| Message ID | 20190710202219.25939-11-brijesh.singh@amd.com (mailing list archive) |
|---|---|
| State | New, archived |
| Headers | show |
| Series | Add SEV guest live migration support | expand |
* Singh, Brijesh (brijesh.singh@amd.com) wrote: > The sev_load_incoming_page() provide the implementation to read the > incoming guest private pages from the socket and load it into the guest > memory. The routines uses the RECEIVE_START command to create the > incoming encryption context on the first call then uses the > RECEIEVE_UPDATE_DATA command to load the encrypted pages into the guest > memory. After migration is completed, we issue the RECEIVE_FINISH command > to transition the SEV guest to the runnable state so that it can be > executed. > > Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com> > --- > accel/kvm/kvm-all.c | 1 + > target/i386/sev.c | 126 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- > target/i386/trace-events | 3 + > 3 files changed, 129 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) > > diff --git a/accel/kvm/kvm-all.c b/accel/kvm/kvm-all.c > index a9fb447248..7f94dba6f9 100644 > --- a/accel/kvm/kvm-all.c > +++ b/accel/kvm/kvm-all.c > @@ -1793,6 +1793,7 @@ static int kvm_init(MachineState *ms) > > kvm_state->memcrypt_encrypt_data = sev_encrypt_data; > kvm_state->memcrypt_save_outgoing_page = sev_save_outgoing_page; > + kvm_state->memcrypt_load_incoming_page = sev_load_incoming_page; > } > > ret = kvm_arch_init(ms, s); > diff --git a/target/i386/sev.c b/target/i386/sev.c > index 28b36c8035..09a62d6f88 100644 > --- a/target/i386/sev.c > +++ b/target/i386/sev.c > @@ -708,13 +708,34 @@ sev_launch_finish(SEVState *s) > } > } > > +static int > +sev_receive_finish(SEVState *s) > +{ > + int error, ret = 1; > + > + trace_kvm_sev_receive_finish(); > + ret = sev_ioctl(s->sev_fd, KVM_SEV_RECEIVE_FINISH, 0, &error); > + if (ret) { > + error_report("%s: RECEIVE_FINISH ret=%d fw_error=%d '%s'", > + __func__, ret, error, fw_error_to_str(error)); > + goto err; > + } > + > + sev_set_guest_state(SEV_STATE_RUNNING); > +err: > + return ret; > +} > + > + > static void > sev_vm_state_change(void *opaque, int running, RunState state) > { > SEVState *s = opaque; > > if (running) { > - if (!sev_check_state(SEV_STATE_RUNNING)) { > + if (sev_check_state(SEV_STATE_RECEIVE_UPDATE)) { > + sev_receive_finish(s); > + } else if (!sev_check_state(SEV_STATE_RUNNING)) { > sev_launch_finish(s); > } > } > @@ -1065,6 +1086,109 @@ int sev_save_outgoing_page(void *handle, QEMUFile *f, uint8_t *ptr, > return sev_send_update_data(s, f, ptr, sz, bytes_sent); > } > > +static int > +sev_receive_start(QSevGuestInfo *sev, QEMUFile *f) > +{ > + int ret = 1; > + int fw_error; > + struct kvm_sev_receive_start *start; > + gchar *session = NULL, *pdh_cert = NULL; > + > + start = g_new0(struct kvm_sev_receive_start, 1); Same as the send patch; these are tiny so may as well be on the stack > + /* get SEV guest handle */ > + start->handle = object_property_get_int(OBJECT(sev), "handle", > + &error_abort); > + > + /* get the source policy */ > + start->policy = qemu_get_be32(f); > + > + /* get source PDH key */ > + start->pdh_len = qemu_get_be32(f); You might want to bound the sizes of pdh_len and session_len on reading; if the migration stream is badly corrupt you could end up allocating and then trying to read a few GB ofjunk off the wire. > + pdh_cert = g_new(gchar, start->pdh_len); > + qemu_get_buffer(f, (uint8_t *)pdh_cert, start->pdh_len); > + start->pdh_uaddr = (unsigned long)pdh_cert; > + > + /* get source session data */ > + start->session_len = qemu_get_be32(f); > + session = g_new(gchar, start->session_len); > + qemu_get_buffer(f, (uint8_t *)session, start->session_len); > + start->session_uaddr = (unsigned long)session; > + > + trace_kvm_sev_receive_start(start->policy, session, pdh_cert); > + > + ret = sev_ioctl(sev_state->sev_fd, KVM_SEV_RECEIVE_START, start, &fw_error); > + if (ret < 0) { > + error_report("Error RECEIVE_START ret=%d fw_error=%d '%s'", > + ret, fw_error, fw_error_to_str(fw_error)); > + goto err; > + } > + > + object_property_set_int(OBJECT(sev), start->handle, "handle", &error_abort); > + sev_set_guest_state(SEV_STATE_RECEIVE_UPDATE); > +err: > + g_free(start); > + g_free(session); > + g_free(pdh_cert); > + > + return ret; > +} > + > +static int sev_receive_update_data(QEMUFile *f, uint8_t *ptr) > +{ > + int ret = 1, fw_error = 0; > + gchar *hdr = NULL, *trans = NULL; > + struct kvm_sev_receive_update_data *update; > + > + update = g_new0(struct kvm_sev_receive_update_data, 1); Similar comments to the _start function > + /* get packet header */ > + update->hdr_len = qemu_get_be32(f); > + hdr = g_new(gchar, update->hdr_len); > + qemu_get_buffer(f, (uint8_t *)hdr, update->hdr_len); > + update->hdr_uaddr = (unsigned long)hdr; > + > + /* get transport buffer */ > + update->trans_len = qemu_get_be32(f); > + trans = g_new(gchar, update->trans_len); > + update->trans_uaddr = (unsigned long)trans; > + qemu_get_buffer(f, (uint8_t *)update->trans_uaddr, update->trans_len); > + > + update->guest_uaddr = (unsigned long) ptr; > + update->guest_len = update->trans_len; > + > + trace_kvm_sev_receive_update_data(trans, ptr, update->guest_len, > + hdr, update->hdr_len); > + > + ret = sev_ioctl(sev_state->sev_fd, KVM_SEV_RECEIVE_UPDATE_DATA, > + update, &fw_error); > + if (ret) { > + error_report("Error RECEIVE_UPDATE_DATA ret=%d fw_error=%d '%s'", > + ret, fw_error, fw_error_to_str(fw_error)); > + goto err; > + } > +err: > + g_free(trans); > + g_free(update); > + g_free(hdr); > + return ret; > +} > + > +int sev_load_incoming_page(void *handle, QEMUFile *f, uint8_t *ptr) > +{ > + SEVState *s = (SEVState *)handle; > + > + /* If this is first buffer and SEV is not in recieiving state then > + * use RECEIVE_START command to create a encryption context. > + */ > + if (!sev_check_state(SEV_STATE_RECEIVE_UPDATE) && > + sev_receive_start(s->sev_info, f)) { > + return 1; > + } > + > + return sev_receive_update_data(f, ptr); > +} > + > static void > sev_register_types(void) > { > diff --git a/target/i386/trace-events b/target/i386/trace-events > index b41516cf9f..609752cca7 100644 > --- a/target/i386/trace-events > +++ b/target/i386/trace-events > @@ -18,3 +18,6 @@ kvm_sev_launch_finish(void) "" > kvm_sev_send_start(uint64_t pdh, int l1, uint64_t plat, int l2, uint64_t amd, int l3) "pdh 0x%" PRIx64 " len %d plat 0x%" PRIx64 " len %d amd 0x%" PRIx64 " len %d" > kvm_sev_send_update_data(void *src, void *dst, int len) "guest %p trans %p len %d" > kvm_sev_send_finish(void) "" > +kvm_sev_receive_start(int policy, void *session, void *pdh) "policy 0x%x session %p pdh %p" > +kvm_sev_receive_update_data(void *src, void *dst, int len, void *hdr, int hdr_len) "guest %p trans %p len %d hdr %p hdr_len %d" > +kvm_sev_receive_finish(void) "" > -- > 2.17.1 > -- Dr. David Alan Gilbert / dgilbert@redhat.com / Manchester, UK
On 7/12/19 6:02 AM, Dr. David Alan Gilbert wrote: > * Singh, Brijesh (brijesh.singh@amd.com) wrote: >> The sev_load_incoming_page() provide the implementation to read the >> incoming guest private pages from the socket and load it into the guest >> memory. The routines uses the RECEIVE_START command to create the >> incoming encryption context on the first call then uses the >> RECEIEVE_UPDATE_DATA command to load the encrypted pages into the guest >> memory. After migration is completed, we issue the RECEIVE_FINISH command >> to transition the SEV guest to the runnable state so that it can be >> executed. >> >> Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com> >> --- >> accel/kvm/kvm-all.c | 1 + >> target/i386/sev.c | 126 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- >> target/i386/trace-events | 3 + >> 3 files changed, 129 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) >> >> diff --git a/accel/kvm/kvm-all.c b/accel/kvm/kvm-all.c >> index a9fb447248..7f94dba6f9 100644 >> --- a/accel/kvm/kvm-all.c >> +++ b/accel/kvm/kvm-all.c >> @@ -1793,6 +1793,7 @@ static int kvm_init(MachineState *ms) >> >> kvm_state->memcrypt_encrypt_data = sev_encrypt_data; >> kvm_state->memcrypt_save_outgoing_page = sev_save_outgoing_page; >> + kvm_state->memcrypt_load_incoming_page = sev_load_incoming_page; >> } >> >> ret = kvm_arch_init(ms, s); >> diff --git a/target/i386/sev.c b/target/i386/sev.c >> index 28b36c8035..09a62d6f88 100644 >> --- a/target/i386/sev.c >> +++ b/target/i386/sev.c >> @@ -708,13 +708,34 @@ sev_launch_finish(SEVState *s) >> } >> } >> >> +static int >> +sev_receive_finish(SEVState *s) >> +{ >> + int error, ret = 1; >> + >> + trace_kvm_sev_receive_finish(); >> + ret = sev_ioctl(s->sev_fd, KVM_SEV_RECEIVE_FINISH, 0, &error); >> + if (ret) { >> + error_report("%s: RECEIVE_FINISH ret=%d fw_error=%d '%s'", >> + __func__, ret, error, fw_error_to_str(error)); >> + goto err; >> + } >> + >> + sev_set_guest_state(SEV_STATE_RUNNING); >> +err: >> + return ret; >> +} >> + >> + >> static void >> sev_vm_state_change(void *opaque, int running, RunState state) >> { >> SEVState *s = opaque; >> >> if (running) { >> - if (!sev_check_state(SEV_STATE_RUNNING)) { >> + if (sev_check_state(SEV_STATE_RECEIVE_UPDATE)) { >> + sev_receive_finish(s); >> + } else if (!sev_check_state(SEV_STATE_RUNNING)) { >> sev_launch_finish(s); >> } >> } >> @@ -1065,6 +1086,109 @@ int sev_save_outgoing_page(void *handle, QEMUFile *f, uint8_t *ptr, >> return sev_send_update_data(s, f, ptr, sz, bytes_sent); >> } >> >> +static int >> +sev_receive_start(QSevGuestInfo *sev, QEMUFile *f) >> +{ >> + int ret = 1; >> + int fw_error; >> + struct kvm_sev_receive_start *start; >> + gchar *session = NULL, *pdh_cert = NULL; >> + >> + start = g_new0(struct kvm_sev_receive_start, 1); > > Same as the send patch; these are tiny so may as well be on the stack > >> + /* get SEV guest handle */ >> + start->handle = object_property_get_int(OBJECT(sev), "handle", >> + &error_abort); >> + >> + /* get the source policy */ >> + start->policy = qemu_get_be32(f); >> + >> + /* get source PDH key */ >> + start->pdh_len = qemu_get_be32(f); > > You might want to bound the sizes of pdh_len and session_len > on reading; if the migration stream is badly corrupt you could > end up allocating and then trying to read a few GB ofjunk off the wire. > Good point. Noted. >> + pdh_cert = g_new(gchar, start->pdh_len); >> + qemu_get_buffer(f, (uint8_t *)pdh_cert, start->pdh_len); >> + start->pdh_uaddr = (unsigned long)pdh_cert; >> + >> + /* get source session data */ >> + start->session_len = qemu_get_be32(f); >> + session = g_new(gchar, start->session_len); >> + qemu_get_buffer(f, (uint8_t *)session, start->session_len); >> + start->session_uaddr = (unsigned long)session; >> + >> + trace_kvm_sev_receive_start(start->policy, session, pdh_cert); >> + >> + ret = sev_ioctl(sev_state->sev_fd, KVM_SEV_RECEIVE_START, start, &fw_error); >> + if (ret < 0) { >> + error_report("Error RECEIVE_START ret=%d fw_error=%d '%s'", >> + ret, fw_error, fw_error_to_str(fw_error)); >> + goto err; >> + } >> + >> + object_property_set_int(OBJECT(sev), start->handle, "handle", &error_abort); >> + sev_set_guest_state(SEV_STATE_RECEIVE_UPDATE); >> +err: >> + g_free(start); >> + g_free(session); >> + g_free(pdh_cert); >> + >> + return ret; >> +} >> + >> +static int sev_receive_update_data(QEMUFile *f, uint8_t *ptr) >> +{ >> + int ret = 1, fw_error = 0; >> + gchar *hdr = NULL, *trans = NULL; >> + struct kvm_sev_receive_update_data *update; >> + >> + update = g_new0(struct kvm_sev_receive_update_data, 1); > > Similar comments to the _start function > Noted. >> + /* get packet header */ >> + update->hdr_len = qemu_get_be32(f); >> + hdr = g_new(gchar, update->hdr_len); >> + qemu_get_buffer(f, (uint8_t *)hdr, update->hdr_len); >> + update->hdr_uaddr = (unsigned long)hdr; >> + >> + /* get transport buffer */ >> + update->trans_len = qemu_get_be32(f); >> + trans = g_new(gchar, update->trans_len); >> + update->trans_uaddr = (unsigned long)trans; >> + qemu_get_buffer(f, (uint8_t *)update->trans_uaddr, update->trans_len); >> + >> + update->guest_uaddr = (unsigned long) ptr; >> + update->guest_len = update->trans_len; >> + >> + trace_kvm_sev_receive_update_data(trans, ptr, update->guest_len, >> + hdr, update->hdr_len); >> + >> + ret = sev_ioctl(sev_state->sev_fd, KVM_SEV_RECEIVE_UPDATE_DATA, >> + update, &fw_error); >> + if (ret) { >> + error_report("Error RECEIVE_UPDATE_DATA ret=%d fw_error=%d '%s'", >> + ret, fw_error, fw_error_to_str(fw_error)); >> + goto err; >> + } >> +err: >> + g_free(trans); >> + g_free(update); >> + g_free(hdr); >> + return ret; >> +} >> + >> +int sev_load_incoming_page(void *handle, QEMUFile *f, uint8_t *ptr) >> +{ >> + SEVState *s = (SEVState *)handle; >> + >> + /* If this is first buffer and SEV is not in recieiving state then >> + * use RECEIVE_START command to create a encryption context. >> + */ >> + if (!sev_check_state(SEV_STATE_RECEIVE_UPDATE) && >> + sev_receive_start(s->sev_info, f)) { >> + return 1; >> + } >> + >> + return sev_receive_update_data(f, ptr); >> +} >> + >> static void >> sev_register_types(void) >> { >> diff --git a/target/i386/trace-events b/target/i386/trace-events >> index b41516cf9f..609752cca7 100644 >> --- a/target/i386/trace-events >> +++ b/target/i386/trace-events >> @@ -18,3 +18,6 @@ kvm_sev_launch_finish(void) "" >> kvm_sev_send_start(uint64_t pdh, int l1, uint64_t plat, int l2, uint64_t amd, int l3) "pdh 0x%" PRIx64 " len %d plat 0x%" PRIx64 " len %d amd 0x%" PRIx64 " len %d" >> kvm_sev_send_update_data(void *src, void *dst, int len) "guest %p trans %p len %d" >> kvm_sev_send_finish(void) "" >> +kvm_sev_receive_start(int policy, void *session, void *pdh) "policy 0x%x session %p pdh %p" >> +kvm_sev_receive_update_data(void *src, void *dst, int len, void *hdr, int hdr_len) "guest %p trans %p len %d hdr %p hdr_len %d" >> +kvm_sev_receive_finish(void) "" >> -- >> 2.17.1 >> > -- > Dr. David Alan Gilbert / dgilbert@redhat.com / Manchester, UK >
diff --git a/accel/kvm/kvm-all.c b/accel/kvm/kvm-all.c index a9fb447248..7f94dba6f9 100644 --- a/accel/kvm/kvm-all.c +++ b/accel/kvm/kvm-all.c @@ -1793,6 +1793,7 @@ static int kvm_init(MachineState *ms) kvm_state->memcrypt_encrypt_data = sev_encrypt_data; kvm_state->memcrypt_save_outgoing_page = sev_save_outgoing_page; + kvm_state->memcrypt_load_incoming_page = sev_load_incoming_page; } ret = kvm_arch_init(ms, s); diff --git a/target/i386/sev.c b/target/i386/sev.c index 28b36c8035..09a62d6f88 100644 --- a/target/i386/sev.c +++ b/target/i386/sev.c @@ -708,13 +708,34 @@ sev_launch_finish(SEVState *s) } } +static int +sev_receive_finish(SEVState *s) +{ + int error, ret = 1; + + trace_kvm_sev_receive_finish(); + ret = sev_ioctl(s->sev_fd, KVM_SEV_RECEIVE_FINISH, 0, &error); + if (ret) { + error_report("%s: RECEIVE_FINISH ret=%d fw_error=%d '%s'", + __func__, ret, error, fw_error_to_str(error)); + goto err; + } + + sev_set_guest_state(SEV_STATE_RUNNING); +err: + return ret; +} + + static void sev_vm_state_change(void *opaque, int running, RunState state) { SEVState *s = opaque; if (running) { - if (!sev_check_state(SEV_STATE_RUNNING)) { + if (sev_check_state(SEV_STATE_RECEIVE_UPDATE)) { + sev_receive_finish(s); + } else if (!sev_check_state(SEV_STATE_RUNNING)) { sev_launch_finish(s); } } @@ -1065,6 +1086,109 @@ int sev_save_outgoing_page(void *handle, QEMUFile *f, uint8_t *ptr, return sev_send_update_data(s, f, ptr, sz, bytes_sent); } +static int +sev_receive_start(QSevGuestInfo *sev, QEMUFile *f) +{ + int ret = 1; + int fw_error; + struct kvm_sev_receive_start *start; + gchar *session = NULL, *pdh_cert = NULL; + + start = g_new0(struct kvm_sev_receive_start, 1); + + /* get SEV guest handle */ + start->handle = object_property_get_int(OBJECT(sev), "handle", + &error_abort); + + /* get the source policy */ + start->policy = qemu_get_be32(f); + + /* get source PDH key */ + start->pdh_len = qemu_get_be32(f); + pdh_cert = g_new(gchar, start->pdh_len); + qemu_get_buffer(f, (uint8_t *)pdh_cert, start->pdh_len); + start->pdh_uaddr = (unsigned long)pdh_cert; + + /* get source session data */ + start->session_len = qemu_get_be32(f); + session = g_new(gchar, start->session_len); + qemu_get_buffer(f, (uint8_t *)session, start->session_len); + start->session_uaddr = (unsigned long)session; + + trace_kvm_sev_receive_start(start->policy, session, pdh_cert); + + ret = sev_ioctl(sev_state->sev_fd, KVM_SEV_RECEIVE_START, start, &fw_error); + if (ret < 0) { + error_report("Error RECEIVE_START ret=%d fw_error=%d '%s'", + ret, fw_error, fw_error_to_str(fw_error)); + goto err; + } + + object_property_set_int(OBJECT(sev), start->handle, "handle", &error_abort); + sev_set_guest_state(SEV_STATE_RECEIVE_UPDATE); +err: + g_free(start); + g_free(session); + g_free(pdh_cert); + + return ret; +} + +static int sev_receive_update_data(QEMUFile *f, uint8_t *ptr) +{ + int ret = 1, fw_error = 0; + gchar *hdr = NULL, *trans = NULL; + struct kvm_sev_receive_update_data *update; + + update = g_new0(struct kvm_sev_receive_update_data, 1); + + /* get packet header */ + update->hdr_len = qemu_get_be32(f); + hdr = g_new(gchar, update->hdr_len); + qemu_get_buffer(f, (uint8_t *)hdr, update->hdr_len); + update->hdr_uaddr = (unsigned long)hdr; + + /* get transport buffer */ + update->trans_len = qemu_get_be32(f); + trans = g_new(gchar, update->trans_len); + update->trans_uaddr = (unsigned long)trans; + qemu_get_buffer(f, (uint8_t *)update->trans_uaddr, update->trans_len); + + update->guest_uaddr = (unsigned long) ptr; + update->guest_len = update->trans_len; + + trace_kvm_sev_receive_update_data(trans, ptr, update->guest_len, + hdr, update->hdr_len); + + ret = sev_ioctl(sev_state->sev_fd, KVM_SEV_RECEIVE_UPDATE_DATA, + update, &fw_error); + if (ret) { + error_report("Error RECEIVE_UPDATE_DATA ret=%d fw_error=%d '%s'", + ret, fw_error, fw_error_to_str(fw_error)); + goto err; + } +err: + g_free(trans); + g_free(update); + g_free(hdr); + return ret; +} + +int sev_load_incoming_page(void *handle, QEMUFile *f, uint8_t *ptr) +{ + SEVState *s = (SEVState *)handle; + + /* If this is first buffer and SEV is not in recieiving state then + * use RECEIVE_START command to create a encryption context. + */ + if (!sev_check_state(SEV_STATE_RECEIVE_UPDATE) && + sev_receive_start(s->sev_info, f)) { + return 1; + } + + return sev_receive_update_data(f, ptr); +} + static void sev_register_types(void) { diff --git a/target/i386/trace-events b/target/i386/trace-events index b41516cf9f..609752cca7 100644 --- a/target/i386/trace-events +++ b/target/i386/trace-events @@ -18,3 +18,6 @@ kvm_sev_launch_finish(void) "" kvm_sev_send_start(uint64_t pdh, int l1, uint64_t plat, int l2, uint64_t amd, int l3) "pdh 0x%" PRIx64 " len %d plat 0x%" PRIx64 " len %d amd 0x%" PRIx64 " len %d" kvm_sev_send_update_data(void *src, void *dst, int len) "guest %p trans %p len %d" kvm_sev_send_finish(void) "" +kvm_sev_receive_start(int policy, void *session, void *pdh) "policy 0x%x session %p pdh %p" +kvm_sev_receive_update_data(void *src, void *dst, int len, void *hdr, int hdr_len) "guest %p trans %p len %d hdr %p hdr_len %d" +kvm_sev_receive_finish(void) ""
The sev_load_incoming_page() provide the implementation to read the incoming guest private pages from the socket and load it into the guest memory. The routines uses the RECEIVE_START command to create the incoming encryption context on the first call then uses the RECEIEVE_UPDATE_DATA command to load the encrypted pages into the guest memory. After migration is completed, we issue the RECEIVE_FINISH command to transition the SEV guest to the runnable state so that it can be executed. Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com> --- accel/kvm/kvm-all.c | 1 + target/i386/sev.c | 126 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- target/i386/trace-events | 3 + 3 files changed, 129 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)