| Message ID | 5e910d11a14da17c41317417fc41d3a9d472c6e7.1613659844.git.bnemeth@redhat.com (mailing list archive) |
|---|---|
| State | Changes Requested |
| Delegated to: | Netdev Maintainers |
| Headers | show |
| Series | net: check if protocol extracted by virtio_net_hdr_set_proto is correct | expand |
| Context | Check | Description |
|---|---|---|
| netdev/tree_selection | success | Not a local patch |
On Thu, Feb 18, 2021 at 10:01 AM Balazs Nemeth <bnemeth@redhat.com> wrote: > > For gso packets, virtio_net_hdr_set_proto sets the protocol (if it isn't > set) based on the type in the virtio net hdr, but the skb could contain > anything since it could come from packet_snd through a raw socket. If > there is a mismatch between what virtio_net_hdr_set_proto sets and > the actual protocol, then the skb could be handled incorrectly later > on by gso. > > The network header of gso packets starts at 14 bytes, but a specially > crafted packet could fool the call to skb_flow_dissect_flow_keys_basic > as the network header offset in the skb could be incorrect. > Consequently, EINVAL is not returned. > > There are even packets that can cause an infinite loop. For example, a > packet with ethernet type ETH_P_MPLS_UC (which is unnoticed by > virtio_net_hdr_to_skb) that is sent to a geneve interface will be > handled by geneve_build_skb. In turn, it calls > udp_tunnel_handle_offloads which then calls skb_reset_inner_headers. > After that, the packet gets passed to mpls_gso_segment. That function > calculates the mpls header length by taking the difference between > network_header and inner_network_header. Since the two are equal > (due to the earlier call to skb_reset_inner_headers), it will calculate > a header of length 0, and it will not pull any headers. Then, it will > call skb_mac_gso_segment which will again call mpls_gso_segment, etc... > This leads to the infinite loop. > > For that reason, address the root cause of the issue: don't blindly > trust the information provided by the virtio net header. Instead, > check if the protocol in the packet actually matches the protocol set by > virtio_net_hdr_set_proto. > > Fixes: 9274124f023b ("net: stricter validation of untrusted gso packets") > Signed-off-by: Balazs Nemeth <bnemeth@redhat.com> > --- > include/linux/virtio_net.h | 7 ++++++- > 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) > > diff --git a/include/linux/virtio_net.h b/include/linux/virtio_net.h > index e8a924eeea3d..cf2c53563f22 100644 > --- a/include/linux/virtio_net.h > +++ b/include/linux/virtio_net.h > @@ -79,8 +79,13 @@ static inline int virtio_net_hdr_to_skb(struct sk_buff *skb, > if (gso_type && skb->network_header) { > struct flow_keys_basic keys; > > - if (!skb->protocol) > + if (!skb->protocol) { > + const struct ethhdr *eth = skb_eth_hdr(skb); > + Unfortunately, cannot assume that the device type is ARPHRD_ETHER. The underlying approach is sound: packets that have a gso type set in the virtio_net_hdr have to be IP packets. > virtio_net_hdr_set_proto(skb, hdr); > + if (skb->protocol != eth->h_proto) > + return -EINVAL; > + } > retry: > if (!skb_flow_dissect_flow_keys_basic(NULL, skb, &keys, > NULL, 0, 0, 0, > -- > 2.29.2 >
On 2021/2/18 11:50 下午, Willem de Bruijn wrote: > On Thu, Feb 18, 2021 at 10:01 AM Balazs Nemeth <bnemeth@redhat.com> wrote: >> For gso packets, virtio_net_hdr_set_proto sets the protocol (if it isn't >> set) based on the type in the virtio net hdr, but the skb could contain >> anything since it could come from packet_snd through a raw socket. If >> there is a mismatch between what virtio_net_hdr_set_proto sets and >> the actual protocol, then the skb could be handled incorrectly later >> on by gso. >> >> The network header of gso packets starts at 14 bytes, but a specially >> crafted packet could fool the call to skb_flow_dissect_flow_keys_basic >> as the network header offset in the skb could be incorrect. >> Consequently, EINVAL is not returned. >> >> There are even packets that can cause an infinite loop. For example, a >> packet with ethernet type ETH_P_MPLS_UC (which is unnoticed by >> virtio_net_hdr_to_skb) that is sent to a geneve interface will be >> handled by geneve_build_skb. In turn, it calls >> udp_tunnel_handle_offloads which then calls skb_reset_inner_headers. >> After that, the packet gets passed to mpls_gso_segment. That function >> calculates the mpls header length by taking the difference between >> network_header and inner_network_header. Since the two are equal >> (due to the earlier call to skb_reset_inner_headers), it will calculate >> a header of length 0, and it will not pull any headers. Then, it will >> call skb_mac_gso_segment which will again call mpls_gso_segment, etc... >> This leads to the infinite loop. I remember kernel will validate dodgy gso packets in gso ops. I wonder why not do the check there? The reason is that virtio/TUN is not the only source for those packets. Thanks >> >> For that reason, address the root cause of the issue: don't blindly >> trust the information provided by the virtio net header. Instead, >> check if the protocol in the packet actually matches the protocol set by >> virtio_net_hdr_set_proto. >> >> Fixes: 9274124f023b ("net: stricter validation of untrusted gso packets") >> Signed-off-by: Balazs Nemeth <bnemeth@redhat.com> >> --- >> include/linux/virtio_net.h | 7 ++++++- >> 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) >> >> diff --git a/include/linux/virtio_net.h b/include/linux/virtio_net.h >> index e8a924eeea3d..cf2c53563f22 100644 >> --- a/include/linux/virtio_net.h >> +++ b/include/linux/virtio_net.h >> @@ -79,8 +79,13 @@ static inline int virtio_net_hdr_to_skb(struct sk_buff *skb, >> if (gso_type && skb->network_header) { >> struct flow_keys_basic keys; >> >> - if (!skb->protocol) >> + if (!skb->protocol) { >> + const struct ethhdr *eth = skb_eth_hdr(skb); >> + > Unfortunately, cannot assume that the device type is ARPHRD_ETHER. > > The underlying approach is sound: packets that have a gso type set in > the virtio_net_hdr have to be IP packets. > >> virtio_net_hdr_set_proto(skb, hdr); >> + if (skb->protocol != eth->h_proto) >> + return -EINVAL; >> + } >> retry: >> if (!skb_flow_dissect_flow_keys_basic(NULL, skb, &keys, >> NULL, 0, 0, 0, >> -- >> 2.29.2 >>
On Fri, Feb 19, 2021 at 3:53 AM Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com> wrote: > > > On 2021/2/18 11:50 下午, Willem de Bruijn wrote: > > On Thu, Feb 18, 2021 at 10:01 AM Balazs Nemeth <bnemeth@redhat.com> wrote: > >> For gso packets, virtio_net_hdr_set_proto sets the protocol (if it isn't > >> set) based on the type in the virtio net hdr, but the skb could contain > >> anything since it could come from packet_snd through a raw socket. If > >> there is a mismatch between what virtio_net_hdr_set_proto sets and > >> the actual protocol, then the skb could be handled incorrectly later > >> on by gso. > >> > >> The network header of gso packets starts at 14 bytes, but a specially > >> crafted packet could fool the call to skb_flow_dissect_flow_keys_basic > >> as the network header offset in the skb could be incorrect. > >> Consequently, EINVAL is not returned. > >> > >> There are even packets that can cause an infinite loop. For example, a > >> packet with ethernet type ETH_P_MPLS_UC (which is unnoticed by > >> virtio_net_hdr_to_skb) that is sent to a geneve interface will be > >> handled by geneve_build_skb. In turn, it calls > >> udp_tunnel_handle_offloads which then calls skb_reset_inner_headers. > >> After that, the packet gets passed to mpls_gso_segment. That function > >> calculates the mpls header length by taking the difference between > >> network_header and inner_network_header. Since the two are equal > >> (due to the earlier call to skb_reset_inner_headers), it will calculate > >> a header of length 0, and it will not pull any headers. Then, it will > >> call skb_mac_gso_segment which will again call mpls_gso_segment, etc... > >> This leads to the infinite loop. > > > I remember kernel will validate dodgy gso packets in gso ops. I wonder > why not do the check there? The reason is that virtio/TUN is not the > only source for those packets. It is? All other GSO packets are generated by the stack itself, either locally or through GRO. But indeed some checks are better performed in the GSO layer. Such as likely the 0-byte mpls header length. If we cannot trust virtio_net_hdr.gso_type passed from userspace, then we can also not trust the eth.h_proto coming from the same source. But it makes sense to require them to be consistent. There is a dev_parse_header_protocol that may return the link layer type in a more generic fashion than casting to skb_eth_hdr. Question remains what to do for the link layer types that do not implement header_ops->parse_protocol, and so we cannot validate the packet's network protocol. Drop will cause false positives, accepts will leave a potential path, just closes it for Ethernet. This might call for multiple fixes, both on first ingest and inside the stack?
On 2021/2/19 10:55 下午, Willem de Bruijn wrote: > On Fri, Feb 19, 2021 at 3:53 AM Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com> wrote: >> >> On 2021/2/18 11:50 下午, Willem de Bruijn wrote: >>> On Thu, Feb 18, 2021 at 10:01 AM Balazs Nemeth <bnemeth@redhat.com> wrote: >>>> For gso packets, virtio_net_hdr_set_proto sets the protocol (if it isn't >>>> set) based on the type in the virtio net hdr, but the skb could contain >>>> anything since it could come from packet_snd through a raw socket. If >>>> there is a mismatch between what virtio_net_hdr_set_proto sets and >>>> the actual protocol, then the skb could be handled incorrectly later >>>> on by gso. >>>> >>>> The network header of gso packets starts at 14 bytes, but a specially >>>> crafted packet could fool the call to skb_flow_dissect_flow_keys_basic >>>> as the network header offset in the skb could be incorrect. >>>> Consequently, EINVAL is not returned. >>>> >>>> There are even packets that can cause an infinite loop. For example, a >>>> packet with ethernet type ETH_P_MPLS_UC (which is unnoticed by >>>> virtio_net_hdr_to_skb) that is sent to a geneve interface will be >>>> handled by geneve_build_skb. In turn, it calls >>>> udp_tunnel_handle_offloads which then calls skb_reset_inner_headers. >>>> After that, the packet gets passed to mpls_gso_segment. That function >>>> calculates the mpls header length by taking the difference between >>>> network_header and inner_network_header. Since the two are equal >>>> (due to the earlier call to skb_reset_inner_headers), it will calculate >>>> a header of length 0, and it will not pull any headers. Then, it will >>>> call skb_mac_gso_segment which will again call mpls_gso_segment, etc... >>>> This leads to the infinite loop. >> >> I remember kernel will validate dodgy gso packets in gso ops. I wonder >> why not do the check there? The reason is that virtio/TUN is not the >> only source for those packets. > It is? All other GSO packets are generated by the stack itself, either > locally or through GRO. Something like what has been done in tcp_tso_segment()? if (skb_gso_ok(skb, features | NETIF_F_GSO_ROBUST)) { /* Packet is from an untrusted source, reset gso_segs. */ skb_shinfo(skb)->gso_segs = DIV_ROUND_UP(skb->len, mss); segs = NULL; goto out; } My understanding of the header check logic is that it tries to dealy the check as much as possible, so for device that has GRO_ROBUST, there's even no need to do that. > > But indeed some checks are better performed in the GSO layer. Such as > likely the 0-byte mpls header length. > > If we cannot trust virtio_net_hdr.gso_type passed from userspace, then > we can also not trust the eth.h_proto coming from the same source. I agree. > But > it makes sense to require them to be consistent. There is a > dev_parse_header_protocol that may return the link layer type in a > more generic fashion than casting to skb_eth_hdr. > > Question remains what to do for the link layer types that do not implement > header_ops->parse_protocol, and so we cannot validate the packet's > network protocol. Drop will cause false positives, accepts will leave a > potential path, just closes it for Ethernet. > > This might call for multiple fixes, both on first ingest and inside the stack? It's a balance between performance and security. Ideally, it looks to me the GSO codes should not assume the header of dodgy packet is correct which means it must validate them before using them. I'm not sure if it needs a lot of changes or not. For security reason, it's better to do a strict check during first ingest. But it bascially suppress the meaning of NETIF_F_GSO_ROBUST somehow. And it needs some benchmark to see if it can cause obvious performance regression. Thanks >
On Mon, 2021-02-22 at 11:39 +0800, Jason Wang wrote: > > On 2021/2/19 10:55 下午, Willem de Bruijn wrote: > > On Fri, Feb 19, 2021 at 3:53 AM Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com> > > wrote: > > > > > > On 2021/2/18 11:50 下午, Willem de Bruijn wrote: > > > > On Thu, Feb 18, 2021 at 10:01 AM Balazs Nemeth < > > > > bnemeth@redhat.com> wrote: > > > > > For gso packets, virtio_net_hdr_set_proto sets the protocol > > > > > (if it isn't > > > > > set) based on the type in the virtio net hdr, but the skb > > > > > could contain > > > > > anything since it could come from packet_snd through a raw > > > > > socket. If > > > > > there is a mismatch between what virtio_net_hdr_set_proto > > > > > sets and > > > > > the actual protocol, then the skb could be handled > > > > > incorrectly later > > > > > on by gso. > > > > > > > > > > The network header of gso packets starts at 14 bytes, but a > > > > > specially > > > > > crafted packet could fool the call to > > > > > skb_flow_dissect_flow_keys_basic > > > > > as the network header offset in the skb could be incorrect. > > > > > Consequently, EINVAL is not returned. > > > > > > > > > > There are even packets that can cause an infinite loop. For > > > > > example, a > > > > > packet with ethernet type ETH_P_MPLS_UC (which is unnoticed > > > > > by > > > > > virtio_net_hdr_to_skb) that is sent to a geneve interface > > > > > will be > > > > > handled by geneve_build_skb. In turn, it calls > > > > > udp_tunnel_handle_offloads which then calls > > > > > skb_reset_inner_headers. > > > > > After that, the packet gets passed to mpls_gso_segment. That > > > > > function > > > > > calculates the mpls header length by taking the difference > > > > > between > > > > > network_header and inner_network_header. Since the two are > > > > > equal > > > > > (due to the earlier call to skb_reset_inner_headers), it will > > > > > calculate > > > > > a header of length 0, and it will not pull any headers. Then, > > > > > it will > > > > > call skb_mac_gso_segment which will again call > > > > > mpls_gso_segment, etc... > > > > > This leads to the infinite loop. > > > > > > I remember kernel will validate dodgy gso packets in gso ops. I > > > wonder > > > why not do the check there? The reason is that virtio/TUN is not > > > the > > > only source for those packets. > > It is? All other GSO packets are generated by the stack itself, > > either > > locally or through GRO. > > > Something like what has been done in tcp_tso_segment()? > > if (skb_gso_ok(skb, features | NETIF_F_GSO_ROBUST)) { > /* Packet is from an untrusted source, reset > gso_segs. */ > > skb_shinfo(skb)->gso_segs = DIV_ROUND_UP(skb->len, mss); > > segs = NULL; > goto out; > } > > My understanding of the header check logic is that it tries to dealy > the > check as much as possible, so for device that has GRO_ROBUST, there's > even no need to do that. > > > > > > But indeed some checks are better performed in the GSO layer. Such > > as > > likely the 0-byte mpls header length. > > > > If we cannot trust virtio_net_hdr.gso_type passed from userspace, > > then > > we can also not trust the eth.h_proto coming from the same source. > > > I agree. > I'll add a check in the GSO layer as well. > > > But > > it makes sense to require them to be consistent. There is a > > dev_parse_header_protocol that may return the link layer type in a > > more generic fashion than casting to skb_eth_hdr. > > > > Question remains what to do for the link layer types that do not > > implement > > header_ops->parse_protocol, and so we cannot validate the packet's > > network protocol. Drop will cause false positives, accepts will > > leave a > > potential path, just closes it for Ethernet. > > > > This might call for multiple fixes, both on first ingest and inside > > the stack? > Given that this is related to dodgy packets and that we can't trust eth.h_proto, wouldn't it make sense to always drop packets (with potential false positives), erring on the side of caution, if header_ops->parse_protocol isn't implemented for the dev in question? > > It's a balance between performance and security. Ideally, it looks to > me > the GSO codes should not assume the header of dodgy packet is correct > which means it must validate them before using them. I'm not sure if > it > needs a lot of changes or not. > > For security reason, it's better to do a strict check during first > ingest. But it bascially suppress the meaning of NETIF_F_GSO_ROBUST > somehow. And it needs some benchmark to see if it can cause obvious > performance regression. > > Thanks > > > > >
On Tue, Feb 23, 2021 at 8:48 AM Balazs Nemeth <bnemeth@redhat.com> wrote: > > On Mon, 2021-02-22 at 11:39 +0800, Jason Wang wrote: > > > > On 2021/2/19 10:55 下午, Willem de Bruijn wrote: > > > On Fri, Feb 19, 2021 at 3:53 AM Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com> > > > wrote: > > > > > > > > On 2021/2/18 11:50 下午, Willem de Bruijn wrote: > > > > > On Thu, Feb 18, 2021 at 10:01 AM Balazs Nemeth < > > > > > bnemeth@redhat.com> wrote: > > > > > > For gso packets, virtio_net_hdr_set_proto sets the protocol > > > > > > (if it isn't > > > > > > set) based on the type in the virtio net hdr, but the skb > > > > > > could contain > > > > > > anything since it could come from packet_snd through a raw > > > > > > socket. If > > > > > > there is a mismatch between what virtio_net_hdr_set_proto > > > > > > sets and > > > > > > the actual protocol, then the skb could be handled > > > > > > incorrectly later > > > > > > on by gso. > > > > > > > > > > > > The network header of gso packets starts at 14 bytes, but a > > > > > > specially > > > > > > crafted packet could fool the call to > > > > > > skb_flow_dissect_flow_keys_basic > > > > > > as the network header offset in the skb could be incorrect. > > > > > > Consequently, EINVAL is not returned. > > > > > > > > > > > > There are even packets that can cause an infinite loop. For > > > > > > example, a > > > > > > packet with ethernet type ETH_P_MPLS_UC (which is unnoticed > > > > > > by > > > > > > virtio_net_hdr_to_skb) that is sent to a geneve interface > > > > > > will be > > > > > > handled by geneve_build_skb. In turn, it calls > > > > > > udp_tunnel_handle_offloads which then calls > > > > > > skb_reset_inner_headers. > > > > > > After that, the packet gets passed to mpls_gso_segment. That > > > > > > function > > > > > > calculates the mpls header length by taking the difference > > > > > > between > > > > > > network_header and inner_network_header. Since the two are > > > > > > equal > > > > > > (due to the earlier call to skb_reset_inner_headers), it will > > > > > > calculate > > > > > > a header of length 0, and it will not pull any headers. Then, > > > > > > it will > > > > > > call skb_mac_gso_segment which will again call > > > > > > mpls_gso_segment, etc... > > > > > > This leads to the infinite loop. > > > > > > > > I remember kernel will validate dodgy gso packets in gso ops. I > > > > wonder > > > > why not do the check there? The reason is that virtio/TUN is not > > > > the > > > > only source for those packets. > > > It is? All other GSO packets are generated by the stack itself, > > > either > > > locally or through GRO. > > > > > > Something like what has been done in tcp_tso_segment()? > > > > if (skb_gso_ok(skb, features | NETIF_F_GSO_ROBUST)) { > > /* Packet is from an untrusted source, reset > > gso_segs. */ > > > > skb_shinfo(skb)->gso_segs = DIV_ROUND_UP(skb->len, mss); > > > > segs = NULL; > > goto out; > > } > > > > My understanding of the header check logic is that it tries to dealy > > the > > check as much as possible, so for device that has GRO_ROBUST, there's > > even no need to do that. > > > > > > > > > > But indeed some checks are better performed in the GSO layer. Such > > > as > > > likely the 0-byte mpls header length. > > > > > > If we cannot trust virtio_net_hdr.gso_type passed from userspace, > > > then > > > we can also not trust the eth.h_proto coming from the same source. > > > > > > I agree. > > > I'll add a check in the GSO layer as well. > > > > > But > > > it makes sense to require them to be consistent. There is a > > > dev_parse_header_protocol that may return the link layer type in a > > > more generic fashion than casting to skb_eth_hdr. > > > > > > Question remains what to do for the link layer types that do not > > > implement > > > header_ops->parse_protocol, and so we cannot validate the packet's > > > network protocol. Drop will cause false positives, accepts will > > > leave a > > > potential path, just closes it for Ethernet. > > > > > > This might call for multiple fixes, both on first ingest and inside > > > the stack? > > > Given that this is related to dodgy packets and that we can't trust > eth.h_proto, wouldn't it make sense to always drop packets (with > potential false positives), erring on the side of caution, if > header_ops->parse_protocol isn't implemented for the dev in question? Unfortunately, that might break applications somewhere out there.
diff --git a/include/linux/virtio_net.h b/include/linux/virtio_net.h index e8a924eeea3d..cf2c53563f22 100644 --- a/include/linux/virtio_net.h +++ b/include/linux/virtio_net.h @@ -79,8 +79,13 @@ static inline int virtio_net_hdr_to_skb(struct sk_buff *skb, if (gso_type && skb->network_header) { struct flow_keys_basic keys; - if (!skb->protocol) + if (!skb->protocol) { + const struct ethhdr *eth = skb_eth_hdr(skb); + virtio_net_hdr_set_proto(skb, hdr); + if (skb->protocol != eth->h_proto) + return -EINVAL; + } retry: if (!skb_flow_dissect_flow_keys_basic(NULL, skb, &keys, NULL, 0, 0, 0,
For gso packets, virtio_net_hdr_set_proto sets the protocol (if it isn't set) based on the type in the virtio net hdr, but the skb could contain anything since it could come from packet_snd through a raw socket. If there is a mismatch between what virtio_net_hdr_set_proto sets and the actual protocol, then the skb could be handled incorrectly later on by gso. The network header of gso packets starts at 14 bytes, but a specially crafted packet could fool the call to skb_flow_dissect_flow_keys_basic as the network header offset in the skb could be incorrect. Consequently, EINVAL is not returned. There are even packets that can cause an infinite loop. For example, a packet with ethernet type ETH_P_MPLS_UC (which is unnoticed by virtio_net_hdr_to_skb) that is sent to a geneve interface will be handled by geneve_build_skb. In turn, it calls udp_tunnel_handle_offloads which then calls skb_reset_inner_headers. After that, the packet gets passed to mpls_gso_segment. That function calculates the mpls header length by taking the difference between network_header and inner_network_header. Since the two are equal (due to the earlier call to skb_reset_inner_headers), it will calculate a header of length 0, and it will not pull any headers. Then, it will call skb_mac_gso_segment which will again call mpls_gso_segment, etc... This leads to the infinite loop. For that reason, address the root cause of the issue: don't blindly trust the information provided by the virtio net header. Instead, check if the protocol in the packet actually matches the protocol set by virtio_net_hdr_set_proto. Fixes: 9274124f023b ("net: stricter validation of untrusted gso packets") Signed-off-by: Balazs Nemeth <bnemeth@redhat.com> --- include/linux/virtio_net.h | 7 ++++++- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)