diff mbox series

[net-next,2/5] tls: block decryption when a rekey is pending

Message ID c2f6961dd1d90d8fed0eb55fe3a1b9d98814ce60.1673952268.git.sd@queasysnail.net (mailing list archive)
State Changes Requested
Delegated to: Netdev Maintainers
Headers show
Series tls: implement key updates for TLS1.3 | expand

Checks

Context Check Description
netdev/tree_selection success Clearly marked for net-next
netdev/fixes_present success Fixes tag not required for -next series
netdev/subject_prefix success Link
netdev/cover_letter success Series has a cover letter
netdev/patch_count success Link
netdev/header_inline success No static functions without inline keyword in header files
netdev/build_32bit success Errors and warnings before: 57 this patch: 57
netdev/cc_maintainers fail 6 maintainers not CCed: edumazet@google.com borisp@nvidia.com davem@davemloft.net kuba@kernel.org pabeni@redhat.com john.fastabend@gmail.com
netdev/build_clang success Errors and warnings before: 3 this patch: 3
netdev/module_param success Was 0 now: 0
netdev/verify_signedoff success Signed-off-by tag matches author and committer
netdev/check_selftest success No net selftest shell script
netdev/verify_fixes success No Fixes tag
netdev/build_allmodconfig_warn success Errors and warnings before: 57 this patch: 57
netdev/checkpatch success total: 0 errors, 0 warnings, 0 checks, 92 lines checked
netdev/kdoc success Errors and warnings before: 0 this patch: 0
netdev/source_inline success Was 0 now: 0

Commit Message

Sabrina Dubroca Jan. 17, 2023, 1:45 p.m. UTC 
When a TLS handshake record carrying a KeyUpdate message is received,
all subsequent records will be encrypted with a new key. We need to
stop decrypting incoming records with the old key, and wait until
userspace provides a new key.

Make a note of this in the RX context just after decrypting that
record, and stop recvmsg/splice calls with EKEYEXPIRED until the new
key is available.

Signed-off-by: Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net>
Tested-by: Frantisek Krenzelok <fkrenzel@redhat.com>
---
 include/net/tls.h |  4 ++++
 net/tls/tls_sw.c  | 44 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 2 files changed, 48 insertions(+)

Comments

Apoorv Kothari Jan. 19, 2023, 2:10 a.m. UTC | #1 
> 2023-01-17, 18:03:51 -0800, Jakub Kicinski wrote:
> > Please CC all the maintainers.
> 
> Sorry.
> 
> > On Tue, 17 Jan 2023 14:45:26 +0100 Sabrina Dubroca wrote:
> > > This adds support for receiving KeyUpdate messages (RFC 8446, 4.6.3
> > > [1]). A sender transmits a KeyUpdate message and then changes its TX
> > > key. The receiver should react by updating its RX key before
> > > processing the next message.
> > > 
> > > This patchset implements key updates by:
> > >  1. pausing decryption when a KeyUpdate message is received, to avoid
> > >     attempting to use the old key to decrypt a record encrypted with
> > >     the new key
> > >  2. returning -EKEYEXPIRED to syscalls that cannot receive the
> > >     KeyUpdate message, until the rekey has been performed by userspace
> > 
> > Why? We return to user space after hitting a cmsg, don't we?
> > If the user space wants to keep reading with the old key -
diff mbox series

Patch

diff --git a/include/net/tls.h b/include/net/tls.h
index 154949c7b0c8..297732f23804 100644
--- a/include/net/tls.h
+++ b/include/net/tls.h
@@ -69,8 +69,11 @@  extern const struct tls_cipher_size_desc tls_cipher_size_desc[];
 
 #define TLS_CRYPTO_INFO_READY(info)	((info)->cipher_type)
 
+#define TLS_RECORD_TYPE_HANDSHAKE	0x16
 #define TLS_RECORD_TYPE_DATA		0x17
 
+#define TLS_HANDSHAKE_KEYUPDATE		24	/* rfc8446 B.3: Key update */
+
 #define TLS_AAD_SPACE_SIZE		13
 
 #define MAX_IV_SIZE			16
@@ -145,6 +148,7 @@  struct tls_sw_context_rx {
 
 	struct tls_strparser strp;
 
+	bool key_update_pending;
 	atomic_t decrypt_pending;
 	/* protect crypto_wait with decrypt_pending*/
 	spinlock_t decrypt_compl_lock;
diff --git a/net/tls/tls_sw.c b/net/tls/tls_sw.c
index 238562f9081b..22efea224a04 100644
--- a/net/tls/tls_sw.c
+++ b/net/tls/tls_sw.c
@@ -1686,6 +1686,33 @@  tls_decrypt_device(struct sock *sk, struct msghdr *msg,
 	return 1;
 }
 
+static int tls_check_pending_rekey(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
+{
+	const struct tls_msg *tlm = tls_msg(skb);
+	const struct strp_msg *rxm = strp_msg(skb);
+
+	if (tlm->control == TLS_RECORD_TYPE_HANDSHAKE) {
+		char hs_type;
+		int err;
+
+		if (rxm->full_len < 1)
+			return -EINVAL;
+
+		err = skb_copy_bits(skb, rxm->offset, &hs_type, 1);
+		if (err < 0)
+			return err;
+
+		if (hs_type == TLS_HANDSHAKE_KEYUPDATE) {
+			struct tls_context *ctx = tls_get_ctx(sk);
+			struct tls_sw_context_rx *rx_ctx = ctx->priv_ctx_rx;
+
+			rx_ctx->key_update_pending = true;
+		}
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
 static int tls_rx_one_record(struct sock *sk, struct msghdr *msg,
 			     struct tls_decrypt_arg *darg)
 {
@@ -1705,6 +1732,10 @@  static int tls_rx_one_record(struct sock *sk, struct msghdr *msg,
 	rxm->full_len -= prot->overhead_size;
 	tls_advance_record_sn(sk, prot, &tls_ctx->rx);
 
+	err = tls_check_pending_rekey(sk, darg->skb);
+	if (err < 0)
+		return err;
+
 	return 0;
 }
 
@@ -1956,6 +1987,12 @@  int tls_sw_recvmsg(struct sock *sk,
 		struct tls_decrypt_arg darg;
 		int to_decrypt, chunk;
 
+		/* a rekey is pending, let userspace deal with it */
+		if (unlikely(ctx->key_update_pending)) {
+			err = -EKEYEXPIRED;
+			break;
+		}
+
 		err = tls_rx_rec_wait(sk, psock, flags & MSG_DONTWAIT,
 				      released);
 		if (err <= 0) {
@@ -2140,6 +2177,12 @@  ssize_t tls_sw_splice_read(struct socket *sock,  loff_t *ppos,
 	if (err < 0)
 		return err;
 
+	/* a rekey is pending, let userspace deal with it */
+	if (unlikely(ctx->key_update_pending)) {
+		err = -EKEYEXPIRED;
+		goto splice_read_end;
+	}
+
 	if (!skb_queue_empty(&ctx->rx_list)) {
 		skb = __skb_dequeue(&ctx->rx_list);
 	} else {
@@ -2521,6 +2564,7 @@  int tls_set_sw_offload(struct sock *sk, int tx)
 		skb_queue_head_init(&sw_ctx_rx->rx_list);
 		skb_queue_head_init(&sw_ctx_rx->async_hold);
 		aead = &sw_ctx_rx->aead_recv;
+		sw_ctx_rx->key_update_pending = false;
 	}
 
 	switch (crypto_info->cipher_type) {