Message ID | 20220413213917.711770-1-keescook@chromium.org (mailing list archive) |
---|---|
State | Superseded |
Headers | show |
Series | lkdtm: Add CFI_BACKWARD to test ROP mitigations | expand |
Hi, Kees, Thanks for the rewrite. I tested this patch, and it works fine for me except for a few minor comments below :) On 4/13/22 14:39, Kees Cook wrote: > +/* The ultimate ROP gadget. */ > +static noinline __no_ret_protection > +void set_return_addr_unchecked(unsigned long *expected, unsigned long *addr) > +{ > + /* Use of volatile is to make sure final write isn't seen as a dead store. */ > + unsigned long * volatile *ret_addr = (unsigned long **)__builtin_frame_address(0) + 1; > + > + /* Make sure we've found the right place on the stack before writing it. */ > + if(*ret_addr == expected) > + *ret_addr = (addr); > + else > + /* Check architecture, stack layout, or compiler behavior... */ > + pr_warn("Eek: return address mismatch! %px != %px\n", > + *ret_addr, addr); > +} > + > +static noinline > +void set_return_addr(unsigned long *expected, unsigned long *addr) > +{ > + /* Use of volatile is to make sure final write isn't seen as a dead store. */ > + unsigned long * volatile *ret_addr = (unsigned long **)__builtin_frame_address(0) + 1; > + > + /* Make sure we've found the right place on the stack before writing it. */ > + if(*ret_addr == expected) > + *ret_addr = (addr); When PAC is enabled, I get a mismatch as follows: /kselftest_install/lkdtm # ./CFI_BACKWARD.sh [ 182.120133] lkdtm: Performing direct entry CFI_BACKWARD [ 182.120665] lkdtm: Attempting unchecked stack return address redirection ... [ 182.122543] lkdtm: ok: redirected stack return address. [ 182.123521] lkdtm: Attempting checked stack return address redirection ... [ 182.123964] lkdtm: Eek: return address mismatch! bfff800008fa8014 != ffff800008fa8030 [ 182.124502] lkdtm: ok: control flow unchanged. CFI_BACKWARD: saw 'call trace:|ok: control flow unchanged': ok We may need to ignore the pac high bits of return address according to TCR.T1SZ (or simply remove the high 16 bits before comparing). > + else > + /* Check architecture, stack layout, or compiler behavior... */ > + pr_warn("Eek: return address mismatch! %px != %px\n", > + *ret_addr, addr); According to the context, it might be "expected" here? pr_warn("Eek: return address mismatch! %px != %px\n", *ret_addr, expected); I simply ignored the upper 16 bits, and tested it separately in gcc/llvm 12 with SCS/PAC and all the four cases worked fine for me. Thanks, Dan.
On Thu, Apr 14, 2022 at 03:19:02AM -0700, Dan Li wrote: > Hi, Kees, > Thanks for the rewrite. I tested this patch, and it works fine for > me except for a few minor comments below :) > > On 4/13/22 14:39, Kees Cook wrote: > > +/* The ultimate ROP gadget. */ > > +static noinline __no_ret_protection > > +void set_return_addr_unchecked(unsigned long *expected, unsigned long *addr) > > +{ > > + /* Use of volatile is to make sure final write isn't seen as a dead store. */ > > + unsigned long * volatile *ret_addr = (unsigned long **)__builtin_frame_address(0) + 1; > > + > > + /* Make sure we've found the right place on the stack before writing it. */ > > + if(*ret_addr == expected) > > + *ret_addr = (addr); > > + else > > + /* Check architecture, stack layout, or compiler behavior... */ > > + pr_warn("Eek: return address mismatch! %px != %px\n", > > + *ret_addr, addr); > > +} > > + > > +static noinline > > +void set_return_addr(unsigned long *expected, unsigned long *addr) > > +{ > > + /* Use of volatile is to make sure final write isn't seen as a dead store. */ > > + unsigned long * volatile *ret_addr = (unsigned long **)__builtin_frame_address(0) + 1; > > + > > + /* Make sure we've found the right place on the stack before writing it. */ > > + if(*ret_addr == expected) > > + *ret_addr = (addr); > > When PAC is enabled, I get a mismatch as follows: > > /kselftest_install/lkdtm # ./CFI_BACKWARD.sh > [ 182.120133] lkdtm: Performing direct entry CFI_BACKWARD > [ 182.120665] lkdtm: Attempting unchecked stack return address redirection ... > [ 182.122543] lkdtm: ok: redirected stack return address. > [ 182.123521] lkdtm: Attempting checked stack return address redirection ... > [ 182.123964] lkdtm: Eek: return address mismatch! bfff800008fa8014 != ffff800008fa8030 > [ 182.124502] lkdtm: ok: control flow unchanged. > CFI_BACKWARD: saw 'call trace:|ok: control flow unchanged': ok > > We may need to ignore the pac high bits of return address according > to TCR.T1SZ (or simply remove the high 16 bits before comparing). Oh! Hah, yes, I totally forgot that. Thanks for testing -- getting PAC emulation working in QEMU has eluded me. I think untagged_addr() will work yes? i.e.: if((untagged_addr(*ret_addr) == expected) > > > + else > > + /* Check architecture, stack layout, or compiler behavior... */ > > + pr_warn("Eek: return address mismatch! %px != %px\n", > > + *ret_addr, addr); > > According to the context, it might be "expected" here? > > pr_warn("Eek: return address mismatch! %px != %px\n", > *ret_addr, expected); > > I simply ignored the upper 16 bits, and tested it separately > in gcc/llvm 12 with SCS/PAC and all the four cases worked fine for me. Great! Do you have the PAC "Oops" text handy so I can include it in the commit log as an example of what should be expected? Thanks!
On 4/14/22 10:22, Kees Cook wrote: > On Thu, Apr 14, 2022 at 03:19:02AM -0700, Dan Li wrote: >> Hi, Kees, >> Thanks for the rewrite. I tested this patch, and it works fine for >> me except for a few minor comments below :) >> We may need to ignore the pac high bits of return address according >> to TCR.T1SZ (or simply remove the high 16 bits before comparing). > > Oh! Hah, yes, I totally forgot that. Thanks for testing -- getting PAC > emulation working in QEMU has eluded me. I think untagged_addr() will > work yes? i.e.: > > if((untagged_addr(*ret_addr) == expected) > untagged_addr might not clear enough bits, the following code works fine for me: +#define no_pac_addr(addr) \ + ((__force __typeof__(addr))((__force u64)(addr) | PAGE_OFFSET)) - if(*ret_addr == expected) + if(no_pac_addr(*ret_addr) == expected) *ret_addr = (addr); I re-checked the arm manual and found that the pac bits in an address is: - Xn[54:bottom_PAC_bit] //When address tagging is used - Xn[63:56, 54:bottom_PAC_bit] //When address tagging is not used bottom_PAC_bit = 64-TCR_ELx.TnSZ //For kernel is VA_BITS The pac bits could be at most [63:56, 54:VA_BITS], untagged_addr clears [63:56] (and clearing the high 16 bits doesn't seem to be enough either :) ). For example, when CONFIG_ARM64_VA_BITS_39 enabled, i get a case: - lr : 0xffffffc0088d04f8 - lr with pac: 0x5681a740088d04f8 - PAGE_OFFSET: 0xffffff8000000000 "lr with pac|PAGE_OFFSET" seems to meet the need. >> >>> + else >>> + /* Check architecture, stack layout, or compiler behavior... */ >>> + pr_warn("Eek: return address mismatch! %px != %px\n", >>> + *ret_addr, addr); >> >> According to the context, it might be "expected" here? >> >> pr_warn("Eek: return address mismatch! %px != %px\n", >> *ret_addr, expected); >> >> I simply ignored the upper 16 bits, and tested it separately >> in gcc/llvm 12 with SCS/PAC and all the four cases worked fine for me. > > Great! Do you have the PAC "Oops" text handy so I can include it in the > commit log as an example of what should be expected? > Yeah, in my test environment I get the following output: /kselftest_install/lkdtm # ./CFI_BACKWARD.sh [ 58.333529] lkdtm: Performing direct entry CFI_BACKWARD [ 58.333927] lkdtm: Attempting unchecked stack return address redirection ... [ 58.334230] lkdtm: ok: redirected stack return address. [ 58.334870] lkdtm: Attempting checked stack return address redirection ... [ 58.336287] Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address bfffffc0088d0514 [ 58.336633] Mem abort info: [ 58.336789] ESR = 0x86000004 [ 58.336992] EC = 0x21: IABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits [ 58.337234] SET = 0, FnV = 0 [ 58.337429] EA = 0, S1PTW = 0 [ 58.337611] FSC = 0x04: level 0 translation fault [ 58.337874] [bfffffc0088d0514] address between user and kernel address ranges [ 58.338304] Internal error: Oops: 86000004 [#1] PREEMPT SMP [ 58.339209] Modules linked in: [ 58.340384] CPU: 1 PID: 131 Comm: cat Not tainted 5.18.0-rc2-29474-gb8dcca8f6a13-dirty #393 [ 58.340842] Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT) [ 58.341231] pstate: 60400005 (nZCv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--) [ 58.341593] pc : 0xbfffffc0088d0514 [ 58.342255] lr : lkdtm_CFI_BACKWARD+0x108/0x130 [ 58.342716] sp : ffffffc00a73bc60 [ 58.342906] x29: ffffffc00a73bc60 x28: ffffff8003320000 x27: 0000000000000002 [ 58.343462] x26: ffffffc00a204d00 x25: 0000000000000002 x24: ffffffc0092e72f0 [ 58.343863] x23: 0000000000000006 x22: ffffffc00a204d10 x21: ffffff80188d2000 [ 58.344264] x20: ffffffc00a73bde0 x19: ffffffc00a302000 x18: ffffffffffffffff [ 58.344732] x17: 663a72646461202c x16: 3866343064383830 x15: 0000000000000004 [ 58.345112] x14: 0000000000000fff x13: ffffffc009f8a3e0 x12: 0000000000000003 [ 58.345492] x11: 00000000ffffefff x10: c0000000ffffefff x9 : 90af2887c07d9500 [ 58.345926] x8 : ffffffc0088d04f8 x7 : 205d323234353333 x6 : 332e38352020205b [ 58.346288] x5 : ffffffc00a2c313c x4 : 0000000000000001 x3 : 0000000000000000 [ 58.346670] x2 : 0000000000000000 x1 : ffffffc00968626d x0 : 000000000000006d [ 58.347154] Call trace: [ 58.347419] 0xbfffffc0088d0514 [ 58.347806] lkdtm_do_action+0x1c/0x30 [ 58.348085] direct_entry+0x178/0x1b0 [ 58.348291] full_proxy_write+0x6c/0xe8 [ 58.348523] vfs_write+0x174/0x3b0 [ 58.348721] ksys_write+0x78/0xe4 [ 58.348914] __arm64_sys_write+0x1c/0x28 [ 58.349125] el0_svc_common+0xa4/0x134 [ 58.349354] do_el0_svc+0x24/0x7c [ 58.349551] el0_svc+0x28/0xa4 [ 58.349745] el0t_64_sync_handler+0x84/0xe4 [ 58.349995] el0t_64_sync+0x170/0x174 [ 58.350659] Code: bad PC value [ 58.351182] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- CFI_BACKWARD: saw 'call trace:|ok: control flow unchanged': ok Thanks, Dan.
diff --git a/drivers/misc/lkdtm/cfi.c b/drivers/misc/lkdtm/cfi.c index e88f778be0d5..59ba983ff23e 100644 --- a/drivers/misc/lkdtm/cfi.c +++ b/drivers/misc/lkdtm/cfi.c @@ -42,8 +42,138 @@ static void lkdtm_CFI_FORWARD_PROTO(void) pr_expected_config(CONFIG_CFI_CLANG); } +/* + * This can stay local to LKDTM, as there should not be a production reason + * to disable PAC && SCS. + */ +#ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH_KERNEL +# ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_BTI_KERNEL +# define __no_pac "branch-protection=bti" +# else +# define __no_pac "branch-protection=none" +# endif +# define __no_ret_protection __noscs __attribute__((__target__(__no_pac))) +#else +# define __no_ret_protection __noscs +#endif + +/* The ultimate ROP gadget. */ +static noinline __no_ret_protection +void set_return_addr_unchecked(unsigned long *expected, unsigned long *addr) +{ + /* Use of volatile is to make sure final write isn't seen as a dead store. */ + unsigned long * volatile *ret_addr = (unsigned long **)__builtin_frame_address(0) + 1; + + /* Make sure we've found the right place on the stack before writing it. */ + if(*ret_addr == expected) + *ret_addr = (addr); + else + /* Check architecture, stack layout, or compiler behavior... */ + pr_warn("Eek: return address mismatch! %px != %px\n", + *ret_addr, addr); +} + +static noinline +void set_return_addr(unsigned long *expected, unsigned long *addr) +{ + /* Use of volatile is to make sure final write isn't seen as a dead store. */ + unsigned long * volatile *ret_addr = (unsigned long **)__builtin_frame_address(0) + 1; + + /* Make sure we've found the right place on the stack before writing it. */ + if(*ret_addr == expected) + *ret_addr = (addr); + else + /* Check architecture, stack layout, or compiler behavior... */ + pr_warn("Eek: return address mismatch! %px != %px\n", + *ret_addr, addr); +} + +static volatile int force_check; + +static void lkdtm_CFI_BACKWARD(void) +{ + /* Use calculated gotos to keep labels addressable. */ + void *labels[] = {0, &&normal, &&redirected, &&check_normal, &&check_redirected}; + + pr_info("Attempting unchecked stack return address redirection ...\n"); + + /* Always false */ + if (force_check) { + /* + * Prepare to call with NULLs to avoid parameters being treated as + * constants in -02. + */ + set_return_addr_unchecked(NULL, NULL); + set_return_addr(NULL, NULL); + if (force_check) + goto *labels[1]; + if (force_check) + goto *labels[2]; + if (force_check) + goto *labels[3]; + if (force_check) + goto *labels[4]; + return; + } + + /* + * Use fallthrough switch case to keep basic block ordering between + * set_return_addr*() and the label after it. + */ + switch (force_check) { + case 0: + set_return_addr_unchecked(&&normal, &&redirected); + fallthrough; + case 1: +normal: + /* Always true */ + if (!force_check) { + pr_err("FAIL: stack return address manipulation failed!\n"); + /* If we can't redirect "normally", we can't test mitigations. */ + return; + } + break; + default: +redirected: + pr_info("ok: redirected stack return address.\n"); + break; + } + + pr_info("Attempting checked stack return address redirection ...\n"); + + switch (force_check) { + case 0: + set_return_addr(&&check_normal, &&check_redirected); + fallthrough; + case 1: +check_normal: + /* Always true */ + if (!force_check) { + pr_info("ok: control flow unchanged.\n"); + return; + } + +check_redirected: + pr_err("FAIL: stack return address was redirected!\n"); + break; + } + + if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH_KERNEL)) { + pr_expected_config(CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH_KERNEL); + return; + } + if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SHADOW_CALL_STACK)) { + pr_expected_config(CONFIG_SHADOW_CALL_STACK); + return; + } + pr_warn("This is probably expected, since this %s was built *without* %s=y nor %s=y\n", + lkdtm_kernel_info, + "CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH_KERNEL", "CONFIG_SHADOW_CALL_STACK"); +} + static struct crashtype crashtypes[] = { CRASHTYPE(CFI_FORWARD_PROTO), + CRASHTYPE(CFI_BACKWARD), }; struct crashtype_category cfi_crashtypes = { diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/lkdtm/tests.txt b/tools/testing/selftests/lkdtm/tests.txt index 243c781f0780..9dace01dbf15 100644 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/lkdtm/tests.txt +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/lkdtm/tests.txt @@ -74,6 +74,7 @@ USERCOPY_STACK_BEYOND USERCOPY_KERNEL STACKLEAK_ERASING OK: the rest of the thread stack is properly erased CFI_FORWARD_PROTO +CFI_BACKWARD call trace:|ok: control flow unchanged FORTIFIED_STRSCPY FORTIFIED_OBJECT FORTIFIED_SUBOBJECT