diff mbox series

[v4] hw_random: use add_hwgenerator_randomness() for early entropy

Message ID 20221108112413.199669-1-Jason@zx2c4.com (mailing list archive)
State Not Applicable
Delegated to: Herbert Xu
Headers show
Series [v4] hw_random: use add_hwgenerator_randomness() for early entropy | expand

Commit Message

Jason A. Donenfeld Nov. 8, 2022, 11:24 a.m. UTC 
Rather than calling add_device_randomness(), the add_early_randomness()
function should use add_hwgenerator_randomness(), so that the early
entropy can be potentially credited, which allows for the RNG to
initialize earlier without having to wait for the kthread to come up.

This requires some minor API refactoring, by adding a `sleep_after`
parameter to add_hwgenerator_randomness(), so that we don't hit a
blocking sleep from add_early_randomness().

Reviewed-by: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net>
Acked-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
---
Changes v3->v4:
- Check `sleep_after` argument before calling `kthread_should_stop()` to
  avoid crash when not called from a kthread.

 drivers/char/hw_random/core.c |  8 +++++---
 drivers/char/random.c         | 12 ++++++------
 include/linux/random.h        |  2 +-
 3 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)

Comments

AngeloGioacchino Del Regno Nov. 8, 2022, 11:44 a.m. UTC | #1 
Il 08/11/22 12:24, Jason A. Donenfeld ha scritto:
> Rather than calling add_device_randomness(), the add_early_randomness()
> function should use add_hwgenerator_randomness(), so that the early
> entropy can be potentially credited, which allows for the RNG to
> initialize earlier without having to wait for the kthread to come up.
> 
> This requires some minor API refactoring, by adding a `sleep_after`
> parameter to add_hwgenerator_randomness(), so that we don't hit a
> blocking sleep from add_early_randomness().
> 
> Reviewed-by: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net>
> Acked-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
> Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>

Reviewed-by: AngeloGioacchino Del Regno <angelogioacchino.delregno@collabora.com>

On MT8192 Asurada, MT8195 Tomato Chromebooks:
Tested-by: AngeloGioacchino Del Regno <angelogioacchino.delregno@collabora.com>

Thanks for the fast fix!

Regards,
Angelo
Marek Szyprowski Nov. 8, 2022, 10:05 p.m. UTC | #2 
On 08.11.2022 12:44, AngeloGioacchino Del Regno wrote:
> Il 08/11/22 12:24, Jason A. Donenfeld ha scritto:
>> Rather than calling add_device_randomness(), the add_early_randomness()
>> function should use add_hwgenerator_randomness(), so that the early
>> entropy can be potentially credited, which allows for the RNG to
>> initialize earlier without having to wait for the kthread to come up.
>>
>> This requires some minor API refactoring, by adding a `sleep_after`
>> parameter to add_hwgenerator_randomness(), so that we don't hit a
>> blocking sleep from add_early_randomness().
>>
>> Reviewed-by: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net>
>> Acked-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
>> Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
>
> Reviewed-by: AngeloGioacchino Del Regno 
> <angelogioacchino.delregno@collabora.com>
>
> On MT8192 Asurada, MT8195 Tomato Chromebooks:
> Tested-by: AngeloGioacchino Del Regno 
> <angelogioacchino.delregno@collabora.com>
>
> Thanks for the fast fix!

I also confirm that this version fixed the boot issue observed on most 
of my test systems with Linux next-20221108.

Tested-by: Marek Szyprowski <m.szyprowski@samsung.com>

Best regards
diff mbox series

Patch

diff --git a/drivers/char/hw_random/core.c b/drivers/char/hw_random/core.c
index cc002b0c2f0c..63a0a8e4505d 100644
--- a/drivers/char/hw_random/core.c
+++ b/drivers/char/hw_random/core.c
@@ -69,8 +69,10 @@  static void add_early_randomness(struct hwrng *rng)
 	mutex_lock(&reading_mutex);
 	bytes_read = rng_get_data(rng, rng_fillbuf, 32, 0);
 	mutex_unlock(&reading_mutex);
-	if (bytes_read > 0)
-		add_device_randomness(rng_fillbuf, bytes_read);
+	if (bytes_read > 0) {
+		size_t entropy = bytes_read * 8 * rng->quality / 1024;
+		add_hwgenerator_randomness(rng_fillbuf, bytes_read, entropy, false);
+	}
 }
 
 static inline void cleanup_rng(struct kref *kref)
@@ -528,7 +530,7 @@  static int hwrng_fillfn(void *unused)
 
 		/* Outside lock, sure, but y'know: randomness. */
 		add_hwgenerator_randomness((void *)rng_fillbuf, rc,
-					   entropy >> 10);
+					   entropy >> 10, true);
 	}
 	hwrng_fill = NULL;
 	return 0;
diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c
index 4591d55cb135..6b7aca683b81 100644
--- a/drivers/char/random.c
+++ b/drivers/char/random.c
@@ -711,7 +711,7 @@  static void __cold _credit_init_bits(size_t bits)
  * the above entropy accumulation routines:
  *
  *	void add_device_randomness(const void *buf, size_t len);
- *	void add_hwgenerator_randomness(const void *buf, size_t len, size_t entropy);
+ *	void add_hwgenerator_randomness(const void *buf, size_t len, size_t entropy, bool sleep_after);
  *	void add_bootloader_randomness(const void *buf, size_t len);
  *	void add_vmfork_randomness(const void *unique_vm_id, size_t len);
  *	void add_interrupt_randomness(int irq);
@@ -891,11 +891,11 @@  void add_device_randomness(const void *buf, size_t len)
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(add_device_randomness);
 
 /*
- * Interface for in-kernel drivers of true hardware RNGs.
- * Those devices may produce endless random bits and will be throttled
- * when our pool is full.
+ * Interface for in-kernel drivers of true hardware RNGs. Those devices
+ * may produce endless random bits, so this function will sleep for
+ * some amount of time after, if the sleep_after parameter is true.
  */
-void add_hwgenerator_randomness(const void *buf, size_t len, size_t entropy)
+void add_hwgenerator_randomness(const void *buf, size_t len, size_t entropy, bool sleep_after)
 {
 	mix_pool_bytes(buf, len);
 	credit_init_bits(entropy);
@@ -904,7 +904,7 @@  void add_hwgenerator_randomness(const void *buf, size_t len, size_t entropy)
 	 * Throttle writing to once every reseed interval, unless we're not yet
 	 * initialized or no entropy is credited.
 	 */
-	if (!kthread_should_stop() && (crng_ready() || !entropy))
+	if (sleep_after && !kthread_should_stop() && (crng_ready() || !entropy))
 		schedule_timeout_interruptible(crng_reseed_interval());
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(add_hwgenerator_randomness);
diff --git a/include/linux/random.h b/include/linux/random.h
index 2bdd3add3400..728b29ade208 100644
--- a/include/linux/random.h
+++ b/include/linux/random.h
@@ -17,7 +17,7 @@  void __init add_bootloader_randomness(const void *buf, size_t len);
 void add_input_randomness(unsigned int type, unsigned int code,
 			  unsigned int value) __latent_entropy;
 void add_interrupt_randomness(int irq) __latent_entropy;
-void add_hwgenerator_randomness(const void *buf, size_t len, size_t entropy);
+void add_hwgenerator_randomness(const void *buf, size_t len, size_t entropy, bool sleep_after);
 
 #if defined(LATENT_ENTROPY_PLUGIN) && !defined(__CHECKER__)
 static inline void add_latent_entropy(void)