| Message ID | 20210421161925.968825-5-roberto.sassu@huawei.com (mailing list archive) |
|---|---|
| State | Superseded |
| Delegated to: | Paul Moore |
| Headers | show |
| Series | evm: Prepare for moving to the LSM infrastructure | expand |
On 4/21/2021 9:19 AM, Roberto Sassu wrote: > The current implementation of security_inode_init_security() is capable of > handling only one LSM providing an xattr to be set at inode creation. That > xattr is then passed to EVM to calculate the HMAC. > > To support multiple LSMs, each providing an xattr, this patch makes the > following modifications: > > security_inode_init_security(): > - dynamically allocates new_xattrs, based on the number of > inode_init_security hooks registered by LSMs; > - replaces the call_int_hook() macro with its definition, to correctly > handle the case of an LSM returning -EOPNOTSUPP (the loop should not be > stopped). > > security_old_inode_init_security(): > - replaces the call_int_hook() macro with its definition, to stop the loop > at the first LSM providing an xattr, to avoid a memory leak (due to > overwriting the *value pointer). > > The modifications necessary for EVM to calculate the HMAC on all xattrs > will be done in a separate patch. > > Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com> > --- > security/security.c | 93 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------ > 1 file changed, 82 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-) > > diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c > index 2c1fe1496069..2ab67fa4422e 100644 > --- a/security/security.c > +++ b/security/security.c > @@ -30,8 +30,6 @@ > #include <linux/msg.h> > #include <net/flow.h> > > -#define MAX_LSM_EVM_XATTR 2 > - > /* How many LSMs were built into the kernel? */ > #define LSM_COUNT (__end_lsm_info - __start_lsm_info) > > @@ -1028,9 +1026,10 @@ int security_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir, > const struct qstr *qstr, > const initxattrs initxattrs, void *fs_data) > { > - struct xattr new_xattrs[MAX_LSM_EVM_XATTR + 1]; > + struct xattr *new_xattrs; > struct xattr *lsm_xattr, *evm_xattr, *xattr; > - int ret; > + struct security_hook_list *P; > + int ret, max_new_xattrs = 0; > > if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode))) > return 0; > @@ -1038,14 +1037,52 @@ int security_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir, > if (!initxattrs) > return call_int_hook(inode_init_security, -EOPNOTSUPP, inode, > dir, qstr, NULL, fs_data); > - memset(new_xattrs, 0, sizeof(new_xattrs)); > + > + /* Determine at run-time the max number of xattr structs to allocate. */ > + hlist_for_each_entry(P, &security_hook_heads.inode_init_security, list) > + max_new_xattrs++; Don't do this here! You can count the number of modules providing inode_init_security hooks when the modules register and save the value for use here. It's not going to change. > + > + if (!max_new_xattrs) > + return 0; > + > + /* Allocate +1 for EVM and +1 as terminator. */ > + new_xattrs = kcalloc(max_new_xattrs + 2, sizeof(*new_xattrs), GFP_NOFS); > + if (!new_xattrs) > + return -ENOMEM; > + > lsm_xattr = new_xattrs; > - ret = call_int_hook(inode_init_security, -EOPNOTSUPP, inode, dir, qstr, > - lsm_xattr, fs_data); > - if (ret) > + hlist_for_each_entry(P, &security_hook_heads.inode_init_security, > + list) { > + ret = P->hook.inode_init_security(inode, dir, qstr, new_xattrs, > + fs_data); > + if (ret) { > + if (ret != -EOPNOTSUPP) > + goto out; > + > + continue; > + } > + > + /* LSM implementation error. */ > + if (lsm_xattr->name == NULL || lsm_xattr->value == NULL) { > + WARN_ONCE( > + "LSM %s: ret = 0 but xattr name/value = NULL\n", > + P->lsm); > + ret = -ENOENT; > + goto out; > + } > + > + lsm_xattr++; > + > + if (!--max_new_xattrs) > + break; > + } > + > + if (!new_xattrs->name) { > + ret = -EOPNOTSUPP; > goto out; > + } > > - evm_xattr = lsm_xattr + 1; > + evm_xattr = lsm_xattr; > ret = evm_inode_init_security(inode, new_xattrs, evm_xattr); + ret = evm_inode_init_security(inode, new_xattrs, lsm_xattr); then you don't need evm_xattr at all. > if (ret) > goto out; > @@ -1053,6 +1090,7 @@ int security_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir, > out: > for (xattr = new_xattrs; xattr->value != NULL; xattr++) > kfree(xattr->value); > + kfree(new_xattrs); > return (ret == -EOPNOTSUPP) ? 0 : ret; > } > EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_init_security); > @@ -1071,11 +1109,44 @@ int security_old_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir, > { > struct xattr xattr = { .name = NULL, .value = NULL, .value_len = 0 }; > struct xattr *lsm_xattr = (name && value && len) ? &xattr : NULL; > + struct security_hook_list *P; > + int ret; > > if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode))) > return -EOPNOTSUPP; > - return call_int_hook(inode_init_security, -EOPNOTSUPP, inode, dir, > - qstr, lsm_xattr, NULL); > + > + hlist_for_each_entry(P, &security_hook_heads.inode_init_security, > + list) { > + ret = P->hook.inode_init_security(inode, dir, qstr, lsm_xattr, > + NULL); > + if (ret) { > + if (ret != -EOPNOTSUPP) > + return ret; > + > + continue; > + } > + > + if (!lsm_xattr) > + continue; > + > + /* LSM implementation error. */ > + if (lsm_xattr->name == NULL || lsm_xattr->value == NULL) { > + WARN_ONCE( > + "LSM %s: ret = 0 but xattr name/value = NULL\n", > + P->lsm); > + > + /* Callers should do the cleanup. */ > + return -ENOENT; > + } > + > + *name = lsm_xattr->name; > + *value = lsm_xattr->value; > + *len = lsm_xattr->value_len; > + > + return ret; > + } > + > + return -EOPNOTSUPP; > } > EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_old_inode_init_security); >
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c index 2c1fe1496069..2ab67fa4422e 100644 --- a/security/security.c +++ b/security/security.c @@ -30,8 +30,6 @@ #include <linux/msg.h> #include <net/flow.h> -#define MAX_LSM_EVM_XATTR 2 - /* How many LSMs were built into the kernel? */ #define LSM_COUNT (__end_lsm_info - __start_lsm_info) @@ -1028,9 +1026,10 @@ int security_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir, const struct qstr *qstr, const initxattrs initxattrs, void *fs_data) { - struct xattr new_xattrs[MAX_LSM_EVM_XATTR + 1]; + struct xattr *new_xattrs; struct xattr *lsm_xattr, *evm_xattr, *xattr; - int ret; + struct security_hook_list *P; + int ret, max_new_xattrs = 0; if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode))) return 0; @@ -1038,14 +1037,52 @@ int security_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir, if (!initxattrs) return call_int_hook(inode_init_security, -EOPNOTSUPP, inode, dir, qstr, NULL, fs_data); - memset(new_xattrs, 0, sizeof(new_xattrs)); + + /* Determine at run-time the max number of xattr structs to allocate. */ + hlist_for_each_entry(P, &security_hook_heads.inode_init_security, list) + max_new_xattrs++; + + if (!max_new_xattrs) + return 0; + + /* Allocate +1 for EVM and +1 as terminator. */ + new_xattrs = kcalloc(max_new_xattrs + 2, sizeof(*new_xattrs), GFP_NOFS); + if (!new_xattrs) + return -ENOMEM; + lsm_xattr = new_xattrs; - ret = call_int_hook(inode_init_security, -EOPNOTSUPP, inode, dir, qstr, - lsm_xattr, fs_data); - if (ret) + hlist_for_each_entry(P, &security_hook_heads.inode_init_security, + list) { + ret = P->hook.inode_init_security(inode, dir, qstr, new_xattrs, + fs_data); + if (ret) { + if (ret != -EOPNOTSUPP) + goto out; + + continue; + } + + /* LSM implementation error. */ + if (lsm_xattr->name == NULL || lsm_xattr->value == NULL) { + WARN_ONCE( + "LSM %s: ret = 0 but xattr name/value = NULL\n", + P->lsm); + ret = -ENOENT; + goto out; + } + + lsm_xattr++; + + if (!--max_new_xattrs) + break; + } + + if (!new_xattrs->name) { + ret = -EOPNOTSUPP; goto out; + } - evm_xattr = lsm_xattr + 1; + evm_xattr = lsm_xattr; ret = evm_inode_init_security(inode, new_xattrs, evm_xattr); if (ret) goto out; @@ -1053,6 +1090,7 @@ int security_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir, out: for (xattr = new_xattrs; xattr->value != NULL; xattr++) kfree(xattr->value); + kfree(new_xattrs); return (ret == -EOPNOTSUPP) ? 0 : ret; } EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_init_security); @@ -1071,11 +1109,44 @@ int security_old_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir, { struct xattr xattr = { .name = NULL, .value = NULL, .value_len = 0 }; struct xattr *lsm_xattr = (name && value && len) ? &xattr : NULL; + struct security_hook_list *P; + int ret; if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode))) return -EOPNOTSUPP; - return call_int_hook(inode_init_security, -EOPNOTSUPP, inode, dir, - qstr, lsm_xattr, NULL); + + hlist_for_each_entry(P, &security_hook_heads.inode_init_security, + list) { + ret = P->hook.inode_init_security(inode, dir, qstr, lsm_xattr, + NULL); + if (ret) { + if (ret != -EOPNOTSUPP) + return ret; + + continue; + } + + if (!lsm_xattr) + continue; + + /* LSM implementation error. */ + if (lsm_xattr->name == NULL || lsm_xattr->value == NULL) { + WARN_ONCE( + "LSM %s: ret = 0 but xattr name/value = NULL\n", + P->lsm); + + /* Callers should do the cleanup. */ + return -ENOENT; + } + + *name = lsm_xattr->name; + *value = lsm_xattr->value; + *len = lsm_xattr->value_len; + + return ret; + } + + return -EOPNOTSUPP; } EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_old_inode_init_security);
The current implementation of security_inode_init_security() is capable of handling only one LSM providing an xattr to be set at inode creation. That xattr is then passed to EVM to calculate the HMAC. To support multiple LSMs, each providing an xattr, this patch makes the following modifications: security_inode_init_security(): - dynamically allocates new_xattrs, based on the number of inode_init_security hooks registered by LSMs; - replaces the call_int_hook() macro with its definition, to correctly handle the case of an LSM returning -EOPNOTSUPP (the loop should not be stopped). security_old_inode_init_security(): - replaces the call_int_hook() macro with its definition, to stop the loop at the first LSM providing an xattr, to avoid a memory leak (due to overwriting the *value pointer). The modifications necessary for EVM to calculate the HMAC on all xattrs will be done in a separate patch. Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com> --- security/security.c | 93 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------ 1 file changed, 82 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)