| Message ID | 20200305043009.611636-1-david@gibson.dropbear.id.au (mailing list archive) |
|---|---|
| Headers | show |
| Series | spapr: Use vIOMMU translation for virtio by default | expand |
On Thu, Mar 05, 2020 at 03:30:07PM +1100, David Gibson wrote: > Upcoming Secure VM support for pSeries machines introduces some > complications for virtio, since the transfer buffers need to be > explicitly shared so that the hypervisor can access them. > > While it's not strictly speaking dependent on it, the fact that virtio > devices bypass normal platform IOMMU translation complicates the issue > on the guest side. Since there are some significan downsides to > bypassing the vIOMMU anyway, let's just disable that. > > There's already a flag to do this in virtio, just turn it on by > default for forthcoming pseries machine types. Breaking existing guest OS to support a new secure VM feature that may not even be used/wanted doesn't seems like a sensible tradeoff for default out of the box behaviour. IOW, if Secure VM needs this, can we tie the change in virtio and IOMMU defaults to the machine type flag that enables the use of Secure VM. That way the changed virtio defaults only take effect if a user/mgmt app has explicitly opted in to the new Secure VM feature, and existing users won't be broken by a new feature they don't even use. > Any opinions on whether dropping support for the older guest kernels > is acceptable at this point? I think this question has different answers depending on whether you are considering downstream vendor policy, current upstream policy, and a possible new downstream policy on guest support. IOW a bit of a can of worms... In the case of RHEL downstream there is a very narrow matrix for what guest OS are considered supported. In the case of current upstream, there has essentially never been any documented guest matrix. The unwritten implicit rule upstream has followed is to not change defaults in a way that would break ability to run existing guest OS. As an example, on x86 upstream defaults to i440fx and thus still uses virtio devices in transitional mode by default, while downstream RHEL used its narrow support matrix as a justification for why it was ok to switch to q35 by default & loose guest support in many cases. Even that was problematic though, because RHEL still needed to support RHEL-6 guest which are broken by default with q35 since they only support legacy mode virtio. Thus we needed work in management apps to enable RHEL-6 to continue working with q35 chipset, by placing the devices onto a PCI bridge, instead of a PCIe root port, or by explicitly using i440fx instead. Thus if we follow our *current* upstream guest support policy, I don't think it is acceptable to break existing guests with the new machine type upstream. It is reasonable to do it downstream if the downstream is willing to sacrifice these guests, or invest to make any mgmt apps add workaround/revert QEMU changes. With that all said, I do *NOT* think current upstream practice is good or sustainable long term (though I admit I've argued on the other side in the past). This policy is why we're still using a machine designed in 1995 on x86 by default, in order that we avoid breaking the popular guest OS of the day, like Windows 95. This is similar to the problem we had with host build platforms, where we afraid to make any change which would break an existing build platform, or on the flipside made arbitrary ad-hoc changes with no consistent approach across different subsystems. I think that we should aim define some clearer policy around how we want to support guest OS in upstream. As we did with our host build platforms policy, any guest support policy should aim to move forward at a reasonable pace so that we are not locked at a specific point in time forever. I can imagine three tiers 1. Recommended. Expected to work well with machine type defaults 2. Supported. Should work with QEMU but may need special settings applied 3. Unsupported. Will not work with QEMU regardless of settings I don't have an opinion right now on what guest OS should fall in which category. One possible way to classify them would be to look at whether the vendor themselves still supported the OS. IOW, to be in the "Recommended" criteria, it must be actively supported by the vendor. Once EOL by the vendor it would be capped at the "Supported" tier. That definition wouldn't help your pseries issue though, because RHEL-6 is still considered a supported OS. Another possible way to classify guest OS would be to look purely at the original release date, and set a cap of "$TODAY - 5 years" for the "Recommended" tier. That would exclude RHEL-6. Regards, Daniel
On Tue, Mar 10, 2020 at 11:43:43AM +0000, Daniel P. Berrangé wrote: > On Thu, Mar 05, 2020 at 03:30:07PM +1100, David Gibson wrote: > > Upcoming Secure VM support for pSeries machines introduces some > > complications for virtio, since the transfer buffers need to be > > explicitly shared so that the hypervisor can access them. > > > > While it's not strictly speaking dependent on it, the fact that virtio > > devices bypass normal platform IOMMU translation complicates the issue > > on the guest side. Since there are some significan downsides to > > bypassing the vIOMMU anyway, let's just disable that. > > > > There's already a flag to do this in virtio, just turn it on by > > default for forthcoming pseries machine types. > > Breaking existing guest OS to support a new secure VM feature that > may not even be used/wanted doesn't seems like a sensible tradeoff > for default out of the box behaviour. > > IOW, if Secure VM needs this, can we tie the change in virtio and > IOMMU defaults to the machine type flag that enables the use of > Secure VM. There is no such flag. In the POWER secure VM model, the secure mode option isn't something that's constructed in when the hypervisor builds the VM. Instead the VM is started normally and transitions itself to secure mode by talking directly with the ultravisor (it then uses TPM shenannigans to safely get the keys to its real storage backend(s)). > That way the changed virtio defaults only take effect if a user/mgmt > app has explicitly opted in to the new Secure VM feature, and existing > users won't be broken by a new feature they don't even use. Sure, but qemu has no natural way to know if secure VM is in use, until too late. I am wondering if we have to introduce an "svm=on" flag anyway. It's pretty ugly, since all it would be doing is changing defaults here and there for compatibilty with a possible future SVM transition, but maybe it's the best we can do :/. > > Any opinions on whether dropping support for the older guest kernels > > is acceptable at this point? > > > I think this question has different answers depending on whether you > are considering downstream vendor policy, current upstream policy, > and a possible new downstream policy on guest support. IOW a bit of a > can of worms... > > > In the case of RHEL downstream there is a very narrow matrix for > what guest OS are considered supported. > > In the case of current upstream, there has essentially never been > any documented guest matrix. The unwritten implicit rule upstream > has followed is to not change defaults in a way that would break > ability to run existing guest OS. Hrm, ok, that's not how I've been treating it for for pseries, though previous breakages have been for much older / rarer cases. We broke support for guests that don't call "ibm,client-architecture-support" long, long ago (but such guests are really, really ancient). We broke support (without workarounds) for guests with 4kiB standard page size more recently, but those are at least a decade old for common downstream distros (you can build such kernels today, but approximately nobody does). > As an example, on x86 upstream defaults to i440fx and thus still > uses virtio devices in transitional mode by default, while downstream > RHEL used its narrow support matrix as a justification for why it was > ok to switch to q35 by default & loose guest support in many cases. > Even that was problematic though, because RHEL still needed to support > RHEL-6 guest which are broken by default with q35 since they only > support legacy mode virtio. Thus we needed work in management apps > to enable RHEL-6 to continue working with q35 chipset, by placing > the devices onto a PCI bridge, instead of a PCIe root port, or by > explicitly using i440fx instead. Yeah, and here's where x86's visibility with mgmt because a big thing. Most of these changes are easily enough worked around with machine type options - and there's no inherent reason those are harder to work with than whole machine types, or other config details. But getting mgmt apps to support machine option based workarounds for us is a real challenge. > Thus if we follow our *current* upstream guest support policy, I don't > think it is acceptable to break existing guests with the new machine > type upstream. It is reasonable to do it downstream if the downstream > is willing to sacrifice these guests, or invest to make any mgmt apps > add workaround/revert QEMU changes. > > > With that all said, I do *NOT* think current upstream practice is good > or sustainable long term (though I admit I've argued on the other side > in the past). > > This policy is why we're still using a machine designed in 1995 on x86 > by default, in order that we avoid breaking the popular guest OS of the > day, like Windows 95. > > This is similar to the problem we had with host build platforms, where > we afraid to make any change which would break an existing build platform, > or on the flipside made arbitrary ad-hoc changes with no consistent > approach across different subsystems. > > > I think that we should aim define some clearer policy around how we > want to support guest OS in upstream. As we did with our host build > platforms policy, any guest support policy should aim to move forward > at a reasonable pace so that we are not locked at a specific point in > time forever. > > I can imagine three tiers > > 1. Recommended. Expected to work well with machine type defaults > 2. Supported. Should work with QEMU but may need special settings applied > 3. Unsupported. Will not work with QEMU regardless of settings > > I don't have an opinion right now on what guest OS should fall in which > category. One possible way to classify them would be to look at whether > the vendor themselves still supported the OS. IOW, to be in the > "Recommended" criteria, it must be actively supported by the vendor. > Once EOL by the vendor it would be capped at the "Supported" tier. > > That definition wouldn't help your pseries issue though, because RHEL-6 > is still considered a supported OS. > > Another possible way to classify guest OS would be to look purely at > the original release date, and set a cap of "$TODAY - 5 years" for > the "Recommended" tier. That would exclude RHEL-6. That seems fairly reasonable to me, but it doesn't really help me move forward right now. Right now, we have no sane way of distinguishing early enough between a RHEL-6 guest that needs legacy virtio and a guest that wants to go to secure mode, and can't have legacy virtio. :(
On Wed, Mar 11, 2020 at 12:12:47PM +1100, David Gibson wrote: > I am wondering if we have to introduce an "svm=on" flag anyway. It's > pretty ugly, since all it would be doing is changing defaults here and > there for compatibilty with a possible future SVM transition, but > maybe it's the best we can do :/. Frankly I'm surprised there's no way for the hypervisor to block VM transition to secure mode. To me an inability to disable DRM looks like a security problem. Does not the ultravisor somehow allow enabling/disabling this functionality from the hypervisor? It would be even better if the hypervisor could block the guest from poking at the ultravisor completely but I guess that would be too much to hope for.
On Wed, Mar 11, 2020 at 12:12:47PM +1100, David Gibson wrote: > On Tue, Mar 10, 2020 at 11:43:43AM +0000, Daniel P. Berrangé wrote: > > On Thu, Mar 05, 2020 at 03:30:07PM +1100, David Gibson wrote: > > > Upcoming Secure VM support for pSeries machines introduces some > > > complications for virtio, since the transfer buffers need to be > > > explicitly shared so that the hypervisor can access them. > > > > > > While it's not strictly speaking dependent on it, the fact that virtio > > > devices bypass normal platform IOMMU translation complicates the issue > > > on the guest side. Since there are some significan downsides to > > > bypassing the vIOMMU anyway, let's just disable that. > > > > > > There's already a flag to do this in virtio, just turn it on by > > > default for forthcoming pseries machine types. > > > > Breaking existing guest OS to support a new secure VM feature that > > may not even be used/wanted doesn't seems like a sensible tradeoff > > for default out of the box behaviour. > > > > IOW, if Secure VM needs this, can we tie the change in virtio and > > IOMMU defaults to the machine type flag that enables the use of > > Secure VM. > > There is no such flag. > > In the POWER secure VM model, the secure mode option isn't something > that's constructed in when the hypervisor builds the VM. Instead the > VM is started normally and transitions itself to secure mode by > talking directly with the ultravisor (it then uses TPM shenannigans to > safely get the keys to its real storage backend(s)). This is pretty suprising to me. The ability to use secure VM mode surely depends on host hardware features. We would need to be able to block the use of this, in order to allow VMs to be live migrated to hosts which lack the feature. Automatically & silently enabling a feature that has a hardware dependancy is something we aim to avoid, unless the user has opted in via some flag (such as -cpu host, or a -cpu $NAME, that implies the feature). > > > Any opinions on whether dropping support for the older guest kernels > > > is acceptable at this point? > > > > > > I think this question has different answers depending on whether you > > are considering downstream vendor policy, current upstream policy, > > and a possible new downstream policy on guest support. IOW a bit of a > > can of worms... > > > > > > In the case of RHEL downstream there is a very narrow matrix for > > what guest OS are considered supported. > > > > In the case of current upstream, there has essentially never been > > any documented guest matrix. The unwritten implicit rule upstream > > has followed is to not change defaults in a way that would break > > ability to run existing guest OS. > > Hrm, ok, that's not how I've been treating it for for pseries, though > previous breakages have been for much older / rarer cases. We broke > support for guests that don't call "ibm,client-architecture-support" > long, long ago (but such guests are really, really ancient). We broke > support (without workarounds) for guests with 4kiB standard page size > more recently, but those are at least a decade old for common > downstream distros (you can build such kernels today, but > approximately nobody does). > > > As an example, on x86 upstream defaults to i440fx and thus still > > uses virtio devices in transitional mode by default, while downstream > > RHEL used its narrow support matrix as a justification for why it was > > ok to switch to q35 by default & loose guest support in many cases. > > Even that was problematic though, because RHEL still needed to support > > RHEL-6 guest which are broken by default with q35 since they only > > support legacy mode virtio. Thus we needed work in management apps > > to enable RHEL-6 to continue working with q35 chipset, by placing > > the devices onto a PCI bridge, instead of a PCIe root port, or by > > explicitly using i440fx instead. > > Yeah, and here's where x86's visibility with mgmt because a big > thing. Most of these changes are easily enough worked around with > machine type options - and there's no inherent reason those are harder > to work with than whole machine types, or other config details. But > getting mgmt apps to support machine option based workarounds for us > is a real challenge. > > > Thus if we follow our *current* upstream guest support policy, I don't > > think it is acceptable to break existing guests with the new machine > > type upstream. It is reasonable to do it downstream if the downstream > > is willing to sacrifice these guests, or invest to make any mgmt apps > > add workaround/revert QEMU changes. > > > > > > With that all said, I do *NOT* think current upstream practice is good > > or sustainable long term (though I admit I've argued on the other side > > in the past). > > > > This policy is why we're still using a machine designed in 1995 on x86 > > by default, in order that we avoid breaking the popular guest OS of the > > day, like Windows 95. > > > > This is similar to the problem we had with host build platforms, where > > we afraid to make any change which would break an existing build platform, > > or on the flipside made arbitrary ad-hoc changes with no consistent > > approach across different subsystems. > > > > > > I think that we should aim define some clearer policy around how we > > want to support guest OS in upstream. As we did with our host build > > platforms policy, any guest support policy should aim to move forward > > at a reasonable pace so that we are not locked at a specific point in > > time forever. > > > > I can imagine three tiers > > > > 1. Recommended. Expected to work well with machine type defaults > > 2. Supported. Should work with QEMU but may need special settings applied > > 3. Unsupported. Will not work with QEMU regardless of settings > > > > I don't have an opinion right now on what guest OS should fall in which > > category. One possible way to classify them would be to look at whether > > the vendor themselves still supported the OS. IOW, to be in the > > "Recommended" criteria, it must be actively supported by the vendor. > > Once EOL by the vendor it would be capped at the "Supported" tier. > > > > That definition wouldn't help your pseries issue though, because RHEL-6 > > is still considered a supported OS. > > > > Another possible way to classify guest OS would be to look purely at > > the original release date, and set a cap of "$TODAY - 5 years" for > > the "Recommended" tier. That would exclude RHEL-6. > > That seems fairly reasonable to me, but it doesn't really help me move > forward right now. Right now, we have no sane way of distinguishing > early enough between a RHEL-6 guest that needs legacy virtio and a > guest that wants to go to secure mode, and can't have legacy virtio. :( Regards, Daniel
On Wed, Mar 11, 2020 at 10:01:27AM +0000, Daniel P. Berrangé wrote: > On Wed, Mar 11, 2020 at 12:12:47PM +1100, David Gibson wrote: > > On Tue, Mar 10, 2020 at 11:43:43AM +0000, Daniel P. Berrangé wrote: > > > On Thu, Mar 05, 2020 at 03:30:07PM +1100, David Gibson wrote: > > > > Upcoming Secure VM support for pSeries machines introduces some > > > > complications for virtio, since the transfer buffers need to be > > > > explicitly shared so that the hypervisor can access them. > > > > > > > > While it's not strictly speaking dependent on it, the fact that virtio > > > > devices bypass normal platform IOMMU translation complicates the issue > > > > on the guest side. Since there are some significan downsides to > > > > bypassing the vIOMMU anyway, let's just disable that. > > > > > > > > There's already a flag to do this in virtio, just turn it on by > > > > default for forthcoming pseries machine types. > > > > > > Breaking existing guest OS to support a new secure VM feature that > > > may not even be used/wanted doesn't seems like a sensible tradeoff > > > for default out of the box behaviour. > > > > > > IOW, if Secure VM needs this, can we tie the change in virtio and > > > IOMMU defaults to the machine type flag that enables the use of > > > Secure VM. > > > > There is no such flag. > > > > In the POWER secure VM model, the secure mode option isn't something > > that's constructed in when the hypervisor builds the VM. Instead the > > VM is started normally and transitions itself to secure mode by > > talking directly with the ultravisor (it then uses TPM shenannigans to > > safely get the keys to its real storage backend(s)). > > This is pretty suprising to me. The ability to use secure VM mode surely > depends on host hardware features. We would need to be able to block the > use of this, in order to allow VMs to be live migrated to hosts which > lack the feature. Automatically & silently enabling a feature that > has a hardware dependancy is something we aim to avoid, unless the user > has opted in via some flag (such as -cpu host, or a -cpu $NAME, that > implies the feature). That's something I don't know. Is migration supported in this mode?
On Thu, 5 Mar 2020 15:30:07 +1100 David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au> wrote: > Upcoming Secure VM support for pSeries machines introduces some > complications for virtio, since the transfer buffers need to be > explicitly shared so that the hypervisor can access them. > > While it's not strictly speaking dependent on it, the fact that virtio > devices bypass normal platform IOMMU translation complicates the issue > on the guest side. Since there are some significan downsides to > bypassing the vIOMMU anyway, let's just disable that. > > There's already a flag to do this in virtio, just turn it on by > default for forthcoming pseries machine types. > > Any opinions on whether dropping support for the older guest kernels > is acceptable at this point? > > Changes since v2: > * Rebase and improve some comments > Changes since v1: > * Added information on which guest kernel versions will no longer > work with these changes > * Use Michael Tsirkin's suggested better way of handling the machine > type change > > David Gibson (2): > spapr: Disable legacy virtio devices for pseries-5.0 and later This disables legacy AND transitional devices. IIUC this first patch is needed because only non-transitional (pure virtio-1) devices support iommu_platform=on, ie. this check in virtio_pci_device_plugged(): if (legacy) { if (virtio_host_has_feature(vdev, VIRTIO_F_IOMMU_PLATFORM)) { error_setg(errp, "VIRTIO_F_IOMMU_PLATFORM was supported by" " neither legacy nor transitional device"); return ; } It certainly looks right for legacy devices but what about transitional ones ? I couldn't find any indication in the spec or in the QEMU archives that explains why IOMMU should only be used with non-transitional devices... Jason or Michael, can you explain ? > spapr: Enable virtio iommu_platform=on by default > > hw/ppc/spapr.c | 19 +++++++++++++++++++ > 1 file changed, 19 insertions(+) >
On Wed, Mar 11, 2020 at 10:01:27AM +0000, Daniel P. Berrangé wrote: 65;5803;1c> On Wed, Mar 11, 2020 at 12:12:47PM +1100, David Gibson wrote: > > On Tue, Mar 10, 2020 at 11:43:43AM +0000, Daniel P. Berrangé wrote: > > > On Thu, Mar 05, 2020 at 03:30:07PM +1100, David Gibson wrote: > > > > Upcoming Secure VM support for pSeries machines introduces some > > > > complications for virtio, since the transfer buffers need to be > > > > explicitly shared so that the hypervisor can access them. > > > > > > > > While it's not strictly speaking dependent on it, the fact that virtio > > > > devices bypass normal platform IOMMU translation complicates the issue > > > > on the guest side. Since there are some significan downsides to > > > > bypassing the vIOMMU anyway, let's just disable that. > > > > > > > > There's already a flag to do this in virtio, just turn it on by > > > > default for forthcoming pseries machine types. > > > > > > Breaking existing guest OS to support a new secure VM feature that > > > may not even be used/wanted doesn't seems like a sensible tradeoff > > > for default out of the box behaviour. > > > > > > IOW, if Secure VM needs this, can we tie the change in virtio and > > > IOMMU defaults to the machine type flag that enables the use of > > > Secure VM. > > > > There is no such flag. > > > > In the POWER secure VM model, the secure mode option isn't something > > that's constructed in when the hypervisor builds the VM. Instead the > > VM is started normally and transitions itself to secure mode by > > talking directly with the ultravisor (it then uses TPM shenannigans to > > safely get the keys to its real storage backend(s)). > > This is pretty suprising to me. The ability to use secure VM mode surely > depends on host hardware features. We would need to be able to block the > use of this, in order to allow VMs to be live migrated to hosts which > lack the feature. Automatically & silently enabling a feature that > has a hardware dependancy is something we aim to avoid, unless the user > has opted in via some flag (such as -cpu host, or a -cpu $NAME, that > implies the feature). That is an excellent point, which I had not previously considered. I have confirmed that there is indeed not, at present, a way to disable the secure transition. But, it looks like it's not too late to fix it. I've discussed with Paul Mackerras, and early in the secure transition apparently the UV makes a call to the HV, which is allowed to fail. So, we're looking at adding another KVM capability for secure mode. It will default to disabled, and until it is explicitly enabled, KVM will always fail that call from the UV, effectively preventing guests from going into secure mode. We can then wire that up to a new spapr cap in qemu, which we can also use to configure these virtio defaults.
On Wed, Mar 11, 2020 at 07:48:26AM -0400, Michael S. Tsirkin wrote: > On Wed, Mar 11, 2020 at 10:01:27AM +0000, Daniel P. Berrangé wrote: > > On Wed, Mar 11, 2020 at 12:12:47PM +1100, David Gibson wrote: > > > On Tue, Mar 10, 2020 at 11:43:43AM +0000, Daniel P. Berrangé wrote: > > > > On Thu, Mar 05, 2020 at 03:30:07PM +1100, David Gibson wrote: > > > > > Upcoming Secure VM support for pSeries machines introduces some > > > > > complications for virtio, since the transfer buffers need to be > > > > > explicitly shared so that the hypervisor can access them. > > > > > > > > > > While it's not strictly speaking dependent on it, the fact that virtio > > > > > devices bypass normal platform IOMMU translation complicates the issue > > > > > on the guest side. Since there are some significan downsides to > > > > > bypassing the vIOMMU anyway, let's just disable that. > > > > > > > > > > There's already a flag to do this in virtio, just turn it on by > > > > > default for forthcoming pseries machine types. > > > > > > > > Breaking existing guest OS to support a new secure VM feature that > > > > may not even be used/wanted doesn't seems like a sensible tradeoff > > > > for default out of the box behaviour. > > > > > > > > IOW, if Secure VM needs this, can we tie the change in virtio and > > > > IOMMU defaults to the machine type flag that enables the use of > > > > Secure VM. > > > > > > There is no such flag. > > > > > > In the POWER secure VM model, the secure mode option isn't something > > > that's constructed in when the hypervisor builds the VM. Instead the > > > VM is started normally and transitions itself to secure mode by > > > talking directly with the ultravisor (it then uses TPM shenannigans to > > > safely get the keys to its real storage backend(s)). > > > > This is pretty suprising to me. The ability to use secure VM mode surely > > depends on host hardware features. We would need to be able to block the > > use of this, in order to allow VMs to be live migrated to hosts which > > lack the feature. Automatically & silently enabling a feature that > > has a hardware dependancy is something we aim to avoid, unless the user > > has opted in via some flag (such as -cpu host, or a -cpu $NAME, that > > implies the feature). > > That's something I don't know. Is migration supported in this mode? Not at this stage, though there's plans for it later.
On Wed, Mar 11, 2020 at 03:33:59AM -0400, Michael S. Tsirkin wrote: > On Wed, Mar 11, 2020 at 12:12:47PM +1100, David Gibson wrote: > > I am wondering if we have to introduce an "svm=on" flag anyway. It's > > pretty ugly, since all it would be doing is changing defaults here and > > there for compatibilty with a possible future SVM transition, but > > maybe it's the best we can do :/. > > Frankly I'm surprised there's no way for the hypervisor to block VM > transition to secure mode. To me an inability to disable DRM looks like > a security problem. Uh.. I don't immediately see how it's a security problem, though I'm certainly convinced it's a problem in other ways. > Does not the ultravisor somehow allow > enabling/disabling this functionality from the hypervisor? Not at present, but as mentioned on the other thread, Paul and I came up with a tentative plan to change that. > It would be > even better if the hypervisor could block the guest from poking at the > ultravisor completely but I guess that would be too much to hope for. Yeah, probably :/.
On Thu, Mar 12, 2020 at 12:10:49PM +1100, David Gibson wrote: > On Wed, Mar 11, 2020 at 03:33:59AM -0400, Michael S. Tsirkin wrote: > > On Wed, Mar 11, 2020 at 12:12:47PM +1100, David Gibson wrote: > > > I am wondering if we have to introduce an "svm=on" flag anyway. It's > > > pretty ugly, since all it would be doing is changing defaults here and > > > there for compatibilty with a possible future SVM transition, but > > > maybe it's the best we can do :/. > > > > Frankly I'm surprised there's no way for the hypervisor to block VM > > transition to secure mode. To me an inability to disable DRM looks like > > a security problem. > > Uh.. I don't immediately see how it's a security problem, though I'm > certainly convinced it's a problem in other ways. Well for one it breaks introspection, allowing guests to hide malicious code from hypervisors. > > Does not the ultravisor somehow allow > > enabling/disabling this functionality from the hypervisor? > > Not at present, but as mentioned on the other thread, Paul and I came > up with a tentative plan to change that. > > > It would be > > even better if the hypervisor could block the guest from poking at the > > ultravisor completely but I guess that would be too much to hope for. > > Yeah, probably :/. > > -- > David Gibson | I'll have my music baroque, and my code > david AT gibson.dropbear.id.au | minimalist, thank you. NOT _the_ _other_ > | _way_ _around_! > http://www.ozlabs.org/~dgibson
On Thu, Mar 12, 2020 at 12:08:47PM +1100, David Gibson wrote: > On Wed, Mar 11, 2020 at 10:01:27AM +0000, Daniel P. Berrangé wrote: > 65;5803;1c> On Wed, Mar 11, 2020 at 12:12:47PM +1100, David Gibson wrote: > > > On Tue, Mar 10, 2020 at 11:43:43AM +0000, Daniel P. Berrangé wrote: > > > > On Thu, Mar 05, 2020 at 03:30:07PM +1100, David Gibson wrote: > > > > > Upcoming Secure VM support for pSeries machines introduces some > > > > > complications for virtio, since the transfer buffers need to be > > > > > explicitly shared so that the hypervisor can access them. > > > > > > > > > > While it's not strictly speaking dependent on it, the fact that virtio > > > > > devices bypass normal platform IOMMU translation complicates the issue > > > > > on the guest side. Since there are some significan downsides to > > > > > bypassing the vIOMMU anyway, let's just disable that. > > > > > > > > > > There's already a flag to do this in virtio, just turn it on by > > > > > default for forthcoming pseries machine types. > > > > > > > > Breaking existing guest OS to support a new secure VM feature that > > > > may not even be used/wanted doesn't seems like a sensible tradeoff > > > > for default out of the box behaviour. > > > > > > > > IOW, if Secure VM needs this, can we tie the change in virtio and > > > > IOMMU defaults to the machine type flag that enables the use of > > > > Secure VM. > > > > > > There is no such flag. > > > > > > In the POWER secure VM model, the secure mode option isn't something > > > that's constructed in when the hypervisor builds the VM. Instead the > > > VM is started normally and transitions itself to secure mode by > > > talking directly with the ultravisor (it then uses TPM shenannigans to > > > safely get the keys to its real storage backend(s)). > > > > This is pretty suprising to me. The ability to use secure VM mode surely > > depends on host hardware features. We would need to be able to block the > > use of this, in order to allow VMs to be live migrated to hosts which > > lack the feature. Automatically & silently enabling a feature that > > has a hardware dependancy is something we aim to avoid, unless the user > > has opted in via some flag (such as -cpu host, or a -cpu $NAME, that > > implies the feature). > > That is an excellent point, which I had not previously considered. > > I have confirmed that there is indeed not, at present, a way to > disable the secure transition. But, it looks like it's not too late > to fix it. > > I've discussed with Paul Mackerras, and early in the secure transition > apparently the UV makes a call to the HV, which is allowed to fail. > > So, we're looking at adding another KVM capability for secure mode. > It will default to disabled, and until it is explicitly enabled, KVM > will always fail that call from the UV, effectively preventing guests > from going into secure mode. > > We can then wire that up to a new spapr cap in qemu, which we can also > use to configure these virtio defaults. Great, that sounds viable to me. Regards, Daniel
On Thu, Mar 12, 2020 at 02:32:11AM -0400, Michael S. Tsirkin wrote: > On Thu, Mar 12, 2020 at 12:10:49PM +1100, David Gibson wrote: > > On Wed, Mar 11, 2020 at 03:33:59AM -0400, Michael S. Tsirkin wrote: > > > On Wed, Mar 11, 2020 at 12:12:47PM +1100, David Gibson wrote: > > > > I am wondering if we have to introduce an "svm=on" flag anyway. It's > > > > pretty ugly, since all it would be doing is changing defaults here and > > > > there for compatibilty with a possible future SVM transition, but > > > > maybe it's the best we can do :/. > > > > > > Frankly I'm surprised there's no way for the hypervisor to block VM > > > transition to secure mode. To me an inability to disable DRM looks like > > > a security problem. > > > > Uh.. I don't immediately see how it's a security problem, though I'm > > certainly convinced it's a problem in other ways. > > Well for one it breaks introspection, allowing guests to hide > malicious code from hypervisors. Hm, ok. Is that much used in practice? (Aside: I don't think I'd call that "introspection" since it's one thing examining another, not something examining itself). > > > > Does not the ultravisor somehow allow > > > enabling/disabling this functionality from the hypervisor? > > > > Not at present, but as mentioned on the other thread, Paul and I came > > up with a tentative plan to change that. > > > > > It would be > > > even better if the hypervisor could block the guest from poking at the > > > ultravisor completely but I guess that would be too much to hope for. > > > > Yeah, probably :/. > > > >