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[2/7] KEYS: X.509: Parse Basic Constraints for CA

Message ID 20220406015337.4000739-3-eric.snowberg@oracle.com (mailing list archive)
State New
Headers show
Series Add CA enforcement keyring restrictions | expand

Commit Message

Eric Snowberg April 6, 2022, 1:53 a.m. UTC
Parse the X.509 Basic Constraints.  The basic constraints extension
identifies whether the subject of the certificate is a CA.

BasicConstraints ::= SEQUENCE {
        cA                      BOOLEAN DEFAULT FALSE,
        pathLenConstraint       INTEGER (0..MAX) OPTIONAL }

If the CA is true, store it in the x509_certificate.  This will be used
in a follow on patch that requires knowing if the public key is a CA.

Signed-off-by: Eric Snowberg <eric.snowberg@oracle.com>
---
 crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c | 9 +++++++++
 crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_parser.h      | 1 +
 2 files changed, 10 insertions(+)

Comments

Mimi Zohar April 8, 2022, 2:39 p.m. UTC | #1
On Tue, 2022-04-05 at 21:53 -0400, Eric Snowberg wrote:
> Parse the X.509 Basic Constraints.  The basic constraints extension
> identifies whether the subject of the certificate is a CA.
> 
> BasicConstraints ::= SEQUENCE {
>         cA                      BOOLEAN DEFAULT FALSE,
>         pathLenConstraint       INTEGER (0..MAX) OPTIONAL }
> 
> If the CA is true, store it in the x509_certificate.  This will be used
> in a follow on patch that requires knowing if the public key is a CA.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Eric Snowberg <eric.snowberg@oracle.com>
> ---
>  crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c | 9 +++++++++
>  crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_parser.h      | 1 +
>  2 files changed, 10 insertions(+)
> 
> diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c
> index 2899ed80bb18..30f7374ea9c0 100644
> --- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c
> +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c
> @@ -583,6 +583,15 @@ int x509_process_extension(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
>  		return 0;
>  	}
>  
> +	if (ctx->last_oid == OID_basicConstraints) {
> +		if (vlen < 2 || v[0] != (ASN1_CONS_BIT | ASN1_SEQ))
> +			return -EBADMSG;
> +		if (v[1] != vlen - 2)
> +			return -EBADMSG;
> +		if (vlen >= 4 && v[1] != 0 && v[2] == ASN1_BOOL && v[3] == 1)
> +			ctx->cert->is_root_ca = true;
> +	}
> +
>  	return 0;
>  }
>  
> diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_parser.h b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_parser.h
> index 97a886cbe01c..dc45df9f6594 100644
> --- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_parser.h
> +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_parser.h
> @@ -38,6 +38,7 @@ struct x509_certificate {
>  	bool		self_signed;		/* T if self-signed (check unsupported_sig too) */
>  	bool		unsupported_sig;	/* T if signature uses unsupported crypto */
>  	bool		blacklisted;
> +	bool		is_root_ca;		/* T if basic constraints CA is set */

There's no need to prefix variables with "is_".  Similar to the
variable "self_signed" simply name this variable "root_ca".

thanks,

Mimi


>  };
>  
>  /*
Eric Snowberg April 8, 2022, 3:31 p.m. UTC | #2
> On Apr 8, 2022, at 8:39 AM, Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> wrote:
> 
> On Tue, 2022-04-05 at 21:53 -0400, Eric Snowberg wrote:
>> Parse the X.509 Basic Constraints.  The basic constraints extension
>> identifies whether the subject of the certificate is a CA.
>> 
>> BasicConstraints ::= SEQUENCE {
>>        cA                      BOOLEAN DEFAULT FALSE,
>>        pathLenConstraint       INTEGER (0..MAX) OPTIONAL }
>> 
>> If the CA is true, store it in the x509_certificate.  This will be used
>> in a follow on patch that requires knowing if the public key is a CA.
>> 
>> Signed-off-by: Eric Snowberg <eric.snowberg@oracle.com>
>> ---
>> crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c | 9 +++++++++
>> crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_parser.h      | 1 +
>> 2 files changed, 10 insertions(+)
>> 
>> diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c
>> index 2899ed80bb18..30f7374ea9c0 100644
>> --- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c
>> +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c
>> @@ -583,6 +583,15 @@ int x509_process_extension(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
>> 		return 0;
>> 	}
>> 
>> +	if (ctx->last_oid == OID_basicConstraints) {
>> +		if (vlen < 2 || v[0] != (ASN1_CONS_BIT | ASN1_SEQ))
>> +			return -EBADMSG;
>> +		if (v[1] != vlen - 2)
>> +			return -EBADMSG;
>> +		if (vlen >= 4 && v[1] != 0 && v[2] == ASN1_BOOL && v[3] == 1)
>> +			ctx->cert->is_root_ca = true;
>> +	}
>> +
>> 	return 0;
>> }
>> 
>> diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_parser.h b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_parser.h
>> index 97a886cbe01c..dc45df9f6594 100644
>> --- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_parser.h
>> +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_parser.h
>> @@ -38,6 +38,7 @@ struct x509_certificate {
>> 	bool		self_signed;		/* T if self-signed (check unsupported_sig too) */
>> 	bool		unsupported_sig;	/* T if signature uses unsupported crypto */
>> 	bool		blacklisted;
>> +	bool		is_root_ca;		/* T if basic constraints CA is set */
> 
> There's no need to prefix variables with "is_".  Similar to the
> variable "self_signed" simply name this variable "root_ca".

I’ll change this name (and also the one you identified in the 3rd patch) in the next
round, thanks.
diff mbox series

Patch

diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c
index 2899ed80bb18..30f7374ea9c0 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c
@@ -583,6 +583,15 @@  int x509_process_extension(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
 		return 0;
 	}
 
+	if (ctx->last_oid == OID_basicConstraints) {
+		if (vlen < 2 || v[0] != (ASN1_CONS_BIT | ASN1_SEQ))
+			return -EBADMSG;
+		if (v[1] != vlen - 2)
+			return -EBADMSG;
+		if (vlen >= 4 && v[1] != 0 && v[2] == ASN1_BOOL && v[3] == 1)
+			ctx->cert->is_root_ca = true;
+	}
+
 	return 0;
 }
 
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_parser.h b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_parser.h
index 97a886cbe01c..dc45df9f6594 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_parser.h
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_parser.h
@@ -38,6 +38,7 @@  struct x509_certificate {
 	bool		self_signed;		/* T if self-signed (check unsupported_sig too) */
 	bool		unsupported_sig;	/* T if signature uses unsupported crypto */
 	bool		blacklisted;
+	bool		is_root_ca;		/* T if basic constraints CA is set */
 };
 
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