| Message ID | 20210317165515.1914146-1-kuba@kernel.org (mailing list archive) |
|---|---|
| State | Accepted |
| Commit | dcc32f4f183ab8479041b23a1525d48233df1d43 |
| Delegated to: | Netdev Maintainers |
| Headers | show |
| Series | [net] ipv6: weaken the v4mapped source check | expand |
| Context | Check | Description |
|---|---|---|
| netdev/cover_letter | success | Link |
| netdev/fixes_present | success | Link |
| netdev/patch_count | success | Link |
| netdev/tree_selection | success | Clearly marked for net |
| netdev/subject_prefix | success | Link |
| netdev/cc_maintainers | success | CCed 13 of 13 maintainers |
| netdev/source_inline | success | Was 0 now: 0 |
| netdev/verify_signedoff | success | Link |
| netdev/module_param | success | Was 0 now: 0 |
| netdev/build_32bit | success | Errors and warnings before: 4 this patch: 4 |
| netdev/kdoc | success | Errors and warnings before: 0 this patch: 0 |
| netdev/verify_fixes | success | Link |
| netdev/checkpatch | success | total: 0 errors, 0 warnings, 0 checks, 49 lines checked |
| netdev/build_allmodconfig_warn | success | Errors and warnings before: 4 this patch: 4 |
| netdev/header_inline | success | Link |
On Wed, 17 Mar 2021, Jakub Kicinski wrote: > This reverts commit 6af1799aaf3f1bc8defedddfa00df3192445bbf3. > > Commit 6af1799aaf3f ("ipv6: drop incoming packets having a v4mapped > source address") introduced an input check against v4mapped addresses. > Use of such addresses on the wire is indeed questionable and not > allowed on public Internet. As the commit pointed out > > https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-itojun-v6ops-v4mapped-harmful-02 > > lists potential issues. > > Unfortunately there are applications which use v4mapped addresses, > and breaking them is a clear regression. For example v4mapped > addresses (or any semi-valid addresses, really) may be used > for uni-direction event streams or packet export. > > Since the issue which sparked the addition of the check was with > TCP and request_socks in particular push the check down to TCPv6 > and DCCP. This restores the ability to receive UDPv6 packets with > v4mapped address as the source. > > Keep using the IPSTATS_MIB_INHDRERRORS statistic to minimize the > user-visible changes. > > Fixes: 6af1799aaf3f ("ipv6: drop incoming packets having a v4mapped source address") > Reported-by: Sunyi Shao <sunyishao@fb.com> > Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org> > --- > net/dccp/ipv6.c | 5 +++++ > net/ipv6/ip6_input.c | 10 ---------- > net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c | 5 +++++ > net/mptcp/subflow.c | 5 +++++ > 4 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-) Jakub - Thanks for keeping the MPTCP code in sync. The IPv6 and v4mapped MPTCP selftests still pass. For the MPTCP content: Acked-by: Mat Martineau <mathew.j.martineau@linux.intel.com> > > diff --git a/net/dccp/ipv6.c b/net/dccp/ipv6.c > index 1f73603913f5..2be5c69824f9 100644 > --- a/net/dccp/ipv6.c > +++ b/net/dccp/ipv6.c > @@ -319,6 +319,11 @@ static int dccp_v6_conn_request(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb) > if (!ipv6_unicast_destination(skb)) > return 0; /* discard, don't send a reset here */ > > + if (ipv6_addr_v4mapped(&ipv6_hdr(skb)->saddr)) { > + __IP6_INC_STATS(sock_net(sk), NULL, IPSTATS_MIB_INHDRERRORS); > + return 0; > + } > + > if (dccp_bad_service_code(sk, service)) { > dcb->dccpd_reset_code = DCCP_RESET_CODE_BAD_SERVICE_CODE; > goto drop; > diff --git a/net/ipv6/ip6_input.c b/net/ipv6/ip6_input.c > index e9d2a4a409aa..80256717868e 100644 > --- a/net/ipv6/ip6_input.c > +++ b/net/ipv6/ip6_input.c > @@ -245,16 +245,6 @@ static struct sk_buff *ip6_rcv_core(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net_device *dev, > if (ipv6_addr_is_multicast(&hdr->saddr)) > goto err; > > - /* While RFC4291 is not explicit about v4mapped addresses > - * in IPv6 headers, it seems clear linux dual-stack > - * model can not deal properly with these. > - * Security models could be fooled by ::ffff:127.0.0.1 for example. > - * > - * https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-itojun-v6ops-v4mapped-harmful-02 > - */ > - if (ipv6_addr_v4mapped(&hdr->saddr)) > - goto err; > - > skb->transport_header = skb->network_header + sizeof(*hdr); > IP6CB(skb)->nhoff = offsetof(struct ipv6hdr, nexthdr); > > diff --git a/net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c b/net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c > index bd44ded7e50c..d0f007741e8e 100644 > --- a/net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c > +++ b/net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c > @@ -1175,6 +1175,11 @@ static int tcp_v6_conn_request(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb) > if (!ipv6_unicast_destination(skb)) > goto drop; > > + if (ipv6_addr_v4mapped(&ipv6_hdr(skb)->saddr)) { > + __IP6_INC_STATS(sock_net(sk), NULL, IPSTATS_MIB_INHDRERRORS); > + return 0; > + } > + > return tcp_conn_request(&tcp6_request_sock_ops, > &tcp_request_sock_ipv6_ops, sk, skb); > > diff --git a/net/mptcp/subflow.c b/net/mptcp/subflow.c > index 3d47d670e665..d17d39ccdf34 100644 > --- a/net/mptcp/subflow.c > +++ b/net/mptcp/subflow.c > @@ -477,6 +477,11 @@ static int subflow_v6_conn_request(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb) > if (!ipv6_unicast_destination(skb)) > goto drop; > > + if (ipv6_addr_v4mapped(&ipv6_hdr(skb)->saddr)) { > + __IP6_INC_STATS(sock_net(sk), NULL, IPSTATS_MIB_INHDRERRORS); > + return 0; > + } > + > return tcp_conn_request(&mptcp_subflow_request_sock_ops, > &subflow_request_sock_ipv6_ops, sk, skb); > > -- > 2.30.2 -- Mat Martineau Intel
On Wed, Mar 17, 2021 at 5:55 PM Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org> wrote: > > This reverts commit 6af1799aaf3f1bc8defedddfa00df3192445bbf3. > > Commit 6af1799aaf3f ("ipv6: drop incoming packets having a v4mapped > source address") introduced an input check against v4mapped addresses. > Use of such addresses on the wire is indeed questionable and not > allowed on public Internet. As the commit pointed out > > https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-itojun-v6ops-v4mapped-harmful-02 > > lists potential issues. > > Unfortunately there are applications which use v4mapped addresses, > and breaking them is a clear regression. For example v4mapped > addresses (or any semi-valid addresses, really) may be used > for uni-direction event streams or packet export. > > Since the issue which sparked the addition of the check was with > TCP and request_socks in particular push the check down to TCPv6 > and DCCP. This restores the ability to receive UDPv6 packets with > v4mapped address as the source. > > Keep using the IPSTATS_MIB_INHDRERRORS statistic to minimize the > user-visible changes. > > Fixes: 6af1799aaf3f ("ipv6: drop incoming packets having a v4mapped source address") > Reported-by: Sunyi Shao <sunyishao@fb.com> > Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org> > --- Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Thanks !
Hello: This patch was applied to netdev/net.git (refs/heads/master): On Wed, 17 Mar 2021 09:55:15 -0700 you wrote: > This reverts commit 6af1799aaf3f1bc8defedddfa00df3192445bbf3. > > Commit 6af1799aaf3f ("ipv6: drop incoming packets having a v4mapped > source address") introduced an input check against v4mapped addresses. > Use of such addresses on the wire is indeed questionable and not > allowed on public Internet. As the commit pointed out > > [...] Here is the summary with links: - [net] ipv6: weaken the v4mapped source check https://git.kernel.org/netdev/net/c/dcc32f4f183a You are awesome, thank you! -- Deet-doot-dot, I am a bot. https://korg.docs.kernel.org/patchwork/pwbot.html
diff --git a/net/dccp/ipv6.c b/net/dccp/ipv6.c index 1f73603913f5..2be5c69824f9 100644 --- a/net/dccp/ipv6.c +++ b/net/dccp/ipv6.c @@ -319,6 +319,11 @@ static int dccp_v6_conn_request(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb) if (!ipv6_unicast_destination(skb)) return 0; /* discard, don't send a reset here */ + if (ipv6_addr_v4mapped(&ipv6_hdr(skb)->saddr)) { + __IP6_INC_STATS(sock_net(sk), NULL, IPSTATS_MIB_INHDRERRORS); + return 0; + } + if (dccp_bad_service_code(sk, service)) { dcb->dccpd_reset_code = DCCP_RESET_CODE_BAD_SERVICE_CODE; goto drop; diff --git a/net/ipv6/ip6_input.c b/net/ipv6/ip6_input.c index e9d2a4a409aa..80256717868e 100644 --- a/net/ipv6/ip6_input.c +++ b/net/ipv6/ip6_input.c @@ -245,16 +245,6 @@ static struct sk_buff *ip6_rcv_core(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net_device *dev, if (ipv6_addr_is_multicast(&hdr->saddr)) goto err; - /* While RFC4291 is not explicit about v4mapped addresses - * in IPv6 headers, it seems clear linux dual-stack - * model can not deal properly with these. - * Security models could be fooled by ::ffff:127.0.0.1 for example. - * - * https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-itojun-v6ops-v4mapped-harmful-02 - */ - if (ipv6_addr_v4mapped(&hdr->saddr)) - goto err; - skb->transport_header = skb->network_header + sizeof(*hdr); IP6CB(skb)->nhoff = offsetof(struct ipv6hdr, nexthdr); diff --git a/net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c b/net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c index bd44ded7e50c..d0f007741e8e 100644 --- a/net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c +++ b/net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c @@ -1175,6 +1175,11 @@ static int tcp_v6_conn_request(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb) if (!ipv6_unicast_destination(skb)) goto drop; + if (ipv6_addr_v4mapped(&ipv6_hdr(skb)->saddr)) { + __IP6_INC_STATS(sock_net(sk), NULL, IPSTATS_MIB_INHDRERRORS); + return 0; + } + return tcp_conn_request(&tcp6_request_sock_ops, &tcp_request_sock_ipv6_ops, sk, skb); diff --git a/net/mptcp/subflow.c b/net/mptcp/subflow.c index 3d47d670e665..d17d39ccdf34 100644 --- a/net/mptcp/subflow.c +++ b/net/mptcp/subflow.c @@ -477,6 +477,11 @@ static int subflow_v6_conn_request(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb) if (!ipv6_unicast_destination(skb)) goto drop; + if (ipv6_addr_v4mapped(&ipv6_hdr(skb)->saddr)) { + __IP6_INC_STATS(sock_net(sk), NULL, IPSTATS_MIB_INHDRERRORS); + return 0; + } + return tcp_conn_request(&mptcp_subflow_request_sock_ops, &subflow_request_sock_ipv6_ops, sk, skb);
This reverts commit 6af1799aaf3f1bc8defedddfa00df3192445bbf3. Commit 6af1799aaf3f ("ipv6: drop incoming packets having a v4mapped source address") introduced an input check against v4mapped addresses. Use of such addresses on the wire is indeed questionable and not allowed on public Internet. As the commit pointed out https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-itojun-v6ops-v4mapped-harmful-02 lists potential issues. Unfortunately there are applications which use v4mapped addresses, and breaking them is a clear regression. For example v4mapped addresses (or any semi-valid addresses, really) may be used for uni-direction event streams or packet export. Since the issue which sparked the addition of the check was with TCP and request_socks in particular push the check down to TCPv6 and DCCP. This restores the ability to receive UDPv6 packets with v4mapped address as the source. Keep using the IPSTATS_MIB_INHDRERRORS statistic to minimize the user-visible changes. Fixes: 6af1799aaf3f ("ipv6: drop incoming packets having a v4mapped source address") Reported-by: Sunyi Shao <sunyishao@fb.com> Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org> --- net/dccp/ipv6.c | 5 +++++ net/ipv6/ip6_input.c | 10 ---------- net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c | 5 +++++ net/mptcp/subflow.c | 5 +++++ 4 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)