| Message ID | 7d27511b07c8337e15096214622b66ef8f0fa345.1536356108.git.alison.schofield@intel.com (mailing list archive) |
|---|---|
| State | New, archived |
| Headers | show |
| Series | Multi-Key Total Memory Encryption API (MKTME) | expand |
On Fri, 2018-09-07 at 15:36 -0700, Alison Schofield wrote: > Implement memory encryption with a new system call that is an > extension of the legacy mprotect() system call. > > In encrypt_mprotect the caller must pass a handle to a previously > allocated and programmed encryption key. Validate the key and store > the keyid bits in the vm_page_prot for each VMA in the protection > range. > > Signed-off-by: Alison Schofield <alison.schofield@intel.com> > --- > fs/exec.c | 4 ++-- > include/linux/key.h | 2 ++ > include/linux/mm.h | 3 ++- > mm/mprotect.c | 67 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-- > --- > 4 files changed, 67 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-) > > diff --git a/fs/exec.c b/fs/exec.c > index a1a246062561..b681a413db9c 100644 > --- a/fs/exec.c > +++ b/fs/exec.c > @@ -754,8 +754,8 @@ int setup_arg_pages(struct linux_binprm *bprm, > vm_flags |= mm->def_flags; > vm_flags |= VM_STACK_INCOMPLETE_SETUP; > > - ret = mprotect_fixup(vma, &prev, vma->vm_start, vma->vm_end, > - vm_flags); > + ret = mprotect_fixup(vma, &prev, vma->vm_start, vma->vm_end, > vm_flags, > + -1); Why you pass a magic number here when you went the trouble having a named constant? > if (ret) > goto out_unlock; > BUG_ON(prev != vma); > diff --git a/include/linux/key.h b/include/linux/key.h > index e58ee10f6e58..fb8a7d5f6149 100644 > --- a/include/linux/key.h > +++ b/include/linux/key.h > @@ -346,6 +346,8 @@ static inline key_serial_t key_serial(const struct key > *key) > > extern void key_set_timeout(struct key *, unsigned); > > +extern key_ref_t lookup_user_key(key_serial_t id, unsigned long lflags, > + key_perm_t perm); > /* > * The permissions required on a key that we're looking up. > */ > diff --git a/include/linux/mm.h b/include/linux/mm.h > index ac85c0805761..0f9422c7841e 100644 > --- a/include/linux/mm.h > +++ b/include/linux/mm.h > @@ -1579,7 +1579,8 @@ extern unsigned long change_protection(struct > vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long > int dirty_accountable, int prot_numa); > extern int mprotect_fixup(struct vm_area_struct *vma, > struct vm_area_struct **pprev, unsigned long start, > - unsigned long end, unsigned long newflags); > + unsigned long end, unsigned long newflags, > + int newkeyid); > > /* > * doesn't attempt to fault and will return short. > diff --git a/mm/mprotect.c b/mm/mprotect.c > index 56e64ef7931e..6c2e1106525c 100644 > --- a/mm/mprotect.c > +++ b/mm/mprotect.c > @@ -28,14 +28,17 @@ > #include <linux/ksm.h> > #include <linux/uaccess.h> > #include <linux/mm_inline.h> > +#include <linux/key.h> > #include <asm/pgtable.h> > #include <asm/cacheflush.h> > #include <asm/mmu_context.h> > #include <asm/tlbflush.h> > +#include <asm/mktme.h> > > #include "internal.h" > > #define NO_PKEY -1 > +#define NO_KEYID -1 Should have only single named constant IMHO. This ambiguity is worse than some reasonable constant name for both cases. Maybe NO_KEYID would be adequate? > > static unsigned long change_pte_range(struct vm_area_struct *vma, pmd_t *pmd, > unsigned long addr, unsigned long end, pgprot_t newprot, > @@ -310,7 +313,8 @@ unsigned long change_protection(struct vm_area_struct > *vma, unsigned long start, > > int > mprotect_fixup(struct vm_area_struct *vma, struct vm_area_struct **pprev, > - unsigned long start, unsigned long end, unsigned long newflags) > + unsigned long start, unsigned long end, unsigned long > newflags, > + int newkeyid) > { > struct mm_struct *mm = vma->vm_mm; > unsigned long oldflags = vma->vm_flags; > @@ -320,10 +324,24 @@ mprotect_fixup(struct vm_area_struct *vma, struct > vm_area_struct **pprev, > int error; > int dirty_accountable = 0; > > + /* > + * Flags match and Keyids match or we have NO_KEYID. > + * This _fixup is usually called from do_mprotect_ext() except > + * for one special case: caller fs/exec.c/setup_arg_pages() > + * In that case, newkeyid is passed as -1 (NO_KEYID). > + */ > + if (newflags == oldflags && > + (newkeyid == vma_keyid(vma) || newkeyid == NO_KEYID)) { > + *pprev = vma; > + return 0; > + } > + /* Flags match and Keyid changes */ > if (newflags == oldflags) { > + mprotect_set_encrypt(vma, newkeyid); > *pprev = vma; > return 0; > } > + /* Flags and Keyids both change, continue. */ > > /* > * If we make a private mapping writable we increase our commit; > @@ -373,6 +391,8 @@ mprotect_fixup(struct vm_area_struct *vma, struct > vm_area_struct **pprev, > } > > success: > + if (newkeyid != NO_KEYID) > + mprotect_set_encrypt(vma, newkeyid); > /* > * vm_flags and vm_page_prot are protected by the mmap_sem > * held in write mode. > @@ -404,10 +424,15 @@ mprotect_fixup(struct vm_area_struct *vma, struct > vm_area_struct **pprev, > } > > /* > - * When pkey==NO_PKEY we get legacy mprotect behavior here. > + * do_mprotect_ext() supports the legacy mprotect behavior plus extensions > + * for protection keys and memory encryption keys. These extensions are > + * mutually exclusive and the behavior is: > + * (pkey==NO_PKEY && keyid==NO_KEYID) ==> legacy mprotect > + * (pkey is valid) ==> legacy mprotect plus protection key extensions > + * (keyid is valid) ==> legacy mprotect plus encryption key extensions > */ The header does not follow https://www.kernel.org/doc/Documentation/kernel-doc-nano-HOWTO.txt > static int do_mprotect_ext(unsigned long start, size_t len, > - unsigned long prot, int pkey) > + unsigned long prot, int pkey, int keyid) > { > unsigned long nstart, end, tmp, reqprot; > struct vm_area_struct *vma, *prev; > @@ -505,7 +530,8 @@ static int do_mprotect_ext(unsigned long start, size_t > len, > tmp = vma->vm_end; > if (tmp > end) > tmp = end; > - error = mprotect_fixup(vma, &prev, nstart, tmp, newflags); > + error = mprotect_fixup(vma, &prev, nstart, tmp, newflags, > + keyid); > if (error) > goto out; > nstart = tmp; > @@ -530,7 +556,7 @@ static int do_mprotect_ext(unsigned long start, size_t > len, > SYSCALL_DEFINE3(mprotect, unsigned long, start, size_t, len, > unsigned long, prot) > { > - return do_mprotect_ext(start, len, prot, NO_PKEY); > + return do_mprotect_ext(start, len, prot, NO_PKEY, NO_KEYID); > } > > #ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_PKEYS > @@ -538,7 +564,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE3(mprotect, unsigned long, start, size_t, > len, > SYSCALL_DEFINE4(pkey_mprotect, unsigned long, start, size_t, len, > unsigned long, prot, int, pkey) > { > - return do_mprotect_ext(start, len, prot, pkey); > + return do_mprotect_ext(start, len, prot, pkey, NO_KEYID); > } > > SYSCALL_DEFINE2(pkey_alloc, unsigned long, flags, unsigned long, init_val) > @@ -587,3 +613,32 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE1(pkey_free, int, pkey) > } > > #endif /* CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_PKEYS */ > + > +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_INTEL_MKTME > + > +SYSCALL_DEFINE4(encrypt_mprotect, unsigned long, start, size_t, len, > + unsigned long, prot, key_serial_t, serial) > +{ > + key_ref_t key_ref; > + int ret, keyid; > + > + /* TODO MKTME key service must be initialized */ > + > + key_ref = lookup_user_key(serial, 0, KEY_NEED_VIEW); > + if (IS_ERR(key_ref)) > + return PTR_ERR(key_ref); > + > + mktme_map_lock(); > + keyid = mktme_map_keyid_from_serial(serial); > + if (!keyid) { > + mktme_map_unlock(); > + key_ref_put(key_ref); > + return -EINVAL; > + } > + ret = do_mprotect_ext(start, len, prot, NO_PKEY, keyid); > + mktme_map_unlock(); > + key_ref_put(key_ref); > + return ret; > +} > + > +#endif /* CONFIG_X86_INTEL_MKTME */ /Jarkko
On Mon, Sep 10, 2018 at 09:02:43PM +0300, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote: > On Fri, 2018-09-07 at 15:36 -0700, Alison Schofield wrote: > > Implement memory encryption with a new system call that is an > > extension of the legacy mprotect() system call. > > > > In encrypt_mprotect the caller must pass a handle to a previously > > allocated and programmed encryption key. Validate the key and store > > the keyid bits in the vm_page_prot for each VMA in the protection > > range. > > > > Signed-off-by: Alison Schofield <alison.schofield@intel.com> > > --- > > fs/exec.c | 4 ++-- > > include/linux/key.h | 2 ++ > > include/linux/mm.h | 3 ++- > > mm/mprotect.c | 67 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-- > > --- > > 4 files changed, 67 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-) > > > > diff --git a/fs/exec.c b/fs/exec.c > > index a1a246062561..b681a413db9c 100644 > > --- a/fs/exec.c > > +++ b/fs/exec.c > > @@ -754,8 +754,8 @@ int setup_arg_pages(struct linux_binprm *bprm, > > vm_flags |= mm->def_flags; > > vm_flags |= VM_STACK_INCOMPLETE_SETUP; > > > > - ret = mprotect_fixup(vma, &prev, vma->vm_start, vma->vm_end, > > - vm_flags); > > + ret = mprotect_fixup(vma, &prev, vma->vm_start, vma->vm_end, > > vm_flags, > > + -1); > > Why you pass a magic number here when you went the trouble having > a named constant? The named constant isn't available over here in fs/exec.c. The special case is documented further down ... (scroll down) That caller has no knowledge of proctection or encryption keys. > > > if (ret) > > goto out_unlock; > > BUG_ON(prev != vma); > > diff --git a/include/linux/key.h b/include/linux/key.h > > index e58ee10f6e58..fb8a7d5f6149 100644 > > --- a/include/linux/key.h > > +++ b/include/linux/key.h > > @@ -346,6 +346,8 @@ static inline key_serial_t key_serial(const struct key > > *key) > > > > extern void key_set_timeout(struct key *, unsigned); > > > > +extern key_ref_t lookup_user_key(key_serial_t id, unsigned long lflags, > > + key_perm_t perm); > > /* > > * The permissions required on a key that we're looking up. > > */ > > diff --git a/include/linux/mm.h b/include/linux/mm.h > > index ac85c0805761..0f9422c7841e 100644 > > --- a/include/linux/mm.h > > +++ b/include/linux/mm.h > > @@ -1579,7 +1579,8 @@ extern unsigned long change_protection(struct > > vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long > > int dirty_accountable, int prot_numa); > > extern int mprotect_fixup(struct vm_area_struct *vma, > > struct vm_area_struct **pprev, unsigned long start, > > - unsigned long end, unsigned long newflags); > > + unsigned long end, unsigned long newflags, > > + int newkeyid); > > > > /* > > * doesn't attempt to fault and will return short. > > diff --git a/mm/mprotect.c b/mm/mprotect.c > > index 56e64ef7931e..6c2e1106525c 100644 > > --- a/mm/mprotect.c > > +++ b/mm/mprotect.c > > @@ -28,14 +28,17 @@ > > #include <linux/ksm.h> > > #include <linux/uaccess.h> > > #include <linux/mm_inline.h> > > +#include <linux/key.h> > > #include <asm/pgtable.h> > > #include <asm/cacheflush.h> > > #include <asm/mmu_context.h> > > #include <asm/tlbflush.h> > > +#include <asm/mktme.h> > > > > #include "internal.h" > > > > #define NO_PKEY -1 > > +#define NO_KEYID -1 > > Should have only single named constant IMHO. This ambiguity > is worse than some reasonable constant name for both cases. > Maybe NO_KEYID would be adequate? Yes, this could be NO_KEY for both. I was worried about readability, but most of the usages compare it to a well-named variable, as in (pkey == NO_KEY) or (keyid == NO_KEY) so it seems to work. Will do! > > > > > static unsigned long change_pte_range(struct vm_area_struct *vma, pmd_t *pmd, > > unsigned long addr, unsigned long end, pgprot_t newprot, > > @@ -310,7 +313,8 @@ unsigned long change_protection(struct vm_area_struct > > *vma, unsigned long start, > > > > int > > mprotect_fixup(struct vm_area_struct *vma, struct vm_area_struct **pprev, > > - unsigned long start, unsigned long end, unsigned long newflags) > > + unsigned long start, unsigned long end, unsigned long > > newflags, > > + int newkeyid) > > { > > struct mm_struct *mm = vma->vm_mm; > > unsigned long oldflags = vma->vm_flags; > > @@ -320,10 +324,24 @@ mprotect_fixup(struct vm_area_struct *vma, struct > > vm_area_struct **pprev, > > int error; > > int dirty_accountable = 0; > > > > + /* > > + * Flags match and Keyids match or we have NO_KEYID. > > + * This _fixup is usually called from do_mprotect_ext() except > > + * for one special case: caller fs/exec.c/setup_arg_pages() > > + * In that case, newkeyid is passed as -1 (NO_KEYID). > > + */ Above is that special case explanation. > > + if (newflags == oldflags && > > + (newkeyid == vma_keyid(vma) || newkeyid == NO_KEYID)) { > > + *pprev = vma; > > + return 0; > > + } > > + /* Flags match and Keyid changes */ > > if (newflags == oldflags) { > > + mprotect_set_encrypt(vma, newkeyid); > > *pprev = vma; > > return 0; > > } > > + /* Flags and Keyids both change, continue. */ > > > > /* > > * If we make a private mapping writable we increase our commit; > > @@ -373,6 +391,8 @@ mprotect_fixup(struct vm_area_struct *vma, struct > > vm_area_struct **pprev, > > } > > > > success: > > + if (newkeyid != NO_KEYID) > > + mprotect_set_encrypt(vma, newkeyid); > > /* > > * vm_flags and vm_page_prot are protected by the mmap_sem > > * held in write mode. > > @@ -404,10 +424,15 @@ mprotect_fixup(struct vm_area_struct *vma, struct > > vm_area_struct **pprev, > > } > > > > /* > > - * When pkey==NO_PKEY we get legacy mprotect behavior here. > > + * do_mprotect_ext() supports the legacy mprotect behavior plus extensions > > + * for protection keys and memory encryption keys. These extensions are > > + * mutually exclusive and the behavior is: > > + * (pkey==NO_PKEY && keyid==NO_KEYID) ==> legacy mprotect > > + * (pkey is valid) ==> legacy mprotect plus protection key extensions > > + * (keyid is valid) ==> legacy mprotect plus encryption key extensions > > */ > > The header does not follow > > https://www.kernel.org/doc/Documentation/kernel-doc-nano-HOWTO.txt Jarkko, I see the "how to" on kernel doc formatting, but I'm not getting the when? When should it be done? I can imagine it for new code, like the mktme_keys.c where new code is being added and the kernel docs could give a complete narrative of the module. Here, in mprotect.c, there are no kernel doc comments. I realize sometime we just need to start somewhere ;), but I find it odd to pluck out one function header to be extracted for kernel docs. Alison > > > static int do_mprotect_ext(unsigned long start, size_t len, > > - unsigned long prot, int pkey) > > + unsigned long prot, int pkey, int keyid) > > { > > unsigned long nstart, end, tmp, reqprot; > > struct vm_area_struct *vma, *prev; > > @@ -505,7 +530,8 @@ static int do_mprotect_ext(unsigned long start, size_t > > len, > > tmp = vma->vm_end; > > if (tmp > end) > > tmp = end; > > - error = mprotect_fixup(vma, &prev, nstart, tmp, newflags); > > + error = mprotect_fixup(vma, &prev, nstart, tmp, newflags, > > + keyid); > > if (error) > > goto out; > > nstart = tmp; > > @@ -530,7 +556,7 @@ static int do_mprotect_ext(unsigned long start, size_t > > len, > > SYSCALL_DEFINE3(mprotect, unsigned long, start, size_t, len, > > unsigned long, prot) > > { > > - return do_mprotect_ext(start, len, prot, NO_PKEY); > > + return do_mprotect_ext(start, len, prot, NO_PKEY, NO_KEYID); > > } > > > > #ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_PKEYS > > @@ -538,7 +564,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE3(mprotect, unsigned long, start, size_t, > > len, > > SYSCALL_DEFINE4(pkey_mprotect, unsigned long, start, size_t, len, > > unsigned long, prot, int, pkey) > > { > > - return do_mprotect_ext(start, len, prot, pkey); > > + return do_mprotect_ext(start, len, prot, pkey, NO_KEYID); > > } > > > > SYSCALL_DEFINE2(pkey_alloc, unsigned long, flags, unsigned long, init_val) > > @@ -587,3 +613,32 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE1(pkey_free, int, pkey) > > } > > > > #endif /* CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_PKEYS */ > > + > > +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_INTEL_MKTME > > + > > +SYSCALL_DEFINE4(encrypt_mprotect, unsigned long, start, size_t, len, > > + unsigned long, prot, key_serial_t, serial) > > +{ > > + key_ref_t key_ref; > > + int ret, keyid; > > + > > + /* TODO MKTME key service must be initialized */ > > + > > + key_ref = lookup_user_key(serial, 0, KEY_NEED_VIEW); > > + if (IS_ERR(key_ref)) > > + return PTR_ERR(key_ref); > > + > > + mktme_map_lock(); > > + keyid = mktme_map_keyid_from_serial(serial); > > + if (!keyid) { > > + mktme_map_unlock(); > > + key_ref_put(key_ref); > > + return -EINVAL; > > + } > > + ret = do_mprotect_ext(start, len, prot, NO_PKEY, keyid); > > + mktme_map_unlock(); > > + key_ref_put(key_ref); > > + return ret; > > +} > > + > > +#endif /* CONFIG_X86_INTEL_MKTME */ > > /Jarkko
diff --git a/fs/exec.c b/fs/exec.c index a1a246062561..b681a413db9c 100644 --- a/fs/exec.c +++ b/fs/exec.c @@ -754,8 +754,8 @@ int setup_arg_pages(struct linux_binprm *bprm, vm_flags |= mm->def_flags; vm_flags |= VM_STACK_INCOMPLETE_SETUP; - ret = mprotect_fixup(vma, &prev, vma->vm_start, vma->vm_end, - vm_flags); + ret = mprotect_fixup(vma, &prev, vma->vm_start, vma->vm_end, vm_flags, + -1); if (ret) goto out_unlock; BUG_ON(prev != vma); diff --git a/include/linux/key.h b/include/linux/key.h index e58ee10f6e58..fb8a7d5f6149 100644 --- a/include/linux/key.h +++ b/include/linux/key.h @@ -346,6 +346,8 @@ static inline key_serial_t key_serial(const struct key *key) extern void key_set_timeout(struct key *, unsigned); +extern key_ref_t lookup_user_key(key_serial_t id, unsigned long lflags, + key_perm_t perm); /* * The permissions required on a key that we're looking up. */ diff --git a/include/linux/mm.h b/include/linux/mm.h index ac85c0805761..0f9422c7841e 100644 --- a/include/linux/mm.h +++ b/include/linux/mm.h @@ -1579,7 +1579,8 @@ extern unsigned long change_protection(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long int dirty_accountable, int prot_numa); extern int mprotect_fixup(struct vm_area_struct *vma, struct vm_area_struct **pprev, unsigned long start, - unsigned long end, unsigned long newflags); + unsigned long end, unsigned long newflags, + int newkeyid); /* * doesn't attempt to fault and will return short. diff --git a/mm/mprotect.c b/mm/mprotect.c index 56e64ef7931e..6c2e1106525c 100644 --- a/mm/mprotect.c +++ b/mm/mprotect.c @@ -28,14 +28,17 @@ #include <linux/ksm.h> #include <linux/uaccess.h> #include <linux/mm_inline.h> +#include <linux/key.h> #include <asm/pgtable.h> #include <asm/cacheflush.h> #include <asm/mmu_context.h> #include <asm/tlbflush.h> +#include <asm/mktme.h> #include "internal.h" #define NO_PKEY -1 +#define NO_KEYID -1 static unsigned long change_pte_range(struct vm_area_struct *vma, pmd_t *pmd, unsigned long addr, unsigned long end, pgprot_t newprot, @@ -310,7 +313,8 @@ unsigned long change_protection(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long start, int mprotect_fixup(struct vm_area_struct *vma, struct vm_area_struct **pprev, - unsigned long start, unsigned long end, unsigned long newflags) + unsigned long start, unsigned long end, unsigned long newflags, + int newkeyid) { struct mm_struct *mm = vma->vm_mm; unsigned long oldflags = vma->vm_flags; @@ -320,10 +324,24 @@ mprotect_fixup(struct vm_area_struct *vma, struct vm_area_struct **pprev, int error; int dirty_accountable = 0; + /* + * Flags match and Keyids match or we have NO_KEYID. + * This _fixup is usually called from do_mprotect_ext() except + * for one special case: caller fs/exec.c/setup_arg_pages() + * In that case, newkeyid is passed as -1 (NO_KEYID). + */ + if (newflags == oldflags && + (newkeyid == vma_keyid(vma) || newkeyid == NO_KEYID)) { + *pprev = vma; + return 0; + } + /* Flags match and Keyid changes */ if (newflags == oldflags) { + mprotect_set_encrypt(vma, newkeyid); *pprev = vma; return 0; } + /* Flags and Keyids both change, continue. */ /* * If we make a private mapping writable we increase our commit; @@ -373,6 +391,8 @@ mprotect_fixup(struct vm_area_struct *vma, struct vm_area_struct **pprev, } success: + if (newkeyid != NO_KEYID) + mprotect_set_encrypt(vma, newkeyid); /* * vm_flags and vm_page_prot are protected by the mmap_sem * held in write mode. @@ -404,10 +424,15 @@ mprotect_fixup(struct vm_area_struct *vma, struct vm_area_struct **pprev, } /* - * When pkey==NO_PKEY we get legacy mprotect behavior here. + * do_mprotect_ext() supports the legacy mprotect behavior plus extensions + * for protection keys and memory encryption keys. These extensions are + * mutually exclusive and the behavior is: + * (pkey==NO_PKEY && keyid==NO_KEYID) ==> legacy mprotect + * (pkey is valid) ==> legacy mprotect plus protection key extensions + * (keyid is valid) ==> legacy mprotect plus encryption key extensions */ static int do_mprotect_ext(unsigned long start, size_t len, - unsigned long prot, int pkey) + unsigned long prot, int pkey, int keyid) { unsigned long nstart, end, tmp, reqprot; struct vm_area_struct *vma, *prev; @@ -505,7 +530,8 @@ static int do_mprotect_ext(unsigned long start, size_t len, tmp = vma->vm_end; if (tmp > end) tmp = end; - error = mprotect_fixup(vma, &prev, nstart, tmp, newflags); + error = mprotect_fixup(vma, &prev, nstart, tmp, newflags, + keyid); if (error) goto out; nstart = tmp; @@ -530,7 +556,7 @@ static int do_mprotect_ext(unsigned long start, size_t len, SYSCALL_DEFINE3(mprotect, unsigned long, start, size_t, len, unsigned long, prot) { - return do_mprotect_ext(start, len, prot, NO_PKEY); + return do_mprotect_ext(start, len, prot, NO_PKEY, NO_KEYID); } #ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_PKEYS @@ -538,7 +564,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE3(mprotect, unsigned long, start, size_t, len, SYSCALL_DEFINE4(pkey_mprotect, unsigned long, start, size_t, len, unsigned long, prot, int, pkey) { - return do_mprotect_ext(start, len, prot, pkey); + return do_mprotect_ext(start, len, prot, pkey, NO_KEYID); } SYSCALL_DEFINE2(pkey_alloc, unsigned long, flags, unsigned long, init_val) @@ -587,3 +613,32 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE1(pkey_free, int, pkey) } #endif /* CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_PKEYS */ + +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_INTEL_MKTME + +SYSCALL_DEFINE4(encrypt_mprotect, unsigned long, start, size_t, len, + unsigned long, prot, key_serial_t, serial) +{ + key_ref_t key_ref; + int ret, keyid; + + /* TODO MKTME key service must be initialized */ + + key_ref = lookup_user_key(serial, 0, KEY_NEED_VIEW); + if (IS_ERR(key_ref)) + return PTR_ERR(key_ref); + + mktme_map_lock(); + keyid = mktme_map_keyid_from_serial(serial); + if (!keyid) { + mktme_map_unlock(); + key_ref_put(key_ref); + return -EINVAL; + } + ret = do_mprotect_ext(start, len, prot, NO_PKEY, keyid); + mktme_map_unlock(); + key_ref_put(key_ref); + return ret; +} + +#endif /* CONFIG_X86_INTEL_MKTME */
Implement memory encryption with a new system call that is an extension of the legacy mprotect() system call. In encrypt_mprotect the caller must pass a handle to a previously allocated and programmed encryption key. Validate the key and store the keyid bits in the vm_page_prot for each VMA in the protection range. Signed-off-by: Alison Schofield <alison.schofield@intel.com> --- fs/exec.c | 4 ++-- include/linux/key.h | 2 ++ include/linux/mm.h | 3 ++- mm/mprotect.c | 67 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----- 4 files changed, 67 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)