| Message ID | 20200115171333.28811-3-kpsingh@chromium.org (mailing list archive) |
|---|---|
| State | New, archived |
| Headers | show |
| Series | MAC and Audit policy using eBPF (KRSI) | expand |
On 1/15/2020 9:13 AM, KP Singh wrote: > From: KP Singh <kpsingh@google.com> > > The LSM can be enabled by CONFIG_SECURITY_BPF. > Without CONFIG_SECURITY_BPF_ENFORCE, the LSM will run the > attached eBPF programs but not enforce MAC policy based > on the return value of the attached programs. > > Signed-off-by: KP Singh <kpsingh@google.com> > --- > MAINTAINERS | 7 +++++++ > security/Kconfig | 11 ++++++----- > security/Makefile | 2 ++ > security/bpf/Kconfig | 22 ++++++++++++++++++++++ > security/bpf/Makefile | 5 +++++ > security/bpf/lsm.c | 25 +++++++++++++++++++++++++ > 6 files changed, 67 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) > create mode 100644 security/bpf/Kconfig > create mode 100644 security/bpf/Makefile > create mode 100644 security/bpf/lsm.c > > diff --git a/MAINTAINERS b/MAINTAINERS > index 66a2e5e07117..0941f478cfa5 100644 > --- a/MAINTAINERS > +++ b/MAINTAINERS > @@ -3203,6 +3203,13 @@ S: Supported > F: arch/x86/net/ > X: arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp32.c > > +BPF SECURITY MODULE > +M: KP Singh <kpsingh@chromium.org> > +L: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org > +L: bpf@vger.kernel.org > +S: Maintained > +F: security/bpf/ > + > BROADCOM B44 10/100 ETHERNET DRIVER > M: Michael Chan <michael.chan@broadcom.com> > L: netdev@vger.kernel.org > diff --git a/security/Kconfig b/security/Kconfig > index 2a1a2d396228..6f1aab195e7d 100644 > --- a/security/Kconfig > +++ b/security/Kconfig > @@ -236,6 +236,7 @@ source "security/tomoyo/Kconfig" > source "security/apparmor/Kconfig" > source "security/loadpin/Kconfig" > source "security/yama/Kconfig" > +source "security/bpf/Kconfig" > source "security/safesetid/Kconfig" > source "security/lockdown/Kconfig" > > @@ -277,11 +278,11 @@ endchoice > > config LSM > string "Ordered list of enabled LSMs" > - default "lockdown,yama,loadpin,safesetid,integrity,smack,selinux,tomoyo,apparmor" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_SMACK > - default "lockdown,yama,loadpin,safesetid,integrity,apparmor,selinux,smack,tomoyo" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_APPARMOR > - default "lockdown,yama,loadpin,safesetid,integrity,tomoyo" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_TOMOYO > - default "lockdown,yama,loadpin,safesetid,integrity" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_DAC > - default "lockdown,yama,loadpin,safesetid,integrity,selinux,smack,tomoyo,apparmor" > + default "lockdown,yama,loadpin,safesetid,integrity,smack,selinux,tomoyo,apparmor,bpf" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_SMACK > + default "lockdown,yama,loadpin,safesetid,integrity,apparmor,selinux,smack,tomoyo,bpf" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_APPARMOR > + default "lockdown,yama,loadpin,safesetid,integrity,tomoyo,bpf" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_TOMOYO > + default "lockdown,yama,loadpin,safesetid,integrity,bpf" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_DAC > + default "lockdown,yama,loadpin,safesetid,integrity,selinux,smack,tomoyo,apparmor,bpf" > help > A comma-separated list of LSMs, in initialization order. > Any LSMs left off this list will be ignored. This can be > diff --git a/security/Makefile b/security/Makefile > index be1dd9d2cb2f..50e6821dd7b7 100644 > --- a/security/Makefile > +++ b/security/Makefile > @@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ subdir-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_YAMA) += yama > subdir-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_LOADPIN) += loadpin > subdir-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_SAFESETID) += safesetid > subdir-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_LOCKDOWN_LSM) += lockdown > +subdir-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_BPF) += bpf > > # always enable default capabilities > obj-y += commoncap.o > @@ -29,6 +30,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_YAMA) += yama/ > obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_LOADPIN) += loadpin/ > obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_SAFESETID) += safesetid/ > obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_LOCKDOWN_LSM) += lockdown/ > +obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_BPF) += bpf/ > obj-$(CONFIG_CGROUP_DEVICE) += device_cgroup.o > > # Object integrity file lists > diff --git a/security/bpf/Kconfig b/security/bpf/Kconfig > new file mode 100644 > index 000000000000..a5f6c67ae526 > --- /dev/null > +++ b/security/bpf/Kconfig > @@ -0,0 +1,22 @@ > +# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 > +# > +# Copyright 2019 Google LLC. > + > +config SECURITY_BPF > + bool "BPF-based MAC and audit policy" > + depends on SECURITY > + depends on BPF_SYSCALL > + help > + This enables instrumentation of the security hooks with > + eBPF programs. > + > + If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N. > + > +config SECURITY_BPF_ENFORCE > + bool "Deny operations based on the evaluation of the attached programs" > + depends on SECURITY_BPF > + help > + eBPF programs attached to hooks can be used for both auditing and > + enforcement. Enabling enforcement implies that the evaluation result > + from the attached eBPF programs will allow or deny the operation > + guarded by the security hook. > diff --git a/security/bpf/Makefile b/security/bpf/Makefile > new file mode 100644 > index 000000000000..26a0ab6f99b7 > --- /dev/null > +++ b/security/bpf/Makefile > @@ -0,0 +1,5 @@ > +# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 > +# > +# Copyright 2019 Google LLC. > + > +obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_BPF) := lsm.o > diff --git a/security/bpf/lsm.c b/security/bpf/lsm.c > new file mode 100644 > index 000000000000..5c5c14f990ce > --- /dev/null > +++ b/security/bpf/lsm.c > @@ -0,0 +1,25 @@ > +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 > + > +/* > + * Copyright 2019 Google LLC. > + */ > + > +#include <linux/lsm_hooks.h> > + > +/* This is only for internal hooks, always statically shipped as part of the > + * BPF LSM. Statically defined hooks are appeneded to the security_hook_heads > + * which is common for LSMs and R/O after init. > + */ > +static struct security_hook_list lsm_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {}; s/lsm_hooks/bpf_hooks/ The lsm prefix is for the infrastructure. The way you have it is massively confusing. > + > +static int __init lsm_init(void) s/lsm_init/bpf_init/ Same reason. When I'm looking at several security modules at once I need to be able to tell them apart. > +{ > + security_add_hooks(lsm_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(lsm_hooks), "bpf"); > + pr_info("eBPF and LSM are friends now.\n"); Cute message, but not very informative if you haven't read the code. "LSM support for eBPF active\n" is more likely to be comprehensible. > + return 0; > +} > + > +DEFINE_LSM(bpf) = { > + .name = "bpf", > + .init = lsm_init, > +};
On 15-Jan 23:04, Casey Schaufler wrote: > On 1/15/2020 9:13 AM, KP Singh wrote: > > From: KP Singh <kpsingh@google.com> > > > > The LSM can be enabled by CONFIG_SECURITY_BPF. > > Without CONFIG_SECURITY_BPF_ENFORCE, the LSM will run the > > attached eBPF programs but not enforce MAC policy based > > on the return value of the attached programs. > > > > Signed-off-by: KP Singh <kpsingh@google.com> > > --- > > MAINTAINERS | 7 +++++++ > > security/Kconfig | 11 ++++++----- > > security/Makefile | 2 ++ > > security/bpf/Kconfig | 22 ++++++++++++++++++++++ > > security/bpf/Makefile | 5 +++++ > > security/bpf/lsm.c | 25 +++++++++++++++++++++++++ > > 6 files changed, 67 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) > > create mode 100644 security/bpf/Kconfig > > create mode 100644 security/bpf/Makefile > > create mode 100644 security/bpf/lsm.c > > > > diff --git a/MAINTAINERS b/MAINTAINERS > > index 66a2e5e07117..0941f478cfa5 100644 > > --- a/MAINTAINERS > > +++ b/MAINTAINERS > > @@ -3203,6 +3203,13 @@ S: Supported > > F: arch/x86/net/ > > X: arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp32.c > > > > +BPF SECURITY MODULE > > +M: KP Singh <kpsingh@chromium.org> > > +L: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org > > +L: bpf@vger.kernel.org > > +S: Maintained > > +F: security/bpf/ > > + > > BROADCOM B44 10/100 ETHERNET DRIVER > > M: Michael Chan <michael.chan@broadcom.com> > > L: netdev@vger.kernel.org > > diff --git a/security/Kconfig b/security/Kconfig > > index 2a1a2d396228..6f1aab195e7d 100644 > > --- a/security/Kconfig > > +++ b/security/Kconfig > > @@ -236,6 +236,7 @@ source "security/tomoyo/Kconfig" > > source "security/apparmor/Kconfig" > > source "security/loadpin/Kconfig" > > source "security/yama/Kconfig" > > +source "security/bpf/Kconfig" > > source "security/safesetid/Kconfig" > > source "security/lockdown/Kconfig" > > > > @@ -277,11 +278,11 @@ endchoice > > > > config LSM > > string "Ordered list of enabled LSMs" > > - default "lockdown,yama,loadpin,safesetid,integrity,smack,selinux,tomoyo,apparmor" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_SMACK > > - default "lockdown,yama,loadpin,safesetid,integrity,apparmor,selinux,smack,tomoyo" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_APPARMOR > > - default "lockdown,yama,loadpin,safesetid,integrity,tomoyo" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_TOMOYO > > - default "lockdown,yama,loadpin,safesetid,integrity" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_DAC > > - default "lockdown,yama,loadpin,safesetid,integrity,selinux,smack,tomoyo,apparmor" > > + default "lockdown,yama,loadpin,safesetid,integrity,smack,selinux,tomoyo,apparmor,bpf" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_SMACK > > + default "lockdown,yama,loadpin,safesetid,integrity,apparmor,selinux,smack,tomoyo,bpf" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_APPARMOR > > + default "lockdown,yama,loadpin,safesetid,integrity,tomoyo,bpf" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_TOMOYO > > + default "lockdown,yama,loadpin,safesetid,integrity,bpf" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_DAC > > + default "lockdown,yama,loadpin,safesetid,integrity,selinux,smack,tomoyo,apparmor,bpf" > > help > > A comma-separated list of LSMs, in initialization order. > > Any LSMs left off this list will be ignored. This can be > > diff --git a/security/Makefile b/security/Makefile > > index be1dd9d2cb2f..50e6821dd7b7 100644 > > --- a/security/Makefile > > +++ b/security/Makefile > > @@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ subdir-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_YAMA) += yama > > subdir-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_LOADPIN) += loadpin > > subdir-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_SAFESETID) += safesetid > > subdir-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_LOCKDOWN_LSM) += lockdown > > +subdir-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_BPF) += bpf > > > > # always enable default capabilities > > obj-y += commoncap.o > > @@ -29,6 +30,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_YAMA) += yama/ > > obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_LOADPIN) += loadpin/ > > obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_SAFESETID) += safesetid/ > > obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_LOCKDOWN_LSM) += lockdown/ > > +obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_BPF) += bpf/ > > obj-$(CONFIG_CGROUP_DEVICE) += device_cgroup.o > > > > # Object integrity file lists > > diff --git a/security/bpf/Kconfig b/security/bpf/Kconfig > > new file mode 100644 > > index 000000000000..a5f6c67ae526 > > --- /dev/null > > +++ b/security/bpf/Kconfig > > @@ -0,0 +1,22 @@ > > +# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 > > +# > > +# Copyright 2019 Google LLC. > > + > > +config SECURITY_BPF > > + bool "BPF-based MAC and audit policy" > > + depends on SECURITY > > + depends on BPF_SYSCALL > > + help > > + This enables instrumentation of the security hooks with > > + eBPF programs. > > + > > + If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N. > > + > > +config SECURITY_BPF_ENFORCE > > + bool "Deny operations based on the evaluation of the attached programs" > > + depends on SECURITY_BPF > > + help > > + eBPF programs attached to hooks can be used for both auditing and > > + enforcement. Enabling enforcement implies that the evaluation result > > + from the attached eBPF programs will allow or deny the operation > > + guarded by the security hook. > > diff --git a/security/bpf/Makefile b/security/bpf/Makefile > > new file mode 100644 > > index 000000000000..26a0ab6f99b7 > > --- /dev/null > > +++ b/security/bpf/Makefile > > @@ -0,0 +1,5 @@ > > +# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 > > +# > > +# Copyright 2019 Google LLC. > > + > > +obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_BPF) := lsm.o > > diff --git a/security/bpf/lsm.c b/security/bpf/lsm.c > > new file mode 100644 > > index 000000000000..5c5c14f990ce > > --- /dev/null > > +++ b/security/bpf/lsm.c > > @@ -0,0 +1,25 @@ > > +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 > > + > > +/* > > + * Copyright 2019 Google LLC. > > + */ > > + > > +#include <linux/lsm_hooks.h> > > + > > +/* This is only for internal hooks, always statically shipped as part of the > > + * BPF LSM. Statically defined hooks are appeneded to the security_hook_heads > > + * which is common for LSMs and R/O after init. > > + */ > > +static struct security_hook_list lsm_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {}; > > s/lsm_hooks/bpf_hooks/ > > The lsm prefix is for the infrastructure. The way you have it is massively confusing. Good point, I changed this to bpf_lsm_hooks as we prefix most types with bpf_lsm_ > > > + > > +static int __init lsm_init(void) > > s/lsm_init/bpf_init/ > > Same reason. When I'm looking at several security modules at once I > need to be able to tell them apart. Changed to bpf_lsm_init. > > > +{ > > + security_add_hooks(lsm_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(lsm_hooks), "bpf"); > > + pr_info("eBPF and LSM are friends now.\n"); > > Cute message, but not very informative if you haven't read the code. > "LSM support for eBPF active\n" is more likely to be comprehensible. Agreed, Updated :) - KP > > > + return 0; > > +} > > + > > +DEFINE_LSM(bpf) = { > > + .name = "bpf", > > + .init = lsm_init, > > +}; >
diff --git a/MAINTAINERS b/MAINTAINERS index 66a2e5e07117..0941f478cfa5 100644 --- a/MAINTAINERS +++ b/MAINTAINERS @@ -3203,6 +3203,13 @@ S: Supported F: arch/x86/net/ X: arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp32.c +BPF SECURITY MODULE +M: KP Singh <kpsingh@chromium.org> +L: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org +L: bpf@vger.kernel.org +S: Maintained +F: security/bpf/ + BROADCOM B44 10/100 ETHERNET DRIVER M: Michael Chan <michael.chan@broadcom.com> L: netdev@vger.kernel.org diff --git a/security/Kconfig b/security/Kconfig index 2a1a2d396228..6f1aab195e7d 100644 --- a/security/Kconfig +++ b/security/Kconfig @@ -236,6 +236,7 @@ source "security/tomoyo/Kconfig" source "security/apparmor/Kconfig" source "security/loadpin/Kconfig" source "security/yama/Kconfig" +source "security/bpf/Kconfig" source "security/safesetid/Kconfig" source "security/lockdown/Kconfig" @@ -277,11 +278,11 @@ endchoice config LSM string "Ordered list of enabled LSMs" - default "lockdown,yama,loadpin,safesetid,integrity,smack,selinux,tomoyo,apparmor" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_SMACK - default "lockdown,yama,loadpin,safesetid,integrity,apparmor,selinux,smack,tomoyo" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_APPARMOR - default "lockdown,yama,loadpin,safesetid,integrity,tomoyo" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_TOMOYO - default "lockdown,yama,loadpin,safesetid,integrity" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_DAC - default "lockdown,yama,loadpin,safesetid,integrity,selinux,smack,tomoyo,apparmor" + default "lockdown,yama,loadpin,safesetid,integrity,smack,selinux,tomoyo,apparmor,bpf" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_SMACK + default "lockdown,yama,loadpin,safesetid,integrity,apparmor,selinux,smack,tomoyo,bpf" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_APPARMOR + default "lockdown,yama,loadpin,safesetid,integrity,tomoyo,bpf" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_TOMOYO + default "lockdown,yama,loadpin,safesetid,integrity,bpf" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_DAC + default "lockdown,yama,loadpin,safesetid,integrity,selinux,smack,tomoyo,apparmor,bpf" help A comma-separated list of LSMs, in initialization order. Any LSMs left off this list will be ignored. This can be diff --git a/security/Makefile b/security/Makefile index be1dd9d2cb2f..50e6821dd7b7 100644 --- a/security/Makefile +++ b/security/Makefile @@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ subdir-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_YAMA) += yama subdir-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_LOADPIN) += loadpin subdir-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_SAFESETID) += safesetid subdir-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_LOCKDOWN_LSM) += lockdown +subdir-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_BPF) += bpf # always enable default capabilities obj-y += commoncap.o @@ -29,6 +30,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_YAMA) += yama/ obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_LOADPIN) += loadpin/ obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_SAFESETID) += safesetid/ obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_LOCKDOWN_LSM) += lockdown/ +obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_BPF) += bpf/ obj-$(CONFIG_CGROUP_DEVICE) += device_cgroup.o # Object integrity file lists diff --git a/security/bpf/Kconfig b/security/bpf/Kconfig new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..a5f6c67ae526 --- /dev/null +++ b/security/bpf/Kconfig @@ -0,0 +1,22 @@ +# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 +# +# Copyright 2019 Google LLC. + +config SECURITY_BPF + bool "BPF-based MAC and audit policy" + depends on SECURITY + depends on BPF_SYSCALL + help + This enables instrumentation of the security hooks with + eBPF programs. + + If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N. + +config SECURITY_BPF_ENFORCE + bool "Deny operations based on the evaluation of the attached programs" + depends on SECURITY_BPF + help + eBPF programs attached to hooks can be used for both auditing and + enforcement. Enabling enforcement implies that the evaluation result + from the attached eBPF programs will allow or deny the operation + guarded by the security hook. diff --git a/security/bpf/Makefile b/security/bpf/Makefile new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..26a0ab6f99b7 --- /dev/null +++ b/security/bpf/Makefile @@ -0,0 +1,5 @@ +# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 +# +# Copyright 2019 Google LLC. + +obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_BPF) := lsm.o diff --git a/security/bpf/lsm.c b/security/bpf/lsm.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..5c5c14f990ce --- /dev/null +++ b/security/bpf/lsm.c @@ -0,0 +1,25 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 + +/* + * Copyright 2019 Google LLC. + */ + +#include <linux/lsm_hooks.h> + +/* This is only for internal hooks, always statically shipped as part of the + * BPF LSM. Statically defined hooks are appeneded to the security_hook_heads + * which is common for LSMs and R/O after init. + */ +static struct security_hook_list lsm_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {}; + +static int __init lsm_init(void) +{ + security_add_hooks(lsm_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(lsm_hooks), "bpf"); + pr_info("eBPF and LSM are friends now.\n"); + return 0; +} + +DEFINE_LSM(bpf) = { + .name = "bpf", + .init = lsm_init, +};