| Message ID | 1520107232-14111-3-git-send-email-alex.popov@linux.com (mailing list archive) |
|---|---|
| State | New, archived |
| Headers | show |
On 03/03/2018 12:00 PM, Alexander Popov wrote: > Documentation/x86/x86_64/mm.txt | 2 + > arch/Kconfig | 27 ++++++++++ > arch/x86/Kconfig | 1 + > arch/x86/entry/entry_32.S | 88 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ > arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S | 108 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ > arch/x86/entry/entry_64_compat.S | 11 ++++ This is a *lot* of assembly. I wonder if you tried at all to get more of this into C or whether you just inherited the assembly from the original code?
On 03/05/2018 08:41 AM, Dave Hansen wrote: > On 03/03/2018 12:00 PM, Alexander Popov wrote: >> Documentation/x86/x86_64/mm.txt | 2 + >> arch/Kconfig | 27 ++++++++++ >> arch/x86/Kconfig | 1 + >> arch/x86/entry/entry_32.S | 88 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ >> arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S | 108 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ >> arch/x86/entry/entry_64_compat.S | 11 ++++ > > This is a *lot* of assembly. I wonder if you tried at all to get more > of this into C or whether you just inherited the assembly from the > original code? > This came up previously http://www.openwall.com/lists/kernel-hardening/2017/10/23/5 there were concerns about trusting C to do the right thing as well as speed. Thanks, Laura
On 03/05/2018 11:43 AM, Laura Abbott wrote: > On 03/05/2018 08:41 AM, Dave Hansen wrote: >> On 03/03/2018 12:00 PM, Alexander Popov wrote: >>> Documentation/x86/x86_64/mm.txt | 2 + >>> arch/Kconfig | 27 ++++++++++ >>> arch/x86/Kconfig | 1 + >>> arch/x86/entry/entry_32.S | 88 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ >>> arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S | 108 >>> +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ >>> arch/x86/entry/entry_64_compat.S | 11 ++++ >> >> This is a *lot* of assembly. I wonder if you tried at all to get more >> of this into C or whether you just inherited the assembly from the >> original code? > > This came up previously > http://www.openwall.com/lists/kernel-hardening/2017/10/23/5 > there were concerns about trusting C to do the right thing as well as > speed. I'm really just curious if anyone tried it and what tradeoffs were made.
On Mon, Mar 05, 2018 at 11:43:19AM -0800, Laura Abbott wrote: > On 03/05/2018 08:41 AM, Dave Hansen wrote: > > On 03/03/2018 12:00 PM, Alexander Popov wrote: > > > Documentation/x86/x86_64/mm.txt | 2 + > > > arch/Kconfig | 27 ++++++++++ > > > arch/x86/Kconfig | 1 + > > > arch/x86/entry/entry_32.S | 88 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ > > > arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S | 108 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ > > > arch/x86/entry/entry_64_compat.S | 11 ++++ > > > > This is a *lot* of assembly. I wonder if you tried at all to get more > > of this into C or whether you just inherited the assembly from the > > original code? > > > > This came up previously http://www.openwall.com/lists/kernel-hardening/2017/10/23/5 > there were concerns about trusting C to do the right thing as well as > speed. And therefore the answer to this obvious question should've been part of the Changelog :-) Dave is last in a long line of people asking this same question.
On 05.03.2018 23:25, Peter Zijlstra wrote: > On Mon, Mar 05, 2018 at 11:43:19AM -0800, Laura Abbott wrote: >> On 03/05/2018 08:41 AM, Dave Hansen wrote: >>> On 03/03/2018 12:00 PM, Alexander Popov wrote: >>>> Documentation/x86/x86_64/mm.txt | 2 + >>>> arch/Kconfig | 27 ++++++++++ >>>> arch/x86/Kconfig | 1 + >>>> arch/x86/entry/entry_32.S | 88 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ >>>> arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S | 108 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ >>>> arch/x86/entry/entry_64_compat.S | 11 ++++ >>> >>> This is a *lot* of assembly. I wonder if you tried at all to get more >>> of this into C or whether you just inherited the assembly from the >>> original code? >>> >> >> This came up previously http://www.openwall.com/lists/kernel-hardening/2017/10/23/5 >> there were concerns about trusting C to do the right thing as well as >> speed. > > And therefore the answer to this obvious question should've been part of > the Changelog :-) > > Dave is last in a long line of people asking this same question. Yes, actually the changelog in the cover letter contains that: After some experiments, kept the asm implementation of erase_kstack(), because it gives a full control over the stack for clearing it neatly and doesn't offend KASAN. Moreover, later erase_kstack() on x86_64 became different from one on x86_32. Best regards, Alexander
On Mon, Mar 5, 2018 at 1:21 PM, Alexander Popov <alex.popov@linux.com> wrote: > On 05.03.2018 23:25, Peter Zijlstra wrote: >> On Mon, Mar 05, 2018 at 11:43:19AM -0800, Laura Abbott wrote: >>> On 03/05/2018 08:41 AM, Dave Hansen wrote: >>>> On 03/03/2018 12:00 PM, Alexander Popov wrote: >>>>> Documentation/x86/x86_64/mm.txt | 2 + >>>>> arch/Kconfig | 27 ++++++++++ >>>>> arch/x86/Kconfig | 1 + >>>>> arch/x86/entry/entry_32.S | 88 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ >>>>> arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S | 108 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ >>>>> arch/x86/entry/entry_64_compat.S | 11 ++++ >>>> >>>> This is a *lot* of assembly. I wonder if you tried at all to get more >>>> of this into C or whether you just inherited the assembly from the >>>> original code? >>>> >>> >>> This came up previously http://www.openwall.com/lists/kernel-hardening/2017/10/23/5 >>> there were concerns about trusting C to do the right thing as well as >>> speed. >> >> And therefore the answer to this obvious question should've been part of >> the Changelog :-) >> >> Dave is last in a long line of people asking this same question. > > Yes, actually the changelog in the cover letter contains that: > > After some experiments, kept the asm implementation of erase_kstack(), > because it gives a full control over the stack for clearing it neatly > and doesn't offend KASAN. > > Moreover, later erase_kstack() on x86_64 became different from one on x86_32. Maybe explicitly mention the C experiments in future change log? -Kees
On 05.03.2018 23:25, Peter Zijlstra wrote: > On Mon, Mar 05, 2018 at 11:43:19AM -0800, Laura Abbott wrote: >> On 03/05/2018 08:41 AM, Dave Hansen wrote: >>> On 03/03/2018 12:00 PM, Alexander Popov wrote: >>>> Documentation/x86/x86_64/mm.txt | 2 + >>>> arch/Kconfig | 27 ++++++++++ >>>> arch/x86/Kconfig | 1 + >>>> arch/x86/entry/entry_32.S | 88 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ >>>> arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S | 108 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ >>>> arch/x86/entry/entry_64_compat.S | 11 ++++ >>> >>> This is a *lot* of assembly. I wonder if you tried at all to get more >>> of this into C or whether you just inherited the assembly from the >>> original code? >>> >> >> This came up previously http://www.openwall.com/lists/kernel-hardening/2017/10/23/5 >> there were concerns about trusting C to do the right thing as well as >> speed. > > And therefore the answer to this obvious question should've been part of > the Changelog :-) > > Dave is last in a long line of people asking this same question. Hello! I've decided to share the details (and ask for advice) regardless of the destiny of this patch series. I've rewritten the assembly part in C, please see the code below. That is erase_kstack() function, which is called at the end of syscall just before returning to the userspace. The generated asm doesn't look nice (and might be somewhat slower), but I don't care now. The main obstacle: erase_kstack() must save and restore any modified registers, because it is called from the trampoline stack (introduced by Andy Lutomirski), when all registers except RDI are live. Laura had a similar issue with C code on ARM: http://www.openwall.com/lists/kernel-hardening/2017/10/10/3 I've solved that with no_caller_saved_registers attribute, which makes all registers callee-saved. But that attribute was introduced only in gcc-7. Does kernel have a solution for similar issues? Thanks! -------- >8 -------- #include <linux/bug.h> #include <linux/sched.h> #include <asm/current.h> #include <asm/linkage.h> #include <asm/processor.h> /* This function must save and restore any modified registers */ __attribute__ ((no_caller_saved_registers)) asmlinkage void erase_kstack(void) { register unsigned long p = current->thread.lowest_stack; register unsigned long boundary = p & ~(THREAD_SIZE - 1); unsigned long poison = 0; unsigned long check_depth = STACKLEAK_POISON_CHECK_DEPTH / sizeof(unsigned long); /* * Two qwords at the bottom of the thread stack are reserved and * should not be poisoned (see CONFIG_SCHED_STACK_END_CHECK). */ boundary += 2 * sizeof(unsigned long); /* * Let's search for the poison value in the stack. * Start from the lowest_stack and go to the bottom. */ while (p >= boundary && poison <= check_depth) { if (*(unsigned long *)p == STACKLEAK_POISON) poison++; else poison = 0; p -= sizeof(unsigned long); } #ifdef CONFIG_STACKLEAK_METRICS current->thread.prev_lowest_stack = p; #endif /* * So let's write the poison value to the kernel stack. Start from * the address in p and move up till the new boundary. */ if (on_thread_stack()) boundary = current_stack_pointer; else boundary = current_top_of_stack(); BUG_ON(boundary - p >= THREAD_SIZE); while (p < boundary) { *(unsigned long *)p = STACKLEAK_POISON; p += sizeof(unsigned long); } /* Reset the lowest_stack value for the next syscall */ current->thread.lowest_stack = current_top_of_stack() - 256; }
On 03/21/2018 04:04 AM, Alexander Popov wrote: > The main obstacle: > erase_kstack() must save and restore any modified registers, because it is > called from the trampoline stack (introduced by Andy Lutomirski), when all > registers except RDI are live. Wow, cool, thanks for doing this! PTI might also cause you some problems here because it probably won't map your function. Did you have to put it in one of the sections that gets mapped by the user page tables?
On 21.03.2018 18:33, Dave Hansen wrote: > On 03/21/2018 04:04 AM, Alexander Popov wrote: >> The main obstacle: >> erase_kstack() must save and restore any modified registers, because it is >> called from the trampoline stack (introduced by Andy Lutomirski), when all >> registers except RDI are live. > > Wow, cool, thanks for doing this! > > PTI might also cause you some problems here because it probably won't > map your function. Did you have to put it in one of the sections that > gets mapped by the user page tables? No, I didn't have to do that: erase_kstack() works fine, it is called just before SWITCH_TO_USER_CR3_STACK. There is also a way not to offend KASAN. erase_kstack() C code can be put in a separate source file and compiled with "KASAN_SANITIZE_erase.o := n". So, as I wrote, the only critical drawback of the C implementation is that it needs no_caller_saved_registers attribute, which is provided by gcc since version 7. Can you recommend any solution? By the way, during my work on STACKLEAK, I've found one case when we get to the userspace directly from the thread stack. Please see sysret32_from_system_call in entry_64_compat.S. I checked that. IMO it seems odd, can the adversary use that to bypass PTI? Best regards, Alexander
On Thu, Mar 22, 2018 at 1:56 PM, Alexander Popov <alex.popov@linux.com> wrote: > By the way, during my work on STACKLEAK, I've found one case when we get to the > userspace directly from the thread stack. Please see sysret32_from_system_call > in entry_64_compat.S. I checked that. > > IMO it seems odd, can the adversary use that to bypass PTI? If it was missing the page table swap, shouldn't this mean that the missing NX bit would immediately crash userspace? -Kees
On Mon, Mar 26, 2018 at 5:32 PM, Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> wrote: > On Thu, Mar 22, 2018 at 1:56 PM, Alexander Popov <alex.popov@linux.com> wrote: >> By the way, during my work on STACKLEAK, I've found one case when we get to the >> userspace directly from the thread stack. Please see sysret32_from_system_call >> in entry_64_compat.S. I checked that. >> >> IMO it seems odd, can the adversary use that to bypass PTI? > > If it was missing the page table swap, shouldn't this mean that the > missing NX bit would immediately crash userspace? sysret32_from_system_call does; SWITCH_TO_USER_CR3_NOSTACK scratch_reg=%r8 scratch_reg2=%r9
diff --git a/Documentation/x86/x86_64/mm.txt b/Documentation/x86/x86_64/mm.txt index ea91cb6..21ee7c5 100644 --- a/Documentation/x86/x86_64/mm.txt +++ b/Documentation/x86/x86_64/mm.txt @@ -24,6 +24,7 @@ ffffffffa0000000 - [fixmap start] (~1526 MB) module mapping space (variable) [fixmap start] - ffffffffff5fffff kernel-internal fixmap range ffffffffff600000 - ffffffffff600fff (=4 kB) legacy vsyscall ABI ffffffffffe00000 - ffffffffffffffff (=2 MB) unused hole +STACKLEAK_POISON value in this last hole: ffffffffffff4111 Virtual memory map with 5 level page tables: @@ -50,6 +51,7 @@ ffffffffa0000000 - fffffffffeffffff (1520 MB) module mapping space [fixmap start] - ffffffffff5fffff kernel-internal fixmap range ffffffffff600000 - ffffffffff600fff (=4 kB) legacy vsyscall ABI ffffffffffe00000 - ffffffffffffffff (=2 MB) unused hole +STACKLEAK_POISON value in this last hole: ffffffffffff4111 Architecture defines a 64-bit virtual address. Implementations can support less. Currently supported are 48- and 57-bit virtual addresses. Bits 63 diff --git a/arch/Kconfig b/arch/Kconfig index 76c0b54..368e2fb 100644 --- a/arch/Kconfig +++ b/arch/Kconfig @@ -401,6 +401,13 @@ config SECCOMP_FILTER See Documentation/prctl/seccomp_filter.txt for details. +config HAVE_ARCH_STACKLEAK + bool + help + An architecture should select this if it has the code which + fills the used part of the kernel stack with the STACKLEAK_POISON + value before returning from system calls. + config HAVE_GCC_PLUGINS bool help @@ -531,6 +538,26 @@ config GCC_PLUGIN_RANDSTRUCT_PERFORMANCE in structures. This reduces the performance hit of RANDSTRUCT at the cost of weakened randomization. +config GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK + bool "Erase the kernel stack before returning from syscalls" + depends on GCC_PLUGINS + depends on HAVE_ARCH_STACKLEAK + help + This option makes the kernel erase the kernel stack before it + returns from a system call. That reduces the information which + kernel stack leak bugs can reveal and blocks some uninitialized + stack variable attacks. This option also provides runtime checks + for kernel stack overflow detection. + + The tradeoff is the performance impact: on a single CPU system kernel + compilation sees a 1% slowdown, other systems and workloads may vary + and you are advised to test this feature on your expected workload + before deploying it. + + This plugin was ported from grsecurity/PaX. More information at: + * https://grsecurity.net/ + * https://pax.grsecurity.net/ + config HAVE_CC_STACKPROTECTOR bool help diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig index eb7f43f..715b5bd 100644 --- a/arch/x86/Kconfig +++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig @@ -119,6 +119,7 @@ config X86 select HAVE_ARCH_COMPAT_MMAP_BASES if MMU && COMPAT select HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP_FILTER select HAVE_ARCH_THREAD_STRUCT_WHITELIST + select HAVE_ARCH_STACKLEAK select HAVE_ARCH_TRACEHOOK select HAVE_ARCH_TRANSPARENT_HUGEPAGE select HAVE_ARCH_TRANSPARENT_HUGEPAGE_PUD if X86_64 diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/entry_32.S b/arch/x86/entry/entry_32.S index 6ad064c..068dde6 100644 --- a/arch/x86/entry/entry_32.S +++ b/arch/x86/entry/entry_32.S @@ -77,6 +77,89 @@ #endif .endm +.macro ERASE_KSTACK +#ifdef CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK + call erase_kstack +#endif +.endm + +#ifdef CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK +ENTRY(erase_kstack) + pushl %edi + pushl %ecx + pushl %eax + pushl %ebp + + movl PER_CPU_VAR(current_task), %ebp + mov TASK_lowest_stack(%ebp), %edi + mov $STACKLEAK_POISON, %eax + std + + /* + * Let's search for the poison value in the stack. + * Start from the lowest_stack and go to the bottom (see STD above). + */ +.Lpoison_search: + mov %edi, %ecx + and $THREAD_SIZE_asm - 1, %ecx + shr $2, %ecx + repne scasl + jecxz .Lpoisoning /* Didn't find it */ + + /* + * Found the poison value in the stack. Go to poisoning if there is + * not enough space left for the poison check. + */ + cmp $STACKLEAK_POISON_CHECK_DEPTH / 4, %ecx + jc .Lpoisoning + + /* + * Check that some further dwords contain poison. If so, the part + * of the stack below the address in %edi is likely to be poisoned. + * Otherwise we need to search deeper. + */ + mov $STACKLEAK_POISON_CHECK_DEPTH / 4, %ecx + repe scasl + jecxz .Lpoisoning + jne .Lpoison_search + +.Lpoisoning: + /* + * Prepare the counter for poisoning the kernel stack between + * %edi and %esp. Two dwords at the bottom of the stack are reserved + * and should not be poisoned (see CONFIG_SCHED_STACK_END_CHECK). + */ + or $2 * 4, %edi + cld + mov %esp, %ecx + sub %edi, %ecx + + cmp $THREAD_SIZE_asm, %ecx + jb .Lgood_counter + ud2 + +.Lgood_counter: + /* + * So let's write the poison value to the kernel stack. Start from the + * address in %edi and move up (see CLD above) to the address in %esp + * (not included, used memory). + */ + shr $2, %ecx + rep stosl + + /* Set the lowest_stack value to the top_of_stack - 128 */ + movl PER_CPU_VAR(cpu_current_top_of_stack), %edi + sub $128, %edi + mov %edi, TASK_lowest_stack(%ebp) + + popl %ebp + popl %eax + popl %ecx + popl %edi + ret +ENDPROC(erase_kstack) +#endif + /* * User gs save/restore * @@ -298,6 +381,7 @@ ENTRY(ret_from_fork) /* When we fork, we trace the syscall return in the child, too. */ movl %esp, %eax call syscall_return_slowpath + ERASE_KSTACK jmp restore_all /* kernel thread */ @@ -458,6 +542,8 @@ ENTRY(entry_SYSENTER_32) ALTERNATIVE "testl %eax, %eax; jz .Lsyscall_32_done", \ "jmp .Lsyscall_32_done", X86_FEATURE_XENPV + ERASE_KSTACK + /* Opportunistic SYSEXIT */ TRACE_IRQS_ON /* User mode traces as IRQs on. */ movl PT_EIP(%esp), %edx /* pt_regs->ip */ @@ -544,6 +630,8 @@ ENTRY(entry_INT80_32) call do_int80_syscall_32 .Lsyscall_32_done: + ERASE_KSTACK + restore_all: TRACE_IRQS_IRET .Lrestore_all_notrace: diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S index d5c7f18..9b360f8 100644 --- a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S +++ b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S @@ -66,6 +66,111 @@ END(native_usergs_sysret64) TRACE_IRQS_FLAGS EFLAGS(%rsp) .endm +.macro ERASE_KSTACK +#ifdef CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK + call erase_kstack +#endif +.endm + +#ifdef CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK +ENTRY(erase_kstack) + pushq %rdi + pushq %rcx + pushq %rax + pushq %r11 + + mov PER_CPU_VAR(current_task), %r11 + mov TASK_lowest_stack(%r11), %rdi + mov $STACKLEAK_POISON, %rax + std + + /* + * Let's search for the poison value in the stack. + * Start from the lowest_stack and go to the bottom (see STD above). + */ +.Lpoison_search: + mov %edi, %ecx + and $THREAD_SIZE_asm - 1, %ecx + shr $3, %ecx + repne scasq + jecxz .Lpoisoning /* Didn't find it */ + + /* + * Found the poison value in the stack. Go to poisoning if there is + * not enough space left for the poison check. + */ + cmp $STACKLEAK_POISON_CHECK_DEPTH / 8, %ecx + jb .Lpoisoning + + /* + * Check that some further qwords contain poison. If so, the part + * of the stack below the address in %rdi is likely to be poisoned. + * Otherwise we need to search deeper. + */ + mov $STACKLEAK_POISON_CHECK_DEPTH / 8, %ecx + repe scasq + jecxz .Lpoisoning + jne .Lpoison_search + +.Lpoisoning: + /* + * Two qwords at the bottom of the thread stack are reserved and + * should not be poisoned (see CONFIG_SCHED_STACK_END_CHECK). + */ + or $2 * 8, %rdi + + /* + * Check whether we are on the thread stack to prepare the counter + * for stack poisoning. + */ + mov PER_CPU_VAR(cpu_current_top_of_stack), %rcx + sub %rsp, %rcx + cmp $THREAD_SIZE_asm, %rcx + jb .Lon_thread_stack + + /* + * We are not on the thread stack, so we can write poison between + * the address in %rdi and the stack top. + */ + mov PER_CPU_VAR(cpu_current_top_of_stack), %rcx + sub %rdi, %rcx + jmp .Lcounter_check + +.Lon_thread_stack: + /* + * We can write poison between the address in %rdi and the address + * in %rsp (not included, used memory). + */ + mov %rsp, %rcx + sub %rdi, %rcx + +.Lcounter_check: + cmp $THREAD_SIZE_asm, %rcx + jb .Lgood_counter + ud2 + +.Lgood_counter: + /* + * So let's write the poison value to the kernel stack. Start from the + * address in %rdi and move up (see CLD). + */ + cld + shr $3, %ecx + rep stosq + + /* Set the lowest_stack value to the top_of_stack - 256 */ + mov PER_CPU_VAR(cpu_current_top_of_stack), %rdi + sub $256, %rdi + mov %rdi, TASK_lowest_stack(%r11) + + popq %r11 + popq %rax + popq %rcx + popq %rdi + ret +ENDPROC(erase_kstack) +#endif + /* * When dynamic function tracer is enabled it will add a breakpoint * to all locations that it is about to modify, sync CPUs, update @@ -323,6 +428,8 @@ syscall_return_via_sysret: * We are on the trampoline stack. All regs except RDI are live. * We can do future final exit work right here. */ + ERASE_KSTACK + SWITCH_TO_USER_CR3_STACK scratch_reg=%rdi popq %rdi @@ -681,6 +788,7 @@ GLOBAL(swapgs_restore_regs_and_return_to_usermode) * We are on the trampoline stack. All regs except RDI are live. * We can do future final exit work right here. */ + ERASE_KSTACK SWITCH_TO_USER_CR3_STACK scratch_reg=%rdi diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64_compat.S b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64_compat.S index e811dd9..8516da7 100644 --- a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64_compat.S +++ b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64_compat.S @@ -19,6 +19,12 @@ .section .entry.text, "ax" + .macro ERASE_KSTACK +#ifdef CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK + call erase_kstack +#endif + .endm + /* * 32-bit SYSENTER entry. * @@ -258,6 +264,11 @@ GLOBAL(entry_SYSCALL_compat_after_hwframe) /* Opportunistic SYSRET */ sysret32_from_system_call: + /* + * We are not going to return to the userspace from the trampoline + * stack. So let's erase the thread stack right now. + */ + ERASE_KSTACK TRACE_IRQS_ON /* User mode traces as IRQs on. */ movq RBX(%rsp), %rbx /* pt_regs->rbx */ movq RBP(%rsp), %rbp /* pt_regs->rbp */ diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h index b0ccd48..0c87813 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h @@ -494,6 +494,10 @@ struct thread_struct { mm_segment_t addr_limit; +#ifdef CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK + unsigned long lowest_stack; +#endif + unsigned int sig_on_uaccess_err:1; unsigned int uaccess_err:1; /* uaccess failed */ diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/asm-offsets.c b/arch/x86/kernel/asm-offsets.c index 76417a9..ef5d260 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/asm-offsets.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/asm-offsets.c @@ -39,6 +39,9 @@ void common(void) { BLANK(); OFFSET(TASK_TI_flags, task_struct, thread_info.flags); OFFSET(TASK_addr_limit, task_struct, thread.addr_limit); +#ifdef CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK + OFFSET(TASK_lowest_stack, task_struct, thread.lowest_stack); +#endif BLANK(); OFFSET(crypto_tfm_ctx_offset, crypto_tfm, __crt_ctx); @@ -75,6 +78,11 @@ void common(void) { OFFSET(PV_MMU_read_cr2, pv_mmu_ops, read_cr2); #endif +#ifdef CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK + BLANK(); + DEFINE(THREAD_SIZE_asm, THREAD_SIZE); +#endif + #ifdef CONFIG_XEN BLANK(); OFFSET(XEN_vcpu_info_mask, vcpu_info, evtchn_upcall_mask); diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/process_32.c b/arch/x86/kernel/process_32.c index 5224c60..6d256ab 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/process_32.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/process_32.c @@ -136,6 +136,11 @@ int copy_thread_tls(unsigned long clone_flags, unsigned long sp, p->thread.sp0 = (unsigned long) (childregs+1); memset(p->thread.ptrace_bps, 0, sizeof(p->thread.ptrace_bps)); +#ifdef CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK + p->thread.lowest_stack = (unsigned long)task_stack_page(p) + + 2 * sizeof(unsigned long); +#endif + if (unlikely(p->flags & PF_KTHREAD)) { /* kernel thread */ memset(childregs, 0, sizeof(struct pt_regs)); diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c b/arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c index 9eb448c..6dc55f6 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c @@ -281,6 +281,11 @@ int copy_thread_tls(unsigned long clone_flags, unsigned long sp, p->thread.sp = (unsigned long) fork_frame; p->thread.io_bitmap_ptr = NULL; +#ifdef CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK + p->thread.lowest_stack = (unsigned long)task_stack_page(p) + + 2 * sizeof(unsigned long); +#endif + savesegment(gs, p->thread.gsindex); p->thread.gsbase = p->thread.gsindex ? 0 : me->thread.gsbase; savesegment(fs, p->thread.fsindex); diff --git a/include/linux/compiler.h b/include/linux/compiler.h index ab4711c..47ea254 100644 --- a/include/linux/compiler.h +++ b/include/linux/compiler.h @@ -342,4 +342,10 @@ unsigned long read_word_at_a_time(const void *addr) compiletime_assert(__native_word(t), \ "Need native word sized stores/loads for atomicity.") +#ifdef CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK +/* Poison value points to the unused hole in the virtual memory map */ +# define STACKLEAK_POISON -0xBEEF +# define STACKLEAK_POISON_CHECK_DEPTH 128 +#endif + #endif /* __LINUX_COMPILER_H */
The STACKLEAK feature erases the kernel stack before returning from syscalls. That reduces the information which kernel stack leak bugs can reveal and blocks some uninitialized stack variable attacks. Moreover, STACKLEAK provides runtime checks for kernel stack overflow detection. This commit introduces the architecture-specific code filling the used part of the kernel stack with a poison value before returning to the userspace. Full STACKLEAK feature also contains the gcc plugin which comes in a separate commit. The STACKLEAK feature is ported from grsecurity/PaX. More information at: https://grsecurity.net/ https://pax.grsecurity.net/ This code is modified from Brad Spengler/PaX Team's code in the last public patch of grsecurity/PaX based on our understanding of the code. Changes or omissions from the original code are ours and don't reflect the original grsecurity/PaX code. Signed-off-by: Alexander Popov <alex.popov@linux.com> --- Documentation/x86/x86_64/mm.txt | 2 + arch/Kconfig | 27 ++++++++++ arch/x86/Kconfig | 1 + arch/x86/entry/entry_32.S | 88 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S | 108 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ arch/x86/entry/entry_64_compat.S | 11 ++++ arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h | 4 ++ arch/x86/kernel/asm-offsets.c | 8 +++ arch/x86/kernel/process_32.c | 5 ++ arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c | 5 ++ include/linux/compiler.h | 6 +++ 11 files changed, 265 insertions(+)