| Message ID | 20220310140911.50924-2-chao.p.peng@linux.intel.com (mailing list archive) |
|---|---|
| State | New, archived |
| Headers | show |
| Series | KVM: mm: fd-based approach for supporting KVM guest private memory | expand |
On Thu, Mar 10, 2022 at 10:08:59PM +0800, Chao Peng wrote: > From: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> > > Introduce a new memfd_create() flag indicating the content of the > created memfd is inaccessible from userspace through ordinary MMU > access (e.g., read/write/mmap). However, the file content can be > accessed via a different mechanism (e.g. KVM MMU) indirectly. > > It provides semantics required for KVM guest private memory support > that a file descriptor with this flag set is going to be used as the > source of guest memory in confidential computing environments such > as Intel TDX/AMD SEV but may not be accessible from host userspace. > > Since page migration/swapping is not yet supported for such usages > so these pages are currently marked as UNMOVABLE and UNEVICTABLE > which makes them behave like long-term pinned pages. > > The flag can not coexist with MFD_ALLOW_SEALING, future sealing is > also impossible for a memfd created with this flag. > > At this time only shmem implements this flag. > > Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> > Signed-off-by: Chao Peng <chao.p.peng@linux.intel.com> > --- > include/linux/shmem_fs.h | 7 +++++ > include/uapi/linux/memfd.h | 1 + > mm/memfd.c | 26 +++++++++++++++-- > mm/shmem.c | 57 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ > 4 files changed, 88 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) > > diff --git a/include/linux/shmem_fs.h b/include/linux/shmem_fs.h > index e65b80ed09e7..2dde843f28ef 100644 > --- a/include/linux/shmem_fs.h > +++ b/include/linux/shmem_fs.h > @@ -12,6 +12,9 @@ > > /* inode in-kernel data */ > > +/* shmem extended flags */ > +#define SHM_F_INACCESSIBLE 0x0001 /* prevent ordinary MMU access (e.g. read/write/mmap) to file content */ > + > struct shmem_inode_info { > spinlock_t lock; > unsigned int seals; /* shmem seals */ > @@ -24,6 +27,7 @@ struct shmem_inode_info { > struct shared_policy policy; /* NUMA memory alloc policy */ > struct simple_xattrs xattrs; /* list of xattrs */ > atomic_t stop_eviction; /* hold when working on inode */ > + unsigned int xflags; /* shmem extended flags */ > struct inode vfs_inode; > }; > AFAICS, only two bits of 'flags' are used. And that's very strange that VM_ flags are used for the purpose. My guess that someone was lazy to introduce new constants for this. I think we should fix this: introduce SHM_F_LOCKED and SHM_F_NORESERVE alongside with SHM_F_INACCESSIBLE and stuff them all into info->flags. It also makes shmem_file_setup_xflags() go away.
On Mon, Apr 11, 2022 at 06:10:23PM +0300, Kirill A. Shutemov wrote: > On Thu, Mar 10, 2022 at 10:08:59PM +0800, Chao Peng wrote: > > From: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> > > > > Introduce a new memfd_create() flag indicating the content of the > > created memfd is inaccessible from userspace through ordinary MMU > > access (e.g., read/write/mmap). However, the file content can be > > accessed via a different mechanism (e.g. KVM MMU) indirectly. > > > > It provides semantics required for KVM guest private memory support > > that a file descriptor with this flag set is going to be used as the > > source of guest memory in confidential computing environments such > > as Intel TDX/AMD SEV but may not be accessible from host userspace. > > > > Since page migration/swapping is not yet supported for such usages > > so these pages are currently marked as UNMOVABLE and UNEVICTABLE > > which makes them behave like long-term pinned pages. > > > > The flag can not coexist with MFD_ALLOW_SEALING, future sealing is > > also impossible for a memfd created with this flag. > > > > At this time only shmem implements this flag. > > > > Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> > > Signed-off-by: Chao Peng <chao.p.peng@linux.intel.com> > > --- > > include/linux/shmem_fs.h | 7 +++++ > > include/uapi/linux/memfd.h | 1 + > > mm/memfd.c | 26 +++++++++++++++-- > > mm/shmem.c | 57 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ > > 4 files changed, 88 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) > > > > diff --git a/include/linux/shmem_fs.h b/include/linux/shmem_fs.h > > index e65b80ed09e7..2dde843f28ef 100644 > > --- a/include/linux/shmem_fs.h > > +++ b/include/linux/shmem_fs.h > > @@ -12,6 +12,9 @@ > > > > /* inode in-kernel data */ > > > > +/* shmem extended flags */ > > +#define SHM_F_INACCESSIBLE 0x0001 /* prevent ordinary MMU access (e.g. read/write/mmap) to file content */ > > + > > struct shmem_inode_info { > > spinlock_t lock; > > unsigned int seals; /* shmem seals */ > > @@ -24,6 +27,7 @@ struct shmem_inode_info { > > struct shared_policy policy; /* NUMA memory alloc policy */ > > struct simple_xattrs xattrs; /* list of xattrs */ > > atomic_t stop_eviction; /* hold when working on inode */ > > + unsigned int xflags; /* shmem extended flags */ > > struct inode vfs_inode; > > }; > > > > AFAICS, only two bits of 'flags' are used. And that's very strange that > VM_ flags are used for the purpose. My guess that someone was lazy to > introduce new constants for this. > > I think we should fix this: introduce SHM_F_LOCKED and SHM_F_NORESERVE > alongside with SHM_F_INACCESSIBLE and stuff them all into info->flags. > It also makes shmem_file_setup_xflags() go away. Did a quick search and sounds we only use SHM_F_LOCKED/SHM_F_NORESERVE and that definitely don't have to be VM_ flags. Chao > > -- > Kirill A. Shutemov
On Thu, Mar 10, 2022 at 6:09 AM Chao Peng <chao.p.peng@linux.intel.com> wrote: > > From: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> > > Introduce a new memfd_create() flag indicating the content of the > created memfd is inaccessible from userspace through ordinary MMU > access (e.g., read/write/mmap). However, the file content can be > accessed via a different mechanism (e.g. KVM MMU) indirectly. > > It provides semantics required for KVM guest private memory support > that a file descriptor with this flag set is going to be used as the > source of guest memory in confidential computing environments such > as Intel TDX/AMD SEV but may not be accessible from host userspace. > > Since page migration/swapping is not yet supported for such usages > so these pages are currently marked as UNMOVABLE and UNEVICTABLE > which makes them behave like long-term pinned pages. > > The flag can not coexist with MFD_ALLOW_SEALING, future sealing is > also impossible for a memfd created with this flag. > > At this time only shmem implements this flag. > > Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> > Signed-off-by: Chao Peng <chao.p.peng@linux.intel.com> > --- > include/linux/shmem_fs.h | 7 +++++ > include/uapi/linux/memfd.h | 1 + > mm/memfd.c | 26 +++++++++++++++-- > mm/shmem.c | 57 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ > 4 files changed, 88 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) > > diff --git a/include/linux/shmem_fs.h b/include/linux/shmem_fs.h > index e65b80ed09e7..2dde843f28ef 100644 > --- a/include/linux/shmem_fs.h > +++ b/include/linux/shmem_fs.h > @@ -12,6 +12,9 @@ > > /* inode in-kernel data */ > > +/* shmem extended flags */ > +#define SHM_F_INACCESSIBLE 0x0001 /* prevent ordinary MMU access (e.g. read/write/mmap) to file content */ > + > struct shmem_inode_info { > spinlock_t lock; > unsigned int seals; /* shmem seals */ > @@ -24,6 +27,7 @@ struct shmem_inode_info { > struct shared_policy policy; /* NUMA memory alloc policy */ > struct simple_xattrs xattrs; /* list of xattrs */ > atomic_t stop_eviction; /* hold when working on inode */ > + unsigned int xflags; /* shmem extended flags */ > struct inode vfs_inode; > }; > > @@ -61,6 +65,9 @@ extern struct file *shmem_file_setup(const char *name, > loff_t size, unsigned long flags); > extern struct file *shmem_kernel_file_setup(const char *name, loff_t size, > unsigned long flags); > +extern struct file *shmem_file_setup_xflags(const char *name, loff_t size, > + unsigned long flags, > + unsigned int xflags); > extern struct file *shmem_file_setup_with_mnt(struct vfsmount *mnt, > const char *name, loff_t size, unsigned long flags); > extern int shmem_zero_setup(struct vm_area_struct *); > diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/memfd.h b/include/uapi/linux/memfd.h > index 7a8a26751c23..48750474b904 100644 > --- a/include/uapi/linux/memfd.h > +++ b/include/uapi/linux/memfd.h > @@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ > #define MFD_CLOEXEC 0x0001U > #define MFD_ALLOW_SEALING 0x0002U > #define MFD_HUGETLB 0x0004U > +#define MFD_INACCESSIBLE 0x0008U > > /* > * Huge page size encoding when MFD_HUGETLB is specified, and a huge page > diff --git a/mm/memfd.c b/mm/memfd.c > index 9f80f162791a..74d45a26cf5d 100644 > --- a/mm/memfd.c > +++ b/mm/memfd.c > @@ -245,16 +245,20 @@ long memfd_fcntl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg) > #define MFD_NAME_PREFIX_LEN (sizeof(MFD_NAME_PREFIX) - 1) > #define MFD_NAME_MAX_LEN (NAME_MAX - MFD_NAME_PREFIX_LEN) > > -#define MFD_ALL_FLAGS (MFD_CLOEXEC | MFD_ALLOW_SEALING | MFD_HUGETLB) > +#define MFD_ALL_FLAGS (MFD_CLOEXEC | MFD_ALLOW_SEALING | MFD_HUGETLB | \ > + MFD_INACCESSIBLE) > > SYSCALL_DEFINE2(memfd_create, > const char __user *, uname, > unsigned int, flags) > { > + struct address_space *mapping; > unsigned int *file_seals; > + unsigned int xflags; > struct file *file; > int fd, error; > char *name; > + gfp_t gfp; > long len; > > if (!(flags & MFD_HUGETLB)) { > @@ -267,6 +271,10 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE2(memfd_create, > return -EINVAL; > } > > + /* Disallow sealing when MFD_INACCESSIBLE is set. */ > + if (flags & MFD_INACCESSIBLE && flags & MFD_ALLOW_SEALING) > + return -EINVAL; > + > /* length includes terminating zero */ > len = strnlen_user(uname, MFD_NAME_MAX_LEN + 1); > if (len <= 0) > @@ -301,8 +309,11 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE2(memfd_create, > HUGETLB_ANONHUGE_INODE, > (flags >> MFD_HUGE_SHIFT) & > MFD_HUGE_MASK); Should hugetlbfs also be modified to be a backing store for private memory like shmem when hugepages are to be used? As of now, this series doesn't seem to support using private memfds with backing hugepages. > - } else > - file = shmem_file_setup(name, 0, VM_NORESERVE); > + } else { > + xflags = flags & MFD_INACCESSIBLE ? SHM_F_INACCESSIBLE : 0; > + file = shmem_file_setup_xflags(name, 0, VM_NORESERVE, xflags); > + } > + > if (IS_ERR(file)) { > error = PTR_ERR(file); > goto err_fd; > @@ -313,6 +324,15 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE2(memfd_create, > if (flags & MFD_ALLOW_SEALING) { > file_seals = memfd_file_seals_ptr(file); > *file_seals &= ~F_SEAL_SEAL; > + } else if (flags & MFD_INACCESSIBLE) { > + mapping = file_inode(file)->i_mapping; > + gfp = mapping_gfp_mask(mapping); > + gfp &= ~__GFP_MOVABLE; > + mapping_set_gfp_mask(mapping, gfp); > + mapping_set_unevictable(mapping); > + > + file_seals = memfd_file_seals_ptr(file); > + *file_seals = F_SEAL_SEAL; > } > > fd_install(fd, file); > diff --git a/mm/shmem.c b/mm/shmem.c > index a09b29ec2b45..9b31a7056009 100644 > --- a/mm/shmem.c > +++ b/mm/shmem.c > @@ -1084,6 +1084,13 @@ static int shmem_setattr(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, > (newsize > oldsize && (info->seals & F_SEAL_GROW))) > return -EPERM; > > + if (info->xflags & SHM_F_INACCESSIBLE) { > + if(oldsize) > + return -EPERM; > + if (!PAGE_ALIGNED(newsize)) > + return -EINVAL; > + } > + > if (newsize != oldsize) { > error = shmem_reacct_size(SHMEM_I(inode)->flags, > oldsize, newsize); > @@ -1331,6 +1338,8 @@ static int shmem_writepage(struct page *page, struct writeback_control *wbc) > goto redirty; > if (!total_swap_pages) > goto redirty; > + if (info->xflags & SHM_F_INACCESSIBLE) > + goto redirty; > > /* > * Our capabilities prevent regular writeback or sync from ever calling > @@ -2228,6 +2237,9 @@ static int shmem_mmap(struct file *file, struct vm_area_struct *vma) > if (ret) > return ret; > > + if (info->xflags & SHM_F_INACCESSIBLE) > + return -EPERM; > + > /* arm64 - allow memory tagging on RAM-based files */ > vma->vm_flags |= VM_MTE_ALLOWED; > > @@ -2433,6 +2445,8 @@ shmem_write_begin(struct file *file, struct address_space *mapping, > if ((info->seals & F_SEAL_GROW) && pos + len > inode->i_size) > return -EPERM; > } > + if (unlikely(info->xflags & SHM_F_INACCESSIBLE)) > + return -EPERM; > > ret = shmem_getpage(inode, index, pagep, SGP_WRITE); > > @@ -2517,6 +2531,21 @@ static ssize_t shmem_file_read_iter(struct kiocb *iocb, struct iov_iter *to) > end_index = i_size >> PAGE_SHIFT; > if (index > end_index) > break; > + > + /* > + * inode_lock protects setting up seals as well as write to > + * i_size. Setting SHM_F_INACCESSIBLE only allowed with > + * i_size == 0. > + * > + * Check SHM_F_INACCESSIBLE after i_size. It effectively > + * serialize read vs. setting SHM_F_INACCESSIBLE without > + * taking inode_lock in read path. > + */ > + if (SHMEM_I(inode)->xflags & SHM_F_INACCESSIBLE) { > + error = -EPERM; > + break; > + } > + > if (index == end_index) { > nr = i_size & ~PAGE_MASK; > if (nr <= offset) > @@ -2648,6 +2677,12 @@ static long shmem_fallocate(struct file *file, int mode, loff_t offset, > goto out; > } > > + if ((info->xflags & SHM_F_INACCESSIBLE) && > + (!PAGE_ALIGNED(offset) || !PAGE_ALIGNED(len))) { > + error = -EINVAL; > + goto out; > + } > + > shmem_falloc.waitq = &shmem_falloc_waitq; > shmem_falloc.start = (u64)unmap_start >> PAGE_SHIFT; > shmem_falloc.next = (unmap_end + 1) >> PAGE_SHIFT; > @@ -4082,6 +4117,28 @@ struct file *shmem_kernel_file_setup(const char *name, loff_t size, unsigned lon > return __shmem_file_setup(shm_mnt, name, size, flags, S_PRIVATE); > } > > +/** > + * shmem_file_setup_xflags - get an unlinked file living in tmpfs with > + * additional xflags. > + * @name: name for dentry (to be seen in /proc/<pid>/maps > + * @size: size to be set for the file > + * @flags: VM_NORESERVE suppresses pre-accounting of the entire object size > + * @xflags: SHM_F_INACCESSIBLE prevents ordinary MMU access to the file content > + */ > + > +struct file *shmem_file_setup_xflags(const char *name, loff_t size, > + unsigned long flags, unsigned int xflags) > +{ > + struct shmem_inode_info *info; > + struct file *res = __shmem_file_setup(shm_mnt, name, size, flags, 0); > + > + if(!IS_ERR(res)) { > + info = SHMEM_I(file_inode(res)); > + info->xflags = xflags & SHM_F_INACCESSIBLE; > + } > + return res; > +} > + > /** > * shmem_file_setup - get an unlinked file living in tmpfs > * @name: name for dentry (to be seen in /proc/<pid>/maps > -- > 2.17.1 >
On Fri, Apr 22, 2022 at 10:43:50PM -0700, Vishal Annapurve wrote: > On Thu, Mar 10, 2022 at 6:09 AM Chao Peng <chao.p.peng@linux.intel.com> wrote: > > > > From: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> > > > > Introduce a new memfd_create() flag indicating the content of the > > created memfd is inaccessible from userspace through ordinary MMU > > access (e.g., read/write/mmap). However, the file content can be > > accessed via a different mechanism (e.g. KVM MMU) indirectly. > > > > It provides semantics required for KVM guest private memory support > > that a file descriptor with this flag set is going to be used as the > > source of guest memory in confidential computing environments such > > as Intel TDX/AMD SEV but may not be accessible from host userspace. > > > > Since page migration/swapping is not yet supported for such usages > > so these pages are currently marked as UNMOVABLE and UNEVICTABLE > > which makes them behave like long-term pinned pages. > > > > The flag can not coexist with MFD_ALLOW_SEALING, future sealing is > > also impossible for a memfd created with this flag. > > > > At this time only shmem implements this flag. > > > > Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> > > Signed-off-by: Chao Peng <chao.p.peng@linux.intel.com> > > --- > > include/linux/shmem_fs.h | 7 +++++ > > include/uapi/linux/memfd.h | 1 + > > mm/memfd.c | 26 +++++++++++++++-- > > mm/shmem.c | 57 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ > > 4 files changed, 88 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) > > > > diff --git a/include/linux/shmem_fs.h b/include/linux/shmem_fs.h > > index e65b80ed09e7..2dde843f28ef 100644 > > --- a/include/linux/shmem_fs.h > > +++ b/include/linux/shmem_fs.h > > @@ -12,6 +12,9 @@ > > > > /* inode in-kernel data */ > > > > +/* shmem extended flags */ > > +#define SHM_F_INACCESSIBLE 0x0001 /* prevent ordinary MMU access (e.g. read/write/mmap) to file content */ > > + > > struct shmem_inode_info { > > spinlock_t lock; > > unsigned int seals; /* shmem seals */ > > @@ -24,6 +27,7 @@ struct shmem_inode_info { > > struct shared_policy policy; /* NUMA memory alloc policy */ > > struct simple_xattrs xattrs; /* list of xattrs */ > > atomic_t stop_eviction; /* hold when working on inode */ > > + unsigned int xflags; /* shmem extended flags */ > > struct inode vfs_inode; > > }; > > > > @@ -61,6 +65,9 @@ extern struct file *shmem_file_setup(const char *name, > > loff_t size, unsigned long flags); > > extern struct file *shmem_kernel_file_setup(const char *name, loff_t size, > > unsigned long flags); > > +extern struct file *shmem_file_setup_xflags(const char *name, loff_t size, > > + unsigned long flags, > > + unsigned int xflags); > > extern struct file *shmem_file_setup_with_mnt(struct vfsmount *mnt, > > const char *name, loff_t size, unsigned long flags); > > extern int shmem_zero_setup(struct vm_area_struct *); > > diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/memfd.h b/include/uapi/linux/memfd.h > > index 7a8a26751c23..48750474b904 100644 > > --- a/include/uapi/linux/memfd.h > > +++ b/include/uapi/linux/memfd.h > > @@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ > > #define MFD_CLOEXEC 0x0001U > > #define MFD_ALLOW_SEALING 0x0002U > > #define MFD_HUGETLB 0x0004U > > +#define MFD_INACCESSIBLE 0x0008U > > > > /* > > * Huge page size encoding when MFD_HUGETLB is specified, and a huge page > > diff --git a/mm/memfd.c b/mm/memfd.c > > index 9f80f162791a..74d45a26cf5d 100644 > > --- a/mm/memfd.c > > +++ b/mm/memfd.c > > @@ -245,16 +245,20 @@ long memfd_fcntl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg) > > #define MFD_NAME_PREFIX_LEN (sizeof(MFD_NAME_PREFIX) - 1) > > #define MFD_NAME_MAX_LEN (NAME_MAX - MFD_NAME_PREFIX_LEN) > > > > -#define MFD_ALL_FLAGS (MFD_CLOEXEC | MFD_ALLOW_SEALING | MFD_HUGETLB) > > +#define MFD_ALL_FLAGS (MFD_CLOEXEC | MFD_ALLOW_SEALING | MFD_HUGETLB | \ > > + MFD_INACCESSIBLE) > > > > SYSCALL_DEFINE2(memfd_create, > > const char __user *, uname, > > unsigned int, flags) > > { > > + struct address_space *mapping; > > unsigned int *file_seals; > > + unsigned int xflags; > > struct file *file; > > int fd, error; > > char *name; > > + gfp_t gfp; > > long len; > > > > if (!(flags & MFD_HUGETLB)) { > > @@ -267,6 +271,10 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE2(memfd_create, > > return -EINVAL; > > } > > > > + /* Disallow sealing when MFD_INACCESSIBLE is set. */ > > + if (flags & MFD_INACCESSIBLE && flags & MFD_ALLOW_SEALING) > > + return -EINVAL; > > + > > /* length includes terminating zero */ > > len = strnlen_user(uname, MFD_NAME_MAX_LEN + 1); > > if (len <= 0) > > @@ -301,8 +309,11 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE2(memfd_create, > > HUGETLB_ANONHUGE_INODE, > > (flags >> MFD_HUGE_SHIFT) & > > MFD_HUGE_MASK); > > Should hugetlbfs also be modified to be a backing store for private > memory like shmem when hugepages are to be used? > As of now, this series doesn't seem to support using private memfds > with backing hugepages. > Right, as the first step tmpfs is the first backing store supported, hugetlbfs would be potentially the second one to support once the user semantics and kAPIs exposed to KVM are well understood. Thanks, Chao
diff --git a/include/linux/shmem_fs.h b/include/linux/shmem_fs.h index e65b80ed09e7..2dde843f28ef 100644 --- a/include/linux/shmem_fs.h +++ b/include/linux/shmem_fs.h @@ -12,6 +12,9 @@ /* inode in-kernel data */ +/* shmem extended flags */ +#define SHM_F_INACCESSIBLE 0x0001 /* prevent ordinary MMU access (e.g. read/write/mmap) to file content */ + struct shmem_inode_info { spinlock_t lock; unsigned int seals; /* shmem seals */ @@ -24,6 +27,7 @@ struct shmem_inode_info { struct shared_policy policy; /* NUMA memory alloc policy */ struct simple_xattrs xattrs; /* list of xattrs */ atomic_t stop_eviction; /* hold when working on inode */ + unsigned int xflags; /* shmem extended flags */ struct inode vfs_inode; }; @@ -61,6 +65,9 @@ extern struct file *shmem_file_setup(const char *name, loff_t size, unsigned long flags); extern struct file *shmem_kernel_file_setup(const char *name, loff_t size, unsigned long flags); +extern struct file *shmem_file_setup_xflags(const char *name, loff_t size, + unsigned long flags, + unsigned int xflags); extern struct file *shmem_file_setup_with_mnt(struct vfsmount *mnt, const char *name, loff_t size, unsigned long flags); extern int shmem_zero_setup(struct vm_area_struct *); diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/memfd.h b/include/uapi/linux/memfd.h index 7a8a26751c23..48750474b904 100644 --- a/include/uapi/linux/memfd.h +++ b/include/uapi/linux/memfd.h @@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ #define MFD_CLOEXEC 0x0001U #define MFD_ALLOW_SEALING 0x0002U #define MFD_HUGETLB 0x0004U +#define MFD_INACCESSIBLE 0x0008U /* * Huge page size encoding when MFD_HUGETLB is specified, and a huge page diff --git a/mm/memfd.c b/mm/memfd.c index 9f80f162791a..74d45a26cf5d 100644 --- a/mm/memfd.c +++ b/mm/memfd.c @@ -245,16 +245,20 @@ long memfd_fcntl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg) #define MFD_NAME_PREFIX_LEN (sizeof(MFD_NAME_PREFIX) - 1) #define MFD_NAME_MAX_LEN (NAME_MAX - MFD_NAME_PREFIX_LEN) -#define MFD_ALL_FLAGS (MFD_CLOEXEC | MFD_ALLOW_SEALING | MFD_HUGETLB) +#define MFD_ALL_FLAGS (MFD_CLOEXEC | MFD_ALLOW_SEALING | MFD_HUGETLB | \ + MFD_INACCESSIBLE) SYSCALL_DEFINE2(memfd_create, const char __user *, uname, unsigned int, flags) { + struct address_space *mapping; unsigned int *file_seals; + unsigned int xflags; struct file *file; int fd, error; char *name; + gfp_t gfp; long len; if (!(flags & MFD_HUGETLB)) { @@ -267,6 +271,10 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE2(memfd_create, return -EINVAL; } + /* Disallow sealing when MFD_INACCESSIBLE is set. */ + if (flags & MFD_INACCESSIBLE && flags & MFD_ALLOW_SEALING) + return -EINVAL; + /* length includes terminating zero */ len = strnlen_user(uname, MFD_NAME_MAX_LEN + 1); if (len <= 0) @@ -301,8 +309,11 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE2(memfd_create, HUGETLB_ANONHUGE_INODE, (flags >> MFD_HUGE_SHIFT) & MFD_HUGE_MASK); - } else - file = shmem_file_setup(name, 0, VM_NORESERVE); + } else { + xflags = flags & MFD_INACCESSIBLE ? SHM_F_INACCESSIBLE : 0; + file = shmem_file_setup_xflags(name, 0, VM_NORESERVE, xflags); + } + if (IS_ERR(file)) { error = PTR_ERR(file); goto err_fd; @@ -313,6 +324,15 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE2(memfd_create, if (flags & MFD_ALLOW_SEALING) { file_seals = memfd_file_seals_ptr(file); *file_seals &= ~F_SEAL_SEAL; + } else if (flags & MFD_INACCESSIBLE) { + mapping = file_inode(file)->i_mapping; + gfp = mapping_gfp_mask(mapping); + gfp &= ~__GFP_MOVABLE; + mapping_set_gfp_mask(mapping, gfp); + mapping_set_unevictable(mapping); + + file_seals = memfd_file_seals_ptr(file); + *file_seals = F_SEAL_SEAL; } fd_install(fd, file); diff --git a/mm/shmem.c b/mm/shmem.c index a09b29ec2b45..9b31a7056009 100644 --- a/mm/shmem.c +++ b/mm/shmem.c @@ -1084,6 +1084,13 @@ static int shmem_setattr(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, (newsize > oldsize && (info->seals & F_SEAL_GROW))) return -EPERM; + if (info->xflags & SHM_F_INACCESSIBLE) { + if(oldsize) + return -EPERM; + if (!PAGE_ALIGNED(newsize)) + return -EINVAL; + } + if (newsize != oldsize) { error = shmem_reacct_size(SHMEM_I(inode)->flags, oldsize, newsize); @@ -1331,6 +1338,8 @@ static int shmem_writepage(struct page *page, struct writeback_control *wbc) goto redirty; if (!total_swap_pages) goto redirty; + if (info->xflags & SHM_F_INACCESSIBLE) + goto redirty; /* * Our capabilities prevent regular writeback or sync from ever calling @@ -2228,6 +2237,9 @@ static int shmem_mmap(struct file *file, struct vm_area_struct *vma) if (ret) return ret; + if (info->xflags & SHM_F_INACCESSIBLE) + return -EPERM; + /* arm64 - allow memory tagging on RAM-based files */ vma->vm_flags |= VM_MTE_ALLOWED; @@ -2433,6 +2445,8 @@ shmem_write_begin(struct file *file, struct address_space *mapping, if ((info->seals & F_SEAL_GROW) && pos + len > inode->i_size) return -EPERM; } + if (unlikely(info->xflags & SHM_F_INACCESSIBLE)) + return -EPERM; ret = shmem_getpage(inode, index, pagep, SGP_WRITE); @@ -2517,6 +2531,21 @@ static ssize_t shmem_file_read_iter(struct kiocb *iocb, struct iov_iter *to) end_index = i_size >> PAGE_SHIFT; if (index > end_index) break; + + /* + * inode_lock protects setting up seals as well as write to + * i_size. Setting SHM_F_INACCESSIBLE only allowed with + * i_size == 0. + * + * Check SHM_F_INACCESSIBLE after i_size. It effectively + * serialize read vs. setting SHM_F_INACCESSIBLE without + * taking inode_lock in read path. + */ + if (SHMEM_I(inode)->xflags & SHM_F_INACCESSIBLE) { + error = -EPERM; + break; + } + if (index == end_index) { nr = i_size & ~PAGE_MASK; if (nr <= offset) @@ -2648,6 +2677,12 @@ static long shmem_fallocate(struct file *file, int mode, loff_t offset, goto out; } + if ((info->xflags & SHM_F_INACCESSIBLE) && + (!PAGE_ALIGNED(offset) || !PAGE_ALIGNED(len))) { + error = -EINVAL; + goto out; + } + shmem_falloc.waitq = &shmem_falloc_waitq; shmem_falloc.start = (u64)unmap_start >> PAGE_SHIFT; shmem_falloc.next = (unmap_end + 1) >> PAGE_SHIFT; @@ -4082,6 +4117,28 @@ struct file *shmem_kernel_file_setup(const char *name, loff_t size, unsigned lon return __shmem_file_setup(shm_mnt, name, size, flags, S_PRIVATE); } +/** + * shmem_file_setup_xflags - get an unlinked file living in tmpfs with + * additional xflags. + * @name: name for dentry (to be seen in /proc/<pid>/maps + * @size: size to be set for the file + * @flags: VM_NORESERVE suppresses pre-accounting of the entire object size + * @xflags: SHM_F_INACCESSIBLE prevents ordinary MMU access to the file content + */ + +struct file *shmem_file_setup_xflags(const char *name, loff_t size, + unsigned long flags, unsigned int xflags) +{ + struct shmem_inode_info *info; + struct file *res = __shmem_file_setup(shm_mnt, name, size, flags, 0); + + if(!IS_ERR(res)) { + info = SHMEM_I(file_inode(res)); + info->xflags = xflags & SHM_F_INACCESSIBLE; + } + return res; +} + /** * shmem_file_setup - get an unlinked file living in tmpfs * @name: name for dentry (to be seen in /proc/<pid>/maps