_EAX_PAGE_FLUSH_MSR (1U << 2) /* Page flush MSR */ +#define CPUID_8000_001F_EAX_SEV_ES (1U << 3) /* SEV-ES */ + /* CPUID[0x80000007].EDX flags: */ #define CPUID_APM_INVTSC (1U << 8)
AMD EPYC processors support memory encryption feature. The feature is reported through CPUID 8000_001F[EAX]. Fn8000_001F [EAX]: Bit 0 Secure Memory Encryption (SME) supported Bit 1 Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) supported Bit 2 Page flush MSR supported Bit 3 Ecrypted State (SEV-ES) support when memory encryption feature is reported, CPUID 8000_001F[EBX] should provide additional information regarding the feature (such as which page table bit is used to mark pages as encrypted etc). The information in EBX and ECX may vary from one family to another hence we use the host cpuid to populate the EBX information. The details for memory encryption CPUID is available in AMD APM (https://support.amd.com/TechDocs/24594.pdf) Section E.4.17 Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Cc: Richard Henderson <rth@twiddle.net> Cc: Eduardo Habkost <ehabkost@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com> --- target/i386/cpu.c | 36 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ target/i386/cpu.h | 6 ++++++ 2 files changed, 42 insertions(+)