Message ID | 20201119232611.30114-8-tusharsu@linux.microsoft.com (mailing list archive) |
---|---|
State | Not Applicable, archived |
Delegated to: | Mike Snitzer |
Headers | show |
Series | IMA: support for measuring kernel integrity critical data | expand |
Hi Lakshmi, On Thu, 2020-11-19 at 15:26 -0800, Tushar Sugandhi wrote: > From: Lakshmi Ramasubramanian <nramas@linux.microsoft.com> > > The IMA hook to measure kernel critical data, namely > ima_measure_critical_data(), could be called before a custom IMA policy > is loaded. > Define a new critical data builtin policy to allow measuring > early kernel integrity critical data before a custom IMA policy is > loaded. Everything needing to be said seems to be included in the second sentence. Does the first sentence add anything? "Define a new critical data builtin policy" makes for a good Subject line. > > Add critical data to built-in IMA rules if the kernel command line > contains "ima_policy=critical_data". The boot command line parameters are defined in Documentation/admin- guide/kernel-parameters.txt. Please update "ima_policy". > > Signed-off-by: Lakshmi Ramasubramanian <nramas@linux.microsoft.com> > --- > security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 12 ++++++++++++ > 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+) > > diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c > index c9e52dab0638..119604a3efa0 100644 > --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c > +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c > @@ -206,6 +206,10 @@ static struct ima_rule_entry secure_boot_rules[] __ro_after_init = { > .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED}, > }; > > +static struct ima_rule_entry critical_data_rules[] __ro_after_init = { > + {.action = MEASURE, .func = CRITICAL_DATA, .flags = IMA_FUNC}, > +}; > + > /* An array of architecture specific rules */ > static struct ima_rule_entry *arch_policy_entry __ro_after_init; > > @@ -228,6 +232,7 @@ __setup("ima_tcb", default_measure_policy_setup); > > static bool ima_use_appraise_tcb __initdata; > static bool ima_use_secure_boot __initdata; > +static bool ima_use_critical_data __ro_after_init; Unlike ima_fail_unverifiable_sigs, ima_use_critical_data is only used during __init. Please change "__ro_after_init" to "__initdata". (The critical data policy itself is defined properly as __ro_after_init.) > static bool ima_fail_unverifiable_sigs __ro_after_init; > static int __init policy_setup(char *str) > { > @@ -242,6 +247,8 @@ static int __init policy_setup(char *str) > ima_use_appraise_tcb = true; > else if (strcmp(p, "secure_boot") == 0) > ima_use_secure_boot = true; > + else if (strcmp(p, "critical_data") == 0) > + ima_use_critical_data = true; > else if (strcmp(p, "fail_securely") == 0) > ima_fail_unverifiable_sigs = true; > else > @@ -875,6 +882,11 @@ void __init ima_init_policy(void) > ARRAY_SIZE(default_appraise_rules), > IMA_DEFAULT_POLICY); > > + if (ima_use_critical_data) > + add_rules(critical_data_rules, > + ARRAY_SIZE(critical_data_rules), > + IMA_DEFAULT_POLICY); > + > ima_update_policy_flag(); > } > -- dm-devel mailing list dm-devel@redhat.com https://www.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/dm-devel
On 11/20/20 6:30 AM, Mimi Zohar wrote: Hi Mimi, > > On Thu, 2020-11-19 at 15:26 -0800, Tushar Sugandhi wrote: >> From: Lakshmi Ramasubramanian <nramas@linux.microsoft.com> >> >> The IMA hook to measure kernel critical data, namely >> ima_measure_critical_data(), could be called before a custom IMA policy >> is loaded. >> Define a new critical data builtin policy to allow measuring >> early kernel integrity critical data before a custom IMA policy is >> loaded. > > Everything needing to be said seems to be included in the second > sentence. Does the first sentence add anything? "Define a new > critical data builtin policy" makes for a good Subject line. Agreed - will update. > >> >> Add critical data to built-in IMA rules if the kernel command line >> contains "ima_policy=critical_data". > > The boot command line parameters are defined in Documentation/admin- > guide/kernel-parameters.txt. Please update "ima_policy". Will do. > >> >> Signed-off-by: Lakshmi Ramasubramanian <nramas@linux.microsoft.com> >> --- >> security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 12 ++++++++++++ >> 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+) >> >> diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c >> index c9e52dab0638..119604a3efa0 100644 >> --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c >> +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c >> @@ -206,6 +206,10 @@ static struct ima_rule_entry secure_boot_rules[] __ro_after_init = { >> .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED}, >> }; >> >> +static struct ima_rule_entry critical_data_rules[] __ro_after_init = { >> + {.action = MEASURE, .func = CRITICAL_DATA, .flags = IMA_FUNC}, >> +}; >> + >> /* An array of architecture specific rules */ >> static struct ima_rule_entry *arch_policy_entry __ro_after_init; >> >> @@ -228,6 +232,7 @@ __setup("ima_tcb", default_measure_policy_setup); >> >> static bool ima_use_appraise_tcb __initdata; >> static bool ima_use_secure_boot __initdata; >> +static bool ima_use_critical_data __ro_after_init; > > Unlike ima_fail_unverifiable_sigs, ima_use_critical_data is only used > during __init. Please change "__ro_after_init" to "__initdata". (The > critical data policy itself is defined properly as __ro_after_init.) Will do. > >> static bool ima_fail_unverifiable_sigs __ro_after_init; >> static int __init policy_setup(char *str) >> { >> @@ -242,6 +247,8 @@ static int __init policy_setup(char *str) >> ima_use_appraise_tcb = true; >> else if (strcmp(p, "secure_boot") == 0) >> ima_use_secure_boot = true; >> + else if (strcmp(p, "critical_data") == 0) >> + ima_use_critical_data = true; >> else if (strcmp(p, "fail_securely") == 0) >> ima_fail_unverifiable_sigs = true; >> else >> @@ -875,6 +882,11 @@ void __init ima_init_policy(void) >> ARRAY_SIZE(default_appraise_rules), >> IMA_DEFAULT_POLICY); >> >> + if (ima_use_critical_data) >> + add_rules(critical_data_rules, >> + ARRAY_SIZE(critical_data_rules), >> + IMA_DEFAULT_POLICY); >> + >> ima_update_policy_flag(); >> } >> > thanks, -lakshmi -- dm-devel mailing list dm-devel@redhat.com https://www.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/dm-devel
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c index c9e52dab0638..119604a3efa0 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c @@ -206,6 +206,10 @@ static struct ima_rule_entry secure_boot_rules[] __ro_after_init = { .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED}, }; +static struct ima_rule_entry critical_data_rules[] __ro_after_init = { + {.action = MEASURE, .func = CRITICAL_DATA, .flags = IMA_FUNC}, +}; + /* An array of architecture specific rules */ static struct ima_rule_entry *arch_policy_entry __ro_after_init; @@ -228,6 +232,7 @@ __setup("ima_tcb", default_measure_policy_setup); static bool ima_use_appraise_tcb __initdata; static bool ima_use_secure_boot __initdata; +static bool ima_use_critical_data __ro_after_init; static bool ima_fail_unverifiable_sigs __ro_after_init; static int __init policy_setup(char *str) { @@ -242,6 +247,8 @@ static int __init policy_setup(char *str) ima_use_appraise_tcb = true; else if (strcmp(p, "secure_boot") == 0) ima_use_secure_boot = true; + else if (strcmp(p, "critical_data") == 0) + ima_use_critical_data = true; else if (strcmp(p, "fail_securely") == 0) ima_fail_unverifiable_sigs = true; else @@ -875,6 +882,11 @@ void __init ima_init_policy(void) ARRAY_SIZE(default_appraise_rules), IMA_DEFAULT_POLICY); + if (ima_use_critical_data) + add_rules(critical_data_rules, + ARRAY_SIZE(critical_data_rules), + IMA_DEFAULT_POLICY); + ima_update_policy_flag(); }