| Message ID | YqcRuQFq5fg1XhB/@noodles-fedora.dhcp.thefacebook.com (mailing list archive) |
|---|---|
| State | New, archived |
| Headers | show |
| Series | [v5] x86/kexec: Carry forward IMA measurement log on kexec | expand |
On Mon, 2022-06-13 at 10:30 +0000, Jonathan McDowell wrote: > On kexec file load Integrity Measurement Architecture (IMA) subsystem > may verify the IMA signature of the kernel and initramfs, and measure > it. The command line parameters passed to the kernel in the kexec call > may also be measured by IMA. A remote attestation service can verify > a TPM quote based on the TPM event log, the IMA measurement list, and > the TPM PCR data. This can be achieved only if the IMA measurement log > is carried over from the current kernel to the next kernel across > the kexec call. > > powerpc and ARM64 both achieve this using device tree with a > "linux,ima-kexec-buffer" node. x86 platforms generally don't make use of > device tree, so use the setup_data mechanism to pass the IMA buffer to > the new kernel. > > (Mimi, Baoquan, I haven't included your reviewed-bys because this has > changed the compile guards around the ima_(free|get)_kexec_buffer > functions in order to fix the warning the kernel test robot found. I > think this is the right thing to do and avoids us compiling them on > platforms where they won't be used. The alternative would be to drop > the guards in ima.h that Mimi requested for v4.)hhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhh > > Signed-off-by: Jonathan McDowell <noodles@fb.com> > --- > v5: > - Guard ima_(free|get)_kexec_buffer functions with > CONFIG_HAVE_IMA_KEXEC (kernel test robot) > - Use setup_data_offset in setup_boot_parameters and update rather than > calculating in call to setup_ima_state. > v4: > - Guard ima.h function prototypes with CONFIG_HAVE_IMA_KEXEC > diff --git a/drivers/of/kexec.c b/drivers/of/kexec.c > index 8d374cc552be..42a6c5721a43 100644 > --- a/drivers/of/kexec.c > +++ b/drivers/of/kexec.c > @@ -9,6 +9,7 @@ > * Copyright (C) 2016 IBM Corporation > */ > > +#include <linux/ima.h> > #include <linux/kernel.h> > #include <linux/kexec.h> > #include <linux/memblock.h> > @@ -115,6 +116,7 @@ static int do_get_kexec_buffer(const void *prop, int len, unsigned long *addr, > return 0; > } > > +#ifdef CONFIG_HAVE_IMA_KEXEC > /** > * ima_get_kexec_buffer - get IMA buffer from the previous kernel > * @addr: On successful return, set to point to the buffer contents. > @@ -173,6 +175,7 @@ int ima_free_kexec_buffer(void) > > return memblock_phys_free(addr, size); > } > +#endif Inside ima_{get,free}_kexec_buffer(), there's no need now to test whether CONFIG_HAVE_IMA_KEXEC is enabled. if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_HAVE_IMA_KEXEC)) return -ENOTSUPP; Otherwise, Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> # IMA function definitions > > /** > * remove_ima_buffer - remove the IMA buffer property and reservation from @fdt > diff --git a/include/linux/ima.h b/include/linux/ima.h
On 06/13/22 at 05:01pm, Mimi Zohar wrote: > On Mon, 2022-06-13 at 10:30 +0000, Jonathan McDowell wrote: > > On kexec file load Integrity Measurement Architecture (IMA) subsystem > > may verify the IMA signature of the kernel and initramfs, and measure > > it. The command line parameters passed to the kernel in the kexec call > > may also be measured by IMA. A remote attestation service can verify > > a TPM quote based on the TPM event log, the IMA measurement list, and > > the TPM PCR data. This can be achieved only if the IMA measurement log > > is carried over from the current kernel to the next kernel across > > the kexec call. > > > > powerpc and ARM64 both achieve this using device tree with a > > "linux,ima-kexec-buffer" node. x86 platforms generally don't make use of > > device tree, so use the setup_data mechanism to pass the IMA buffer to > > the new kernel. > > > > (Mimi, Baoquan, I haven't included your reviewed-bys because this has > > changed the compile guards around the ima_(free|get)_kexec_buffer > > functions in order to fix the warning the kernel test robot found. I > > think this is the right thing to do and avoids us compiling them on > > platforms where they won't be used. The alternative would be to drop > > the guards in ima.h that Mimi requested for v4.)hhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhh > > > > Signed-off-by: Jonathan McDowell <noodles@fb.com> > > --- > > v5: > > - Guard ima_(free|get)_kexec_buffer functions with > > CONFIG_HAVE_IMA_KEXEC (kernel test robot) > > - Use setup_data_offset in setup_boot_parameters and update rather than > > calculating in call to setup_ima_state. > > v4: > > - Guard ima.h function prototypes with CONFIG_HAVE_IMA_KEXEC > > > diff --git a/drivers/of/kexec.c b/drivers/of/kexec.c > > index 8d374cc552be..42a6c5721a43 100644 > > --- a/drivers/of/kexec.c > > +++ b/drivers/of/kexec.c > > @@ -9,6 +9,7 @@ > > * Copyright (C) 2016 IBM Corporation > > */ > > > > +#include <linux/ima.h> > > #include <linux/kernel.h> > > #include <linux/kexec.h> > > #include <linux/memblock.h> > > @@ -115,6 +116,7 @@ static int do_get_kexec_buffer(const void *prop, int len, unsigned long *addr, > > return 0; > > } > > > > +#ifdef CONFIG_HAVE_IMA_KEXEC > > /** > > * ima_get_kexec_buffer - get IMA buffer from the previous kernel > > * @addr: On successful return, set to point to the buffer contents. > > @@ -173,6 +175,7 @@ int ima_free_kexec_buffer(void) > > > > return memblock_phys_free(addr, size); > > } > > +#endif > > Inside ima_{get,free}_kexec_buffer(), there's no need now to test > whether CONFIG_HAVE_IMA_KEXEC is enabled. > > if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_HAVE_IMA_KEXEC)) > return -ENOTSUPP; Indeed. The #ifdef added by Jonathan is redundant. Not sure if the original IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_HAVE_IMA_KEXEC) checking inside ima_{get,free}_kexec_buffer() is intended. I ever reviewed below patch, the IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_XX) inside static function will make the function compiled, and will be optimized out if the CONFIG_XX is not enabled. However, it only has effect on static function. Here, ima_{get,free}_kexec_buffer() is not static, likely we should remove the inside IS_ENABLED() checking. commit 4ece09be9913a87ff99ea347fd7e7adad5bdbc8f Author: Jisheng Zhang <jszhang@kernel.org> Date: Wed Mar 23 16:06:39 2022 -0700 x86/setup: use IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KEXEC_CORE) instead of #ifdef Replace the conditional compilation using "#ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_CORE" by a check for "IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KEXEC_CORE)", to simplify the code and increase compile coverage. Other than this one Mimi pointed out, this patch looks good to me, thx. Reviewed-by: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com> > > > > > > /** > > * remove_ima_buffer - remove the IMA buffer property and reservation from @fdt > > diff --git a/include/linux/ima.h b/include/linux/ima.h > >
diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig index f6225c9952e8..2cc727125cd6 100644 --- a/arch/x86/Kconfig +++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig @@ -2034,6 +2034,7 @@ config KEXEC_FILE bool "kexec file based system call" select KEXEC_CORE select BUILD_BIN2C + select HAVE_IMA_KEXEC if IMA depends on X86_64 depends on CRYPTO=y depends on CRYPTO_SHA256=y diff --git a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/bootparam.h b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/bootparam.h index bea5cdcdf532..ca0796ac4403 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/bootparam.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/bootparam.h @@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ #define SETUP_APPLE_PROPERTIES 5 #define SETUP_JAILHOUSE 6 #define SETUP_CC_BLOB 7 +#define SETUP_IMA 8 #define SETUP_INDIRECT (1<<31) @@ -172,6 +173,14 @@ struct jailhouse_setup_data { } __attribute__((packed)) v2; } __attribute__((packed)); +/* + * IMA buffer setup data information from the previous kernel during kexec + */ +struct ima_setup_data { + __u64 addr; + __u64 size; +} __attribute__((packed)); + /* The so-called "zeropage" */ struct boot_params { struct screen_info screen_info; /* 0x000 */ diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/e820.c b/arch/x86/kernel/e820.c index f267205f2d5a..9dac24680ff8 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/e820.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/e820.c @@ -1017,10 +1017,10 @@ void __init e820__reserve_setup_data(void) e820__range_update(pa_data, sizeof(*data)+data->len, E820_TYPE_RAM, E820_TYPE_RESERVED_KERN); /* - * SETUP_EFI is supplied by kexec and does not need to be - * reserved. + * SETUP_EFI and SETUP_IMA are supplied by kexec and do not need + * to be reserved. */ - if (data->type != SETUP_EFI) + if (data->type != SETUP_EFI && data->type != SETUP_IMA) e820__range_update_kexec(pa_data, sizeof(*data) + data->len, E820_TYPE_RAM, E820_TYPE_RESERVED_KERN); diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/kexec-bzimage64.c b/arch/x86/kernel/kexec-bzimage64.c index 170d0fd68b1f..c63974e94272 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/kexec-bzimage64.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/kexec-bzimage64.c @@ -186,11 +186,38 @@ setup_efi_state(struct boot_params *params, unsigned long params_load_addr, } #endif /* CONFIG_EFI */ +static void +setup_ima_state(const struct kimage *image, struct boot_params *params, + unsigned long params_load_addr, + unsigned int ima_setup_data_offset) +{ +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_KEXEC + struct setup_data *sd = (void *)params + ima_setup_data_offset; + unsigned long setup_data_phys; + struct ima_setup_data *ima; + + if (!image->ima_buffer_size) + return; + + sd->type = SETUP_IMA; + sd->len = sizeof(*ima); + + ima = (void *)sd + sizeof(struct setup_data); + ima->addr = image->ima_buffer_addr; + ima->size = image->ima_buffer_size; + + /* Add setup data */ + setup_data_phys = params_load_addr + ima_setup_data_offset; + sd->next = params->hdr.setup_data; + params->hdr.setup_data = setup_data_phys; +#endif /* CONFIG_IMA_KEXEC */ +} + static int setup_boot_parameters(struct kimage *image, struct boot_params *params, unsigned long params_load_addr, unsigned int efi_map_offset, unsigned int efi_map_sz, - unsigned int efi_setup_data_offset) + unsigned int setup_data_offset) { unsigned int nr_e820_entries; unsigned long long mem_k, start, end; @@ -245,8 +272,15 @@ setup_boot_parameters(struct kimage *image, struct boot_params *params, #ifdef CONFIG_EFI /* Setup EFI state */ setup_efi_state(params, params_load_addr, efi_map_offset, efi_map_sz, - efi_setup_data_offset); + setup_data_offset); + setup_data_offset += sizeof(struct setup_data) + + sizeof(struct efi_setup_data); #endif + + /* Setup IMA log buffer state */ + setup_ima_state(image, params, params_load_addr, + setup_data_offset); + /* Setup EDD info */ memcpy(params->eddbuf, boot_params.eddbuf, EDDMAXNR * sizeof(struct edd_info)); @@ -403,6 +437,10 @@ static void *bzImage64_load(struct kimage *image, char *kernel, sizeof(struct setup_data) + sizeof(struct efi_setup_data); + if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IMA_KEXEC)) + kbuf.bufsz += sizeof(struct setup_data) + + sizeof(struct ima_setup_data); + params = kzalloc(kbuf.bufsz, GFP_KERNEL); if (!params) return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c b/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c index 3ebb85327edb..2d0dd8b6588a 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c @@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ #include <linux/dma-map-ops.h> #include <linux/dmi.h> #include <linux/efi.h> +#include <linux/ima.h> #include <linux/init_ohci1394_dma.h> #include <linux/initrd.h> #include <linux/iscsi_ibft.h> @@ -145,6 +146,11 @@ __visible unsigned long mmu_cr4_features __ro_after_init; __visible unsigned long mmu_cr4_features __ro_after_init = X86_CR4_PAE; #endif +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA +static phys_addr_t ima_kexec_buffer_phys; +static size_t ima_kexec_buffer_size; +#endif + /* Boot loader ID and version as integers, for the benefit of proc_dointvec */ int bootloader_type, bootloader_version; @@ -335,6 +341,59 @@ static void __init reserve_initrd(void) } #endif /* CONFIG_BLK_DEV_INITRD */ +static void __init add_early_ima_buffer(u64 phys_addr) +{ +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA + struct ima_setup_data *data; + + data = early_memremap(phys_addr + sizeof(struct setup_data), + sizeof(*data)); + if (!data) { + pr_warn("setup: failed to memremap ima_setup_data entry\n"); + return; + } + if (data->size != 0) { + memblock_reserve(data->addr, data->size); + ima_kexec_buffer_phys = data->addr; + ima_kexec_buffer_size = data->size; + } + early_memunmap(data, sizeof(*data)); +#else + pr_warn("Passed IMA kexec data, but CONFIG_IMA not set. Ignoring.\n"); +#endif +} + +#if defined(CONFIG_HAVE_IMA_KEXEC) && !defined(CONFIG_OF_FLATTREE) +int __meminit ima_free_kexec_buffer(void) +{ + int rc; + + if (ima_kexec_buffer_size == 0) + return -ENOENT; + + rc = memblock_phys_free(ima_kexec_buffer_phys, + ima_kexec_buffer_size); + if (rc) + return rc; + + ima_kexec_buffer_phys = 0; + ima_kexec_buffer_size = 0; + + return 0; +} + +int __init ima_get_kexec_buffer(void **addr, size_t *size) +{ + if (ima_kexec_buffer_size == 0) + return -ENOENT; + + *addr = __va(ima_kexec_buffer_phys); + *size = ima_kexec_buffer_size; + + return 0; +} +#endif + static void __init parse_setup_data(void) { struct setup_data *data; @@ -360,6 +419,9 @@ static void __init parse_setup_data(void) case SETUP_EFI: parse_efi_setup(pa_data, data_len); break; + case SETUP_IMA: + add_early_ima_buffer(pa_data); + break; default: break; } diff --git a/drivers/of/kexec.c b/drivers/of/kexec.c index 8d374cc552be..42a6c5721a43 100644 --- a/drivers/of/kexec.c +++ b/drivers/of/kexec.c @@ -9,6 +9,7 @@ * Copyright (C) 2016 IBM Corporation */ +#include <linux/ima.h> #include <linux/kernel.h> #include <linux/kexec.h> #include <linux/memblock.h> @@ -115,6 +116,7 @@ static int do_get_kexec_buffer(const void *prop, int len, unsigned long *addr, return 0; } +#ifdef CONFIG_HAVE_IMA_KEXEC /** * ima_get_kexec_buffer - get IMA buffer from the previous kernel * @addr: On successful return, set to point to the buffer contents. @@ -173,6 +175,7 @@ int ima_free_kexec_buffer(void) return memblock_phys_free(addr, size); } +#endif /** * remove_ima_buffer - remove the IMA buffer property and reservation from @fdt diff --git a/include/linux/ima.h b/include/linux/ima.h index 426b1744215e..ff4bd993e432 100644 --- a/include/linux/ima.h +++ b/include/linux/ima.h @@ -140,6 +140,11 @@ static inline int ima_measure_critical_data(const char *event_label, #endif /* CONFIG_IMA */ +#ifdef CONFIG_HAVE_IMA_KEXEC +int ima_free_kexec_buffer(void); +int ima_get_kexec_buffer(void **addr, size_t *size); +#endif + #ifdef CONFIG_IMA_SECURE_AND_OR_TRUSTED_BOOT extern bool arch_ima_get_secureboot(void); extern const char * const *arch_get_ima_policy(void); diff --git a/include/linux/of.h b/include/linux/of.h index f0a5d6b10c5a..20a4e7cb7afe 100644 --- a/include/linux/of.h +++ b/include/linux/of.h @@ -441,8 +441,6 @@ void *of_kexec_alloc_and_setup_fdt(const struct kimage *image, unsigned long initrd_load_addr, unsigned long initrd_len, const char *cmdline, size_t extra_fdt_size); -int ima_get_kexec_buffer(void **addr, size_t *size); -int ima_free_kexec_buffer(void); #else /* CONFIG_OF */ static inline void of_core_init(void) diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_kexec.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_kexec.c index 13753136f03f..419dc405c831 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_kexec.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_kexec.c @@ -137,7 +137,7 @@ void ima_add_kexec_buffer(struct kimage *image) /* * Restore the measurement list from the previous kernel. */ -void ima_load_kexec_buffer(void) +void __init ima_load_kexec_buffer(void) { void *kexec_buffer = NULL; size_t kexec_buffer_size = 0;
On kexec file load Integrity Measurement Architecture (IMA) subsystem may verify the IMA signature of the kernel and initramfs, and measure it. The command line parameters passed to the kernel in the kexec call may also be measured by IMA. A remote attestation service can verify a TPM quote based on the TPM event log, the IMA measurement list, and the TPM PCR data. This can be achieved only if the IMA measurement log is carried over from the current kernel to the next kernel across the kexec call. powerpc and ARM64 both achieve this using device tree with a "linux,ima-kexec-buffer" node. x86 platforms generally don't make use of device tree, so use the setup_data mechanism to pass the IMA buffer to the new kernel. (Mimi, Baoquan, I haven't included your reviewed-bys because this has changed the compile guards around the ima_(free|get)_kexec_buffer functions in order to fix the warning the kernel test robot found. I think this is the right thing to do and avoids us compiling them on platforms where they won't be used. The alternative would be to drop the guards in ima.h that Mimi requested for v4.) Signed-off-by: Jonathan McDowell <noodles@fb.com> --- v5: - Guard ima_(free|get)_kexec_buffer functions with CONFIG_HAVE_IMA_KEXEC (kernel test robot) - Use setup_data_offset in setup_boot_parameters and update rather than calculating in call to setup_ima_state. v4: - Guard ima.h function prototypes with CONFIG_HAVE_IMA_KEXEC v3: - Rebase on tip/master - Pull ima_(free|get)_kexec_buffer into x86 code - Push ifdefs into functions where possible - Reverse fir tree variable declarations - Fix section annotation on ima_free_kexec_buffer (__meminit) - Only allocate ima_setup_data space when IMA_KEXEC is enabled v2: - Fix operation with EFI systems --- arch/x86/Kconfig | 1 + arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/bootparam.h | 9 ++++ arch/x86/kernel/e820.c | 6 +-- arch/x86/kernel/kexec-bzimage64.c | 42 +++++++++++++++++- arch/x86/kernel/setup.c | 62 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++ drivers/of/kexec.c | 3 ++ include/linux/ima.h | 5 +++ include/linux/of.h | 2 - security/integrity/ima/ima_kexec.c | 2 +- 9 files changed, 124 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)