| Message ID | c0cd07661be8c0ce6f395a386401289a0f362765.1588234824.git.ashish.kalra@amd.com (mailing list archive) |
|---|---|
| State | New, archived |
| Headers | show |
| Series | Add AMD SEV guest live migration support | expand |
On 2020-04-30 08:41:08 +0000, Ashish Kalra wrote: > From: Brijesh Singh <Brijesh.Singh@amd.com> > > The command is used to finailize the encryption context created with > KVM_SEV_SEND_START command. > > Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> > Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> > Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> > Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> > Cc: "Radim Krčmář" <rkrcmar@redhat.com> > Cc: Joerg Roedel <joro@8bytes.org> > Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> > Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> > Cc: x86@kernel.org > Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org > Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org > Reviewed-by: Steve Rutherford <srutherford@google.com> > Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com> > Signed-off-by: Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@amd.com> > --- > .../virt/kvm/amd-memory-encryption.rst | 8 +++++++ > arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c | 23 +++++++++++++++++++ > 2 files changed, 31 insertions(+) > > diff --git a/Documentation/virt/kvm/amd-memory-encryption.rst b/Documentation/virt/kvm/amd-memory-encryption.rst > index f46817ef7019..a45dcb5f8687 100644 > --- a/Documentation/virt/kvm/amd-memory-encryption.rst > +++ b/Documentation/virt/kvm/amd-memory-encryption.rst > @@ -314,6 +314,14 @@ Returns: 0 on success, -negative on error As I commented in the v6 patches (see https://lore.kernel.org/kvm/20200402181710.GA655710@vbusired-dt/), there are multiple occurrences of the word "-negative" in amd-memory-encryption.rst. Can these be changed to either "negative" or "less than 0"? > __u32 trans_len; > }; > > +12. KVM_SEV_SEND_FINISH > +------------------------ > + > +After completion of the migration flow, the KVM_SEV_SEND_FINISH command can be > +issued by the hypervisor to delete the encryption context. > + > +Returns: 0 on success, -negative on error > + > References > ========== > > diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c > index 0c92c16505ab..81d661706d31 100644 > --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c > +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c > @@ -1153,6 +1153,26 @@ static int sev_send_update_data(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp) > return ret; > } > > +static int sev_send_finish(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp) > +{ > + struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info; > + struct sev_data_send_finish *data; > + int ret; > + > + if (!sev_guest(kvm)) > + return -ENOTTY; > + > + data = kzalloc(sizeof(*data), GFP_KERNEL); > + if (!data) > + return -ENOMEM; > + > + data->handle = sev->handle; > + ret = sev_issue_cmd(kvm, SEV_CMD_SEND_FINISH, data, &argp->error); > + > + kfree(data); > + return ret; > +} > + > int svm_mem_enc_op(struct kvm *kvm, void __user *argp) > { > struct kvm_sev_cmd sev_cmd; > @@ -1203,6 +1223,9 @@ int svm_mem_enc_op(struct kvm *kvm, void __user *argp) > case KVM_SEV_SEND_UPDATE_DATA: > r = sev_send_update_data(kvm, &sev_cmd); > break; > + case KVM_SEV_SEND_FINISH: > + r = sev_send_finish(kvm, &sev_cmd); > + break; > default: > r = -EINVAL; > goto out; > -- > 2.17.1 >
diff --git a/Documentation/virt/kvm/amd-memory-encryption.rst b/Documentation/virt/kvm/amd-memory-encryption.rst index f46817ef7019..a45dcb5f8687 100644 --- a/Documentation/virt/kvm/amd-memory-encryption.rst +++ b/Documentation/virt/kvm/amd-memory-encryption.rst @@ -314,6 +314,14 @@ Returns: 0 on success, -negative on error __u32 trans_len; }; +12. KVM_SEV_SEND_FINISH +------------------------ + +After completion of the migration flow, the KVM_SEV_SEND_FINISH command can be +issued by the hypervisor to delete the encryption context. + +Returns: 0 on success, -negative on error + References ========== diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c index 0c92c16505ab..81d661706d31 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c @@ -1153,6 +1153,26 @@ static int sev_send_update_data(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp) return ret; } +static int sev_send_finish(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp) +{ + struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info; + struct sev_data_send_finish *data; + int ret; + + if (!sev_guest(kvm)) + return -ENOTTY; + + data = kzalloc(sizeof(*data), GFP_KERNEL); + if (!data) + return -ENOMEM; + + data->handle = sev->handle; + ret = sev_issue_cmd(kvm, SEV_CMD_SEND_FINISH, data, &argp->error); + + kfree(data); + return ret; +} + int svm_mem_enc_op(struct kvm *kvm, void __user *argp) { struct kvm_sev_cmd sev_cmd; @@ -1203,6 +1223,9 @@ int svm_mem_enc_op(struct kvm *kvm, void __user *argp) case KVM_SEV_SEND_UPDATE_DATA: r = sev_send_update_data(kvm, &sev_cmd); break; + case KVM_SEV_SEND_FINISH: + r = sev_send_finish(kvm, &sev_cmd); + break; default: r = -EINVAL; goto out;