diff mbox series

[v2,3/5] hv_sock: Add validation for untrusted Hyper-V values

Message ID 20220427131225.3785-4-parri.andrea@gmail.com (mailing list archive)
State Superseded
Delegated to: Netdev Maintainers
Headers show
Series hv_sock: Hardening changes | expand

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Context Check Description
netdev/fixes_present success Fixes tag not required for -next series
netdev/subject_prefix success Link
netdev/cover_letter success Series has a cover letter
netdev/patch_count success Link
netdev/header_inline success No static functions without inline keyword in header files
netdev/build_32bit success Errors and warnings before: 445 this patch: 445
netdev/cc_maintainers success CCed 12 of 12 maintainers
netdev/build_clang success Errors and warnings before: 15 this patch: 15
netdev/module_param success Was 0 now: 0
netdev/verify_signedoff success Signed-off-by tag matches author and committer
netdev/verify_fixes success No Fixes tag
netdev/build_allmodconfig_warn success Errors and warnings before: 456 this patch: 456
netdev/checkpatch success total: 0 errors, 0 warnings, 0 checks, 31 lines checked
netdev/kdoc success Errors and warnings before: 0 this patch: 0
netdev/source_inline success Was 0 now: 0
netdev/tree_selection success Guessing tree name failed - patch did not apply

Commit Message

Andrea Parri April 27, 2022, 1:12 p.m. UTC
For additional robustness in the face of Hyper-V errors or malicious
behavior, validate all values that originate from packets that Hyper-V
has sent to the guest in the host-to-guest ring buffer.  Ensure that
invalid values cannot cause data being copied out of the bounds of the
source buffer in hvs_stream_dequeue().

Signed-off-by: Andrea Parri (Microsoft) <parri.andrea@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Michael Kelley <mikelley@microsoft.com>
---
 include/linux/hyperv.h           |  5 +++++
 net/vmw_vsock/hyperv_transport.c | 10 ++++++++--
 2 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

Comments

Stefano Garzarella April 27, 2022, 1:38 p.m. UTC | #1
On Wed, Apr 27, 2022 at 03:12:23PM +0200, Andrea Parri (Microsoft) wrote:
>For additional robustness in the face of Hyper-V errors or malicious
>behavior, validate all values that originate from packets that Hyper-V
>has sent to the guest in the host-to-guest ring buffer.  Ensure that
>invalid values cannot cause data being copied out of the bounds of the
>source buffer in hvs_stream_dequeue().
>
>Signed-off-by: Andrea Parri (Microsoft) <parri.andrea@gmail.com>
>Reviewed-by: Michael Kelley <mikelley@microsoft.com>
>---
> include/linux/hyperv.h           |  5 +++++
> net/vmw_vsock/hyperv_transport.c | 10 ++++++++--
> 2 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
>
>diff --git a/include/linux/hyperv.h b/include/linux/hyperv.h
>index fe2e0179ed51e..55478a6810b60 100644
>--- a/include/linux/hyperv.h
>+++ b/include/linux/hyperv.h
>@@ -1663,6 +1663,11 @@ static inline u32 hv_pkt_datalen(const struct vmpacket_descriptor *desc)
> 	return (desc->len8 << 3) - (desc->offset8 << 3);
> }
>
>+/* Get packet length associated with descriptor */
>+static inline u32 hv_pkt_len(const struct vmpacket_descriptor *desc)
>+{
>+	return desc->len8 << 3;
>+}
>
> struct vmpacket_descriptor *
> hv_pkt_iter_first_raw(struct vmbus_channel *channel);
>diff --git a/net/vmw_vsock/hyperv_transport.c b/net/vmw_vsock/hyperv_transport.c
>index 8c37d07017fc4..fd98229e3db30 100644
>--- a/net/vmw_vsock/hyperv_transport.c
>+++ b/net/vmw_vsock/hyperv_transport.c
>@@ -577,12 +577,18 @@ static bool hvs_dgram_allow(u32 cid, u32 port)
> static int hvs_update_recv_data(struct hvsock *hvs)
> {
> 	struct hvs_recv_buf *recv_buf;
>-	u32 payload_len;
>+	u32 pkt_len, payload_len;
>+
>+	pkt_len = hv_pkt_len(hvs->recv_desc);
>+
>+	if (pkt_len < HVS_HEADER_LEN)
>+		return -EIO;
>
> 	recv_buf = (struct hvs_recv_buf *)(hvs->recv_desc + 1);
> 	payload_len = recv_buf->hdr.data_size;
>
>-	if (payload_len > HVS_MTU_SIZE)
>+	if (payload_len > pkt_len - HVS_HEADER_LEN ||
>+	    payload_len > HVS_MTU_SIZE)
> 		return -EIO;
>
> 	if (payload_len == 0)
>-- 
>2.25.1
>

Reviewed-by: Stefano Garzarella <sgarzare@redhat.com>
diff mbox series

Patch

diff --git a/include/linux/hyperv.h b/include/linux/hyperv.h
index fe2e0179ed51e..55478a6810b60 100644
--- a/include/linux/hyperv.h
+++ b/include/linux/hyperv.h
@@ -1663,6 +1663,11 @@  static inline u32 hv_pkt_datalen(const struct vmpacket_descriptor *desc)
 	return (desc->len8 << 3) - (desc->offset8 << 3);
 }
 
+/* Get packet length associated with descriptor */
+static inline u32 hv_pkt_len(const struct vmpacket_descriptor *desc)
+{
+	return desc->len8 << 3;
+}
 
 struct vmpacket_descriptor *
 hv_pkt_iter_first_raw(struct vmbus_channel *channel);
diff --git a/net/vmw_vsock/hyperv_transport.c b/net/vmw_vsock/hyperv_transport.c
index 8c37d07017fc4..fd98229e3db30 100644
--- a/net/vmw_vsock/hyperv_transport.c
+++ b/net/vmw_vsock/hyperv_transport.c
@@ -577,12 +577,18 @@  static bool hvs_dgram_allow(u32 cid, u32 port)
 static int hvs_update_recv_data(struct hvsock *hvs)
 {
 	struct hvs_recv_buf *recv_buf;
-	u32 payload_len;
+	u32 pkt_len, payload_len;
+
+	pkt_len = hv_pkt_len(hvs->recv_desc);
+
+	if (pkt_len < HVS_HEADER_LEN)
+		return -EIO;
 
 	recv_buf = (struct hvs_recv_buf *)(hvs->recv_desc + 1);
 	payload_len = recv_buf->hdr.data_size;
 
-	if (payload_len > HVS_MTU_SIZE)
+	if (payload_len > pkt_len - HVS_HEADER_LEN ||
+	    payload_len > HVS_MTU_SIZE)
 		return -EIO;
 
 	if (payload_len == 0)