| Message ID | 20201209194212.5131-5-tusharsu@linux.microsoft.com (mailing list archive) |
|---|---|
| State | Not Applicable, archived |
| Delegated to: | Mike Snitzer |
| Headers | show |
| Series | IMA: support for measuring kernel integrity critical data | expand |
On 2020-12-09 11:42:08, Tushar Sugandhi wrote: > A new IMA policy rule is needed for the IMA hook > ima_measure_critical_data() and the corresponding func CRITICAL_DATA for > measuring the input buffer. The policy rule should ensure the buffer > would get measured only when the policy rule allows the action. The > policy rule should also support the necessary constraints (flags etc.) > for integrity critical buffer data measurements. > > Add a policy rule to define the constraints for restricting integrity > critical data measurements. > > Signed-off-by: Tushar Sugandhi <tusharsu@linux.microsoft.com> > --- > security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 35 +++++++++++++++++++++++++---- > 1 file changed, 31 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) > > diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c > index 2a0c0603626e..9a8ee80a3128 100644 > --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c > +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c > @@ -34,6 +34,7 @@ > #define IMA_PCR 0x0100 > #define IMA_FSNAME 0x0200 > #define IMA_KEYRINGS 0x0400 > +#define IMA_DATA_SOURCE 0x0800 You introduce data_source= in the next patch. This macro shouldn't be added until the next patch. > > #define UNKNOWN 0 > #define MEASURE 0x0001 /* same as IMA_MEASURE */ > @@ -85,6 +86,7 @@ struct ima_rule_entry { > } lsm[MAX_LSM_RULES]; > char *fsname; > struct ima_rule_opt_list *keyrings; /* Measure keys added to these keyrings */ > + struct ima_rule_opt_list *data_source; /* Measure data from this source */ > struct ima_template_desc *template; > }; > > @@ -479,6 +481,12 @@ static bool ima_match_rule_data(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, > else > opt_list = rule->keyrings; > break; > + case CRITICAL_DATA: > + if (!rule->data_source) > + return true; > + else > + opt_list = rule->data_source; If you take my suggestions on patch #1, remove the else and simply assign opt_list here, too. > + break; > default: > break; > } > @@ -518,13 +526,19 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, struct inode *inode, > { > int i; > > - if (func == KEY_CHECK) { > - return (rule->flags & IMA_FUNC) && (rule->func == func) && > - ima_match_rule_data(rule, func_data, cred); > - } > if ((rule->flags & IMA_FUNC) && > (rule->func != func && func != POST_SETATTR)) > return false; > + > + switch (func) { > + case KEY_CHECK: > + case CRITICAL_DATA: > + return ((rule->func == func) && > + ima_match_rule_data(rule, func_data, cred)); > + default: > + break; > + } > + > if ((rule->flags & IMA_MASK) && > (rule->mask != mask && func != POST_SETATTR)) > return false; > @@ -1119,6 +1133,19 @@ static bool ima_validate_rule(struct ima_rule_entry *entry) > if (ima_rule_contains_lsm_cond(entry)) > return false; > > + break; > + case CRITICAL_DATA: > + if (entry->action & ~(MEASURE | DONT_MEASURE)) > + return false; > + > + if (!(entry->flags & IMA_DATA_SOURCE) || > + (entry->flags & ~(IMA_FUNC | IMA_UID | IMA_PCR | > + IMA_DATA_SOURCE))) IMA_DATA_SOURCE shouldn't exist in this patch. This isn't the right indentation, either. See how IMA_KEYRINGS is indented in the KEY_CHECK case above. Tyler > + return false; > + > + if (ima_rule_contains_lsm_cond(entry)) > + return false; > + > break; > default: > return false; > -- > 2.17.1 > -- dm-devel mailing list dm-devel@redhat.com https://www.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/dm-devel
On 2020-12-10 3:10 p.m., Tyler Hicks wrote: > On 2020-12-09 11:42:08, Tushar Sugandhi wrote: >> A new IMA policy rule is needed for the IMA hook >> ima_measure_critical_data() and the corresponding func CRITICAL_DATA for >> measuring the input buffer. The policy rule should ensure the buffer >> would get measured only when the policy rule allows the action. The >> policy rule should also support the necessary constraints (flags etc.) >> for integrity critical buffer data measurements. >> >> Add a policy rule to define the constraints for restricting integrity >> critical data measurements. >> >> Signed-off-by: Tushar Sugandhi <tusharsu@linux.microsoft.com> >> --- >> security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 35 +++++++++++++++++++++++++---- >> 1 file changed, 31 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) >> >> diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c >> index 2a0c0603626e..9a8ee80a3128 100644 >> --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c >> +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c >> @@ -34,6 +34,7 @@ >> #define IMA_PCR 0x0100 >> #define IMA_FSNAME 0x0200 >> #define IMA_KEYRINGS 0x0400 >> +#define IMA_DATA_SOURCE 0x0800 > > You introduce data_source= in the next patch. This macro shouldn't be > added until the next patch. > Ok I will move IMA_DATA_SOURCE to the next patch. >> >> #define UNKNOWN 0 >> #define MEASURE 0x0001 /* same as IMA_MEASURE */ >> @@ -85,6 +86,7 @@ struct ima_rule_entry { >> } lsm[MAX_LSM_RULES]; >> char *fsname; >> struct ima_rule_opt_list *keyrings; /* Measure keys added to these keyrings */ >> + struct ima_rule_opt_list *data_source; /* Measure data from this source */ >> struct ima_template_desc *template; >> }; >> >> @@ -479,6 +481,12 @@ static bool ima_match_rule_data(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, >> else >> opt_list = rule->keyrings; >> break; >> + case CRITICAL_DATA: >> + if (!rule->data_source) >> + return true; >> + else >> + opt_list = rule->data_source; > > If you take my suggestions on patch #1, remove the else and simply > assign opt_list here, too. > Yup. Will do. >> + break; >> default: >> break; >> } >> @@ -518,13 +526,19 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, struct inode *inode, >> { >> int i; >> >> - if (func == KEY_CHECK) { >> - return (rule->flags & IMA_FUNC) && (rule->func == func) && >> - ima_match_rule_data(rule, func_data, cred); >> - } >> if ((rule->flags & IMA_FUNC) && >> (rule->func != func && func != POST_SETATTR)) >> return false; >> + >> + switch (func) { >> + case KEY_CHECK: >> + case CRITICAL_DATA: >> + return ((rule->func == func) && >> + ima_match_rule_data(rule, func_data, cred)); >> + default: >> + break; >> + } >> + >> if ((rule->flags & IMA_MASK) && >> (rule->mask != mask && func != POST_SETATTR)) >> return false; >> @@ -1119,6 +1133,19 @@ static bool ima_validate_rule(struct ima_rule_entry *entry) >> if (ima_rule_contains_lsm_cond(entry)) >> return false; >> >> + break; >> + case CRITICAL_DATA: >> + if (entry->action & ~(MEASURE | DONT_MEASURE)) >> + return false; >> + >> + if (!(entry->flags & IMA_DATA_SOURCE) || >> + (entry->flags & ~(IMA_FUNC | IMA_UID | IMA_PCR | >> + IMA_DATA_SOURCE))) > > IMA_DATA_SOURCE shouldn't exist in this patch. This isn't the right > indentation, either. See how IMA_KEYRINGS is indented in the KEY_CHECK > case above. > Will do. ~Tushar > Tyler > >> + return false; >> + >> + if (ima_rule_contains_lsm_cond(entry)) >> + return false; >> + >> break; >> default: >> return false; >> -- >> 2.17.1 >> -- dm-devel mailing list dm-devel@redhat.com https://www.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/dm-devel
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c index 2a0c0603626e..9a8ee80a3128 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c @@ -34,6 +34,7 @@ #define IMA_PCR 0x0100 #define IMA_FSNAME 0x0200 #define IMA_KEYRINGS 0x0400 +#define IMA_DATA_SOURCE 0x0800 #define UNKNOWN 0 #define MEASURE 0x0001 /* same as IMA_MEASURE */ @@ -85,6 +86,7 @@ struct ima_rule_entry { } lsm[MAX_LSM_RULES]; char *fsname; struct ima_rule_opt_list *keyrings; /* Measure keys added to these keyrings */ + struct ima_rule_opt_list *data_source; /* Measure data from this source */ struct ima_template_desc *template; }; @@ -479,6 +481,12 @@ static bool ima_match_rule_data(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, else opt_list = rule->keyrings; break; + case CRITICAL_DATA: + if (!rule->data_source) + return true; + else + opt_list = rule->data_source; + break; default: break; } @@ -518,13 +526,19 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, struct inode *inode, { int i; - if (func == KEY_CHECK) { - return (rule->flags & IMA_FUNC) && (rule->func == func) && - ima_match_rule_data(rule, func_data, cred); - } if ((rule->flags & IMA_FUNC) && (rule->func != func && func != POST_SETATTR)) return false; + + switch (func) { + case KEY_CHECK: + case CRITICAL_DATA: + return ((rule->func == func) && + ima_match_rule_data(rule, func_data, cred)); + default: + break; + } + if ((rule->flags & IMA_MASK) && (rule->mask != mask && func != POST_SETATTR)) return false; @@ -1119,6 +1133,19 @@ static bool ima_validate_rule(struct ima_rule_entry *entry) if (ima_rule_contains_lsm_cond(entry)) return false; + break; + case CRITICAL_DATA: + if (entry->action & ~(MEASURE | DONT_MEASURE)) + return false; + + if (!(entry->flags & IMA_DATA_SOURCE) || + (entry->flags & ~(IMA_FUNC | IMA_UID | IMA_PCR | + IMA_DATA_SOURCE))) + return false; + + if (ima_rule_contains_lsm_cond(entry)) + return false; + break; default: return false;
A new IMA policy rule is needed for the IMA hook ima_measure_critical_data() and the corresponding func CRITICAL_DATA for measuring the input buffer. The policy rule should ensure the buffer would get measured only when the policy rule allows the action. The policy rule should also support the necessary constraints (flags etc.) for integrity critical buffer data measurements. Add a policy rule to define the constraints for restricting integrity critical data measurements. Signed-off-by: Tushar Sugandhi <tusharsu@linux.microsoft.com> --- security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 35 +++++++++++++++++++++++++---- 1 file changed, 31 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)