| Message ID | 20180529131128.3rkzzv66uy6h5ts7@kili.mountain (mailing list archive) |
|---|---|
| State | New, archived |
| Headers | show |
On Tue, 2018-05-29 at 16:11 +0300, Dan Carpenter wrote: > If the user sets xattr->name[0] to NUL then we would read one character > before the start of the array. This bug seems harmless as far as I can > see but perhaps it would trigger a warning in KASAN. > > Fixes: fa516b66a1bf ("EVM: Allow runtime modification of the set of verified xattrs") > Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com> Thanks, this patch is now queued in the next-integrity branch. Mimi > --- > The user can pass a zeroed buffer to memdup_user_nul() so we can't rely > on "count" to test this. > > diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_secfs.c b/security/integrity/evm/evm_secfs.c > index a7a0a1acae99..94c739180a0b 100644 > --- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_secfs.c > +++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_secfs.c > @@ -207,7 +207,7 @@ static ssize_t evm_write_xattrs(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, > > /* Remove any trailing newline */ > len = strlen(xattr->name); > - if (xattr->name[len-1] == '\n') > + if (len && xattr->name[len-1] == '\n') > xattr->name[len-1] = '\0'; > > if (strcmp(xattr->name, ".") == 0) { > -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-security-module" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_secfs.c b/security/integrity/evm/evm_secfs.c index a7a0a1acae99..94c739180a0b 100644 --- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_secfs.c +++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_secfs.c @@ -207,7 +207,7 @@ static ssize_t evm_write_xattrs(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, /* Remove any trailing newline */ len = strlen(xattr->name); - if (xattr->name[len-1] == '\n') + if (len && xattr->name[len-1] == '\n') xattr->name[len-1] = '\0'; if (strcmp(xattr->name, ".") == 0) {
If the user sets xattr->name[0] to NUL then we would read one character before the start of the array. This bug seems harmless as far as I can see but perhaps it would trigger a warning in KASAN. Fixes: fa516b66a1bf ("EVM: Allow runtime modification of the set of verified xattrs") Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com> --- The user can pass a zeroed buffer to memdup_user_nul() so we can't rely on "count" to test this. -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-security-module" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html