[net,2/2] ipv4: make exception cache less predictible

Commit Message

Eric Dumazet Aug. 29, 2021, 10:16 p.m. UTC

From: Eric Dumazet <[e-mail]>

Even after commit 6457378fe796 ("ipv4: use siphash instead of Jenkins in
fnhe_hashfun()"), an attacker can still use brute force to learn
some secrets from a victim linux host.

One way to defeat these attacks is to make the max depth of the hash
table bucket a random value.

Before this patch, each bucket of the hash table used to store exceptions
could contain 6 items under attack.

After the patch, each bucket would contains a random number of items,
between 6 and 10. The attacker can no longer infer secrets.

This is slightly increasing memory size used by the hash table,
by 50% in average, we do not expect this to be a problem.

This patch is more complex than the prior one (IPv6 equivalent),
because IPv4 was reusing the oldest entry.
Since we need to be able to evict more than one entry per
update_or_create_fnhe() call, I had to replace
fnhe_oldest() with fnhe_remove_oldest().

Also note that we will queue extra kfree_rcu() calls under stress,
which hopefully wont be a too big issue.

Fixes: 4895c771c7f0 ("ipv4: Add FIB nexthop exceptions.")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[e-mail]>
Reported-by: Keyu Man <[e-mail]>
Cc: Willy Tarreau <[e-mail]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[e-mail]>
---
 net/ipv4/route.c | 44 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------------
 1 file changed, 29 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)

Comments

David Ahern Aug. 30, 2021, 12:40 a.m. UTC | #1

On 8/29/21 3:16 PM, Eric Dumazet wrote:
> From: Eric Dumazet <[e-mail]>
> 
> Even after commit 6457378fe796 ("ipv4: use siphash instead of Jenkins in
> fnhe_hashfun()"), an attacker can still use brute force to learn
> some secrets from a victim linux host.
> 
> One way to defeat these attacks is to make the max depth of the hash
> table bucket a random value.
> 
> Before this patch, each bucket of the hash table used to store exceptions
> could contain 6 items under attack.
> 
> After the patch, each bucket would contains a random number of items,
> between 6 and 10. The attacker can no longer infer secrets.
> 
> This is slightly increasing memory size used by the hash table,
> by 50% in average, we do not expect this to be a problem.
> 
> This patch is more complex than the prior one (IPv6 equivalent),
> because IPv4 was reusing the oldest entry.
> Since we need to be able to evict more than one entry per
> update_or_create_fnhe() call, I had to replace
> fnhe_oldest() with fnhe_remove_oldest().
> 
> Also note that we will queue extra kfree_rcu() calls under stress,
> which hopefully wont be a too big issue.
> 
> Fixes: 4895c771c7f0 ("ipv4: Add FIB nexthop exceptions.")
> Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[e-mail]>
> Reported-by: Keyu Man <[e-mail]>
> Cc: Willy Tarreau <[e-mail]>
> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[e-mail]>
> ---
>  net/ipv4/route.c | 44 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------------
>  1 file changed, 29 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
> 

Reviewed-by: David Ahern <[e-mail]>
Tested-by: David Ahern <[e-mail]>

Patch

diff --git a/net/ipv4/route.c b/net/ipv4/route.c
index a6f20ee3533554b210d27c4ab6637ca7a05b148b..225714b5efc0b9c6bcd2d58a62d4656cdc5a1cde 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/route.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/route.c
@@ -586,18 +586,25 @@  static void fnhe_flush_routes(struct fib_nh_exception *fnhe)
 	}
 }
 
-static struct fib_nh_exception *fnhe_oldest(struct fnhe_hash_bucket *hash)
+static void fnhe_remove_oldest(struct fnhe_hash_bucket *hash)
 {
-	struct fib_nh_exception *fnhe, *oldest;
+	struct fib_nh_exception __rcu **fnhe_p, **oldest_p;
+	struct fib_nh_exception *fnhe, *oldest = NULL;
 
-	oldest = rcu_dereference(hash->chain);
-	for (fnhe = rcu_dereference(oldest->fnhe_next); fnhe;
-	     fnhe = rcu_dereference(fnhe->fnhe_next)) {
-		if (time_before(fnhe->fnhe_stamp, oldest->fnhe_stamp))
+	for (fnhe_p = &hash->chain; ; fnhe_p = &fnhe->fnhe_next) {
+		fnhe = rcu_dereference_protected(*fnhe_p,
+						 lockdep_is_held(&fnhe_lock));
+		if (!fnhe)
+			break;
+		if (!oldest ||
+		    time_before(fnhe->fnhe_stamp, oldest->fnhe_stamp)) {
 			oldest = fnhe;
+			oldest_p = fnhe_p;
+		}
 	}
 	fnhe_flush_routes(oldest);
-	return oldest;
+	*oldest_p = oldest->fnhe_next;
+	kfree_rcu(oldest, rcu);
 }
 
 static u32 fnhe_hashfun(__be32 daddr)
@@ -676,16 +683,21 @@  static void update_or_create_fnhe(struct fib_nh_common *nhc, __be32 daddr,
 		if (rt)
 			fill_route_from_fnhe(rt, fnhe);
 	} else {
-		if (depth > FNHE_RECLAIM_DEPTH)
-			fnhe = fnhe_oldest(hash);
-		else {
-			fnhe = kzalloc(sizeof(*fnhe), GFP_ATOMIC);
-			if (!fnhe)
-				goto out_unlock;
+		/* Randomize max depth to avoid some side channels attacks. */
+		int max_depth = FNHE_RECLAIM_DEPTH +
+				prandom_u32_max(FNHE_RECLAIM_DEPTH);
 
-			fnhe->fnhe_next = hash->chain;
-			rcu_assign_pointer(hash->chain, fnhe);
+		while (depth > max_depth) {
+			fnhe_remove_oldest(hash);
+			depth--;
 		}
+
+		fnhe = kzalloc(sizeof(*fnhe), GFP_ATOMIC);
+		if (!fnhe)
+			goto out_unlock;
+
+		fnhe->fnhe_next = hash->chain;
+
 		fnhe->fnhe_genid = genid;
 		fnhe->fnhe_daddr = daddr;
 		fnhe->fnhe_gw = gw;
@@ -693,6 +705,8 @@  static void update_or_create_fnhe(struct fib_nh_common *nhc, __be32 daddr,
 		fnhe->fnhe_mtu_locked = lock;
 		fnhe->fnhe_expires = max(1UL, expires);
 
+		rcu_assign_pointer(hash->chain, fnhe);
+
 		/* Exception created; mark the cached routes for the nexthop
 		 * stale, so anyone caching it rechecks if this exception
 		 * applies to them.