| Message ID | 1571300065-10236-4-git-send-email-amit.kachhap@arm.com (mailing list archive) |
|---|---|
| State | New, archived |
| Headers | show |
| Series | arm64: return address signing | expand |
Hi Amit, On 17/10/2019 09:14, Amit Daniel Kachhap wrote: > From: Kristina Martsenko <kristina.martsenko@arm.com> > > Each system capability can be of either boot, local, or system scope, > depending on when the state of the capability is finalized. When we > detect a conflict on a late CPU, we either offline the CPU or panic the > system. We currently always panic if the conflict is caused by a boot > scope capability, and offline the CPU if the conflict is caused by a > local or system scope capability. > > We're going to want to add a new capability (for pointer authentication) > which needs to be boot scope but doesn't need to panic the system when a > conflict is detected. So add a new flag to specify whether the > capability requires the system to panic or not. Current boot scope > capabilities are updated to set the flag, so there should be no > functional change as a result of this patch. > > Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> > Reviewed-by: Suzuki K Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com> > Signed-off-by: Kristina Martsenko <kristina.martsenko@arm.com> > Signed-off-by: Amit Daniel Kachhap <amit.kachhap@arm.com> > --- With the early parking of the CPUs without ptr_auth, I believe this change is not needed, as long as we use ARM64_CPUCAP_PERMITTED_FOR_LATE_CPU flag for the ptr_auth capability. Moreover, we may want to retain the "panic" situation, as we don't expect a secondary CPU to turn up without the ptr_auth and have a "conflict". Cheers Suzuki
On 10/17/19 7:36 PM, Suzuki K Poulose wrote: > Hi Amit, > > On 17/10/2019 09:14, Amit Daniel Kachhap wrote: >> From: Kristina Martsenko <kristina.martsenko@arm.com> >> >> Each system capability can be of either boot, local, or system scope, >> depending on when the state of the capability is finalized. When we >> detect a conflict on a late CPU, we either offline the CPU or panic the >> system. We currently always panic if the conflict is caused by a boot >> scope capability, and offline the CPU if the conflict is caused by a >> local or system scope capability. >> >> We're going to want to add a new capability (for pointer authentication) >> which needs to be boot scope but doesn't need to panic the system when a >> conflict is detected. So add a new flag to specify whether the >> capability requires the system to panic or not. Current boot scope >> capabilities are updated to set the flag, so there should be no >> functional change as a result of this patch. >> >> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> >> Reviewed-by: Suzuki K Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com> >> Signed-off-by: Kristina Martsenko <kristina.martsenko@arm.com> >> Signed-off-by: Amit Daniel Kachhap <amit.kachhap@arm.com> >> --- > > With the early parking of the CPUs without ptr_auth, I believe this > change is not needed, as long as we use ARM64_CPUCAP_PERMITTED_FOR_LATE_CPU > flag for the ptr_auth capability. Moreover, we may want to retain > the "panic" situation, as we don't expect a secondary CPU to turn > up without the ptr_auth and have a "conflict". Yes you are right that this patch is not required and panic better for error scenario. I will drop it in next iteration. Thanks, Amit > > Cheers > Suzuki IMPORTANT NOTICE: The contents of this email and any attachments are confidential and may also be privileged. If you are not the intended recipient, please notify the sender immediately and do not disclose the contents to any other person, use it for any purpose, or store or copy the information in any medium. Thank you.
diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/cpufeature.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/cpufeature.h index 670497d..011a665 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/cpufeature.h +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/cpufeature.h @@ -208,6 +208,10 @@ extern struct arm64_ftr_reg arm64_ftr_reg_ctrel0; * In some non-typical cases either both (a) and (b), or neither, * should be permitted. This can be described by including neither * or both flags in the capability's type field. + * + * In case of a conflict, the CPU is prevented from booting. If the + * ARM64_CPUCAP_PANIC_ON_CONFLICT flag is specified for the capability, + * then a kernel panic is triggered. */ @@ -240,6 +244,8 @@ extern struct arm64_ftr_reg arm64_ftr_reg_ctrel0; #define ARM64_CPUCAP_PERMITTED_FOR_LATE_CPU ((u16)BIT(4)) /* Is it safe for a late CPU to miss this capability when system has it */ #define ARM64_CPUCAP_OPTIONAL_FOR_LATE_CPU ((u16)BIT(5)) +/* Panic when a conflict is detected */ +#define ARM64_CPUCAP_PANIC_ON_CONFLICT ((u16)BIT(6)) /* * CPU errata workarounds that need to be enabled at boot time if one or @@ -279,9 +285,11 @@ extern struct arm64_ftr_reg arm64_ftr_reg_ctrel0; /* * CPU feature used early in the boot based on the boot CPU. All secondary - * CPUs must match the state of the capability as detected by the boot CPU. + * CPUs must match the state of the capability as detected by the boot CPU. In + * case of a conflict, a kernel panic is triggered. */ -#define ARM64_CPUCAP_STRICT_BOOT_CPU_FEATURE ARM64_CPUCAP_SCOPE_BOOT_CPU +#define ARM64_CPUCAP_STRICT_BOOT_CPU_FEATURE \ + (ARM64_CPUCAP_SCOPE_BOOT_CPU | ARM64_CPUCAP_PANIC_ON_CONFLICT) struct arm64_cpu_capabilities { const char *desc; @@ -352,6 +360,12 @@ cpucap_late_cpu_permitted(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *cap) return !!(cap->type & ARM64_CPUCAP_PERMITTED_FOR_LATE_CPU); } +static inline bool +cpucap_panic_on_conflict(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *cap) +{ + return !!(cap->type & ARM64_CPUCAP_PANIC_ON_CONFLICT); +} + /* * Generic helper for handling capabilties with multiple (match,enable) pairs * of call backs, sharing the same capability bit. diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c index a73400b..4ef40c9 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c @@ -1850,10 +1850,8 @@ static void __init enable_cpu_capabilities(u16 scope_mask) * Run through the list of capabilities to check for conflicts. * If the system has already detected a capability, take necessary * action on this CPU. - * - * Returns "false" on conflicts. */ -static bool verify_local_cpu_caps(u16 scope_mask) +static void verify_local_cpu_caps(u16 scope_mask) { int i; bool cpu_has_cap, system_has_cap; @@ -1898,10 +1896,12 @@ static bool verify_local_cpu_caps(u16 scope_mask) pr_crit("CPU%d: Detected conflict for capability %d (%s), System: %d, CPU: %d\n", smp_processor_id(), caps->capability, caps->desc, system_has_cap, cpu_has_cap); - return false; - } - return true; + if (cpucap_panic_on_conflict(caps)) + cpu_panic_kernel(); + else + cpu_die_early(); + } } /* @@ -1911,12 +1911,8 @@ static bool verify_local_cpu_caps(u16 scope_mask) static void check_early_cpu_features(void) { verify_cpu_asid_bits(); - /* - * Early features are used by the kernel already. If there - * is a conflict, we cannot proceed further. - */ - if (!verify_local_cpu_caps(SCOPE_BOOT_CPU)) - cpu_panic_kernel(); + + verify_local_cpu_caps(SCOPE_BOOT_CPU); } static void @@ -1964,8 +1960,7 @@ static void verify_local_cpu_capabilities(void) * check_early_cpu_features(), as they need to be verified * on all secondary CPUs. */ - if (!verify_local_cpu_caps(SCOPE_ALL & ~SCOPE_BOOT_CPU)) - cpu_die_early(); + verify_local_cpu_caps(SCOPE_ALL & ~SCOPE_BOOT_CPU); verify_local_elf_hwcaps(arm64_elf_hwcaps);