| Message ID | c7400111ed7458eee01007c4d8d57cdf2cbb0fc2.1618254007.git.ashish.kalra@amd.com (mailing list archive) |
|---|---|
| State | New, archived |
| Headers | show |
| Series | Add AMD SEV guest live migration support | expand |
On Mon, Apr 12, 2021 at 12:44 PM Ashish Kalra <Ashish.Kalra@amd.com> wrote: > > From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com> > > The command is used to create the encryption context for an incoming > SEV guest. The encryption context can be later used by the hypervisor > to import the incoming data into the SEV guest memory space. > > Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> > Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> > Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> > Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> > Cc: Joerg Roedel <joro@8bytes.org> > Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> > Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> > Cc: x86@kernel.org > Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org > Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org > Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com> > Signed-off-by: Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@amd.com> > --- > .../virt/kvm/amd-memory-encryption.rst | 29 +++++++ > arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c | 81 +++++++++++++++++++ > include/uapi/linux/kvm.h | 9 +++ > 3 files changed, 119 insertions(+) > > diff --git a/Documentation/virt/kvm/amd-memory-encryption.rst b/Documentation/virt/kvm/amd-memory-encryption.rst > index 26c4e6c83f62..c86c1ded8dd8 100644 > --- a/Documentation/virt/kvm/amd-memory-encryption.rst > +++ b/Documentation/virt/kvm/amd-memory-encryption.rst > @@ -343,6 +343,35 @@ issued by the hypervisor to delete the encryption context. > > Returns: 0 on success, -negative on error > > +13. KVM_SEV_RECEIVE_START > +------------------------ > + > +The KVM_SEV_RECEIVE_START command is used for creating the memory encryption > +context for an incoming SEV guest. To create the encryption context, the user must > +provide a guest policy, the platform public Diffie-Hellman (PDH) key and session > +information. > + > +Parameters: struct kvm_sev_receive_start (in/out) > + > +Returns: 0 on success, -negative on error > + > +:: > + > + struct kvm_sev_receive_start { > + __u32 handle; /* if zero then firmware creates a new handle */ > + __u32 policy; /* guest's policy */ > + > + __u64 pdh_uaddr; /* userspace address pointing to the PDH key */ > + __u32 pdh_len; > + > + __u64 session_uaddr; /* userspace address which points to the guest session information */ > + __u32 session_len; > + }; > + > +On success, the 'handle' field contains a new handle and on error, a negative value. > + > +For more details, see SEV spec Section 6.12. > + > References > ========== > > diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c > index 92325d9527ce..e530c2b34b5e 100644 > --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c > +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c > @@ -1370,6 +1370,84 @@ static int sev_send_finish(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp) > return ret; > } > > +static int sev_receive_start(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp) > +{ > + struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info; > + struct sev_data_receive_start *start; > + struct kvm_sev_receive_start params; > + int *error = &argp->error; > + void *session_data; > + void *pdh_data; > + int ret; > + > + if (!sev_guest(kvm)) > + return -ENOTTY; > + > + /* Get parameter from the userspace */ > + if (copy_from_user(¶ms, (void __user *)(uintptr_t)argp->data, > + sizeof(struct kvm_sev_receive_start))) > + return -EFAULT; > + > + /* some sanity checks */ > + if (!params.pdh_uaddr || !params.pdh_len || > + !params.session_uaddr || !params.session_len) > + return -EINVAL; > + > + pdh_data = psp_copy_user_blob(params.pdh_uaddr, params.pdh_len); > + if (IS_ERR(pdh_data)) > + return PTR_ERR(pdh_data); > + > + session_data = psp_copy_user_blob(params.session_uaddr, > + params.session_len); > + if (IS_ERR(session_data)) { > + ret = PTR_ERR(session_data); > + goto e_free_pdh; > + } > + > + ret = -ENOMEM; > + start = kzalloc(sizeof(*start), GFP_KERNEL); > + if (!start) > + goto e_free_session; > + > + start->handle = params.handle; > + start->policy = params.policy; > + start->pdh_cert_address = __psp_pa(pdh_data); > + start->pdh_cert_len = params.pdh_len; > + start->session_address = __psp_pa(session_data); > + start->session_len = params.session_len; > + > + /* create memory encryption context */ > + ret = __sev_issue_cmd(argp->sev_fd, SEV_CMD_RECEIVE_START, start, > + error); > + if (ret) > + goto e_free; > + > + /* Bind ASID to this guest */ > + ret = sev_bind_asid(kvm, start->handle, error); > + if (ret) > + goto e_free; > + > + params.handle = start->handle; > + if (copy_to_user((void __user *)(uintptr_t)argp->data, > + ¶ms, sizeof(struct kvm_sev_receive_start))) { > + ret = -EFAULT; > + sev_unbind_asid(kvm, start->handle); > + goto e_free; > + } > + > + sev->handle = start->handle; > + sev->fd = argp->sev_fd; > + > +e_free: > + kfree(start); > +e_free_session: > + kfree(session_data); > +e_free_pdh: > + kfree(pdh_data); > + > + return ret; > +} > + > int svm_mem_enc_op(struct kvm *kvm, void __user *argp) > { > struct kvm_sev_cmd sev_cmd; > @@ -1432,6 +1510,9 @@ int svm_mem_enc_op(struct kvm *kvm, void __user *argp) > case KVM_SEV_SEND_FINISH: > r = sev_send_finish(kvm, &sev_cmd); > break; > + case KVM_SEV_RECEIVE_START: > + r = sev_receive_start(kvm, &sev_cmd); > + break; > default: > r = -EINVAL; > goto out; > diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h b/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h > index d45af34c31be..29c25e641a0c 100644 > --- a/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h > +++ b/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h > @@ -1750,6 +1750,15 @@ struct kvm_sev_send_update_data { > __u32 trans_len; > }; > > +struct kvm_sev_receive_start { > + __u32 handle; > + __u32 policy; > + __u64 pdh_uaddr; > + __u32 pdh_len; > + __u64 session_uaddr; > + __u32 session_len; > +}; > + > #define KVM_DEV_ASSIGN_ENABLE_IOMMU (1 << 0) > #define KVM_DEV_ASSIGN_PCI_2_3 (1 << 1) > #define KVM_DEV_ASSIGN_MASK_INTX (1 << 2) > -- > 2.17.1 > Reviewed-by: Steve Rutherford <srutherford@google.com>
diff --git a/Documentation/virt/kvm/amd-memory-encryption.rst b/Documentation/virt/kvm/amd-memory-encryption.rst index 26c4e6c83f62..c86c1ded8dd8 100644 --- a/Documentation/virt/kvm/amd-memory-encryption.rst +++ b/Documentation/virt/kvm/amd-memory-encryption.rst @@ -343,6 +343,35 @@ issued by the hypervisor to delete the encryption context. Returns: 0 on success, -negative on error +13. KVM_SEV_RECEIVE_START +------------------------ + +The KVM_SEV_RECEIVE_START command is used for creating the memory encryption +context for an incoming SEV guest. To create the encryption context, the user must +provide a guest policy, the platform public Diffie-Hellman (PDH) key and session +information. + +Parameters: struct kvm_sev_receive_start (in/out) + +Returns: 0 on success, -negative on error + +:: + + struct kvm_sev_receive_start { + __u32 handle; /* if zero then firmware creates a new handle */ + __u32 policy; /* guest's policy */ + + __u64 pdh_uaddr; /* userspace address pointing to the PDH key */ + __u32 pdh_len; + + __u64 session_uaddr; /* userspace address which points to the guest session information */ + __u32 session_len; + }; + +On success, the 'handle' field contains a new handle and on error, a negative value. + +For more details, see SEV spec Section 6.12. + References ========== diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c index 92325d9527ce..e530c2b34b5e 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c @@ -1370,6 +1370,84 @@ static int sev_send_finish(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp) return ret; } +static int sev_receive_start(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp) +{ + struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info; + struct sev_data_receive_start *start; + struct kvm_sev_receive_start params; + int *error = &argp->error; + void *session_data; + void *pdh_data; + int ret; + + if (!sev_guest(kvm)) + return -ENOTTY; + + /* Get parameter from the userspace */ + if (copy_from_user(¶ms, (void __user *)(uintptr_t)argp->data, + sizeof(struct kvm_sev_receive_start))) + return -EFAULT; + + /* some sanity checks */ + if (!params.pdh_uaddr || !params.pdh_len || + !params.session_uaddr || !params.session_len) + return -EINVAL; + + pdh_data = psp_copy_user_blob(params.pdh_uaddr, params.pdh_len); + if (IS_ERR(pdh_data)) + return PTR_ERR(pdh_data); + + session_data = psp_copy_user_blob(params.session_uaddr, + params.session_len); + if (IS_ERR(session_data)) { + ret = PTR_ERR(session_data); + goto e_free_pdh; + } + + ret = -ENOMEM; + start = kzalloc(sizeof(*start), GFP_KERNEL); + if (!start) + goto e_free_session; + + start->handle = params.handle; + start->policy = params.policy; + start->pdh_cert_address = __psp_pa(pdh_data); + start->pdh_cert_len = params.pdh_len; + start->session_address = __psp_pa(session_data); + start->session_len = params.session_len; + + /* create memory encryption context */ + ret = __sev_issue_cmd(argp->sev_fd, SEV_CMD_RECEIVE_START, start, + error); + if (ret) + goto e_free; + + /* Bind ASID to this guest */ + ret = sev_bind_asid(kvm, start->handle, error); + if (ret) + goto e_free; + + params.handle = start->handle; + if (copy_to_user((void __user *)(uintptr_t)argp->data, + ¶ms, sizeof(struct kvm_sev_receive_start))) { + ret = -EFAULT; + sev_unbind_asid(kvm, start->handle); + goto e_free; + } + + sev->handle = start->handle; + sev->fd = argp->sev_fd; + +e_free: + kfree(start); +e_free_session: + kfree(session_data); +e_free_pdh: + kfree(pdh_data); + + return ret; +} + int svm_mem_enc_op(struct kvm *kvm, void __user *argp) { struct kvm_sev_cmd sev_cmd; @@ -1432,6 +1510,9 @@ int svm_mem_enc_op(struct kvm *kvm, void __user *argp) case KVM_SEV_SEND_FINISH: r = sev_send_finish(kvm, &sev_cmd); break; + case KVM_SEV_RECEIVE_START: + r = sev_receive_start(kvm, &sev_cmd); + break; default: r = -EINVAL; goto out; diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h b/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h index d45af34c31be..29c25e641a0c 100644 --- a/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h +++ b/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h @@ -1750,6 +1750,15 @@ struct kvm_sev_send_update_data { __u32 trans_len; }; +struct kvm_sev_receive_start { + __u32 handle; + __u32 policy; + __u64 pdh_uaddr; + __u32 pdh_len; + __u64 session_uaddr; + __u32 session_len; +}; + #define KVM_DEV_ASSIGN_ENABLE_IOMMU (1 << 0) #define KVM_DEV_ASSIGN_PCI_2_3 (1 << 1) #define KVM_DEV_ASSIGN_MASK_INTX (1 << 2)