| Message ID | 20220504161439.8.I87952411cf83f2199ff7a4cc8c828d357b8c8ce3@changeid (mailing list archive) |
|---|---|
| State | New, archived |
| Headers | show |
| Series | Encrypted Hibernation | expand |
Hi! > One annoyance of the "preloading" scheme is that hibernate image memory > is effectively double-allocated: first by the usermode process pulling > encrypted contents off of disk and holding it, and second by the kernel > in its giant allocation in prepare_image(). An interesting future > optimization would be to allow the kernel to accept and store encrypted > page data before the user key is available. This would remove the > double allocation problem, as usermode could push the encrypted pages > loaded from disk immediately without storing them. The kernel could defer > decryption of the data until the user key is available, while still > knowing the correct page locations to store the encrypted data in. Um. Dunno. Won't you run out of memory? Hibernation images can be quite big... Best regards, Pavel
On Fri, May 6, 2022 at 9:08 AM Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz> wrote: > > Hi! Hi Pavel! > > > One annoyance of the "preloading" scheme is that hibernate image memory > > is effectively double-allocated: first by the usermode process pulling > > encrypted contents off of disk and holding it, and second by the kernel > > in its giant allocation in prepare_image(). An interesting future > > optimization would be to allow the kernel to accept and store encrypted > > page data before the user key is available. This would remove the > > double allocation problem, as usermode could push the encrypted pages > > loaded from disk immediately without storing them. The kernel could defer > > decryption of the data until the user key is available, while still > > knowing the correct page locations to store the encrypted data in. > > Um. Dunno. Won't you run out of memory? Hibernation images can be quite big... > As you know, with the way the snapshot mechanism works, a hibernation image can be at most 50% of RAM. If the system was using more than that at hibernation time, it has to free up the excess via swap before hibernating. So during this resume period, there's at least 50% of RAM to play around in and still be able to preload the hibernation image. What I've been doing in practice is to load as much of the hibernate image as possible into memory at the login screen while at the same time ensuring the system maintains a comfortable margin of free memory. I have to coerce the kernel into doing its giant allocation in prepare_image() first since it uses GFP_ATOMIC. This might mean I can only preload some of the image from disk. With the disk I/O being by far the longest pole in the tent, hiding even some of that latency behind the password prompt is still great for perceived resume time. -Evan
Hi! > > > One annoyance of the "preloading" scheme is that hibernate image memory > > > is effectively double-allocated: first by the usermode process pulling > > > encrypted contents off of disk and holding it, and second by the kernel > > > in its giant allocation in prepare_image(). An interesting future > > > optimization would be to allow the kernel to accept and store encrypted > > > page data before the user key is available. This would remove the > > > double allocation problem, as usermode could push the encrypted pages > > > loaded from disk immediately without storing them. The kernel could defer > > > decryption of the data until the user key is available, while still > > > knowing the correct page locations to store the encrypted data in. > > > > Um. Dunno. Won't you run out of memory? Hibernation images can be quite big... > > > > As you know, with the way the snapshot mechanism works, a hibernation > image can be at most 50% of RAM. If the system was using more than There used to be 50% of RAM limit, but it was removed. Best regards, Pavel
On Tue, May 10, 2022 at 5:29 AM Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz> wrote: > > Hi! > > > > > One annoyance of the "preloading" scheme is that hibernate image memory > > > > is effectively double-allocated: first by the usermode process pulling > > > > encrypted contents off of disk and holding it, and second by the kernel > > > > in its giant allocation in prepare_image(). An interesting future > > > > optimization would be to allow the kernel to accept and store encrypted > > > > page data before the user key is available. This would remove the > > > > double allocation problem, as usermode could push the encrypted pages > > > > loaded from disk immediately without storing them. The kernel could defer > > > > decryption of the data until the user key is available, while still > > > > knowing the correct page locations to store the encrypted data in. > > > > > > Um. Dunno. Won't you run out of memory? Hibernation images can be quite big... > > > > > > > As you know, with the way the snapshot mechanism works, a hibernation > > image can be at most 50% of RAM. If the system was using more than > > There used to be 50% of RAM limit, but it was removed. I'm confused. My mental model of the way this works is that to create the snapshot, we create a copy of every page in use. So if every used page needs another page for its snapshot copy, isn't the theoretical max usage at snapshot time 50%? (Plus or minus some wiggle room for asking the system to shrink a bit, ignoring nosave regions, and leaving a bit of extra working space). Setting aside my potential misunderstanding of the max image size, frontloading as much of the slow I/O work as we can pack into memory is still useful for us in terms of user experience. I was originally planning to include this "deferred user keys" patch in the series, but it started getting a little unpleasant between a) having to keep the auth tags around somewhere since they aren't consumed yet, and b) dealing with highmem and the staging area during replay when the keys finally did come in. So I opted to stop for now and get feedback before going any deeper. -Evan
On Wed, May 04, 2022 at 04:21:00PM -0700, Evan Green wrote: > +/* > + * Allow user mode to fold in key material for the data portion of the hibernate > + * image. > + */ > +struct uswsusp_user_key { > + /* Kernel returns the metadata size. */ > + __kernel_loff_t meta_size; > + __u32 key_len; > + __u8 key[16]; > + __u32 pad; > +}; Shouldn't the key field be 32 bytes? > +/* Derive a key from the kernel and user keys for data encryption. */ > +static int snapshot_use_user_key(struct snapshot_data *data) > +{ > + struct shash_desc *desc; > + u8 digest[SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE]; > + struct trusted_key_payload *payload; > + struct crypto_shash *tfm; > + int ret; > + > + tfm = crypto_alloc_shash("sha256", 0, 0); > + if (IS_ERR(tfm)) { > + ret = -EINVAL; > + goto err_rel; > + } > + > + desc = kmalloc(sizeof(struct shash_desc) + > + crypto_shash_descsize(tfm), GFP_KERNEL); > + if (!desc) { > + ret = -ENOMEM; > + goto err_rel; > + } > + > + desc->tfm = tfm; > + ret = crypto_shash_init(desc); > + if (ret != 0) > + goto err_free; > + > + /* > + * Hash the kernel key and the user key together. This folds in the user > + * key, but not in a way that gives the user mode predictable control > + * over the key bits. Hash in all 32 bytes of the key even though only 16 > + * are in active use as extra salt. > + */ > + payload = data->key->payload.data[0]; > + crypto_shash_update(desc, payload->key, MIN_KEY_SIZE); > + crypto_shash_update(desc, data->user_key, sizeof(data->user_key)); > + crypto_shash_final(desc, digest); > + ret = crypto_aead_setkey(data->aead_tfm, > + digest, > + SNAPSHOT_ENCRYPTION_KEY_SIZE); > + > +err_free: > + kfree(desc); > + > +err_rel: > + crypto_free_shash(tfm); > + return ret; > +} Just select CRYPTO_LIB_SHA256, and you can use sha256_init/update/final which would be much simpler. Similarly with sha256_data() that is added by the next patch; you could just call sha256(). - Eric
On Tue, Aug 2, 2022 at 3:48 PM Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org> wrote: > > On Wed, May 04, 2022 at 04:21:00PM -0700, Evan Green wrote: > > +/* > > + * Allow user mode to fold in key material for the data portion of the hibernate > > + * image. > > + */ > > +struct uswsusp_user_key { > > + /* Kernel returns the metadata size. */ > > + __kernel_loff_t meta_size; > > + __u32 key_len; > > + __u8 key[16]; > > + __u32 pad; > > +}; > > Shouldn't the key field be 32 bytes? > Short answer: yes, it should, will fix. Long answer: I had used a hardcoded AEAD algorithm of "gcm(aes)", and was envisioning it being AES128. But making it accommodate 32 bytes now before this gets set in stone is a better idea. > > +/* Derive a key from the kernel and user keys for data encryption. */ > > +static int snapshot_use_user_key(struct snapshot_data *data) > > +{ > > + struct shash_desc *desc; > > + u8 digest[SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE]; > > + struct trusted_key_payload *payload; > > + struct crypto_shash *tfm; > > + int ret; > > + > > + tfm = crypto_alloc_shash("sha256", 0, 0); > > + if (IS_ERR(tfm)) { > > + ret = -EINVAL; > > + goto err_rel; > > + } > > + > > + desc = kmalloc(sizeof(struct shash_desc) + > > + crypto_shash_descsize(tfm), GFP_KERNEL); > > + if (!desc) { > > + ret = -ENOMEM; > > + goto err_rel; > > + } > > + > > + desc->tfm = tfm; > > + ret = crypto_shash_init(desc); > > + if (ret != 0) > > + goto err_free; > > + > > + /* > > + * Hash the kernel key and the user key together. This folds in the user > > + * key, but not in a way that gives the user mode predictable control > > + * over the key bits. Hash in all 32 bytes of the key even though only 16 > > + * are in active use as extra salt. > > + */ > > + payload = data->key->payload.data[0]; > > + crypto_shash_update(desc, payload->key, MIN_KEY_SIZE); > > + crypto_shash_update(desc, data->user_key, sizeof(data->user_key)); > > + crypto_shash_final(desc, digest); > > + ret = crypto_aead_setkey(data->aead_tfm, > > + digest, > > + SNAPSHOT_ENCRYPTION_KEY_SIZE); > > + > > +err_free: > > + kfree(desc); > > + > > +err_rel: > > + crypto_free_shash(tfm); > > + return ret; > > +} > > Just select CRYPTO_LIB_SHA256, and you can use sha256_init/update/final which > would be much simpler. Similarly with sha256_data() that is added by the next > patch; you could just call sha256(). Good idea, will do. Thanks! > > - Eric
diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/suspend_ioctls.h b/include/uapi/linux/suspend_ioctls.h index b73026ef824bb9..c60b84cbb33ae1 100644 --- a/include/uapi/linux/suspend_ioctls.h +++ b/include/uapi/linux/suspend_ioctls.h @@ -25,6 +25,18 @@ struct uswsusp_key_blob { __u8 nonce[USWSUSP_KEY_NONCE_SIZE]; } __attribute__((packed)); +/* + * Allow user mode to fold in key material for the data portion of the hibernate + * image. + */ +struct uswsusp_user_key { + /* Kernel returns the metadata size. */ + __kernel_loff_t meta_size; + __u32 key_len; + __u8 key[16]; + __u32 pad; +}; + #define SNAPSHOT_IOC_MAGIC '3' #define SNAPSHOT_FREEZE _IO(SNAPSHOT_IOC_MAGIC, 1) #define SNAPSHOT_UNFREEZE _IO(SNAPSHOT_IOC_MAGIC, 2) @@ -42,6 +54,7 @@ struct uswsusp_key_blob { #define SNAPSHOT_AVAIL_SWAP_SIZE _IOR(SNAPSHOT_IOC_MAGIC, 19, __kernel_loff_t) #define SNAPSHOT_ALLOC_SWAP_PAGE _IOR(SNAPSHOT_IOC_MAGIC, 20, __kernel_loff_t) #define SNAPSHOT_ENABLE_ENCRYPTION _IOWR(SNAPSHOT_IOC_MAGIC, 21, struct uswsusp_key_blob) -#define SNAPSHOT_IOC_MAXNR 21 +#define SNAPSHOT_SET_USER_KEY _IOWR(SNAPSHOT_IOC_MAGIC, 22, struct uswsusp_user_key) +#define SNAPSHOT_IOC_MAXNR 22 #endif /* _LINUX_SUSPEND_IOCTLS_H */ diff --git a/kernel/power/power.h b/kernel/power/power.h index b4f43394320961..5955e5cf692302 100644 --- a/kernel/power/power.h +++ b/kernel/power/power.h @@ -151,6 +151,7 @@ struct snapshot_handle { extern unsigned int snapshot_additional_pages(struct zone *zone); extern unsigned long snapshot_get_image_size(void); +extern unsigned long snapshot_get_meta_page_count(void); extern int snapshot_read_next(struct snapshot_handle *handle); extern int snapshot_write_next(struct snapshot_handle *handle); extern void snapshot_write_finalize(struct snapshot_handle *handle); diff --git a/kernel/power/snapenc.c b/kernel/power/snapenc.c index 2bd5fe05a321e7..067f49c05a4d54 100644 --- a/kernel/power/snapenc.c +++ b/kernel/power/snapenc.c @@ -6,6 +6,8 @@ #include <crypto/gcm.h> #include <keys/trusted-type.h> #include <linux/key-type.h> +#include <crypto/hash.h> +#include <crypto/sha.h> #include <linux/random.h> #include <linux/mm.h> #include <linux/tpm.h> @@ -21,6 +23,66 @@ static struct tpm_digest known_digest = { .alg_id = TPM_ALG_SHA256, 0xf1, 0x22, 0x38, 0x6c, 0x33, 0xb1, 0x14, 0xb7, 0xec, 0x05, 0x5f, 0x49}}; +/* Derive a key from the kernel and user keys for data encryption. */ +static int snapshot_use_user_key(struct snapshot_data *data) +{ + struct shash_desc *desc; + u8 digest[SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE]; + struct trusted_key_payload *payload; + struct crypto_shash *tfm; + int ret; + + tfm = crypto_alloc_shash("sha256", 0, 0); + if (IS_ERR(tfm)) { + ret = -EINVAL; + goto err_rel; + } + + desc = kmalloc(sizeof(struct shash_desc) + + crypto_shash_descsize(tfm), GFP_KERNEL); + if (!desc) { + ret = -ENOMEM; + goto err_rel; + } + + desc->tfm = tfm; + ret = crypto_shash_init(desc); + if (ret != 0) + goto err_free; + + /* + * Hash the kernel key and the user key together. This folds in the user + * key, but not in a way that gives the user mode predictable control + * over the key bits. Hash in all 32 bytes of the key even though only 16 + * are in active use as extra salt. + */ + payload = data->key->payload.data[0]; + crypto_shash_update(desc, payload->key, MIN_KEY_SIZE); + crypto_shash_update(desc, data->user_key, sizeof(data->user_key)); + crypto_shash_final(desc, digest); + ret = crypto_aead_setkey(data->aead_tfm, + digest, + SNAPSHOT_ENCRYPTION_KEY_SIZE); + +err_free: + kfree(desc); + +err_rel: + crypto_free_shash(tfm); + return ret; +} + +/* Check to see if it's time to switch to the user key, and do it if so. */ +static int snapshot_check_user_key_switch(struct snapshot_data *data) +{ + if (data->user_key_valid && data->meta_size && + data->crypt_total == data->meta_size) { + return snapshot_use_user_key(data); + } + + return 0; +} + /* Encrypt more data from the snapshot into the staging area. */ static int snapshot_encrypt_refill(struct snapshot_data *data) { @@ -32,6 +94,15 @@ static int snapshot_encrypt_refill(struct snapshot_data *data) DECLARE_CRYPTO_WAIT(wait); size_t total = 0; + if (data->crypt_total == 0) { + data->meta_size = snapshot_get_meta_page_count() << PAGE_SHIFT; + + } else { + res = snapshot_check_user_key_switch(data); + if (res) + return res; + } + /* * The first buffer is the associated data, set to the offset to prevent * attacks that rearrange chunks. @@ -42,6 +113,11 @@ static int snapshot_encrypt_refill(struct snapshot_data *data) for (pg_idx = 0; pg_idx < CHUNK_SIZE; pg_idx++) { void *buf = data->crypt_pages[pg_idx]; + /* Stop at the meta page boundary to potentially switch keys. */ + if (total && + ((data->crypt_total + total) == data->meta_size)) + break; + res = snapshot_read_next(&data->handle); if (res < 0) return res; @@ -114,10 +190,10 @@ static int snapshot_decrypt_drain(struct snapshot_data *data) sg_set_buf(&data->sg[1 + pg_idx], data->crypt_pages[pg_idx], PAGE_SIZE); /* - * It's possible this is the final decrypt, and there are fewer than - * CHUNK_SIZE pages. If this is the case we would have just written the - * auth tag into the first few bytes of a new page. Copy to the tag if - * so. + * It's possible this is the final decrypt, or the final decrypt of the + * meta region, and there are fewer than CHUNK_SIZE pages. If this is + * the case we would have just written the auth tag into the first few + * bytes of a new page. Copy to the tag if so. */ if ((page_count < CHUNK_SIZE) && (data->crypt_offset - total) == sizeof(data->auth_tag)) { @@ -172,7 +248,14 @@ static int snapshot_decrypt_drain(struct snapshot_data *data) total += PAGE_SIZE; } + if (data->crypt_total == 0) + data->meta_size = snapshot_get_meta_page_count() << PAGE_SHIFT; + data->crypt_total += total; + res = snapshot_check_user_key_switch(data); + if (res) + return res; + return 0; } @@ -221,8 +304,26 @@ static ssize_t snapshot_write_next_encrypted(struct snapshot_data *data, if (data->crypt_offset < (PAGE_SIZE * CHUNK_SIZE)) { size_t pg_idx = data->crypt_offset >> PAGE_SHIFT; size_t pg_off = data->crypt_offset & (PAGE_SIZE - 1); + size_t size_avail = PAGE_SIZE; *buf = data->crypt_pages[pg_idx] + pg_off; - return PAGE_SIZE - pg_off; + + /* + * If this is the boundary where the meta pages end, then just + * return enough for the auth tag. + */ + if (data->meta_size && (data->crypt_total < data->meta_size)) { + uint64_t total_done = + data->crypt_total + data->crypt_offset; + + if ((total_done >= data->meta_size) && + (total_done < + (data->meta_size + SNAPSHOT_AUTH_TAG_SIZE))) { + + size_avail = SNAPSHOT_AUTH_TAG_SIZE; + } + } + + return size_avail - pg_off; } /* Use offsets just beyond the size to return the tag. */ @@ -303,9 +404,15 @@ ssize_t snapshot_write_encrypted(struct snapshot_data *data, break; } - /* Drain the encrypted buffer if it's full. */ + /* + * Drain the encrypted buffer if it's full, or if we hit the end + * of the meta pages and need a key change. + */ if ((data->crypt_offset >= - ((PAGE_SIZE * CHUNK_SIZE) + SNAPSHOT_AUTH_TAG_SIZE))) { + ((PAGE_SIZE * CHUNK_SIZE) + SNAPSHOT_AUTH_TAG_SIZE)) || + (data->meta_size && (data->crypt_total < data->meta_size) && + ((data->crypt_total + data->crypt_offset) == + (data->meta_size + SNAPSHOT_AUTH_TAG_SIZE)))) { int rc; @@ -345,6 +452,8 @@ void snapshot_teardown_encryption(struct snapshot_data *data) data->crypt_pages[i] = NULL; } } + + memset(data->user_key, 0, sizeof(data->user_key)); } static int snapshot_setup_encryption_common(struct snapshot_data *data) @@ -354,6 +463,7 @@ static int snapshot_setup_encryption_common(struct snapshot_data *data) data->crypt_total = 0; data->crypt_offset = 0; data->crypt_size = 0; + data->user_key_valid = false; memset(data->crypt_pages, 0, sizeof(data->crypt_pages)); /* This only works once per hibernate. */ if (data->aead_tfm) @@ -643,15 +753,72 @@ int snapshot_set_encryption_key(struct snapshot_data *data, return rc; } -loff_t snapshot_get_encrypted_image_size(loff_t raw_size) +loff_t snapshot_encrypted_byte_count(loff_t plain_size) { - loff_t pages = raw_size >> PAGE_SHIFT; + loff_t pages = plain_size >> PAGE_SHIFT; loff_t chunks = (pages + (CHUNK_SIZE - 1)) / CHUNK_SIZE; /* * The encrypted size is the normal size, plus a stitched in * authentication tag for every chunk of pages. */ - return raw_size + (chunks * SNAPSHOT_AUTH_TAG_SIZE); + return plain_size + (chunks * SNAPSHOT_AUTH_TAG_SIZE); +} + +static loff_t snapshot_get_meta_data_size(void) +{ + loff_t pages = snapshot_get_meta_page_count(); + + return snapshot_encrypted_byte_count(pages << PAGE_SHIFT); +} + +int snapshot_set_user_key(struct snapshot_data *data, + struct uswsusp_user_key __user *key) +{ + struct uswsusp_user_key user_key; + unsigned int key_len; + int rc; + loff_t size; + + /* + * Return the metadata size, the number of bytes that can be fed in before + * the user data key is needed at resume time. + */ + size = snapshot_get_meta_data_size(); + rc = put_user(size, &key->meta_size); + if (rc) + return rc; + + rc = copy_from_user(&user_key, key, sizeof(struct uswsusp_user_key)); + if (rc) + return rc; + + key_len = min_t(__u32, user_key.key_len, sizeof(data->user_key)); + if (key_len < 8) + return -EINVAL; + + /* Don't allow it if it's too late. */ + if (data->crypt_total > data->meta_size) + return -EBUSY; + + memset(data->user_key, 0, sizeof(data->user_key)); + memcpy(data->user_key, user_key.key, key_len); + data->user_key_valid = true; + /* Install the key if the user is just under the wire. */ + rc = snapshot_check_user_key_switch(data); + if (rc) + return rc; + + return 0; +} + +loff_t snapshot_get_encrypted_image_size(loff_t raw_size) +{ + loff_t pages = raw_size >> PAGE_SHIFT; + loff_t meta_size; + + pages -= snapshot_get_meta_page_count(); + meta_size = snapshot_get_meta_data_size(); + return snapshot_encrypted_byte_count(pages << PAGE_SHIFT) + meta_size; } int snapshot_finalize_decrypted_image(struct snapshot_data *data) diff --git a/kernel/power/snapshot.c b/kernel/power/snapshot.c index 2a406753af9049..026ee511633bc9 100644 --- a/kernel/power/snapshot.c +++ b/kernel/power/snapshot.c @@ -2083,6 +2083,11 @@ unsigned long snapshot_get_image_size(void) return nr_copy_pages + nr_meta_pages + 1; } +unsigned long snapshot_get_meta_page_count(void) +{ + return nr_meta_pages + 1; +} + static int init_header(struct swsusp_info *info) { memset(info, 0, sizeof(struct swsusp_info)); diff --git a/kernel/power/user.c b/kernel/power/user.c index 52ad25df4518dc..f35263e6724975 100644 --- a/kernel/power/user.c +++ b/kernel/power/user.c @@ -412,6 +412,10 @@ static long snapshot_ioctl(struct file *filp, unsigned int cmd, error = snapshot_set_encryption_key(data, (void __user *)arg); break; + case SNAPSHOT_SET_USER_KEY: + error = snapshot_set_user_key(data, (void __user *)arg); + break; + default: error = -ENOTTY; diff --git a/kernel/power/user.h b/kernel/power/user.h index 591b30bb213349..1b0743b36eee14 100644 --- a/kernel/power/user.h +++ b/kernel/power/user.h @@ -32,6 +32,9 @@ struct snapshot_data { uint64_t nonce_low; uint64_t nonce_high; struct key *key; + u8 user_key[SNAPSHOT_ENCRYPTION_KEY_SIZE]; + bool user_key_valid; + uint64_t meta_size; #endif }; @@ -54,6 +57,9 @@ int snapshot_get_encryption_key(struct snapshot_data *data, int snapshot_set_encryption_key(struct snapshot_data *data, struct uswsusp_key_blob __user *key); +int snapshot_set_user_key(struct snapshot_data *data, + struct uswsusp_user_key __user *key); + loff_t snapshot_get_encrypted_image_size(loff_t raw_size); int snapshot_finalize_decrypted_image(struct snapshot_data *data); @@ -87,6 +93,12 @@ static int snapshot_set_encryption_key(struct snapshot_data *data, return -ENOTTY; } +static int snapshot_set_user_key(struct snapshot_data *data, + struct uswsusp_user_key __user *key) +{ + return -ENOTTY; +} + static loff_t snapshot_get_encrypted_image_size(loff_t raw_size) { return raw_size;
Usermode may have their own data protection requirements when it comes to encrypting the hibernate image. For example, users may want a policy where the hibernate image is protected by a key derived both from platform-level security as well as authentication data (such as a password or PIN). This way, even if the platform is compromised (ie a stolen laptop), sensitive data cannot be exfiltrated via the hibernate image without additional data (like the user's password). The kernel is already doing the encryption, but will be protecting its key with the TPM alone. Allow usermode to mix in key content of their own for the data portion of the hibernate image, so that the image encryption key is determined both by a TPM-backed secret and user-defined data. To mix the user key in, we hash the kernel key followed by the user key, and use the resulting hash as the new key. This allows usermode to mix in its key material without giving it too much control over what key is actually driving the encryption (which might be used to attack the secret kernel key). Limiting this to the data portion allows the kernel to receive the page map and prepare its giant allocation even if this user key is not yet available (ie the user has not yet finished typing in their password). Once the user key becomes available, the data portion can be pushed through to the kernel as well. This enables "preloading" scenarios, where the hibernate image is loaded off of disk while the additional key material (eg password) is being collected. One annoyance of the "preloading" scheme is that hibernate image memory is effectively double-allocated: first by the usermode process pulling encrypted contents off of disk and holding it, and second by the kernel in its giant allocation in prepare_image(). An interesting future optimization would be to allow the kernel to accept and store encrypted page data before the user key is available. This would remove the double allocation problem, as usermode could push the encrypted pages loaded from disk immediately without storing them. The kernel could defer decryption of the data until the user key is available, while still knowing the correct page locations to store the encrypted data in. Signed-off-by: Evan Green <evgreen@chromium.org> --- include/uapi/linux/suspend_ioctls.h | 15 ++- kernel/power/power.h | 1 + kernel/power/snapenc.c | 187 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++-- kernel/power/snapshot.c | 5 + kernel/power/user.c | 4 + kernel/power/user.h | 12 ++ 6 files changed, 213 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)