diff mbox series

[net-next] net: ipv4: add capability check for net administration

Message ID 20210720014328.378868-1-yang.yang29@zte.com.cn (mailing list archive)
State Accepted
Commit 8292d7f6e8712381a828eac2a19a610ce680c4dd
Delegated to: Netdev Maintainers
Headers show
Series [net-next] net: ipv4: add capability check for net administration | expand

Checks

Context Check Description
netdev/cover_letter success Link
netdev/fixes_present success Link
netdev/patch_count success Link
netdev/tree_selection success Clearly marked for net-next
netdev/subject_prefix success Link
netdev/cc_maintainers success CCed 5 of 5 maintainers
netdev/source_inline success Was 0 now: 0
netdev/verify_signedoff success Link
netdev/module_param success Was 0 now: 0
netdev/build_32bit success Errors and warnings before: 1 this patch: 1
netdev/kdoc success Errors and warnings before: 0 this patch: 0
netdev/verify_fixes success Link
netdev/checkpatch success total: 0 errors, 0 warnings, 0 checks, 18 lines checked
netdev/build_allmodconfig_warn success Errors and warnings before: 1 this patch: 1
netdev/header_inline success Link

Commit Message

CGEL July 20, 2021, 1:43 a.m. UTC 
From: Yang Yang <yang.yang29@zte.com.cn>

Root in init user namespace can modify /proc/sys/net/ipv4/ip_forward
without CAP_NET_ADMIN, this doesn't follow the principle of
capabilities. For example, let's take a look at netdev_store(),
root can't modify netdev attribute without CAP_NET_ADMIN.
So let's keep the consistency of permission check logic.

Reported-by: Zeal Robot <zealci@zte.com.cn>
Signed-off-by: Yang Yang <yang.yang29@zte.com.cn>
---
 net/ipv4/devinet.c | 10 +++++++---
 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

Comments

patchwork-bot+netdevbpf@kernel.org July 20, 2021, 2:20 p.m. UTC | #1 
Hello:

This patch was applied to netdev/net-next.git (refs/heads/master):

On Mon, 19 Jul 2021 18:43:28 -0700 you wrote:
> From: Yang Yang <yang.yang29@zte.com.cn>
> 
> Root in init user namespace can modify /proc/sys/net/ipv4/ip_forward
> without CAP_NET_ADMIN, this doesn't follow the principle of
> capabilities. For example, let's take a look at netdev_store(),
> root can't modify netdev attribute without CAP_NET_ADMIN.
> So let's keep the consistency of permission check logic.
> 
> [...]

Here is the summary with links:
  - [net-next] net: ipv4: add capability check for net administration
    https://git.kernel.org/netdev/net-next/c/8292d7f6e871

You are awesome, thank you!
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diff mbox series

Patch

diff --git a/net/ipv4/devinet.c b/net/ipv4/devinet.c
index 73721a4448bd..6238ab2dd3d1 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/devinet.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/devinet.c
@@ -2424,11 +2424,15 @@  static int devinet_sysctl_forward(struct ctl_table *ctl, int write,
 	int *valp = ctl->data;
 	int val = *valp;
 	loff_t pos = *ppos;
-	int ret = proc_dointvec(ctl, write, buffer, lenp, ppos);
+	struct net *net = ctl->extra2;
+	int ret;
 
-	if (write && *valp != val) {
-		struct net *net = ctl->extra2;
+	if (write && !ns_capable(net->user_ns, CAP_NET_ADMIN))
+		return -EPERM;
+
+	ret = proc_dointvec(ctl, write, buffer, lenp, ppos);
 
+	if (write && *valp != val) {
 		if (valp != &IPV4_DEVCONF_DFLT(net, FORWARDING)) {
 			if (!rtnl_trylock()) {
 				/* Restore the original values before restarting */