Message ID | bb86eda2963d7bef0c469c1ef8d7b32222e3a145.1612398155.git.ashish.kalra@amd.com (mailing list archive) |
---|---|
State | New, archived |
Headers | show |
Series | Add AMD SEV guest live migration support | expand |
On Wed, Feb 3, 2021 at 4:39 PM Ashish Kalra <Ashish.Kalra@amd.com> wrote: > > From: Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@amd.com> > > Add new KVM_FEATURE_SEV_LIVE_MIGRATION feature for guest to check > for host-side support for SEV live migration. Also add a new custom > MSR_KVM_SEV_LIVE_MIGRATION for guest to enable the SEV live migration > feature. > > Signed-off-by: Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@amd.com> > --- > Documentation/virt/kvm/cpuid.rst | 5 +++++ > Documentation/virt/kvm/msr.rst | 12 ++++++++++++ > arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm_para.h | 4 ++++ > arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c | 13 +++++++++++++ > arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c | 16 ++++++++++++++++ > arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h | 2 ++ > 6 files changed, 52 insertions(+) > > diff --git a/Documentation/virt/kvm/cpuid.rst b/Documentation/virt/kvm/cpuid.rst > index cf62162d4be2..0bdb6cdb12d3 100644 > --- a/Documentation/virt/kvm/cpuid.rst > +++ b/Documentation/virt/kvm/cpuid.rst > @@ -96,6 +96,11 @@ KVM_FEATURE_MSI_EXT_DEST_ID 15 guest checks this feature bit > before using extended destination > ID bits in MSI address bits 11-5. > > +KVM_FEATURE_SEV_LIVE_MIGRATION 16 guest checks this feature bit before > + using the page encryption state > + hypercall to notify the page state > + change > + > KVM_FEATURE_CLOCKSOURCE_STABLE_BIT 24 host will warn if no guest-side > per-cpu warps are expected in > kvmclock > diff --git a/Documentation/virt/kvm/msr.rst b/Documentation/virt/kvm/msr.rst > index e37a14c323d2..020245d16087 100644 > --- a/Documentation/virt/kvm/msr.rst > +++ b/Documentation/virt/kvm/msr.rst > @@ -376,3 +376,15 @@ data: > write '1' to bit 0 of the MSR, this causes the host to re-scan its queue > and check if there are more notifications pending. The MSR is available > if KVM_FEATURE_ASYNC_PF_INT is present in CPUID. > + > +MSR_KVM_SEV_LIVE_MIGRATION: > + 0x4b564d08 > + > + Control SEV Live Migration features. > + > +data: > + Bit 0 enables (1) or disables (0) host-side SEV Live Migration feature, > + in other words, this is guest->host communication that it's properly > + handling the shared pages list. > + > + All other bits are reserved. > diff --git a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm_para.h b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm_para.h > index 950afebfba88..f6bfa138874f 100644 > --- a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm_para.h > +++ b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm_para.h > @@ -33,6 +33,7 @@ > #define KVM_FEATURE_PV_SCHED_YIELD 13 > #define KVM_FEATURE_ASYNC_PF_INT 14 > #define KVM_FEATURE_MSI_EXT_DEST_ID 15 > +#define KVM_FEATURE_SEV_LIVE_MIGRATION 16 > > #define KVM_HINTS_REALTIME 0 > > @@ -54,6 +55,7 @@ > #define MSR_KVM_POLL_CONTROL 0x4b564d05 > #define MSR_KVM_ASYNC_PF_INT 0x4b564d06 > #define MSR_KVM_ASYNC_PF_ACK 0x4b564d07 > +#define MSR_KVM_SEV_LIVE_MIGRATION 0x4b564d08 > > struct kvm_steal_time { > __u64 steal; > @@ -136,4 +138,6 @@ struct kvm_vcpu_pv_apf_data { > #define KVM_PV_EOI_ENABLED KVM_PV_EOI_MASK > #define KVM_PV_EOI_DISABLED 0x0 > > +#define KVM_SEV_LIVE_MIGRATION_ENABLED BIT_ULL(0) > + > #endif /* _UAPI_ASM_X86_KVM_PARA_H */ > diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c > index b0d324aed515..93f42b3d3e33 100644 > --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c > +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c > @@ -1627,6 +1627,16 @@ int svm_page_enc_status_hc(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned long gpa, > return ret; > } > > +void sev_update_migration_flags(struct kvm *kvm, u64 data) > +{ > + struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info; > + > + if (!sev_guest(kvm)) > + return; This should assert that userspace wanted the guest to be able to make these calls (see more below). > > + > + sev->live_migration_enabled = !!(data & KVM_SEV_LIVE_MIGRATION_ENABLED); > +} > + > int svm_get_shared_pages_list(struct kvm *kvm, > struct kvm_shared_pages_list *list) > { > @@ -1639,6 +1649,9 @@ int svm_get_shared_pages_list(struct kvm *kvm, > if (!sev_guest(kvm)) > return -ENOTTY; > > + if (!sev->live_migration_enabled) > + return -EINVAL; > + > if (!list->size) > return -EINVAL; > > diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c > index 58f89f83caab..43ea5061926f 100644 > --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c > +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c > @@ -2903,6 +2903,9 @@ static int svm_set_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr) > svm->msr_decfg = data; > break; > } > + case MSR_KVM_SEV_LIVE_MIGRATION: > + sev_update_migration_flags(vcpu->kvm, data); > + break; > case MSR_IA32_APICBASE: > if (kvm_vcpu_apicv_active(vcpu)) > avic_update_vapic_bar(to_svm(vcpu), data); > @@ -3976,6 +3979,19 @@ static void svm_vcpu_after_set_cpuid(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) > vcpu->arch.cr3_lm_rsvd_bits &= ~(1UL << (best->ebx & 0x3f)); > } > > + /* > + * If SEV guest then enable the Live migration feature. > + */ > + if (sev_guest(vcpu->kvm)) { > + struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *best; > + > + best = kvm_find_cpuid_entry(vcpu, KVM_CPUID_FEATURES, 0); > + if (!best) > + return; > + > + best->eax |= (1 << KVM_FEATURE_SEV_LIVE_MIGRATION); > + } > + Looking at this, I believe the only way for this bit to get enabled is if userspace toggles it. There needs to be a way for userspace to identify if the kernel underneath them does, in fact, support SEV LM. I'm at risk for having misread these patches (it's a long series), but I don't see anything that communicates upwards. This could go upward with the other paravirt features flags in cpuid.c. It could also be an explicit KVM Capability (checked through check_extension). Userspace should then have a chance to decide whether or not this should be enabled. And when it's not enabled, the host should return a GP in response to the hypercall. This could be configured either through userspace stripping out the LM feature bit, or by calling a VM scoped enable cap (KVM_VM_IOCTL_ENABLE_CAP). I believe the typical path for a feature like this to be configured would be to use ENABLE_CAP. > > if (!kvm_vcpu_apicv_active(vcpu)) > return; > > diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h > index 066ca2a9f1e6..e1bffc11e425 100644 > --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h > +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h > @@ -79,6 +79,7 @@ struct kvm_sev_info { > unsigned long pages_locked; /* Number of pages locked */ > struct list_head regions_list; /* List of registered regions */ > u64 ap_jump_table; /* SEV-ES AP Jump Table address */ > + bool live_migration_enabled; > /* List and count of shared pages */ > int shared_pages_list_count; > struct list_head shared_pages_list; > @@ -592,6 +593,7 @@ int svm_unregister_enc_region(struct kvm *kvm, > void pre_sev_run(struct vcpu_svm *svm, int cpu); > void __init sev_hardware_setup(void); > void sev_hardware_teardown(void); > +void sev_update_migration_flags(struct kvm *kvm, u64 data); > void sev_free_vcpu(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu); > int sev_handle_vmgexit(struct vcpu_svm *svm); > int sev_es_string_io(struct vcpu_svm *svm, int size, unsigned int port, int in); > -- > 2.17.1 >
Hello Steve, On Thu, Feb 04, 2021 at 04:56:35PM -0800, Steve Rutherford wrote: > On Wed, Feb 3, 2021 at 4:39 PM Ashish Kalra <Ashish.Kalra@amd.com> wrote: > > > > From: Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@amd.com> > > > > Add new KVM_FEATURE_SEV_LIVE_MIGRATION feature for guest to check > > for host-side support for SEV live migration. Also add a new custom > > MSR_KVM_SEV_LIVE_MIGRATION for guest to enable the SEV live migration > > feature. > > > > Signed-off-by: Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@amd.com> > > --- > > Documentation/virt/kvm/cpuid.rst | 5 +++++ > > Documentation/virt/kvm/msr.rst | 12 ++++++++++++ > > arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm_para.h | 4 ++++ > > arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c | 13 +++++++++++++ > > arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c | 16 ++++++++++++++++ > > arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h | 2 ++ > > 6 files changed, 52 insertions(+) > > > > diff --git a/Documentation/virt/kvm/cpuid.rst b/Documentation/virt/kvm/cpuid.rst > > index cf62162d4be2..0bdb6cdb12d3 100644 > > --- a/Documentation/virt/kvm/cpuid.rst > > +++ b/Documentation/virt/kvm/cpuid.rst > > @@ -96,6 +96,11 @@ KVM_FEATURE_MSI_EXT_DEST_ID 15 guest checks this feature bit > > before using extended destination > > ID bits in MSI address bits 11-5. > > > > +KVM_FEATURE_SEV_LIVE_MIGRATION 16 guest checks this feature bit before > > + using the page encryption state > > + hypercall to notify the page state > > + change > > + > > KVM_FEATURE_CLOCKSOURCE_STABLE_BIT 24 host will warn if no guest-side > > per-cpu warps are expected in > > kvmclock > > diff --git a/Documentation/virt/kvm/msr.rst b/Documentation/virt/kvm/msr.rst > > index e37a14c323d2..020245d16087 100644 > > --- a/Documentation/virt/kvm/msr.rst > > +++ b/Documentation/virt/kvm/msr.rst > > @@ -376,3 +376,15 @@ data: > > write '1' to bit 0 of the MSR, this causes the host to re-scan its queue > > and check if there are more notifications pending. The MSR is available > > if KVM_FEATURE_ASYNC_PF_INT is present in CPUID. > > + > > +MSR_KVM_SEV_LIVE_MIGRATION: > > + 0x4b564d08 > > + > > + Control SEV Live Migration features. > > + > > +data: > > + Bit 0 enables (1) or disables (0) host-side SEV Live Migration feature, > > + in other words, this is guest->host communication that it's properly > > + handling the shared pages list. > > + > > + All other bits are reserved. > > diff --git a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm_para.h b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm_para.h > > index 950afebfba88..f6bfa138874f 100644 > > --- a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm_para.h > > +++ b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm_para.h > > @@ -33,6 +33,7 @@ > > #define KVM_FEATURE_PV_SCHED_YIELD 13 > > #define KVM_FEATURE_ASYNC_PF_INT 14 > > #define KVM_FEATURE_MSI_EXT_DEST_ID 15 > > +#define KVM_FEATURE_SEV_LIVE_MIGRATION 16 > > > > #define KVM_HINTS_REALTIME 0 > > > > @@ -54,6 +55,7 @@ > > #define MSR_KVM_POLL_CONTROL 0x4b564d05 > > #define MSR_KVM_ASYNC_PF_INT 0x4b564d06 > > #define MSR_KVM_ASYNC_PF_ACK 0x4b564d07 > > +#define MSR_KVM_SEV_LIVE_MIGRATION 0x4b564d08 > > > > struct kvm_steal_time { > > __u64 steal; > > @@ -136,4 +138,6 @@ struct kvm_vcpu_pv_apf_data { > > #define KVM_PV_EOI_ENABLED KVM_PV_EOI_MASK > > #define KVM_PV_EOI_DISABLED 0x0 > > > > +#define KVM_SEV_LIVE_MIGRATION_ENABLED BIT_ULL(0) > > + > > #endif /* _UAPI_ASM_X86_KVM_PARA_H */ > > diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c > > index b0d324aed515..93f42b3d3e33 100644 > > --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c > > +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c > > @@ -1627,6 +1627,16 @@ int svm_page_enc_status_hc(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned long gpa, > > return ret; > > } > > > > +void sev_update_migration_flags(struct kvm *kvm, u64 data) > > +{ > > + struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info; > > + > > + if (!sev_guest(kvm)) > > + return; > > This should assert that userspace wanted the guest to be able to make > these calls (see more below). > > > > > + > > + sev->live_migration_enabled = !!(data & KVM_SEV_LIVE_MIGRATION_ENABLED); > > +} > > + > > int svm_get_shared_pages_list(struct kvm *kvm, > > struct kvm_shared_pages_list *list) > > { > > @@ -1639,6 +1649,9 @@ int svm_get_shared_pages_list(struct kvm *kvm, > > if (!sev_guest(kvm)) > > return -ENOTTY; > > > > + if (!sev->live_migration_enabled) > > + return -EINVAL; > > + > > if (!list->size) > > return -EINVAL; > > > > diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c > > index 58f89f83caab..43ea5061926f 100644 > > --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c > > +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c > > @@ -2903,6 +2903,9 @@ static int svm_set_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr) > > svm->msr_decfg = data; > > break; > > } > > + case MSR_KVM_SEV_LIVE_MIGRATION: > > + sev_update_migration_flags(vcpu->kvm, data); > > + break; > > case MSR_IA32_APICBASE: > > if (kvm_vcpu_apicv_active(vcpu)) > > avic_update_vapic_bar(to_svm(vcpu), data); > > @@ -3976,6 +3979,19 @@ static void svm_vcpu_after_set_cpuid(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) > > vcpu->arch.cr3_lm_rsvd_bits &= ~(1UL << (best->ebx & 0x3f)); > > } > > > > + /* > > + * If SEV guest then enable the Live migration feature. > > + */ > > + if (sev_guest(vcpu->kvm)) { > > + struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *best; > > + > > + best = kvm_find_cpuid_entry(vcpu, KVM_CPUID_FEATURES, 0); > > + if (!best) > > + return; > > + > > + best->eax |= (1 << KVM_FEATURE_SEV_LIVE_MIGRATION); > > + } > > + > > Looking at this, I believe the only way for this bit to get enabled is > if userspace toggles it. There needs to be a way for userspace to > identify if the kernel underneath them does, in fact, support SEV LM. > I'm at risk for having misread these patches (it's a long series), but > I don't see anything that communicates upwards. > > This could go upward with the other paravirt features flags in > cpuid.c. It could also be an explicit KVM Capability (checked through > check_extension). > > Userspace should then have a chance to decide whether or not this > should be enabled. And when it's not enabled, the host should return a > GP in response to the hypercall. This could be configured either > through userspace stripping out the LM feature bit, or by calling a VM > scoped enable cap (KVM_VM_IOCTL_ENABLE_CAP). > > I believe the typical path for a feature like this to be configured > would be to use ENABLE_CAP. I believe we have discussed and reviewed this earlier too. To summarize this feature, the host indicates if it supports the Live Migration feature and the feature and the hypercall are only enabled on the host when the guest checks for this support and does a wrmsrl() to enable the feature. Also the guest will not make the hypercall if the host does not indicate support for it. And these were your review comments on the above : I see I misunderstood how the CPUID bits get passed through: usermode can still override them. Forgot about the back and forth for CPUID with usermode. So as you mentioned, userspace can still override these and it gets a chance to decide whether or not this should be enabled. Thanks, Ashish > > > > if (!kvm_vcpu_apicv_active(vcpu)) > > return; > > > > diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h > > index 066ca2a9f1e6..e1bffc11e425 100644 > > --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h > > +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h > > @@ -79,6 +79,7 @@ struct kvm_sev_info { > > unsigned long pages_locked; /* Number of pages locked */ > > struct list_head regions_list; /* List of registered regions */ > > u64 ap_jump_table; /* SEV-ES AP Jump Table address */ > > + bool live_migration_enabled; > > /* List and count of shared pages */ > > int shared_pages_list_count; > > struct list_head shared_pages_list; > > @@ -592,6 +593,7 @@ int svm_unregister_enc_region(struct kvm *kvm, > > void pre_sev_run(struct vcpu_svm *svm, int cpu); > > void __init sev_hardware_setup(void); > > void sev_hardware_teardown(void); > > +void sev_update_migration_flags(struct kvm *kvm, u64 data); > > void sev_free_vcpu(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu); > > int sev_handle_vmgexit(struct vcpu_svm *svm); > > int sev_es_string_io(struct vcpu_svm *svm, int size, unsigned int port, int in); > > -- > > 2.17.1 > >
On Thu, Feb 4, 2021 at 7:08 PM Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@amd.com> wrote: > > Hello Steve, > > On Thu, Feb 04, 2021 at 04:56:35PM -0800, Steve Rutherford wrote: > > On Wed, Feb 3, 2021 at 4:39 PM Ashish Kalra <Ashish.Kalra@amd.com> wrote: > > > > > > From: Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@amd.com> > > > > > > Add new KVM_FEATURE_SEV_LIVE_MIGRATION feature for guest to check > > > for host-side support for SEV live migration. Also add a new custom > > > MSR_KVM_SEV_LIVE_MIGRATION for guest to enable the SEV live migration > > > feature. > > > > > > Signed-off-by: Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@amd.com> > > > --- > > > Documentation/virt/kvm/cpuid.rst | 5 +++++ > > > Documentation/virt/kvm/msr.rst | 12 ++++++++++++ > > > arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm_para.h | 4 ++++ > > > arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c | 13 +++++++++++++ > > > arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c | 16 ++++++++++++++++ > > > arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h | 2 ++ > > > 6 files changed, 52 insertions(+) > > > > > > diff --git a/Documentation/virt/kvm/cpuid.rst b/Documentation/virt/kvm/cpuid.rst > > > index cf62162d4be2..0bdb6cdb12d3 100644 > > > --- a/Documentation/virt/kvm/cpuid.rst > > > +++ b/Documentation/virt/kvm/cpuid.rst > > > @@ -96,6 +96,11 @@ KVM_FEATURE_MSI_EXT_DEST_ID 15 guest checks this feature bit > > > before using extended destination > > > ID bits in MSI address bits 11-5. > > > > > > +KVM_FEATURE_SEV_LIVE_MIGRATION 16 guest checks this feature bit before > > > + using the page encryption state > > > + hypercall to notify the page state > > > + change > > > + > > > KVM_FEATURE_CLOCKSOURCE_STABLE_BIT 24 host will warn if no guest-side > > > per-cpu warps are expected in > > > kvmclock > > > diff --git a/Documentation/virt/kvm/msr.rst b/Documentation/virt/kvm/msr.rst > > > index e37a14c323d2..020245d16087 100644 > > > --- a/Documentation/virt/kvm/msr.rst > > > +++ b/Documentation/virt/kvm/msr.rst > > > @@ -376,3 +376,15 @@ data: > > > write '1' to bit 0 of the MSR, this causes the host to re-scan its queue > > > and check if there are more notifications pending. The MSR is available > > > if KVM_FEATURE_ASYNC_PF_INT is present in CPUID. > > > + > > > +MSR_KVM_SEV_LIVE_MIGRATION: > > > + 0x4b564d08 > > > + > > > + Control SEV Live Migration features. > > > + > > > +data: > > > + Bit 0 enables (1) or disables (0) host-side SEV Live Migration feature, > > > + in other words, this is guest->host communication that it's properly > > > + handling the shared pages list. > > > + > > > + All other bits are reserved. > > > diff --git a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm_para.h b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm_para.h > > > index 950afebfba88..f6bfa138874f 100644 > > > --- a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm_para.h > > > +++ b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm_para.h > > > @@ -33,6 +33,7 @@ > > > #define KVM_FEATURE_PV_SCHED_YIELD 13 > > > #define KVM_FEATURE_ASYNC_PF_INT 14 > > > #define KVM_FEATURE_MSI_EXT_DEST_ID 15 > > > +#define KVM_FEATURE_SEV_LIVE_MIGRATION 16 > > > > > > #define KVM_HINTS_REALTIME 0 > > > > > > @@ -54,6 +55,7 @@ > > > #define MSR_KVM_POLL_CONTROL 0x4b564d05 > > > #define MSR_KVM_ASYNC_PF_INT 0x4b564d06 > > > #define MSR_KVM_ASYNC_PF_ACK 0x4b564d07 > > > +#define MSR_KVM_SEV_LIVE_MIGRATION 0x4b564d08 > > > > > > struct kvm_steal_time { > > > __u64 steal; > > > @@ -136,4 +138,6 @@ struct kvm_vcpu_pv_apf_data { > > > #define KVM_PV_EOI_ENABLED KVM_PV_EOI_MASK > > > #define KVM_PV_EOI_DISABLED 0x0 > > > > > > +#define KVM_SEV_LIVE_MIGRATION_ENABLED BIT_ULL(0) > > > + > > > #endif /* _UAPI_ASM_X86_KVM_PARA_H */ > > > diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c > > > index b0d324aed515..93f42b3d3e33 100644 > > > --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c > > > +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c > > > @@ -1627,6 +1627,16 @@ int svm_page_enc_status_hc(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned long gpa, > > > return ret; > > > } > > > > > > +void sev_update_migration_flags(struct kvm *kvm, u64 data) > > > +{ > > > + struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info; > > > + > > > + if (!sev_guest(kvm)) > > > + return; > > > > This should assert that userspace wanted the guest to be able to make > > these calls (see more below). > > > > > > > > + > > > + sev->live_migration_enabled = !!(data & KVM_SEV_LIVE_MIGRATION_ENABLED); > > > +} > > > + > > > int svm_get_shared_pages_list(struct kvm *kvm, > > > struct kvm_shared_pages_list *list) > > > { > > > @@ -1639,6 +1649,9 @@ int svm_get_shared_pages_list(struct kvm *kvm, > > > if (!sev_guest(kvm)) > > > return -ENOTTY; > > > > > > + if (!sev->live_migration_enabled) > > > + return -EINVAL; This is currently under guest control, so I'm not certain this is helpful. If I called this with otherwise valid parameters, and got back -EINVAL, I would probably think the bug is on my end. But it could be on the guest's end! I would probably drop this, but you could have KVM return an empty list of regions when this happens. Alternatively, as explained below, this could call guest_pv_has instead. > > > > + > > > if (!list->size) > > > return -EINVAL; > > > > > > diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c > > > index 58f89f83caab..43ea5061926f 100644 > > > --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c > > > +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c > > > @@ -2903,6 +2903,9 @@ static int svm_set_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr) > > > svm->msr_decfg = data; > > > break; > > > } > > > + case MSR_KVM_SEV_LIVE_MIGRATION: > > > + sev_update_migration_flags(vcpu->kvm, data); > > > + break; > > > case MSR_IA32_APICBASE: > > > if (kvm_vcpu_apicv_active(vcpu)) > > > avic_update_vapic_bar(to_svm(vcpu), data); > > > @@ -3976,6 +3979,19 @@ static void svm_vcpu_after_set_cpuid(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) > > > vcpu->arch.cr3_lm_rsvd_bits &= ~(1UL << (best->ebx & 0x3f)); > > > } > > > > > > + /* > > > + * If SEV guest then enable the Live migration feature. > > > + */ > > > + if (sev_guest(vcpu->kvm)) { > > > + struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *best; > > > + > > > + best = kvm_find_cpuid_entry(vcpu, KVM_CPUID_FEATURES, 0); > > > + if (!best) > > > + return; > > > + > > > + best->eax |= (1 << KVM_FEATURE_SEV_LIVE_MIGRATION); > > > + } > > > + > > > > Looking at this, I believe the only way for this bit to get enabled is > > if userspace toggles it. There needs to be a way for userspace to > > identify if the kernel underneath them does, in fact, support SEV LM. > > I'm at risk for having misread these patches (it's a long series), but > > I don't see anything that communicates upwards. > > > > This could go upward with the other paravirt features flags in > > cpuid.c. It could also be an explicit KVM Capability (checked through > > check_extension). > > > > Userspace should then have a chance to decide whether or not this > > should be enabled. And when it's not enabled, the host should return a > > GP in response to the hypercall. This could be configured either > > through userspace stripping out the LM feature bit, or by calling a VM > > scoped enable cap (KVM_VM_IOCTL_ENABLE_CAP). > > > > I believe the typical path for a feature like this to be configured > > would be to use ENABLE_CAP. > > I believe we have discussed and reviewed this earlier too. > > To summarize this feature, the host indicates if it supports the Live > Migration feature and the feature and the hypercall are only enabled on > the host when the guest checks for this support and does a wrmsrl() to > enable the feature. Also the guest will not make the hypercall if the > host does not indicate support for it. I've gone through and read this patch a bit more closely, and the surrounding code. Previously, I clearly misread this and the surrounding space. What happens if the guest just writes to the MSR anyway? Even if it didn't receive a cue to do so? I believe the hypercall would still get invoked here, since the hypercall does not check if SEV live migration is enabled. Similarly, the MSR for enabling it is always available, even if userspace didn't ask for the cpuid bit to be set. This should not happen. Userspace should be in control of a new hypercall rolling out. I believe my interpretation last time was that the cpuid bit was getting surfaced from the host kernel to host userspace, but I don't actually see that in this patch series. Another way to ask this question would be "How does userspace know the kernel they are on has this patch series?". It needs some way of checking whether or not the kernel underneath it supports SEV live migration. Technically, I think userspace could call get_cpuid, set_cpuid (with the same values), and then get_cpuid again, and it would be able to infer by checking the SEV LM feature flag in the KVM leaf. This seems a bit kludgy. Checking support should be easy. An additional question is "how does userspace choose whether live migration is advertised to the guest"? I believe userspace's desire for a particular value of the paravirt feature flag in CPUID get's overridden when they call set cpuid, since the feature flag is set in svm_vcpu_after_set_cpuid regardless of what userspace asks for. Userspace should have a choice in the matter. Looking at similar paravirt-y features, there's precedent for another way of doing this (may be preferred over CHECK_EXTENSION/ENABLE_CAP?): this could call guest_pv_has before running the hypercall. The feature (KVM_FEATURE_SEV_LIVE_MIGRATION) would then need to be exposed with the other paravirt features in __do_cpuid_func. The function guest_pv_has would represent if userspace has decided to expose SEV live migration to the guest, and the sev->live_migration_enabled would indicate if the guest responded affirmatively to the CPUID bit. The downside of using guest_pv_has is that, if pv enforcement is disabled, guest_pv_has will always return true, which seems a bit odd for a non-SEV guest. This isn't a deal breaker, but seems a bit odd for say, a guest that isn't even running SEV. Using CHECK_EXTENSION and ENABLE_CAP sidestep that. I'm also not certain I would call this a paravirt feature. > And these were your review comments on the above : > I see I misunderstood how the CPUID bits get passed > through: usermode can still override them. Forgot about the back and > forth for CPUID with usermode. > > So as you mentioned, userspace can still override these and it gets a > chance to decide whether or not this should be enabled. > > Thanks, > Ashish Thanks, Steve
Hello Steve, Let me first answer those queries which i can do immediately ... On Fri, Feb 05, 2021 at 06:54:21PM -0800, Steve Rutherford wrote: > On Thu, Feb 4, 2021 at 7:08 PM Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@amd.com> wrote: > > > > Hello Steve, > > > > On Thu, Feb 04, 2021 at 04:56:35PM -0800, Steve Rutherford wrote: > > > On Wed, Feb 3, 2021 at 4:39 PM Ashish Kalra <Ashish.Kalra@amd.com> wrote: > > > > > > > > From: Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@amd.com> > > > > > > > > Add new KVM_FEATURE_SEV_LIVE_MIGRATION feature for guest to check > > > > for host-side support for SEV live migration. Also add a new custom > > > > MSR_KVM_SEV_LIVE_MIGRATION for guest to enable the SEV live migration > > > > feature. > > > > > > > > Signed-off-by: Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@amd.com> > > > > --- > > > > Documentation/virt/kvm/cpuid.rst | 5 +++++ > > > > Documentation/virt/kvm/msr.rst | 12 ++++++++++++ > > > > arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm_para.h | 4 ++++ > > > > arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c | 13 +++++++++++++ > > > > arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c | 16 ++++++++++++++++ > > > > arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h | 2 ++ > > > > 6 files changed, 52 insertions(+) > > > > > > > > diff --git a/Documentation/virt/kvm/cpuid.rst b/Documentation/virt/kvm/cpuid.rst > > > > index cf62162d4be2..0bdb6cdb12d3 100644 > > > > --- a/Documentation/virt/kvm/cpuid.rst > > > > +++ b/Documentation/virt/kvm/cpuid.rst > > > > @@ -96,6 +96,11 @@ KVM_FEATURE_MSI_EXT_DEST_ID 15 guest checks this feature bit > > > > before using extended destination > > > > ID bits in MSI address bits 11-5. > > > > > > > > +KVM_FEATURE_SEV_LIVE_MIGRATION 16 guest checks this feature bit before > > > > + using the page encryption state > > > > + hypercall to notify the page state > > > > + change > > > > + > > > > KVM_FEATURE_CLOCKSOURCE_STABLE_BIT 24 host will warn if no guest-side > > > > per-cpu warps are expected in > > > > kvmclock > > > > diff --git a/Documentation/virt/kvm/msr.rst b/Documentation/virt/kvm/msr.rst > > > > index e37a14c323d2..020245d16087 100644 > > > > --- a/Documentation/virt/kvm/msr.rst > > > > +++ b/Documentation/virt/kvm/msr.rst > > > > @@ -376,3 +376,15 @@ data: > > > > write '1' to bit 0 of the MSR, this causes the host to re-scan its queue > > > > and check if there are more notifications pending. The MSR is available > > > > if KVM_FEATURE_ASYNC_PF_INT is present in CPUID. > > > > + > > > > +MSR_KVM_SEV_LIVE_MIGRATION: > > > > + 0x4b564d08 > > > > + > > > > + Control SEV Live Migration features. > > > > + > > > > +data: > > > > + Bit 0 enables (1) or disables (0) host-side SEV Live Migration feature, > > > > + in other words, this is guest->host communication that it's properly > > > > + handling the shared pages list. > > > > + > > > > + All other bits are reserved. > > > > diff --git a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm_para.h b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm_para.h > > > > index 950afebfba88..f6bfa138874f 100644 > > > > --- a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm_para.h > > > > +++ b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm_para.h > > > > @@ -33,6 +33,7 @@ > > > > #define KVM_FEATURE_PV_SCHED_YIELD 13 > > > > #define KVM_FEATURE_ASYNC_PF_INT 14 > > > > #define KVM_FEATURE_MSI_EXT_DEST_ID 15 > > > > +#define KVM_FEATURE_SEV_LIVE_MIGRATION 16 > > > > > > > > #define KVM_HINTS_REALTIME 0 > > > > > > > > @@ -54,6 +55,7 @@ > > > > #define MSR_KVM_POLL_CONTROL 0x4b564d05 > > > > #define MSR_KVM_ASYNC_PF_INT 0x4b564d06 > > > > #define MSR_KVM_ASYNC_PF_ACK 0x4b564d07 > > > > +#define MSR_KVM_SEV_LIVE_MIGRATION 0x4b564d08 > > > > > > > > struct kvm_steal_time { > > > > __u64 steal; > > > > @@ -136,4 +138,6 @@ struct kvm_vcpu_pv_apf_data { > > > > #define KVM_PV_EOI_ENABLED KVM_PV_EOI_MASK > > > > #define KVM_PV_EOI_DISABLED 0x0 > > > > > > > > +#define KVM_SEV_LIVE_MIGRATION_ENABLED BIT_ULL(0) > > > > + > > > > #endif /* _UAPI_ASM_X86_KVM_PARA_H */ > > > > diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c > > > > index b0d324aed515..93f42b3d3e33 100644 > > > > --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c > > > > +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c > > > > @@ -1627,6 +1627,16 @@ int svm_page_enc_status_hc(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned long gpa, > > > > return ret; > > > > } > > > > > > > > +void sev_update_migration_flags(struct kvm *kvm, u64 data) > > > > +{ > > > > + struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info; > > > > + > > > > + if (!sev_guest(kvm)) > > > > + return; > > > > > > This should assert that userspace wanted the guest to be able to make > > > these calls (see more below). > > > > > > > > > > > + > > > > + sev->live_migration_enabled = !!(data & KVM_SEV_LIVE_MIGRATION_ENABLED); > > > > +} > > > > + > > > > int svm_get_shared_pages_list(struct kvm *kvm, > > > > struct kvm_shared_pages_list *list) > > > > { > > > > @@ -1639,6 +1649,9 @@ int svm_get_shared_pages_list(struct kvm *kvm, > > > > if (!sev_guest(kvm)) > > > > return -ENOTTY; > > > > > > > > + if (!sev->live_migration_enabled) > > > > + return -EINVAL; > > This is currently under guest control, so I'm not certain this is > helpful. If I called this with otherwise valid parameters, and got > back -EINVAL, I would probably think the bug is on my end. But it > could be on the guest's end! I would probably drop this, but you could > have KVM return an empty list of regions when this happens. You will get -EINVAL till the guest kernel has booted to a specific point, because live migration is enabled when guest kernel has checked for host support for live migration and also OVMF/UEFI support for live migration, as per this guest kernel code below : arch/x86/kernel/kvm.c: kvm_init_platform() -> check_kvm_sev_migration() .. arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c: void __init check_kvm_sev_migration(void) { if (sev_active() && kvm_para_has_feature(KVM_FEATURE_SEV_LIVE_MIGRATION)) { unsigned long nr_pages; pr_info("KVM enable live migration\n"); sev_live_migration_enabled = true; /* * Ensure that _bss_decrypted section is marked as decrypted in the * shared pages list. */ nr_pages = DIV_ROUND_UP(__end_bss_decrypted - __start_bss_decrypted, PAGE_SIZE); early_set_mem_enc_dec_hypercall((unsigned long)__start_bss_decrypted, nr_pages, 0); /* * If not booted using EFI, enable Live migration support. */ if (!efi_enabled(EFI_BOOT)) wrmsrl(MSR_KVM_SEV_LIVE_MIGRATION, KVM_SEV_LIVE_MIGRATION_ENABLED); } else { pr_info("KVM enable live migration feature unsupported\n"); } Later, setup_kvm_sev_migration() invoked via a late initcall, checks for live migration supported(setup above) and UEFI/OVMF support for live migration and then enables live migration on the host via the wrmrsl() : static int __init setup_kvm_sev_migration(void) { efi_char16_t efi_sev_live_migration_enabled[] = L"SevLiveMigrationEnabled"; efi_guid_t efi_variable_guid = MEM_ENCRYPT_GUID; efi_status_t status; unsigned long size; bool enabled; /* * check_kvm_sev_migration() invoked via kvm_init_platform() before * this callback would have setup the indicator that live migration * feature is supported/enabled. */ if (!sev_live_migration_enabled) return 0; if (!efi_enabled(EFI_RUNTIME_SERVICES)) { pr_info("%s : EFI runtime services are not enabled\n", __func__); return 0; } size = sizeof(enabled); /* Get variable contents into buffer */ status = efi.get_variable(efi_sev_live_migration_enabled, &efi_variable_guid, NULL, &size, &enabled); if (status == EFI_NOT_FOUND) { pr_info("%s : EFI live migration variable not found\n", __func__); return 0; } if (status != EFI_SUCCESS) { pr_info("%s : EFI variable retrieval failed\n", __func__); return 0; } if (enabled == 0) { pr_info("%s: live migration disabled in EFI\n", __func__); return 0; } pr_info("%s : live migration enabled in EFI\n", __func__); wrmsrl(MSR_KVM_SEV_LIVE_MIGRATION, KVM_SEV_LIVE_MIGRATION_ENABLED); return true; This ensures that host/guest live migration negotation is completed only when both host and guest have support for it and also UEFI/OVMF supports it. Please note, that live migration cannot be initiated before this negotation is complete, which makes sense, as we don't want to enable it till the host/guest negotation is complete and UEFI/OVMF support for it is checked. So there is this window, till guest is booting and till the late initcall is invoked that live migration cannot be initiated, and KVM_GET_SHARED_PAGES ioctl will return -EINVAL till then. > Alternatively, as explained below, this could call guest_pv_has instead. > > > > > > > + > > > > if (!list->size) > > > > return -EINVAL; > > > > > > > > diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c > > > > index 58f89f83caab..43ea5061926f 100644 > > > > --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c > > > > +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c > > > > @@ -2903,6 +2903,9 @@ static int svm_set_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr) > > > > svm->msr_decfg = data; > > > > break; > > > > } > > > > + case MSR_KVM_SEV_LIVE_MIGRATION: > > > > + sev_update_migration_flags(vcpu->kvm, data); > > > > + break; > > > > case MSR_IA32_APICBASE: > > > > if (kvm_vcpu_apicv_active(vcpu)) > > > > avic_update_vapic_bar(to_svm(vcpu), data); > > > > @@ -3976,6 +3979,19 @@ static void svm_vcpu_after_set_cpuid(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) > > > > vcpu->arch.cr3_lm_rsvd_bits &= ~(1UL << (best->ebx & 0x3f)); > > > > } > > > > > > > > + /* > > > > + * If SEV guest then enable the Live migration feature. > > > > + */ > > > > + if (sev_guest(vcpu->kvm)) { > > > > + struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *best; > > > > + > > > > + best = kvm_find_cpuid_entry(vcpu, KVM_CPUID_FEATURES, 0); > > > > + if (!best) > > > > + return; > > > > + > > > > + best->eax |= (1 << KVM_FEATURE_SEV_LIVE_MIGRATION); > > > > + } > > > > + > > > > > > Looking at this, I believe the only way for this bit to get enabled is > > > if userspace toggles it. There needs to be a way for userspace to > > > identify if the kernel underneath them does, in fact, support SEV LM. > > > I'm at risk for having misread these patches (it's a long series), but > > > I don't see anything that communicates upwards. > > > > > > This could go upward with the other paravirt features flags in > > > cpuid.c. It could also be an explicit KVM Capability (checked through > > > check_extension). > > > > > > Userspace should then have a chance to decide whether or not this > > > should be enabled. And when it's not enabled, the host should return a > > > GP in response to the hypercall. This could be configured either > > > through userspace stripping out the LM feature bit, or by calling a VM > > > scoped enable cap (KVM_VM_IOCTL_ENABLE_CAP). > > > > > > I believe the typical path for a feature like this to be configured > > > would be to use ENABLE_CAP. > > > > I believe we have discussed and reviewed this earlier too. > > > > To summarize this feature, the host indicates if it supports the Live > > Migration feature and the feature and the hypercall are only enabled on > > the host when the guest checks for this support and does a wrmsrl() to > > enable the feature. Also the guest will not make the hypercall if the > > host does not indicate support for it. > > I've gone through and read this patch a bit more closely, and the > surrounding code. Previously, I clearly misread this and the > surrounding space. > > What happens if the guest just writes to the MSR anyway? Even if it > didn't receive a cue to do so? I believe the hypercall would still get > invoked here, since the hypercall does not check if SEV live migration > is enabled. Similarly, the MSR for enabling it is always available, > even if userspace didn't ask for the cpuid bit to be set. This should > not happen. Userspace should be in control of a new hypercall rolling > out. No, the guest will not invoke hypercall until live migration support has been enabled on the guest as i described above. The hypercall invocation code does this check as shown below: static void set_memory_enc_dec_hypercall(unsigned long vaddr, int npages, bool enc) { unsigned long sz = npages << PAGE_SHIFT; unsigned long vaddr_end, vaddr_next; if (!sev_live_migration_enabled) return; ... ... Thanks, Ashish > > I believe my interpretation last time was that the cpuid bit was > getting surfaced from the host kernel to host userspace, but I don't > actually see that in this patch series. Another way to ask this > question would be "How does userspace know the kernel they are on has > this patch series?". It needs some way of checking whether or not the > kernel underneath it supports SEV live migration. Technically, I think > userspace could call get_cpuid, set_cpuid (with the same values), and > then get_cpuid again, and it would be able to infer by checking the > SEV LM feature flag in the KVM leaf. This seems a bit kludgy. Checking > support should be easy. > > An additional question is "how does userspace choose whether live > migration is advertised to the guest"? I believe userspace's desire > for a particular value of the paravirt feature flag in CPUID get's > overridden when they call set cpuid, since the feature flag is set in > svm_vcpu_after_set_cpuid regardless of what userspace asks for. > Userspace should have a choice in the matter. > > Looking at similar paravirt-y features, there's precedent for another > way of doing this (may be preferred over CHECK_EXTENSION/ENABLE_CAP?): > this could call guest_pv_has before running the hypercall. The feature > (KVM_FEATURE_SEV_LIVE_MIGRATION) would then need to be exposed with > the other paravirt features in __do_cpuid_func. The function > guest_pv_has would represent if userspace has decided to expose SEV > live migration to the guest, and the sev->live_migration_enabled would > indicate if the guest responded affirmatively to the CPUID bit. > > The downside of using guest_pv_has is that, if pv enforcement is > disabled, guest_pv_has will always return true, which seems a bit odd > for a non-SEV guest. This isn't a deal breaker, but seems a bit odd > for say, a guest that isn't even running SEV. Using CHECK_EXTENSION > and ENABLE_CAP sidestep that. I'm also not certain I would call this a > paravirt feature. > > > And these were your review comments on the above : > > I see I misunderstood how the CPUID bits get passed > > through: usermode can still override them. Forgot about the back and > > forth for CPUID with usermode. > > > > So as you mentioned, userspace can still override these and it gets a > > chance to decide whether or not this should be enabled. > > > > Thanks, > > Ashish > > > Thanks, > Steve
Hello Steve, Continued response to your queries, especially related to userspace control of SEV live migration feature : On Fri, Feb 05, 2021 at 06:54:21PM -0800, Steve Rutherford wrote: > On Thu, Feb 4, 2021 at 7:08 PM Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@amd.com> wrote: > > > > Hello Steve, > > > > On Thu, Feb 04, 2021 at 04:56:35PM -0800, Steve Rutherford wrote: > > > On Wed, Feb 3, 2021 at 4:39 PM Ashish Kalra <Ashish.Kalra@amd.com> wrote: > > > > > > > > From: Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@amd.com> > > > > > > > > Add new KVM_FEATURE_SEV_LIVE_MIGRATION feature for guest to check > > > > for host-side support for SEV live migration. Also add a new custom > > > > MSR_KVM_SEV_LIVE_MIGRATION for guest to enable the SEV live migration > > > > feature. > > > > > > > > Signed-off-by: Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@amd.com> > > > > --- > > > > Documentation/virt/kvm/cpuid.rst | 5 +++++ > > > > Documentation/virt/kvm/msr.rst | 12 ++++++++++++ > > > > arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm_para.h | 4 ++++ > > > > arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c | 13 +++++++++++++ > > > > arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c | 16 ++++++++++++++++ > > > > arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h | 2 ++ > > > > 6 files changed, 52 insertions(+) > > > > > > > > diff --git a/Documentation/virt/kvm/cpuid.rst b/Documentation/virt/kvm/cpuid.rst > > > > index cf62162d4be2..0bdb6cdb12d3 100644 > > > > --- a/Documentation/virt/kvm/cpuid.rst > > > > +++ b/Documentation/virt/kvm/cpuid.rst > > > > @@ -96,6 +96,11 @@ KVM_FEATURE_MSI_EXT_DEST_ID 15 guest checks this feature bit > > > > before using extended destination > > > > ID bits in MSI address bits 11-5. > > > > > > > > +KVM_FEATURE_SEV_LIVE_MIGRATION 16 guest checks this feature bit before > > > > + using the page encryption state > > > > + hypercall to notify the page state > > > > + change > > > > + > > > > KVM_FEATURE_CLOCKSOURCE_STABLE_BIT 24 host will warn if no guest-side > > > > per-cpu warps are expected in > > > > kvmclock > > > > diff --git a/Documentation/virt/kvm/msr.rst b/Documentation/virt/kvm/msr.rst > > > > index e37a14c323d2..020245d16087 100644 > > > > --- a/Documentation/virt/kvm/msr.rst > > > > +++ b/Documentation/virt/kvm/msr.rst > > > > @@ -376,3 +376,15 @@ data: > > > > write '1' to bit 0 of the MSR, this causes the host to re-scan its queue > > > > and check if there are more notifications pending. The MSR is available > > > > if KVM_FEATURE_ASYNC_PF_INT is present in CPUID. > > > > + > > > > +MSR_KVM_SEV_LIVE_MIGRATION: > > > > + 0x4b564d08 > > > > + > > > > + Control SEV Live Migration features. > > > > + > > > > +data: > > > > + Bit 0 enables (1) or disables (0) host-side SEV Live Migration feature, > > > > + in other words, this is guest->host communication that it's properly > > > > + handling the shared pages list. > > > > + > > > > + All other bits are reserved. > > > > diff --git a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm_para.h b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm_para.h > > > > index 950afebfba88..f6bfa138874f 100644 > > > > --- a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm_para.h > > > > +++ b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm_para.h > > > > @@ -33,6 +33,7 @@ > > > > #define KVM_FEATURE_PV_SCHED_YIELD 13 > > > > #define KVM_FEATURE_ASYNC_PF_INT 14 > > > > #define KVM_FEATURE_MSI_EXT_DEST_ID 15 > > > > +#define KVM_FEATURE_SEV_LIVE_MIGRATION 16 > > > > > > > > #define KVM_HINTS_REALTIME 0 > > > > > > > > @@ -54,6 +55,7 @@ > > > > #define MSR_KVM_POLL_CONTROL 0x4b564d05 > > > > #define MSR_KVM_ASYNC_PF_INT 0x4b564d06 > > > > #define MSR_KVM_ASYNC_PF_ACK 0x4b564d07 > > > > +#define MSR_KVM_SEV_LIVE_MIGRATION 0x4b564d08 > > > > > > > > struct kvm_steal_time { > > > > __u64 steal; > > > > @@ -136,4 +138,6 @@ struct kvm_vcpu_pv_apf_data { > > > > #define KVM_PV_EOI_ENABLED KVM_PV_EOI_MASK > > > > #define KVM_PV_EOI_DISABLED 0x0 > > > > > > > > +#define KVM_SEV_LIVE_MIGRATION_ENABLED BIT_ULL(0) > > > > + > > > > #endif /* _UAPI_ASM_X86_KVM_PARA_H */ > > > > diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c > > > > index b0d324aed515..93f42b3d3e33 100644 > > > > --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c > > > > +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c > > > > @@ -1627,6 +1627,16 @@ int svm_page_enc_status_hc(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned long gpa, > > > > return ret; > > > > } > > > > > > > > +void sev_update_migration_flags(struct kvm *kvm, u64 data) > > > > +{ > > > > + struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info; > > > > + > > > > + if (!sev_guest(kvm)) > > > > + return; > > > > > > This should assert that userspace wanted the guest to be able to make > > > these calls (see more below). > > > > > > > > > > > + > > > > + sev->live_migration_enabled = !!(data & KVM_SEV_LIVE_MIGRATION_ENABLED); > > > > +} > > > > + > > > > int svm_get_shared_pages_list(struct kvm *kvm, > > > > struct kvm_shared_pages_list *list) > > > > { > > > > @@ -1639,6 +1649,9 @@ int svm_get_shared_pages_list(struct kvm *kvm, > > > > if (!sev_guest(kvm)) > > > > return -ENOTTY; > > > > > > > > + if (!sev->live_migration_enabled) > > > > + return -EINVAL; > > This is currently under guest control, so I'm not certain this is > helpful. If I called this with otherwise valid parameters, and got > back -EINVAL, I would probably think the bug is on my end. But it > could be on the guest's end! I would probably drop this, but you could > have KVM return an empty list of regions when this happens. > > Alternatively, as explained below, this could call guest_pv_has instead. > > > > > > > + > > > > if (!list->size) > > > > return -EINVAL; > > > > > > > > diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c > > > > index 58f89f83caab..43ea5061926f 100644 > > > > --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c > > > > +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c > > > > @@ -2903,6 +2903,9 @@ static int svm_set_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr) > > > > svm->msr_decfg = data; > > > > break; > > > > } > > > > + case MSR_KVM_SEV_LIVE_MIGRATION: > > > > + sev_update_migration_flags(vcpu->kvm, data); > > > > + break; > > > > case MSR_IA32_APICBASE: > > > > if (kvm_vcpu_apicv_active(vcpu)) > > > > avic_update_vapic_bar(to_svm(vcpu), data); > > > > @@ -3976,6 +3979,19 @@ static void svm_vcpu_after_set_cpuid(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) > > > > vcpu->arch.cr3_lm_rsvd_bits &= ~(1UL << (best->ebx & 0x3f)); > > > > } > > > > > > > > + /* > > > > + * If SEV guest then enable the Live migration feature. > > > > + */ > > > > + if (sev_guest(vcpu->kvm)) { > > > > + struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *best; > > > > + > > > > + best = kvm_find_cpuid_entry(vcpu, KVM_CPUID_FEATURES, 0); > > > > + if (!best) > > > > + return; > > > > + > > > > + best->eax |= (1 << KVM_FEATURE_SEV_LIVE_MIGRATION); > > > > + } > > > > + > > > > > > Looking at this, I believe the only way for this bit to get enabled is > > > if userspace toggles it. There needs to be a way for userspace to > > > identify if the kernel underneath them does, in fact, support SEV LM. > > > I'm at risk for having misread these patches (it's a long series), but > > > I don't see anything that communicates upwards. > > > > > > This could go upward with the other paravirt features flags in > > > cpuid.c. It could also be an explicit KVM Capability (checked through > > > check_extension). > > > > > > Userspace should then have a chance to decide whether or not this > > > should be enabled. And when it's not enabled, the host should return a > > > GP in response to the hypercall. This could be configured either > > > through userspace stripping out the LM feature bit, or by calling a VM > > > scoped enable cap (KVM_VM_IOCTL_ENABLE_CAP). > > > > > > I believe the typical path for a feature like this to be configured > > > would be to use ENABLE_CAP. > > > > I believe we have discussed and reviewed this earlier too. > > > > To summarize this feature, the host indicates if it supports the Live > > Migration feature and the feature and the hypercall are only enabled on > > the host when the guest checks for this support and does a wrmsrl() to > > enable the feature. Also the guest will not make the hypercall if the > > host does not indicate support for it. > > I've gone through and read this patch a bit more closely, and the > surrounding code. Previously, I clearly misread this and the > surrounding space. > > What happens if the guest just writes to the MSR anyway? Even if it > didn't receive a cue to do so? I believe the hypercall would still get > invoked here, since the hypercall does not check if SEV live migration > is enabled. Similarly, the MSR for enabling it is always available, > even if userspace didn't ask for the cpuid bit to be set. This should > not happen. Userspace should be in control of a new hypercall rolling > out. > > I believe my interpretation last time was that the cpuid bit was > getting surfaced from the host kernel to host userspace, but I don't > actually see that in this patch series. Another way to ask this > question would be "How does userspace know the kernel they are on has > this patch series?". It needs some way of checking whether or not the > kernel underneath it supports SEV live migration. Technically, I think > userspace could call get_cpuid, set_cpuid (with the same values), and > then get_cpuid again, and it would be able to infer by checking the > SEV LM feature flag in the KVM leaf. This seems a bit kludgy. Checking > support should be easy. > > An additional question is "how does userspace choose whether live > migration is advertised to the guest"? I believe userspace's desire > for a particular value of the paravirt feature flag in CPUID get's > overridden when they call set cpuid, since the feature flag is set in > svm_vcpu_after_set_cpuid regardless of what userspace asks for. > Userspace should have a choice in the matter. > To summarize, KVM (host) enables SEV live migration feature as following: static void svm_vcpu_after_set_cpuid(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) { ... /* * If SEV guest then enable the Live migration feature. */ if (sev_guest(vcpu->kvm)) { struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *best; best = kvm_find_cpuid_entry(vcpu, KVM_CPUID_FEATURES, 0); if (!best) return; best->eax |= (1 << KVM_FEATURE_SEV_LIVE_MIGRATION); } ... ... Later userspace can call cpuid(KVM_CPUID_FEATURES) and get the cpuid data and override it, for example, this is how Qemu userspace code currently fixups/overrides the KVM reported CPUID features : target/i386/kvm/kvm.c: uint32_t kvm_arch_get_supported_cpuid(KVMState *s, uint32_t function, uint32_t index, int reg) { ... ... cpuid = get_supported_cpuid(s); struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *entry = cpuid_find_entry(cpuid, function, index); if (entry) { ret = cpuid_entry_get_reg(entry, reg); } /* Fixups for the data returned by KVM, below */ ... ... } else if (function == KVM_CPUID_FEATURES && reg == R_EAX) { /* kvm_pv_unhalt is reported by GET_SUPPORTED_CPUID, but it can't * be enabled without the in-kernel irqchip */ if (!kvm_irqchip_in_kernel()) { ret &= ~(1U << KVM_FEATURE_PV_UNHALT); } if (kvm_irqchip_is_split()) { ret |= 1U << KVM_FEATURE_MSI_EXT_DEST_ID; } } else if (function == KVM_CPUID_FEATURES && reg == R_EDX) { ret |= 1U << KVM_HINTS_REALTIME; } return ret; So you can use a similar approach to override KVM_FEATURE_SEV_LIVE_MIGRATION feature. Thanks, Ashish > Looking at similar paravirt-y features, there's precedent for another > way of doing this (may be preferred over CHECK_EXTENSION/ENABLE_CAP?): > this could call guest_pv_has before running the hypercall. The feature > (KVM_FEATURE_SEV_LIVE_MIGRATION) would then need to be exposed with > the other paravirt features in __do_cpuid_func. The function > guest_pv_has would represent if userspace has decided to expose SEV > live migration to the guest, and the sev->live_migration_enabled would > indicate if the guest responded affirmatively to the CPUID bit. > > The downside of using guest_pv_has is that, if pv enforcement is > disabled, guest_pv_has will always return true, which seems a bit odd > for a non-SEV guest. This isn't a deal breaker, but seems a bit odd > for say, a guest that isn't even running SEV. Using CHECK_EXTENSION > and ENABLE_CAP sidestep that. I'm also not certain I would call this a > paravirt feature. > > > And these were your review comments on the above : > > I see I misunderstood how the CPUID bits get passed > > through: usermode can still override them. Forgot about the back and > > forth for CPUID with usermode. > > > > So as you mentioned, userspace can still override these and it gets a > > chance to decide whether or not this should be enabled. > > > > Thanks, > > Ashish > > > Thanks, > Steve
Hello Steve, On Sat, Feb 06, 2021 at 05:46:17AM +0000, Ashish Kalra wrote: > Hello Steve, > > Continued response to your queries, especially related to userspace > control of SEV live migration feature : > > On Fri, Feb 05, 2021 at 06:54:21PM -0800, Steve Rutherford wrote: > > On Thu, Feb 4, 2021 at 7:08 PM Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@amd.com> wrote: > > > > > > Hello Steve, > > > > > > On Thu, Feb 04, 2021 at 04:56:35PM -0800, Steve Rutherford wrote: > > > > On Wed, Feb 3, 2021 at 4:39 PM Ashish Kalra <Ashish.Kalra@amd.com> wrote: > > > > > > > > > > From: Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@amd.com> > > > > > > > > > > Add new KVM_FEATURE_SEV_LIVE_MIGRATION feature for guest to check > > > > > for host-side support for SEV live migration. Also add a new custom > > > > > MSR_KVM_SEV_LIVE_MIGRATION for guest to enable the SEV live migration > > > > > feature. > > > > > > > > > > Signed-off-by: Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@amd.com> > > > > > --- > > > > > Documentation/virt/kvm/cpuid.rst | 5 +++++ > > > > > Documentation/virt/kvm/msr.rst | 12 ++++++++++++ > > > > > arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm_para.h | 4 ++++ > > > > > arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c | 13 +++++++++++++ > > > > > arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c | 16 ++++++++++++++++ > > > > > arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h | 2 ++ > > > > > 6 files changed, 52 insertions(+) > > > > > > > > > > diff --git a/Documentation/virt/kvm/cpuid.rst b/Documentation/virt/kvm/cpuid.rst > > > > > index cf62162d4be2..0bdb6cdb12d3 100644 > > > > > --- a/Documentation/virt/kvm/cpuid.rst > > > > > +++ b/Documentation/virt/kvm/cpuid.rst > > > > > @@ -96,6 +96,11 @@ KVM_FEATURE_MSI_EXT_DEST_ID 15 guest checks this feature bit > > > > > before using extended destination > > > > > ID bits in MSI address bits 11-5. > > > > > > > > > > +KVM_FEATURE_SEV_LIVE_MIGRATION 16 guest checks this feature bit before > > > > > + using the page encryption state > > > > > + hypercall to notify the page state > > > > > + change > > > > > + > > > > > KVM_FEATURE_CLOCKSOURCE_STABLE_BIT 24 host will warn if no guest-side > > > > > per-cpu warps are expected in > > > > > kvmclock > > > > > diff --git a/Documentation/virt/kvm/msr.rst b/Documentation/virt/kvm/msr.rst > > > > > index e37a14c323d2..020245d16087 100644 > > > > > --- a/Documentation/virt/kvm/msr.rst > > > > > +++ b/Documentation/virt/kvm/msr.rst > > > > > @@ -376,3 +376,15 @@ data: > > > > > write '1' to bit 0 of the MSR, this causes the host to re-scan its queue > > > > > and check if there are more notifications pending. The MSR is available > > > > > if KVM_FEATURE_ASYNC_PF_INT is present in CPUID. > > > > > + > > > > > +MSR_KVM_SEV_LIVE_MIGRATION: > > > > > + 0x4b564d08 > > > > > + > > > > > + Control SEV Live Migration features. > > > > > + > > > > > +data: > > > > > + Bit 0 enables (1) or disables (0) host-side SEV Live Migration feature, > > > > > + in other words, this is guest->host communication that it's properly > > > > > + handling the shared pages list. > > > > > + > > > > > + All other bits are reserved. > > > > > diff --git a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm_para.h b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm_para.h > > > > > index 950afebfba88..f6bfa138874f 100644 > > > > > --- a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm_para.h > > > > > +++ b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm_para.h > > > > > @@ -33,6 +33,7 @@ > > > > > #define KVM_FEATURE_PV_SCHED_YIELD 13 > > > > > #define KVM_FEATURE_ASYNC_PF_INT 14 > > > > > #define KVM_FEATURE_MSI_EXT_DEST_ID 15 > > > > > +#define KVM_FEATURE_SEV_LIVE_MIGRATION 16 > > > > > > > > > > #define KVM_HINTS_REALTIME 0 > > > > > > > > > > @@ -54,6 +55,7 @@ > > > > > #define MSR_KVM_POLL_CONTROL 0x4b564d05 > > > > > #define MSR_KVM_ASYNC_PF_INT 0x4b564d06 > > > > > #define MSR_KVM_ASYNC_PF_ACK 0x4b564d07 > > > > > +#define MSR_KVM_SEV_LIVE_MIGRATION 0x4b564d08 > > > > > > > > > > struct kvm_steal_time { > > > > > __u64 steal; > > > > > @@ -136,4 +138,6 @@ struct kvm_vcpu_pv_apf_data { > > > > > #define KVM_PV_EOI_ENABLED KVM_PV_EOI_MASK > > > > > #define KVM_PV_EOI_DISABLED 0x0 > > > > > > > > > > +#define KVM_SEV_LIVE_MIGRATION_ENABLED BIT_ULL(0) > > > > > + > > > > > #endif /* _UAPI_ASM_X86_KVM_PARA_H */ > > > > > diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c > > > > > index b0d324aed515..93f42b3d3e33 100644 > > > > > --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c > > > > > +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c > > > > > @@ -1627,6 +1627,16 @@ int svm_page_enc_status_hc(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned long gpa, > > > > > return ret; > > > > > } > > > > > > > > > > +void sev_update_migration_flags(struct kvm *kvm, u64 data) > > > > > +{ > > > > > + struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info; > > > > > + > > > > > + if (!sev_guest(kvm)) > > > > > + return; > > > > > > > > This should assert that userspace wanted the guest to be able to make > > > > these calls (see more below). > > > > > > > > > > > > > > + > > > > > + sev->live_migration_enabled = !!(data & KVM_SEV_LIVE_MIGRATION_ENABLED); > > > > > +} > > > > > + > > > > > int svm_get_shared_pages_list(struct kvm *kvm, > > > > > struct kvm_shared_pages_list *list) > > > > > { > > > > > @@ -1639,6 +1649,9 @@ int svm_get_shared_pages_list(struct kvm *kvm, > > > > > if (!sev_guest(kvm)) > > > > > return -ENOTTY; > > > > > > > > > > + if (!sev->live_migration_enabled) > > > > > + return -EINVAL; > > > > This is currently under guest control, so I'm not certain this is > > helpful. If I called this with otherwise valid parameters, and got > > back -EINVAL, I would probably think the bug is on my end. But it > > could be on the guest's end! I would probably drop this, but you could > > have KVM return an empty list of regions when this happens. > > > > Alternatively, as explained below, this could call guest_pv_has instead. > > > > > > > > > > + > > > > > if (!list->size) > > > > > return -EINVAL; > > > > > > > > > > diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c > > > > > index 58f89f83caab..43ea5061926f 100644 > > > > > --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c > > > > > +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c > > > > > @@ -2903,6 +2903,9 @@ static int svm_set_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr) > > > > > svm->msr_decfg = data; > > > > > break; > > > > > } > > > > > + case MSR_KVM_SEV_LIVE_MIGRATION: > > > > > + sev_update_migration_flags(vcpu->kvm, data); > > > > > + break; > > > > > case MSR_IA32_APICBASE: > > > > > if (kvm_vcpu_apicv_active(vcpu)) > > > > > avic_update_vapic_bar(to_svm(vcpu), data); > > > > > @@ -3976,6 +3979,19 @@ static void svm_vcpu_after_set_cpuid(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) > > > > > vcpu->arch.cr3_lm_rsvd_bits &= ~(1UL << (best->ebx & 0x3f)); > > > > > } > > > > > > > > > > + /* > > > > > + * If SEV guest then enable the Live migration feature. > > > > > + */ > > > > > + if (sev_guest(vcpu->kvm)) { > > > > > + struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *best; > > > > > + > > > > > + best = kvm_find_cpuid_entry(vcpu, KVM_CPUID_FEATURES, 0); > > > > > + if (!best) > > > > > + return; > > > > > + > > > > > + best->eax |= (1 << KVM_FEATURE_SEV_LIVE_MIGRATION); > > > > > + } > > > > > + > > > > > > > > Looking at this, I believe the only way for this bit to get enabled is > > > > if userspace toggles it. There needs to be a way for userspace to > > > > identify if the kernel underneath them does, in fact, support SEV LM. > > > > I'm at risk for having misread these patches (it's a long series), but > > > > I don't see anything that communicates upwards. > > > > > > > > This could go upward with the other paravirt features flags in > > > > cpuid.c. It could also be an explicit KVM Capability (checked through > > > > check_extension). > > > > > > > > Userspace should then have a chance to decide whether or not this > > > > should be enabled. And when it's not enabled, the host should return a > > > > GP in response to the hypercall. This could be configured either > > > > through userspace stripping out the LM feature bit, or by calling a VM > > > > scoped enable cap (KVM_VM_IOCTL_ENABLE_CAP). > > > > > > > > I believe the typical path for a feature like this to be configured > > > > would be to use ENABLE_CAP. > > > > > > I believe we have discussed and reviewed this earlier too. > > > > > > To summarize this feature, the host indicates if it supports the Live > > > Migration feature and the feature and the hypercall are only enabled on > > > the host when the guest checks for this support and does a wrmsrl() to > > > enable the feature. Also the guest will not make the hypercall if the > > > host does not indicate support for it. > > > > I've gone through and read this patch a bit more closely, and the > > surrounding code. Previously, I clearly misread this and the > > surrounding space. > > > > What happens if the guest just writes to the MSR anyway? Even if it > > didn't receive a cue to do so? I believe the hypercall would still get > > invoked here, since the hypercall does not check if SEV live migration > > is enabled. Similarly, the MSR for enabling it is always available, > > even if userspace didn't ask for the cpuid bit to be set. This should > > not happen. Userspace should be in control of a new hypercall rolling > > out. > > > > I believe my interpretation last time was that the cpuid bit was > > getting surfaced from the host kernel to host userspace, but I don't > > actually see that in this patch series. Another way to ask this > > question would be "How does userspace know the kernel they are on has > > this patch series?". It needs some way of checking whether or not the > > kernel underneath it supports SEV live migration. Technically, I think > > userspace could call get_cpuid, set_cpuid (with the same values), and > > then get_cpuid again, and it would be able to infer by checking the > > SEV LM feature flag in the KVM leaf. This seems a bit kludgy. Checking > > support should be easy. > > > > An additional question is "how does userspace choose whether live > > migration is advertised to the guest"? I believe userspace's desire > > for a particular value of the paravirt feature flag in CPUID get's > > overridden when they call set cpuid, since the feature flag is set in > > svm_vcpu_after_set_cpuid regardless of what userspace asks for. > > Userspace should have a choice in the matter. > > Actually i did some more analysis of this, and i believe you are right about the above, feature flag gets set in svm_vcpu_after_set_cpuid. So please ignore my comments below. I am still analyzing this further. Thanks, Ashish > > To summarize, KVM (host) enables SEV live migration feature as > following: > > static void svm_vcpu_after_set_cpuid(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) > { > ... > /* > * If SEV guest then enable the Live migration feature. > */ > if (sev_guest(vcpu->kvm)) { > struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *best; > > best = kvm_find_cpuid_entry(vcpu, KVM_CPUID_FEATURES, 0); > if (!best) > return; > > best->eax |= (1 << KVM_FEATURE_SEV_LIVE_MIGRATION); > } > > ... > ... > > Later userspace can call cpuid(KVM_CPUID_FEATURES) and get the cpuid data > and override it, for example, this is how Qemu userspace code currently > fixups/overrides the KVM reported CPUID features : > > target/i386/kvm/kvm.c: > > uint32_t kvm_arch_get_supported_cpuid(KVMState *s, uint32_t function, > uint32_t index, int reg) > { > ... > ... > > cpuid = get_supported_cpuid(s); > > struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *entry = cpuid_find_entry(cpuid, function, index); > if (entry) { > ret = cpuid_entry_get_reg(entry, reg); > } > > /* Fixups for the data returned by KVM, below */ > > ... > ... > > } else if (function == KVM_CPUID_FEATURES && reg == R_EAX) { > /* kvm_pv_unhalt is reported by GET_SUPPORTED_CPUID, but it can't > * be enabled without the in-kernel irqchip > */ > if (!kvm_irqchip_in_kernel()) { > ret &= ~(1U << KVM_FEATURE_PV_UNHALT); > } > if (kvm_irqchip_is_split()) { > ret |= 1U << KVM_FEATURE_MSI_EXT_DEST_ID; > } > } else if (function == KVM_CPUID_FEATURES && reg == R_EDX) { > ret |= 1U << KVM_HINTS_REALTIME; > } > > return ret; > > So you can use a similar approach to override > KVM_FEATURE_SEV_LIVE_MIGRATION feature. > > Thanks, > Ashish > > > Looking at similar paravirt-y features, there's precedent for another > > way of doing this (may be preferred over CHECK_EXTENSION/ENABLE_CAP?): > > this could call guest_pv_has before running the hypercall. The feature > > (KVM_FEATURE_SEV_LIVE_MIGRATION) would then need to be exposed with > > the other paravirt features in __do_cpuid_func. The function > > guest_pv_has would represent if userspace has decided to expose SEV > > live migration to the guest, and the sev->live_migration_enabled would > > indicate if the guest responded affirmatively to the CPUID bit. > > > > The downside of using guest_pv_has is that, if pv enforcement is > > disabled, guest_pv_has will always return true, which seems a bit odd > > for a non-SEV guest. This isn't a deal breaker, but seems a bit odd > > for say, a guest that isn't even running SEV. Using CHECK_EXTENSION > > and ENABLE_CAP sidestep that. I'm also not certain I would call this a > > paravirt feature. > > > > > And these were your review comments on the above : > > > I see I misunderstood how the CPUID bits get passed > > > through: usermode can still override them. Forgot about the back and > > > forth for CPUID with usermode. > > > > > > So as you mentioned, userspace can still override these and it gets a > > > chance to decide whether or not this should be enabled. > > > > > > Thanks, > > > Ashish > > > > > > Thanks, > > Steve
Hello Steve, On Sat, Feb 06, 2021 at 01:56:46PM +0000, Ashish Kalra wrote: > Hello Steve, > > On Sat, Feb 06, 2021 at 05:46:17AM +0000, Ashish Kalra wrote: > > Hello Steve, > > > > Continued response to your queries, especially related to userspace > > control of SEV live migration feature : > > > > On Fri, Feb 05, 2021 at 06:54:21PM -0800, Steve Rutherford wrote: > > > On Thu, Feb 4, 2021 at 7:08 PM Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@amd.com> wrote: > > > > > > > > Hello Steve, > > > > > > > > On Thu, Feb 04, 2021 at 04:56:35PM -0800, Steve Rutherford wrote: > > > > > On Wed, Feb 3, 2021 at 4:39 PM Ashish Kalra <Ashish.Kalra@amd.com> wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > > From: Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@amd.com> > > > > > > > > > > > > Add new KVM_FEATURE_SEV_LIVE_MIGRATION feature for guest to check > > > > > > for host-side support for SEV live migration. Also add a new custom > > > > > > MSR_KVM_SEV_LIVE_MIGRATION for guest to enable the SEV live migration > > > > > > feature. > > > > > > > > > > > > Signed-off-by: Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@amd.com> > > > > > > --- > > > > > > Documentation/virt/kvm/cpuid.rst | 5 +++++ > > > > > > Documentation/virt/kvm/msr.rst | 12 ++++++++++++ > > > > > > arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm_para.h | 4 ++++ > > > > > > arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c | 13 +++++++++++++ > > > > > > arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c | 16 ++++++++++++++++ > > > > > > arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h | 2 ++ > > > > > > 6 files changed, 52 insertions(+) > > > > > > > > > > > > diff --git a/Documentation/virt/kvm/cpuid.rst b/Documentation/virt/kvm/cpuid.rst > > > > > > index cf62162d4be2..0bdb6cdb12d3 100644 > > > > > > --- a/Documentation/virt/kvm/cpuid.rst > > > > > > +++ b/Documentation/virt/kvm/cpuid.rst > > > > > > @@ -96,6 +96,11 @@ KVM_FEATURE_MSI_EXT_DEST_ID 15 guest checks this feature bit > > > > > > before using extended destination > > > > > > ID bits in MSI address bits 11-5. > > > > > > > > > > > > +KVM_FEATURE_SEV_LIVE_MIGRATION 16 guest checks this feature bit before > > > > > > + using the page encryption state > > > > > > + hypercall to notify the page state > > > > > > + change > > > > > > + > > > > > > KVM_FEATURE_CLOCKSOURCE_STABLE_BIT 24 host will warn if no guest-side > > > > > > per-cpu warps are expected in > > > > > > kvmclock > > > > > > diff --git a/Documentation/virt/kvm/msr.rst b/Documentation/virt/kvm/msr.rst > > > > > > index e37a14c323d2..020245d16087 100644 > > > > > > --- a/Documentation/virt/kvm/msr.rst > > > > > > +++ b/Documentation/virt/kvm/msr.rst > > > > > > @@ -376,3 +376,15 @@ data: > > > > > > write '1' to bit 0 of the MSR, this causes the host to re-scan its queue > > > > > > and check if there are more notifications pending. The MSR is available > > > > > > if KVM_FEATURE_ASYNC_PF_INT is present in CPUID. > > > > > > + > > > > > > +MSR_KVM_SEV_LIVE_MIGRATION: > > > > > > + 0x4b564d08 > > > > > > + > > > > > > + Control SEV Live Migration features. > > > > > > + > > > > > > +data: > > > > > > + Bit 0 enables (1) or disables (0) host-side SEV Live Migration feature, > > > > > > + in other words, this is guest->host communication that it's properly > > > > > > + handling the shared pages list. > > > > > > + > > > > > > + All other bits are reserved. > > > > > > diff --git a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm_para.h b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm_para.h > > > > > > index 950afebfba88..f6bfa138874f 100644 > > > > > > --- a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm_para.h > > > > > > +++ b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm_para.h > > > > > > @@ -33,6 +33,7 @@ > > > > > > #define KVM_FEATURE_PV_SCHED_YIELD 13 > > > > > > #define KVM_FEATURE_ASYNC_PF_INT 14 > > > > > > #define KVM_FEATURE_MSI_EXT_DEST_ID 15 > > > > > > +#define KVM_FEATURE_SEV_LIVE_MIGRATION 16 > > > > > > > > > > > > #define KVM_HINTS_REALTIME 0 > > > > > > > > > > > > @@ -54,6 +55,7 @@ > > > > > > #define MSR_KVM_POLL_CONTROL 0x4b564d05 > > > > > > #define MSR_KVM_ASYNC_PF_INT 0x4b564d06 > > > > > > #define MSR_KVM_ASYNC_PF_ACK 0x4b564d07 > > > > > > +#define MSR_KVM_SEV_LIVE_MIGRATION 0x4b564d08 > > > > > > > > > > > > struct kvm_steal_time { > > > > > > __u64 steal; > > > > > > @@ -136,4 +138,6 @@ struct kvm_vcpu_pv_apf_data { > > > > > > #define KVM_PV_EOI_ENABLED KVM_PV_EOI_MASK > > > > > > #define KVM_PV_EOI_DISABLED 0x0 > > > > > > > > > > > > +#define KVM_SEV_LIVE_MIGRATION_ENABLED BIT_ULL(0) > > > > > > + > > > > > > #endif /* _UAPI_ASM_X86_KVM_PARA_H */ > > > > > > diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c > > > > > > index b0d324aed515..93f42b3d3e33 100644 > > > > > > --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c > > > > > > +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c > > > > > > @@ -1627,6 +1627,16 @@ int svm_page_enc_status_hc(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned long gpa, > > > > > > return ret; > > > > > > } > > > > > > > > > > > > +void sev_update_migration_flags(struct kvm *kvm, u64 data) > > > > > > +{ > > > > > > + struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info; > > > > > > + > > > > > > + if (!sev_guest(kvm)) > > > > > > + return; > > > > > > > > > > This should assert that userspace wanted the guest to be able to make > > > > > these calls (see more below). > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > + > > > > > > + sev->live_migration_enabled = !!(data & KVM_SEV_LIVE_MIGRATION_ENABLED); > > > > > > +} > > > > > > + > > > > > > int svm_get_shared_pages_list(struct kvm *kvm, > > > > > > struct kvm_shared_pages_list *list) > > > > > > { > > > > > > @@ -1639,6 +1649,9 @@ int svm_get_shared_pages_list(struct kvm *kvm, > > > > > > if (!sev_guest(kvm)) > > > > > > return -ENOTTY; > > > > > > > > > > > > + if (!sev->live_migration_enabled) > > > > > > + return -EINVAL; > > > > > > This is currently under guest control, so I'm not certain this is > > > helpful. If I called this with otherwise valid parameters, and got > > > back -EINVAL, I would probably think the bug is on my end. But it > > > could be on the guest's end! I would probably drop this, but you could > > > have KVM return an empty list of regions when this happens. > > > > > > Alternatively, as explained below, this could call guest_pv_has instead. > > > > > > > > > > > > > + > > > > > > if (!list->size) > > > > > > return -EINVAL; > > > > > > > > > > > > diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c > > > > > > index 58f89f83caab..43ea5061926f 100644 > > > > > > --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c > > > > > > +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c > > > > > > @@ -2903,6 +2903,9 @@ static int svm_set_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr) > > > > > > svm->msr_decfg = data; > > > > > > break; > > > > > > } > > > > > > + case MSR_KVM_SEV_LIVE_MIGRATION: > > > > > > + sev_update_migration_flags(vcpu->kvm, data); > > > > > > + break; > > > > > > case MSR_IA32_APICBASE: > > > > > > if (kvm_vcpu_apicv_active(vcpu)) > > > > > > avic_update_vapic_bar(to_svm(vcpu), data); > > > > > > @@ -3976,6 +3979,19 @@ static void svm_vcpu_after_set_cpuid(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) > > > > > > vcpu->arch.cr3_lm_rsvd_bits &= ~(1UL << (best->ebx & 0x3f)); > > > > > > } > > > > > > > > > > > > + /* > > > > > > + * If SEV guest then enable the Live migration feature. > > > > > > + */ > > > > > > + if (sev_guest(vcpu->kvm)) { > > > > > > + struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *best; > > > > > > + > > > > > > + best = kvm_find_cpuid_entry(vcpu, KVM_CPUID_FEATURES, 0); > > > > > > + if (!best) > > > > > > + return; > > > > > > + > > > > > > + best->eax |= (1 << KVM_FEATURE_SEV_LIVE_MIGRATION); > > > > > > + } > > > > > > + > > > > > > > > > > Looking at this, I believe the only way for this bit to get enabled is > > > > > if userspace toggles it. There needs to be a way for userspace to > > > > > identify if the kernel underneath them does, in fact, support SEV LM. > > > > > I'm at risk for having misread these patches (it's a long series), but > > > > > I don't see anything that communicates upwards. > > > > > > > > > > This could go upward with the other paravirt features flags in > > > > > cpuid.c. It could also be an explicit KVM Capability (checked through > > > > > check_extension). > > > > > > > > > > Userspace should then have a chance to decide whether or not this > > > > > should be enabled. And when it's not enabled, the host should return a > > > > > GP in response to the hypercall. This could be configured either > > > > > through userspace stripping out the LM feature bit, or by calling a VM > > > > > scoped enable cap (KVM_VM_IOCTL_ENABLE_CAP). > > > > > > > > > > I believe the typical path for a feature like this to be configured > > > > > would be to use ENABLE_CAP. > > > > > > > > I believe we have discussed and reviewed this earlier too. > > > > > > > > To summarize this feature, the host indicates if it supports the Live > > > > Migration feature and the feature and the hypercall are only enabled on > > > > the host when the guest checks for this support and does a wrmsrl() to > > > > enable the feature. Also the guest will not make the hypercall if the > > > > host does not indicate support for it. > > > > > > I've gone through and read this patch a bit more closely, and the > > > surrounding code. Previously, I clearly misread this and the > > > surrounding space. > > > > > > What happens if the guest just writes to the MSR anyway? Even if it > > > didn't receive a cue to do so? I believe the hypercall would still get > > > invoked here, since the hypercall does not check if SEV live migration > > > is enabled. Similarly, the MSR for enabling it is always available, > > > even if userspace didn't ask for the cpuid bit to be set. This should > > > not happen. Userspace should be in control of a new hypercall rolling > > > out. > > > > > > I believe my interpretation last time was that the cpuid bit was > > > getting surfaced from the host kernel to host userspace, but I don't > > > actually see that in this patch series. Another way to ask this > > > question would be "How does userspace know the kernel they are on has > > > this patch series?". It needs some way of checking whether or not the > > > kernel underneath it supports SEV live migration. Technically, I think > > > userspace could call get_cpuid, set_cpuid (with the same values), and > > > then get_cpuid again, and it would be able to infer by checking the > > > SEV LM feature flag in the KVM leaf. This seems a bit kludgy. Checking > > > support should be easy. > > > > > > An additional question is "how does userspace choose whether live > > > migration is advertised to the guest"? I believe userspace's desire > > > for a particular value of the paravirt feature flag in CPUID get's > > > overridden when they call set cpuid, since the feature flag is set in > > > svm_vcpu_after_set_cpuid regardless of what userspace asks for. > > > Userspace should have a choice in the matter. > > > > > Actually i did some more analysis of this, and i believe you are right > about the above, feature flag gets set in svm_vcpu_after_set_cpuid. > As you mentioned above and as i confirmed in my previous email, calling KVM_SET_CPUID2 vcpu ioctl will always set the live migration feature flag for the vCPU. This is what will be queried by the guest to enable the kernel's live migration feature and to start making hypercalls. Now, i want to understand why do you want the userspace to have a choice in this matter ? After all, it is the userspace which actually initiates the live migration process, so doesn't it have the final choice in this matter ? Even if this feature is reported by host, the guest only uses it to enable and make page encryption status hypercalls and the host's shared pages list gets setup accordingly. But unless userspace calls KVM_GET_SHARED_PAGES_LIST ioctl and initiates live migration process, the above is simply enabling the guest to make hypercalls whenever a page's encryption status is changed. Thanks, Ashish
Hi Ashish, On Sun, Feb 7, 2021 at 4:29 PM Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@amd.com> wrote: > > Hello Steve, > > On Sat, Feb 06, 2021 at 01:56:46PM +0000, Ashish Kalra wrote: > > Hello Steve, > > > > On Sat, Feb 06, 2021 at 05:46:17AM +0000, Ashish Kalra wrote: > > > Hello Steve, > > > > > > Continued response to your queries, especially related to userspace > > > control of SEV live migration feature : > > > > > > On Fri, Feb 05, 2021 at 06:54:21PM -0800, Steve Rutherford wrote: > > > > On Thu, Feb 4, 2021 at 7:08 PM Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@amd.com> wrote: > > > > > > > > > > Hello Steve, > > > > > > > > > > On Thu, Feb 04, 2021 at 04:56:35PM -0800, Steve Rutherford wrote: > > > > > > On Wed, Feb 3, 2021 at 4:39 PM Ashish Kalra <Ashish.Kalra@amd.com> wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > > > > From: Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@amd.com> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Add new KVM_FEATURE_SEV_LIVE_MIGRATION feature for guest to check > > > > > > > for host-side support for SEV live migration. Also add a new custom > > > > > > > MSR_KVM_SEV_LIVE_MIGRATION for guest to enable the SEV live migration > > > > > > > feature. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Signed-off-by: Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@amd.com> > > > > > > > --- > > > > > > > Documentation/virt/kvm/cpuid.rst | 5 +++++ > > > > > > > Documentation/virt/kvm/msr.rst | 12 ++++++++++++ > > > > > > > arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm_para.h | 4 ++++ > > > > > > > arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c | 13 +++++++++++++ > > > > > > > arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c | 16 ++++++++++++++++ > > > > > > > arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h | 2 ++ > > > > > > > 6 files changed, 52 insertions(+) > > > > > > > > > > > > > > diff --git a/Documentation/virt/kvm/cpuid.rst b/Documentation/virt/kvm/cpuid.rst > > > > > > > index cf62162d4be2..0bdb6cdb12d3 100644 > > > > > > > --- a/Documentation/virt/kvm/cpuid.rst > > > > > > > +++ b/Documentation/virt/kvm/cpuid.rst > > > > > > > @@ -96,6 +96,11 @@ KVM_FEATURE_MSI_EXT_DEST_ID 15 guest checks this feature bit > > > > > > > before using extended destination > > > > > > > ID bits in MSI address bits 11-5. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > +KVM_FEATURE_SEV_LIVE_MIGRATION 16 guest checks this feature bit before > > > > > > > + using the page encryption state > > > > > > > + hypercall to notify the page state > > > > > > > + change > > > > > > > + > > > > > > > KVM_FEATURE_CLOCKSOURCE_STABLE_BIT 24 host will warn if no guest-side > > > > > > > per-cpu warps are expected in > > > > > > > kvmclock > > > > > > > diff --git a/Documentation/virt/kvm/msr.rst b/Documentation/virt/kvm/msr.rst > > > > > > > index e37a14c323d2..020245d16087 100644 > > > > > > > --- a/Documentation/virt/kvm/msr.rst > > > > > > > +++ b/Documentation/virt/kvm/msr.rst > > > > > > > @@ -376,3 +376,15 @@ data: > > > > > > > write '1' to bit 0 of the MSR, this causes the host to re-scan its queue > > > > > > > and check if there are more notifications pending. The MSR is available > > > > > > > if KVM_FEATURE_ASYNC_PF_INT is present in CPUID. > > > > > > > + > > > > > > > +MSR_KVM_SEV_LIVE_MIGRATION: > > > > > > > + 0x4b564d08 > > > > > > > + > > > > > > > + Control SEV Live Migration features. > > > > > > > + > > > > > > > +data: > > > > > > > + Bit 0 enables (1) or disables (0) host-side SEV Live Migration feature, > > > > > > > + in other words, this is guest->host communication that it's properly > > > > > > > + handling the shared pages list. > > > > > > > + > > > > > > > + All other bits are reserved. > > > > > > > diff --git a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm_para.h b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm_para.h > > > > > > > index 950afebfba88..f6bfa138874f 100644 > > > > > > > --- a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm_para.h > > > > > > > +++ b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm_para.h > > > > > > > @@ -33,6 +33,7 @@ > > > > > > > #define KVM_FEATURE_PV_SCHED_YIELD 13 > > > > > > > #define KVM_FEATURE_ASYNC_PF_INT 14 > > > > > > > #define KVM_FEATURE_MSI_EXT_DEST_ID 15 > > > > > > > +#define KVM_FEATURE_SEV_LIVE_MIGRATION 16 > > > > > > > > > > > > > > #define KVM_HINTS_REALTIME 0 > > > > > > > > > > > > > > @@ -54,6 +55,7 @@ > > > > > > > #define MSR_KVM_POLL_CONTROL 0x4b564d05 > > > > > > > #define MSR_KVM_ASYNC_PF_INT 0x4b564d06 > > > > > > > #define MSR_KVM_ASYNC_PF_ACK 0x4b564d07 > > > > > > > +#define MSR_KVM_SEV_LIVE_MIGRATION 0x4b564d08 > > > > > > > > > > > > > > struct kvm_steal_time { > > > > > > > __u64 steal; > > > > > > > @@ -136,4 +138,6 @@ struct kvm_vcpu_pv_apf_data { > > > > > > > #define KVM_PV_EOI_ENABLED KVM_PV_EOI_MASK > > > > > > > #define KVM_PV_EOI_DISABLED 0x0 > > > > > > > > > > > > > > +#define KVM_SEV_LIVE_MIGRATION_ENABLED BIT_ULL(0) > > > > > > > + > > > > > > > #endif /* _UAPI_ASM_X86_KVM_PARA_H */ > > > > > > > diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c > > > > > > > index b0d324aed515..93f42b3d3e33 100644 > > > > > > > --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c > > > > > > > +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c > > > > > > > @@ -1627,6 +1627,16 @@ int svm_page_enc_status_hc(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned long gpa, > > > > > > > return ret; > > > > > > > } > > > > > > > > > > > > > > +void sev_update_migration_flags(struct kvm *kvm, u64 data) > > > > > > > +{ > > > > > > > + struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info; > > > > > > > + > > > > > > > + if (!sev_guest(kvm)) > > > > > > > + return; > > > > > > > > > > > > This should assert that userspace wanted the guest to be able to make > > > > > > these calls (see more below). > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > + > > > > > > > + sev->live_migration_enabled = !!(data & KVM_SEV_LIVE_MIGRATION_ENABLED); > > > > > > > +} > > > > > > > + > > > > > > > int svm_get_shared_pages_list(struct kvm *kvm, > > > > > > > struct kvm_shared_pages_list *list) > > > > > > > { > > > > > > > @@ -1639,6 +1649,9 @@ int svm_get_shared_pages_list(struct kvm *kvm, > > > > > > > if (!sev_guest(kvm)) > > > > > > > return -ENOTTY; > > > > > > > > > > > > > > + if (!sev->live_migration_enabled) > > > > > > > + return -EINVAL; > > > > > > > > This is currently under guest control, so I'm not certain this is > > > > helpful. If I called this with otherwise valid parameters, and got > > > > back -EINVAL, I would probably think the bug is on my end. But it > > > > could be on the guest's end! I would probably drop this, but you could > > > > have KVM return an empty list of regions when this happens. > > > > > > > > Alternatively, as explained below, this could call guest_pv_has instead. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > + > > > > > > > if (!list->size) > > > > > > > return -EINVAL; > > > > > > > > > > > > > > diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c > > > > > > > index 58f89f83caab..43ea5061926f 100644 > > > > > > > --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c > > > > > > > +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c > > > > > > > @@ -2903,6 +2903,9 @@ static int svm_set_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr) > > > > > > > svm->msr_decfg = data; > > > > > > > break; > > > > > > > } > > > > > > > + case MSR_KVM_SEV_LIVE_MIGRATION: > > > > > > > + sev_update_migration_flags(vcpu->kvm, data); > > > > > > > + break; > > > > > > > case MSR_IA32_APICBASE: > > > > > > > if (kvm_vcpu_apicv_active(vcpu)) > > > > > > > avic_update_vapic_bar(to_svm(vcpu), data); > > > > > > > @@ -3976,6 +3979,19 @@ static void svm_vcpu_after_set_cpuid(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) > > > > > > > vcpu->arch.cr3_lm_rsvd_bits &= ~(1UL << (best->ebx & 0x3f)); > > > > > > > } > > > > > > > > > > > > > > + /* > > > > > > > + * If SEV guest then enable the Live migration feature. > > > > > > > + */ > > > > > > > + if (sev_guest(vcpu->kvm)) { > > > > > > > + struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *best; > > > > > > > + > > > > > > > + best = kvm_find_cpuid_entry(vcpu, KVM_CPUID_FEATURES, 0); > > > > > > > + if (!best) > > > > > > > + return; > > > > > > > + > > > > > > > + best->eax |= (1 << KVM_FEATURE_SEV_LIVE_MIGRATION); > > > > > > > + } > > > > > > > + > > > > > > > > > > > > Looking at this, I believe the only way for this bit to get enabled is > > > > > > if userspace toggles it. There needs to be a way for userspace to > > > > > > identify if the kernel underneath them does, in fact, support SEV LM. > > > > > > I'm at risk for having misread these patches (it's a long series), but > > > > > > I don't see anything that communicates upwards. > > > > > > > > > > > > This could go upward with the other paravirt features flags in > > > > > > cpuid.c. It could also be an explicit KVM Capability (checked through > > > > > > check_extension). > > > > > > > > > > > > Userspace should then have a chance to decide whether or not this > > > > > > should be enabled. And when it's not enabled, the host should return a > > > > > > GP in response to the hypercall. This could be configured either > > > > > > through userspace stripping out the LM feature bit, or by calling a VM > > > > > > scoped enable cap (KVM_VM_IOCTL_ENABLE_CAP). > > > > > > > > > > > > I believe the typical path for a feature like this to be configured > > > > > > would be to use ENABLE_CAP. > > > > > > > > > > I believe we have discussed and reviewed this earlier too. > > > > > > > > > > To summarize this feature, the host indicates if it supports the Live > > > > > Migration feature and the feature and the hypercall are only enabled on > > > > > the host when the guest checks for this support and does a wrmsrl() to > > > > > enable the feature. Also the guest will not make the hypercall if the > > > > > host does not indicate support for it. > > > > > > > > I've gone through and read this patch a bit more closely, and the > > > > surrounding code. Previously, I clearly misread this and the > > > > surrounding space. > > > > > > > > What happens if the guest just writes to the MSR anyway? Even if it > > > > didn't receive a cue to do so? I believe the hypercall would still get > > > > invoked here, since the hypercall does not check if SEV live migration > > > > is enabled. Similarly, the MSR for enabling it is always available, > > > > even if userspace didn't ask for the cpuid bit to be set. This should > > > > not happen. Userspace should be in control of a new hypercall rolling > > > > out. > > > > > > > > I believe my interpretation last time was that the cpuid bit was > > > > getting surfaced from the host kernel to host userspace, but I don't > > > > actually see that in this patch series. Another way to ask this > > > > question would be "How does userspace know the kernel they are on has > > > > this patch series?". It needs some way of checking whether or not the > > > > kernel underneath it supports SEV live migration. Technically, I think > > > > userspace could call get_cpuid, set_cpuid (with the same values), and > > > > then get_cpuid again, and it would be able to infer by checking the > > > > SEV LM feature flag in the KVM leaf. This seems a bit kludgy. Checking > > > > support should be easy. > > > > > > > > An additional question is "how does userspace choose whether live > > > > migration is advertised to the guest"? I believe userspace's desire > > > > for a particular value of the paravirt feature flag in CPUID get's > > > > overridden when they call set cpuid, since the feature flag is set in > > > > svm_vcpu_after_set_cpuid regardless of what userspace asks for. > > > > Userspace should have a choice in the matter. > > > > > > > > Actually i did some more analysis of this, and i believe you are right > > about the above, feature flag gets set in svm_vcpu_after_set_cpuid. > > > > As you mentioned above and as i confirmed in my previous email, > calling KVM_SET_CPUID2 vcpu ioctl will always set the live migration > feature flag for the vCPU. > > This is what will be queried by the guest to enable the kernel's > live migration feature and to start making hypercalls. > > Now, i want to understand why do you want the userspace to have a > choice in this matter ? Kernel rollout risk is a pretty big factor: 1) Feature flagging is a pretty common risk mitigation for new features. 2) Without userspace being able to intervene, the kernel rollout becomes a feature rollout. IIUC, as soon as new VMs started running on this host kernel, they would immediately start calling the hypercall if they had the guest patches, even if they did not do so on older versions of the host kernel. > > After all, it is the userspace which actually initiates the live > migration process, so doesn't it have the final choice in this > matter ? With the current implementation, userspace has the final say in the migration, but not the final say in whether or not that particular hypercall is used by the guest. If a customer showed up, and said "don't have my guest migrate", there is no way for the host to tell the guest "hey, we're not even listening to what you're sending over the hypercall". IIRC, there is an SEV Policy bit for migration enablement, but even if it were set to false, that guest would still update the host about its unencrypted regions. Right now, the host can't even remove the feature bit from CPUID (since its desire would be overridden post-set), so it doesn't have the ability to tell the guest to hang up the phone. And even if we could tell the guest through CPUID, if the guest ignored what we told it, it could still send data down anyway! If there were a bug in this implementation that we missed, the only way to avoid it would be to roll out a new kernel, which is pretty heavy handed. If you could just disable the feature (or never enable it in the first place), that would be much less costly. > Even if this feature is reported by host, the guest only uses > it to enable and make page encryption status hypercalls > and the host's shared pages list gets setup accordingly. > > But unless userspace calls KVM_GET_SHARED_PAGES_LIST ioctl and > initiates live migration process, the above is simply enabling > the guest to make hypercalls whenever a page's encryption > status is changed. > > Thanks, > Ashish Thanks, Steve
Hello Steve, On Mon, Feb 08, 2021 at 02:50:14PM -0800, Steve Rutherford wrote: > Hi Ashish, > > On Sun, Feb 7, 2021 at 4:29 PM Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@amd.com> wrote: > > > > Hello Steve, > > > > On Sat, Feb 06, 2021 at 01:56:46PM +0000, Ashish Kalra wrote: > > > Hello Steve, > > > > > > On Sat, Feb 06, 2021 at 05:46:17AM +0000, Ashish Kalra wrote: > > > > Hello Steve, > > > > > > > > Continued response to your queries, especially related to userspace > > > > control of SEV live migration feature : > > > > > > > > On Fri, Feb 05, 2021 at 06:54:21PM -0800, Steve Rutherford wrote: > > > > > On Thu, Feb 4, 2021 at 7:08 PM Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@amd.com> wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > > Hello Steve, > > > > > > > > > > > > On Thu, Feb 04, 2021 at 04:56:35PM -0800, Steve Rutherford wrote: > > > > > > > On Wed, Feb 3, 2021 at 4:39 PM Ashish Kalra <Ashish.Kalra@amd.com> wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > From: Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@amd.com> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Add new KVM_FEATURE_SEV_LIVE_MIGRATION feature for guest to check > > > > > > > > for host-side support for SEV live migration. Also add a new custom > > > > > > > > MSR_KVM_SEV_LIVE_MIGRATION for guest to enable the SEV live migration > > > > > > > > feature. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Signed-off-by: Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@amd.com> > > > > > > > > --- > > > > > > > > Documentation/virt/kvm/cpuid.rst | 5 +++++ > > > > > > > > Documentation/virt/kvm/msr.rst | 12 ++++++++++++ > > > > > > > > arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm_para.h | 4 ++++ > > > > > > > > arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c | 13 +++++++++++++ > > > > > > > > arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c | 16 ++++++++++++++++ > > > > > > > > arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h | 2 ++ > > > > > > > > 6 files changed, 52 insertions(+) > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > diff --git a/Documentation/virt/kvm/cpuid.rst b/Documentation/virt/kvm/cpuid.rst > > > > > > > > index cf62162d4be2..0bdb6cdb12d3 100644 > > > > > > > > --- a/Documentation/virt/kvm/cpuid.rst > > > > > > > > +++ b/Documentation/virt/kvm/cpuid.rst > > > > > > > > @@ -96,6 +96,11 @@ KVM_FEATURE_MSI_EXT_DEST_ID 15 guest checks this feature bit > > > > > > > > before using extended destination > > > > > > > > ID bits in MSI address bits 11-5. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > +KVM_FEATURE_SEV_LIVE_MIGRATION 16 guest checks this feature bit before > > > > > > > > + using the page encryption state > > > > > > > > + hypercall to notify the page state > > > > > > > > + change > > > > > > > > + > > > > > > > > KVM_FEATURE_CLOCKSOURCE_STABLE_BIT 24 host will warn if no guest-side > > > > > > > > per-cpu warps are expected in > > > > > > > > kvmclock > > > > > > > > diff --git a/Documentation/virt/kvm/msr.rst b/Documentation/virt/kvm/msr.rst > > > > > > > > index e37a14c323d2..020245d16087 100644 > > > > > > > > --- a/Documentation/virt/kvm/msr.rst > > > > > > > > +++ b/Documentation/virt/kvm/msr.rst > > > > > > > > @@ -376,3 +376,15 @@ data: > > > > > > > > write '1' to bit 0 of the MSR, this causes the host to re-scan its queue > > > > > > > > and check if there are more notifications pending. The MSR is available > > > > > > > > if KVM_FEATURE_ASYNC_PF_INT is present in CPUID. > > > > > > > > + > > > > > > > > +MSR_KVM_SEV_LIVE_MIGRATION: > > > > > > > > + 0x4b564d08 > > > > > > > > + > > > > > > > > + Control SEV Live Migration features. > > > > > > > > + > > > > > > > > +data: > > > > > > > > + Bit 0 enables (1) or disables (0) host-side SEV Live Migration feature, > > > > > > > > + in other words, this is guest->host communication that it's properly > > > > > > > > + handling the shared pages list. > > > > > > > > + > > > > > > > > + All other bits are reserved. > > > > > > > > diff --git a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm_para.h b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm_para.h > > > > > > > > index 950afebfba88..f6bfa138874f 100644 > > > > > > > > --- a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm_para.h > > > > > > > > +++ b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm_para.h > > > > > > > > @@ -33,6 +33,7 @@ > > > > > > > > #define KVM_FEATURE_PV_SCHED_YIELD 13 > > > > > > > > #define KVM_FEATURE_ASYNC_PF_INT 14 > > > > > > > > #define KVM_FEATURE_MSI_EXT_DEST_ID 15 > > > > > > > > +#define KVM_FEATURE_SEV_LIVE_MIGRATION 16 > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > #define KVM_HINTS_REALTIME 0 > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > @@ -54,6 +55,7 @@ > > > > > > > > #define MSR_KVM_POLL_CONTROL 0x4b564d05 > > > > > > > > #define MSR_KVM_ASYNC_PF_INT 0x4b564d06 > > > > > > > > #define MSR_KVM_ASYNC_PF_ACK 0x4b564d07 > > > > > > > > +#define MSR_KVM_SEV_LIVE_MIGRATION 0x4b564d08 > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > struct kvm_steal_time { > > > > > > > > __u64 steal; > > > > > > > > @@ -136,4 +138,6 @@ struct kvm_vcpu_pv_apf_data { > > > > > > > > #define KVM_PV_EOI_ENABLED KVM_PV_EOI_MASK > > > > > > > > #define KVM_PV_EOI_DISABLED 0x0 > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > +#define KVM_SEV_LIVE_MIGRATION_ENABLED BIT_ULL(0) > > > > > > > > + > > > > > > > > #endif /* _UAPI_ASM_X86_KVM_PARA_H */ > > > > > > > > diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c > > > > > > > > index b0d324aed515..93f42b3d3e33 100644 > > > > > > > > --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c > > > > > > > > +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c > > > > > > > > @@ -1627,6 +1627,16 @@ int svm_page_enc_status_hc(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned long gpa, > > > > > > > > return ret; > > > > > > > > } > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > +void sev_update_migration_flags(struct kvm *kvm, u64 data) > > > > > > > > +{ > > > > > > > > + struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info; > > > > > > > > + > > > > > > > > + if (!sev_guest(kvm)) > > > > > > > > + return; > > > > > > > > > > > > > > This should assert that userspace wanted the guest to be able to make > > > > > > > these calls (see more below). > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > + > > > > > > > > + sev->live_migration_enabled = !!(data & KVM_SEV_LIVE_MIGRATION_ENABLED); > > > > > > > > +} > > > > > > > > + > > > > > > > > int svm_get_shared_pages_list(struct kvm *kvm, > > > > > > > > struct kvm_shared_pages_list *list) > > > > > > > > { > > > > > > > > @@ -1639,6 +1649,9 @@ int svm_get_shared_pages_list(struct kvm *kvm, > > > > > > > > if (!sev_guest(kvm)) > > > > > > > > return -ENOTTY; > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > + if (!sev->live_migration_enabled) > > > > > > > > + return -EINVAL; > > > > > > > > > > This is currently under guest control, so I'm not certain this is > > > > > helpful. If I called this with otherwise valid parameters, and got > > > > > back -EINVAL, I would probably think the bug is on my end. But it > > > > > could be on the guest's end! I would probably drop this, but you could > > > > > have KVM return an empty list of regions when this happens. > > > > > > > > > > Alternatively, as explained below, this could call guest_pv_has instead. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > + > > > > > > > > if (!list->size) > > > > > > > > return -EINVAL; > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c > > > > > > > > index 58f89f83caab..43ea5061926f 100644 > > > > > > > > --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c > > > > > > > > +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c > > > > > > > > @@ -2903,6 +2903,9 @@ static int svm_set_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr) > > > > > > > > svm->msr_decfg = data; > > > > > > > > break; > > > > > > > > } > > > > > > > > + case MSR_KVM_SEV_LIVE_MIGRATION: > > > > > > > > + sev_update_migration_flags(vcpu->kvm, data); > > > > > > > > + break; > > > > > > > > case MSR_IA32_APICBASE: > > > > > > > > if (kvm_vcpu_apicv_active(vcpu)) > > > > > > > > avic_update_vapic_bar(to_svm(vcpu), data); > > > > > > > > @@ -3976,6 +3979,19 @@ static void svm_vcpu_after_set_cpuid(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) > > > > > > > > vcpu->arch.cr3_lm_rsvd_bits &= ~(1UL << (best->ebx & 0x3f)); > > > > > > > > } > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > + /* > > > > > > > > + * If SEV guest then enable the Live migration feature. > > > > > > > > + */ > > > > > > > > + if (sev_guest(vcpu->kvm)) { > > > > > > > > + struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *best; > > > > > > > > + > > > > > > > > + best = kvm_find_cpuid_entry(vcpu, KVM_CPUID_FEATURES, 0); > > > > > > > > + if (!best) > > > > > > > > + return; > > > > > > > > + > > > > > > > > + best->eax |= (1 << KVM_FEATURE_SEV_LIVE_MIGRATION); > > > > > > > > + } > > > > > > > > + > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Looking at this, I believe the only way for this bit to get enabled is > > > > > > > if userspace toggles it. There needs to be a way for userspace to > > > > > > > identify if the kernel underneath them does, in fact, support SEV LM. > > > > > > > I'm at risk for having misread these patches (it's a long series), but > > > > > > > I don't see anything that communicates upwards. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > This could go upward with the other paravirt features flags in > > > > > > > cpuid.c. It could also be an explicit KVM Capability (checked through > > > > > > > check_extension). > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Userspace should then have a chance to decide whether or not this > > > > > > > should be enabled. And when it's not enabled, the host should return a > > > > > > > GP in response to the hypercall. This could be configured either > > > > > > > through userspace stripping out the LM feature bit, or by calling a VM > > > > > > > scoped enable cap (KVM_VM_IOCTL_ENABLE_CAP). > > > > > > > > > > > > > > I believe the typical path for a feature like this to be configured > > > > > > > would be to use ENABLE_CAP. > > > > > > > > > > > > I believe we have discussed and reviewed this earlier too. > > > > > > > > > > > > To summarize this feature, the host indicates if it supports the Live > > > > > > Migration feature and the feature and the hypercall are only enabled on > > > > > > the host when the guest checks for this support and does a wrmsrl() to > > > > > > enable the feature. Also the guest will not make the hypercall if the > > > > > > host does not indicate support for it. > > > > > > > > > > I've gone through and read this patch a bit more closely, and the > > > > > surrounding code. Previously, I clearly misread this and the > > > > > surrounding space. > > > > > > > > > > What happens if the guest just writes to the MSR anyway? Even if it > > > > > didn't receive a cue to do so? I believe the hypercall would still get > > > > > invoked here, since the hypercall does not check if SEV live migration > > > > > is enabled. Similarly, the MSR for enabling it is always available, > > > > > even if userspace didn't ask for the cpuid bit to be set. This should > > > > > not happen. Userspace should be in control of a new hypercall rolling > > > > > out. > > > > > > > > > > I believe my interpretation last time was that the cpuid bit was > > > > > getting surfaced from the host kernel to host userspace, but I don't > > > > > actually see that in this patch series. Another way to ask this > > > > > question would be "How does userspace know the kernel they are on has > > > > > this patch series?". It needs some way of checking whether or not the > > > > > kernel underneath it supports SEV live migration. Technically, I think > > > > > userspace could call get_cpuid, set_cpuid (with the same values), and > > > > > then get_cpuid again, and it would be able to infer by checking the > > > > > SEV LM feature flag in the KVM leaf. This seems a bit kludgy. Checking > > > > > support should be easy. > > > > > > > > > > An additional question is "how does userspace choose whether live > > > > > migration is advertised to the guest"? I believe userspace's desire > > > > > for a particular value of the paravirt feature flag in CPUID get's > > > > > overridden when they call set cpuid, since the feature flag is set in > > > > > svm_vcpu_after_set_cpuid regardless of what userspace asks for. > > > > > Userspace should have a choice in the matter. > > > > > > > > > > > Actually i did some more analysis of this, and i believe you are right > > > about the above, feature flag gets set in svm_vcpu_after_set_cpuid. > > > > > > > As you mentioned above and as i confirmed in my previous email, > > calling KVM_SET_CPUID2 vcpu ioctl will always set the live migration > > feature flag for the vCPU. > > > > This is what will be queried by the guest to enable the kernel's > > live migration feature and to start making hypercalls. > > > > Now, i want to understand why do you want the userspace to have a > > choice in this matter ? > Kernel rollout risk is a pretty big factor: > 1) Feature flagging is a pretty common risk mitigation for new features. > 2) Without userspace being able to intervene, the kernel rollout > becomes a feature rollout. > > IIUC, as soon as new VMs started running on this host kernel, they > would immediately start calling the hypercall if they had the guest > patches, even if they did not do so on older versions of the host > kernel. > > > > > After all, it is the userspace which actually initiates the live > > migration process, so doesn't it have the final choice in this > > matter ? > With the current implementation, userspace has the final say in the > migration, but not the final say in whether or not that particular > hypercall is used by the guest. If a customer showed up, and said > "don't have my guest migrate", there is no way for the host to tell > the guest "hey, we're not even listening to what you're sending over > the hypercall". IIRC, there is an SEV Policy bit for migration > enablement, but even if it were set to false, that guest would still > update the host about its unencrypted regions. > > Right now, the host can't even remove the feature bit from CPUID > (since its desire would be overridden post-set), so it doesn't have > the ability to tell the guest to hang up the phone. And even if we > could tell the guest through CPUID, if the guest ignored what we told > it, it could still send data down anyway! If there were a bug in this > implementation that we missed, the only way to avoid it would be to > roll out a new kernel, which is pretty heavy handed. If you could just > disable the feature (or never enable it in the first place), that > would be much less costly. > We can remove the implicit enabling of this live migration feature from svm_vcpu_after_set_cpuid() callback invoked afer KVM_SET_CPUID2 ioctl, and let this feature flag be controlled by the userspace VMM/qemu. Userspace can set this feature flag explicitly by calling the KVM_SET_CPUID2 ioctl and enable this feature whenever it is ready to do so. I have tested this as part of Qemu code : int kvm_arch_init_vcpu(CPUState *cs) { ... ... c->function = KVM_CPUID_FEATURES | kvm_base; c->eax = env->features[FEAT_KVM]; c->eax |= (1 << KVM_FEATURE_SEV_LIVE_MIGRATION); ... ... r = kvm_vcpu_ioctl(cs, KVM_SET_CPUID2, &cpuid_data); ... Let me know if this addresses your concerns. Thanks, Ashish
Hi Ashish, On Wed, Feb 10, 2021 at 12:37 PM Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@amd.com> wrote: > > Hello Steve, > > We can remove the implicit enabling of this live migration feature > from svm_vcpu_after_set_cpuid() callback invoked afer KVM_SET_CPUID2 > ioctl, and let this feature flag be controlled by the userspace > VMM/qemu. > > Userspace can set this feature flag explicitly by calling the > KVM_SET_CPUID2 ioctl and enable this feature whenever it is ready to > do so. > > I have tested this as part of Qemu code : > > int kvm_arch_init_vcpu(CPUState *cs) > { > ... > ... > c->function = KVM_CPUID_FEATURES | kvm_base; > c->eax = env->features[FEAT_KVM]; > c->eax |= (1 << KVM_FEATURE_SEV_LIVE_MIGRATION); > ... > ... > > r = kvm_vcpu_ioctl(cs, KVM_SET_CPUID2, &cpuid_data); > ... > > Let me know if this addresses your concerns. Removing implicit enablement is one part of the equation. The other two are: 1) Host userspace being able to ask the kernel if it supports SEV Live Migration 2) Host userspace being able to disable access to the MSR/hypercall Feature flagging for paravirt features is pretty complicated, since you need all three parties to negotiate (host userspace/host kernel/guest), and every single one has veto power. In the end, the feature should only be available to the guest if every single party says yes. For an example of how to handle 1), the new feature flag could be checked when asking the kernel which cpuid bits it supports by adding it to the list of features that the kernel mentions in KVM_GET_SUPPORTED_CPUID. For example (in KVM's arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c): case KVM_CPUID_FEATURES: ========== entry->eax = (1 << KVM_FEATURE_CLOCKSOURCE) | (1 << KVM_FEATURE_NOP_IO_DELAY) | ... (1 << KVM_FEATURE_PV_SCHED_YIELD) | + (1 << KVM_FEATURE_ASYNC_PF_INT) | - (1 << KVM_FEATURE_ASYNC_PF_INT); + (1 << KVM_FEATURE_SEV_LIVE_MIGRATION); ========== Without this, userspace has to infer if the kernel it is on supports that flag. For an example of how to handle 2), in the new msr handler, KVM should throw a GP `if (!guest_pv_has(vcpu, KVM_FEATURE_SEV_LIVE_MIGRATION))` (it can do this by returning th. The issue here is "what if the guest ignores CPUID and calls the MSR/hypercall anyway". This is a less important issue as it requires the guest to be malicious, but still worth resolving. Additionally, the hypercall itself should check if the MSR has been toggled by the guest. Thanks, Steve
On Wed, Feb 10, 2021 at 2:01 PM Steve Rutherford <srutherford@google.com> wrote: > > Hi Ashish, > > On Wed, Feb 10, 2021 at 12:37 PM Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@amd.com> wrote: > > > > Hello Steve, > > > > We can remove the implicit enabling of this live migration feature > > from svm_vcpu_after_set_cpuid() callback invoked afer KVM_SET_CPUID2 > > ioctl, and let this feature flag be controlled by the userspace > > VMM/qemu. > > > > Userspace can set this feature flag explicitly by calling the > > KVM_SET_CPUID2 ioctl and enable this feature whenever it is ready to > > do so. > > > > I have tested this as part of Qemu code : > > > > int kvm_arch_init_vcpu(CPUState *cs) > > { > > ... > > ... > > c->function = KVM_CPUID_FEATURES | kvm_base; > > c->eax = env->features[FEAT_KVM]; > > c->eax |= (1 << KVM_FEATURE_SEV_LIVE_MIGRATION); > > ... > > ... > > > > r = kvm_vcpu_ioctl(cs, KVM_SET_CPUID2, &cpuid_data); > > ... > > > > Let me know if this addresses your concerns. > Removing implicit enablement is one part of the equation. > The other two are: > 1) Host userspace being able to ask the kernel if it supports SEV Live Migration > 2) Host userspace being able to disable access to the MSR/hypercall > > Feature flagging for paravirt features is pretty complicated, since > you need all three parties to negotiate (host userspace/host > kernel/guest), and every single one has veto power. In the end, the > feature should only be available to the guest if every single party > says yes. > > For an example of how to handle 1), the new feature flag could be > checked when asking the kernel which cpuid bits it supports by adding > it to the list of features that the kernel mentions in > KVM_GET_SUPPORTED_CPUID. > > For example (in KVM's arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c): > case KVM_CPUID_FEATURES: > ========== > entry->eax = (1 << KVM_FEATURE_CLOCKSOURCE) | > (1 << KVM_FEATURE_NOP_IO_DELAY) | > ... > (1 << KVM_FEATURE_PV_SCHED_YIELD) | > + (1 << KVM_FEATURE_ASYNC_PF_INT) | > - (1 << KVM_FEATURE_ASYNC_PF_INT); > + (1 << KVM_FEATURE_SEV_LIVE_MIGRATION); > ========== > > Without this, userspace has to infer if the kernel it is on supports that flag. > > For an example of how to handle 2), in the new msr handler, KVM should > throw a GP `if (!guest_pv_has(vcpu, KVM_FEATURE_SEV_LIVE_MIGRATION))` > (it can do this by returning th. The issue here is "what if the guest Correction: (it can do this by returning 1).
On Thu, Feb 04, 2021, Ashish Kalra wrote: > diff --git a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm_para.h b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm_para.h > index 950afebfba88..f6bfa138874f 100644 > --- a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm_para.h > +++ b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm_para.h > @@ -33,6 +33,7 @@ > #define KVM_FEATURE_PV_SCHED_YIELD 13 > #define KVM_FEATURE_ASYNC_PF_INT 14 > #define KVM_FEATURE_MSI_EXT_DEST_ID 15 > +#define KVM_FEATURE_SEV_LIVE_MIGRATION 16 > > #define KVM_HINTS_REALTIME 0 > > @@ -54,6 +55,7 @@ > #define MSR_KVM_POLL_CONTROL 0x4b564d05 > #define MSR_KVM_ASYNC_PF_INT 0x4b564d06 > #define MSR_KVM_ASYNC_PF_ACK 0x4b564d07 > +#define MSR_KVM_SEV_LIVE_MIGRATION 0x4b564d08 > > struct kvm_steal_time { > __u64 steal; > @@ -136,4 +138,6 @@ struct kvm_vcpu_pv_apf_data { > #define KVM_PV_EOI_ENABLED KVM_PV_EOI_MASK > #define KVM_PV_EOI_DISABLED 0x0 > > +#define KVM_SEV_LIVE_MIGRATION_ENABLED BIT_ULL(0) > + > #endif /* _UAPI_ASM_X86_KVM_PARA_H */ > diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c > index b0d324aed515..93f42b3d3e33 100644 > --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c > +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c > @@ -1627,6 +1627,16 @@ int svm_page_enc_status_hc(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned long gpa, > return ret; > } > > +void sev_update_migration_flags(struct kvm *kvm, u64 data) > +{ I don't see the point for a helper. It's actually going to make the code less readable once proper error handling is added. Given that it's not static and exposed via svm.h, without an external user, I assume this got left behind when the implicit enabling was removed. > + struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info; > + > + if (!sev_guest(kvm)) I 100% agree with Steve, this needs to check guest_cpuid_has() in addition to sev_guest(). And it should return '1', i.e. signal #GP to the guest, not silently eat the bad WRMSR. > + return; > + > + sev->live_migration_enabled = !!(data & KVM_SEV_LIVE_MIGRATION_ENABLED); The value needs to be checked as well, i.e. all bits except LIVE_MIGRATION... should to be reserved to zero. > +} > + > int svm_get_shared_pages_list(struct kvm *kvm, > struct kvm_shared_pages_list *list) > { > @@ -1639,6 +1649,9 @@ int svm_get_shared_pages_list(struct kvm *kvm, > if (!sev_guest(kvm)) > return -ENOTTY; > > + if (!sev->live_migration_enabled) > + return -EINVAL; EINVAL is a weird return value for something that is controlled by the guest, especially since it's possible for the guest to support migration, just not yet. EBUSY maybe? EOPNOTSUPP? > + > if (!list->size) > return -EINVAL; > > diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c > index 58f89f83caab..43ea5061926f 100644 > --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c > +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c > @@ -2903,6 +2903,9 @@ static int svm_set_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr) > svm->msr_decfg = data; > break; > } > + case MSR_KVM_SEV_LIVE_MIGRATION: > + sev_update_migration_flags(vcpu->kvm, data); > + break; There shuld be a svm_get_msr() entry as well, I don't see any reason to prevent the guest from reading the MSR. > case MSR_IA32_APICBASE: > if (kvm_vcpu_apicv_active(vcpu)) > avic_update_vapic_bar(to_svm(vcpu), data); > @@ -3976,6 +3979,19 @@ static void svm_vcpu_after_set_cpuid(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) > vcpu->arch.cr3_lm_rsvd_bits &= ~(1UL << (best->ebx & 0x3f)); > } > > + /* > + * If SEV guest then enable the Live migration feature. > + */ > + if (sev_guest(vcpu->kvm)) { > + struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *best; > + > + best = kvm_find_cpuid_entry(vcpu, KVM_CPUID_FEATURES, 0); > + if (!best) > + return; > + > + best->eax |= (1 << KVM_FEATURE_SEV_LIVE_MIGRATION); Again echoing Steve's concern, userspace is the ultimate authority on what features are exposed to the VM. I don't see any motivation for forcing live migration to be enabled. And as I believe was pointed out elsewhere, this bit needs to be advertised to userspace via kvm_cpu_caps. > + } > + > if (!kvm_vcpu_apicv_active(vcpu)) > return; > > diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h > index 066ca2a9f1e6..e1bffc11e425 100644 > --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h > +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h > @@ -79,6 +79,7 @@ struct kvm_sev_info { > unsigned long pages_locked; /* Number of pages locked */ > struct list_head regions_list; /* List of registered regions */ > u64 ap_jump_table; /* SEV-ES AP Jump Table address */ > + bool live_migration_enabled; > /* List and count of shared pages */ > int shared_pages_list_count; > struct list_head shared_pages_list; > @@ -592,6 +593,7 @@ int svm_unregister_enc_region(struct kvm *kvm, > void pre_sev_run(struct vcpu_svm *svm, int cpu); > void __init sev_hardware_setup(void); > void sev_hardware_teardown(void); > +void sev_update_migration_flags(struct kvm *kvm, u64 data); > void sev_free_vcpu(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu); > int sev_handle_vmgexit(struct vcpu_svm *svm); > int sev_es_string_io(struct vcpu_svm *svm, int size, unsigned int port, int in); > -- > 2.17.1 >
diff --git a/Documentation/virt/kvm/cpuid.rst b/Documentation/virt/kvm/cpuid.rst index cf62162d4be2..0bdb6cdb12d3 100644 --- a/Documentation/virt/kvm/cpuid.rst +++ b/Documentation/virt/kvm/cpuid.rst @@ -96,6 +96,11 @@ KVM_FEATURE_MSI_EXT_DEST_ID 15 guest checks this feature bit before using extended destination ID bits in MSI address bits 11-5. +KVM_FEATURE_SEV_LIVE_MIGRATION 16 guest checks this feature bit before + using the page encryption state + hypercall to notify the page state + change + KVM_FEATURE_CLOCKSOURCE_STABLE_BIT 24 host will warn if no guest-side per-cpu warps are expected in kvmclock diff --git a/Documentation/virt/kvm/msr.rst b/Documentation/virt/kvm/msr.rst index e37a14c323d2..020245d16087 100644 --- a/Documentation/virt/kvm/msr.rst +++ b/Documentation/virt/kvm/msr.rst @@ -376,3 +376,15 @@ data: write '1' to bit 0 of the MSR, this causes the host to re-scan its queue and check if there are more notifications pending. The MSR is available if KVM_FEATURE_ASYNC_PF_INT is present in CPUID. + +MSR_KVM_SEV_LIVE_MIGRATION: + 0x4b564d08 + + Control SEV Live Migration features. + +data: + Bit 0 enables (1) or disables (0) host-side SEV Live Migration feature, + in other words, this is guest->host communication that it's properly + handling the shared pages list. + + All other bits are reserved. diff --git a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm_para.h b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm_para.h index 950afebfba88..f6bfa138874f 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm_para.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm_para.h @@ -33,6 +33,7 @@ #define KVM_FEATURE_PV_SCHED_YIELD 13 #define KVM_FEATURE_ASYNC_PF_INT 14 #define KVM_FEATURE_MSI_EXT_DEST_ID 15 +#define KVM_FEATURE_SEV_LIVE_MIGRATION 16 #define KVM_HINTS_REALTIME 0 @@ -54,6 +55,7 @@ #define MSR_KVM_POLL_CONTROL 0x4b564d05 #define MSR_KVM_ASYNC_PF_INT 0x4b564d06 #define MSR_KVM_ASYNC_PF_ACK 0x4b564d07 +#define MSR_KVM_SEV_LIVE_MIGRATION 0x4b564d08 struct kvm_steal_time { __u64 steal; @@ -136,4 +138,6 @@ struct kvm_vcpu_pv_apf_data { #define KVM_PV_EOI_ENABLED KVM_PV_EOI_MASK #define KVM_PV_EOI_DISABLED 0x0 +#define KVM_SEV_LIVE_MIGRATION_ENABLED BIT_ULL(0) + #endif /* _UAPI_ASM_X86_KVM_PARA_H */ diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c index b0d324aed515..93f42b3d3e33 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c @@ -1627,6 +1627,16 @@ int svm_page_enc_status_hc(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned long gpa, return ret; } +void sev_update_migration_flags(struct kvm *kvm, u64 data) +{ + struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info; + + if (!sev_guest(kvm)) + return; + + sev->live_migration_enabled = !!(data & KVM_SEV_LIVE_MIGRATION_ENABLED); +} + int svm_get_shared_pages_list(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_shared_pages_list *list) { @@ -1639,6 +1649,9 @@ int svm_get_shared_pages_list(struct kvm *kvm, if (!sev_guest(kvm)) return -ENOTTY; + if (!sev->live_migration_enabled) + return -EINVAL; + if (!list->size) return -EINVAL; diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c index 58f89f83caab..43ea5061926f 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c @@ -2903,6 +2903,9 @@ static int svm_set_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr) svm->msr_decfg = data; break; } + case MSR_KVM_SEV_LIVE_MIGRATION: + sev_update_migration_flags(vcpu->kvm, data); + break; case MSR_IA32_APICBASE: if (kvm_vcpu_apicv_active(vcpu)) avic_update_vapic_bar(to_svm(vcpu), data); @@ -3976,6 +3979,19 @@ static void svm_vcpu_after_set_cpuid(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) vcpu->arch.cr3_lm_rsvd_bits &= ~(1UL << (best->ebx & 0x3f)); } + /* + * If SEV guest then enable the Live migration feature. + */ + if (sev_guest(vcpu->kvm)) { + struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *best; + + best = kvm_find_cpuid_entry(vcpu, KVM_CPUID_FEATURES, 0); + if (!best) + return; + + best->eax |= (1 << KVM_FEATURE_SEV_LIVE_MIGRATION); + } + if (!kvm_vcpu_apicv_active(vcpu)) return; diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h index 066ca2a9f1e6..e1bffc11e425 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h @@ -79,6 +79,7 @@ struct kvm_sev_info { unsigned long pages_locked; /* Number of pages locked */ struct list_head regions_list; /* List of registered regions */ u64 ap_jump_table; /* SEV-ES AP Jump Table address */ + bool live_migration_enabled; /* List and count of shared pages */ int shared_pages_list_count; struct list_head shared_pages_list; @@ -592,6 +593,7 @@ int svm_unregister_enc_region(struct kvm *kvm, void pre_sev_run(struct vcpu_svm *svm, int cpu); void __init sev_hardware_setup(void); void sev_hardware_teardown(void); +void sev_update_migration_flags(struct kvm *kvm, u64 data); void sev_free_vcpu(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu); int sev_handle_vmgexit(struct vcpu_svm *svm); int sev_es_string_io(struct vcpu_svm *svm, int size, unsigned int port, int in);