| Message ID | 17be72ff-dc52-72ef-fbcc-0e9ec8b61604@linux.intel.com (mailing list archive) |
|---|---|
| State | Superseded |
| Headers | show |
| Series | Introduce CAP_PERFMON to secure system performance monitoring and observability | expand |
On Tue, 28 Jan 2020, Alexey Budankov wrote: > > Open access to monitoring for CAP_PERFMON privileged process. > Providing the access under CAP_PERFMON capability singly, without the > rest of CAP_SYS_ADMIN credentials, excludes chances to misuse the > credentials and makes operation more secure. > > CAP_PERFMON implements the principal of least privilege for performance > monitoring and observability operations (POSIX IEEE 1003.1e 2.2.2.39 principle > of least privilege: A security design principle that states that a process > or program be granted only those privileges (e.g., capabilities) necessary > to accomplish its legitimate function, and only for the time that such > privileges are actually required) > > For backward compatibility reasons access to the monitoring remains open > for CAP_SYS_ADMIN privileged processes but CAP_SYS_ADMIN usage for secure > monitoring is discouraged with respect to CAP_PERFMON capability. > > Signed-off-by: Alexey Budankov <alexey.budankov@linux.intel.com> > --- > arch/parisc/kernel/perf.c | 2 +- > 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) > > diff --git a/arch/parisc/kernel/perf.c b/arch/parisc/kernel/perf.c > index 676683641d00..c4208d027794 100644 > --- a/arch/parisc/kernel/perf.c > +++ b/arch/parisc/kernel/perf.c > @@ -300,7 +300,7 @@ static ssize_t perf_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, > else > return -EFAULT; > > - if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) > + if (!perfmon_capable()) > return -EACCES; > > if (count != sizeof(uint32_t)) > Acked-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>
diff --git a/arch/parisc/kernel/perf.c b/arch/parisc/kernel/perf.c index 676683641d00..c4208d027794 100644 --- a/arch/parisc/kernel/perf.c +++ b/arch/parisc/kernel/perf.c @@ -300,7 +300,7 @@ static ssize_t perf_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, else return -EFAULT; - if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) + if (!perfmon_capable()) return -EACCES; if (count != sizeof(uint32_t))
Open access to monitoring for CAP_PERFMON privileged process. Providing the access under CAP_PERFMON capability singly, without the rest of CAP_SYS_ADMIN credentials, excludes chances to misuse the credentials and makes operation more secure. CAP_PERFMON implements the principal of least privilege for performance monitoring and observability operations (POSIX IEEE 1003.1e 2.2.2.39 principle of least privilege: A security design principle that states that a process or program be granted only those privileges (e.g., capabilities) necessary to accomplish its legitimate function, and only for the time that such privileges are actually required) For backward compatibility reasons access to the monitoring remains open for CAP_SYS_ADMIN privileged processes but CAP_SYS_ADMIN usage for secure monitoring is discouraged with respect to CAP_PERFMON capability. Signed-off-by: Alexey Budankov <alexey.budankov@linux.intel.com> --- arch/parisc/kernel/perf.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)