Message ID | 161248518659.21478.2484341937387294998.stgit@noble1 (mailing list archive) |
---|---|
Headers | show |
Series | Fix some seq_file users that were recently broken | expand |
On Fri, 05 Feb 2021 11:36:30 +1100 NeilBrown <neilb@suse.de> wrote: > A recent change to seq_file broke some users which were using seq_file > in a non-"standard" way ... though the "standard" isn't documented, so > they can be excused. The result is a possible leak - of memory in one > case, of references to a 'transport' in the other. > > These three patches: > 1/ document and explain the problem > 2/ fix the problem user in x86 > 3/ fix the problem user in net/sctp > 1f4aace60b0e ("fs/seq_file.c: simplify seq_file iteration code and interface") was August 2018, so I don't think "recent" applies here? I didn't look closely, but it appears that the sctp procfs file is world-readable. So we gave unprivileged userspace the ability to leak kernel memory? So I'm thinking that we aim for 5.12-rc1 on all three patches with a cc:stable?
On Fri, 5 Feb 2021 14:35:50 -0800 Andrew Morton wrote: > On Fri, 05 Feb 2021 11:36:30 +1100 NeilBrown <neilb@suse.de> wrote: > > > A recent change to seq_file broke some users which were using seq_file > > in a non-"standard" way ... though the "standard" isn't documented, so > > they can be excused. The result is a possible leak - of memory in one > > case, of references to a 'transport' in the other. > > > > These three patches: > > 1/ document and explain the problem > > 2/ fix the problem user in x86 > > 3/ fix the problem user in net/sctp > > 1f4aace60b0e ("fs/seq_file.c: simplify seq_file iteration code and > interface") was August 2018, so I don't think "recent" applies here? > > I didn't look closely, but it appears that the sctp procfs file is > world-readable. So we gave unprivileged userspace the ability to leak > kernel memory? > > So I'm thinking that we aim for 5.12-rc1 on all three patches with a cc:stable? I'd rather take the sctp patch sooner, we'll send another batch of networking fixes for 5.11, anyway. Would that be okay with you?
On Sat, 6 Feb 2021 14:29:24 -0800 Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org> wrote: > On Fri, 5 Feb 2021 14:35:50 -0800 Andrew Morton wrote: > > On Fri, 05 Feb 2021 11:36:30 +1100 NeilBrown <neilb@suse.de> wrote: > > > > > A recent change to seq_file broke some users which were using seq_file > > > in a non-"standard" way ... though the "standard" isn't documented, so > > > they can be excused. The result is a possible leak - of memory in one > > > case, of references to a 'transport' in the other. > > > > > > These three patches: > > > 1/ document and explain the problem > > > 2/ fix the problem user in x86 > > > 3/ fix the problem user in net/sctp > > > > 1f4aace60b0e ("fs/seq_file.c: simplify seq_file iteration code and > > interface") was August 2018, so I don't think "recent" applies here? > > > > I didn't look closely, but it appears that the sctp procfs file is > > world-readable. So we gave unprivileged userspace the ability to leak > > kernel memory? > > > > So I'm thinking that we aim for 5.12-rc1 on all three patches with a cc:stable? > > I'd rather take the sctp patch sooner, we'll send another batch > of networking fixes for 5.11, anyway. Would that be okay with you? Sure.
On Fri, Feb 05 2021, Andrew Morton wrote: > On Fri, 05 Feb 2021 11:36:30 +1100 NeilBrown <neilb@suse.de> wrote: > >> A recent change to seq_file broke some users which were using seq_file >> in a non-"standard" way ... though the "standard" isn't documented, so >> they can be excused. The result is a possible leak - of memory in one >> case, of references to a 'transport' in the other. >> >> These three patches: >> 1/ document and explain the problem >> 2/ fix the problem user in x86 >> 3/ fix the problem user in net/sctp >> > > 1f4aace60b0e ("fs/seq_file.c: simplify seq_file iteration code and > interface") was August 2018, so I don't think "recent" applies here? I must be getting old :-( > > I didn't look closely, but it appears that the sctp procfs file is > world-readable. So we gave unprivileged userspace the ability to leak > kernel memory? Not quite that bad. The x86 problem allows arbitrary memory to be leaked, but that is in debugfs (as I'm sure you saw) so is root-only. The sctp one only allows an sctp_transport to be pinned. That is not good and would, e.g., prevent the module from being unloaded. But unlike a simple memory leak it won't affect anything outside of sctp. > > So I'm thinking that we aim for 5.12-rc1 on all three patches with a cc:stable? Thanks for looking after these! NeilBrown
On Sun, 7 Feb 2021 13:11:45 -0800 Andrew Morton wrote: > On Sat, 6 Feb 2021 14:29:24 -0800 Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org> wrote: > > On Fri, 5 Feb 2021 14:35:50 -0800 Andrew Morton wrote: > > > On Fri, 05 Feb 2021 11:36:30 +1100 NeilBrown <neilb@suse.de> wrote: > > > 1f4aace60b0e ("fs/seq_file.c: simplify seq_file iteration code and > > > interface") was August 2018, so I don't think "recent" applies here? > > > > > > I didn't look closely, but it appears that the sctp procfs file is > > > world-readable. So we gave unprivileged userspace the ability to leak > > > kernel memory? > > > > > > So I'm thinking that we aim for 5.12-rc1 on all three patches with a cc:stable? > > > > I'd rather take the sctp patch sooner, we'll send another batch > > of networking fixes for 5.11, anyway. Would that be okay with you? > > Sure. Applied patch 3 to net, thanks everyone!