| Message ID | 20221227142740.2807136-3-roberto.sassu@huaweicloud.com (mailing list archive) |
|---|---|
| State | New |
| Headers | show |
| Series | KEYS: asymmetric: Copy sig and digest in public_key_verify_signature() | expand |
On Tue, Dec 27, 2022 at 03:27:40PM +0100, Roberto Sassu wrote: > From: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com> > > Commit ac4e97abce9b8 ("scatterlist: sg_set_buf() argument must be in linear > mapping") checks that both the signature and the digest reside in the > linear mapping area. > > However, more recently commit ba14a194a434c ("fork: Add generic vmalloced > stack support") made it possible to move the stack in the vmalloc area, > which is not contiguous, and thus not suitable for sg_set_buf() which needs > adjacent pages. > > Always make a copy of the signature and digest in the same buffer used to > store the key and its parameters, and pass them to sg_init_one(). Prefer it > to conditionally doing the copy if necessary, to keep the code simple. The > buffer allocated with kmalloc() is in the linear mapping area. > > Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.9.x > Fixes: ba14a194a434 ("fork: Add generic vmalloced stack support") > Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-integrity/Y4pIpxbjBdajymBJ@sol.localdomain/ > Suggested-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org> > Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com> > --- > crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c | 38 ++++++++++++++++------------- > 1 file changed, 21 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-) Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> - Eric
On Thu, 2022-12-29 at 14:39 -0800, Eric Biggers wrote: > On Tue, Dec 27, 2022 at 03:27:40PM +0100, Roberto Sassu wrote: > > From: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com> > > > > Commit ac4e97abce9b8 ("scatterlist: sg_set_buf() argument must be in linear > > mapping") checks that both the signature and the digest reside in the > > linear mapping area. > > > > However, more recently commit ba14a194a434c ("fork: Add generic vmalloced > > stack support") made it possible to move the stack in the vmalloc area, > > which is not contiguous, and thus not suitable for sg_set_buf() which needs > > adjacent pages. > > > > Always make a copy of the signature and digest in the same buffer used to > > store the key and its parameters, and pass them to sg_init_one(). Prefer it > > to conditionally doing the copy if necessary, to keep the code simple. The > > buffer allocated with kmalloc() is in the linear mapping area. > > > > Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.9.x > > Fixes: ba14a194a434 ("fork: Add generic vmalloced stack support") > > Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-integrity/Y4pIpxbjBdajymBJ@sol.localdomain/ > > Suggested-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org> > > Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com> > > --- > > crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c | 38 ++++++++++++++++------------- > > 1 file changed, 21 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-) > > Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Hi David could you please take this patch in your repo, if it is ok? Thanks Roberto
On Fri, 2023-01-27 at 09:27 +0100, Roberto Sassu wrote: > On Thu, 2022-12-29 at 14:39 -0800, Eric Biggers wrote: > > On Tue, Dec 27, 2022 at 03:27:40PM +0100, Roberto Sassu wrote: > > > From: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com> > > > > > > Commit ac4e97abce9b8 ("scatterlist: sg_set_buf() argument must be in linear > > > mapping") checks that both the signature and the digest reside in the > > > linear mapping area. > > > > > > However, more recently commit ba14a194a434c ("fork: Add generic vmalloced > > > stack support") made it possible to move the stack in the vmalloc area, > > > which is not contiguous, and thus not suitable for sg_set_buf() which needs > > > adjacent pages. > > > > > > Always make a copy of the signature and digest in the same buffer used to > > > store the key and its parameters, and pass them to sg_init_one(). Prefer it > > > to conditionally doing the copy if necessary, to keep the code simple. The > > > buffer allocated with kmalloc() is in the linear mapping area. > > > > > > Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.9.x > > > Fixes: ba14a194a434 ("fork: Add generic vmalloced stack support") > > > Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-integrity/Y4pIpxbjBdajymBJ@sol.localdomain/ > > > Suggested-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org> > > > Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com> > > > --- > > > crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c | 38 ++++++++++++++++------------- > > > 1 file changed, 21 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-) > > > > Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> > > Hi David > > could you please take this patch in your repo, if it is ok? Kindly ask your support here. Has this patch been queued somewhere? Wasn't able to find it, also it is not in linux-next. Thanks Roberto
On Thu, Feb 09, 2023 at 11:49:19AM +0100, Roberto Sassu wrote: > On Fri, 2023-01-27 at 09:27 +0100, Roberto Sassu wrote: > > On Thu, 2022-12-29 at 14:39 -0800, Eric Biggers wrote: > > > On Tue, Dec 27, 2022 at 03:27:40PM +0100, Roberto Sassu wrote: > > > > From: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com> > > > > > > > > Commit ac4e97abce9b8 ("scatterlist: sg_set_buf() argument must be in linear > > > > mapping") checks that both the signature and the digest reside in the > > > > linear mapping area. > > > > > > > > However, more recently commit ba14a194a434c ("fork: Add generic vmalloced > > > > stack support") made it possible to move the stack in the vmalloc area, > > > > which is not contiguous, and thus not suitable for sg_set_buf() which needs > > > > adjacent pages. > > > > > > > > Always make a copy of the signature and digest in the same buffer used to > > > > store the key and its parameters, and pass them to sg_init_one(). Prefer it > > > > to conditionally doing the copy if necessary, to keep the code simple. The > > > > buffer allocated with kmalloc() is in the linear mapping area. > > > > > > > > Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.9.x > > > > Fixes: ba14a194a434 ("fork: Add generic vmalloced stack support") > > > > Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-integrity/Y4pIpxbjBdajymBJ@sol.localdomain/ > > > > Suggested-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org> > > > > Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com> > > > > --- > > > > crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c | 38 ++++++++++++++++------------- > > > > 1 file changed, 21 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-) > > > > > > Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> > > > > Hi David > > > > could you please take this patch in your repo, if it is ok? > > Kindly ask your support here. Has this patch been queued somewhere? > Wasn't able to find it, also it is not in linux-next. > The maintainer of asymmetric_keys (David Howells) is ignoring this patch, so you'll need to find someone else to apply it. Herbert Xu, the maintainer of the crypto subsystem, might be willing to apply it. Or maybe Jarkko Sakkinen, who is a co-maintainer of the keyrings subsystem (but not asymmetric_keys, for some reason; should that change?). - Eric
On Thu, Feb 9, 2023 at 1:53 PM Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org> wrote: > On Thu, Feb 09, 2023 at 11:49:19AM +0100, Roberto Sassu wrote: > > On Fri, 2023-01-27 at 09:27 +0100, Roberto Sassu wrote: > > > On Thu, 2022-12-29 at 14:39 -0800, Eric Biggers wrote: > > > > On Tue, Dec 27, 2022 at 03:27:40PM +0100, Roberto Sassu wrote: > > > > > From: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com> > > > > > > > > > > Commit ac4e97abce9b8 ("scatterlist: sg_set_buf() argument must be in linear > > > > > mapping") checks that both the signature and the digest reside in the > > > > > linear mapping area. > > > > > > > > > > However, more recently commit ba14a194a434c ("fork: Add generic vmalloced > > > > > stack support") made it possible to move the stack in the vmalloc area, > > > > > which is not contiguous, and thus not suitable for sg_set_buf() which needs > > > > > adjacent pages. > > > > > > > > > > Always make a copy of the signature and digest in the same buffer used to > > > > > store the key and its parameters, and pass them to sg_init_one(). Prefer it > > > > > to conditionally doing the copy if necessary, to keep the code simple. The > > > > > buffer allocated with kmalloc() is in the linear mapping area. > > > > > > > > > > Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.9.x > > > > > Fixes: ba14a194a434 ("fork: Add generic vmalloced stack support") > > > > > Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-integrity/Y4pIpxbjBdajymBJ@sol.localdomain/ > > > > > Suggested-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org> > > > > > Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com> > > > > > --- > > > > > crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c | 38 ++++++++++++++++------------- > > > > > 1 file changed, 21 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-) > > > > > > > > Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> > > > > > > Hi David > > > > > > could you please take this patch in your repo, if it is ok? > > > > Kindly ask your support here. Has this patch been queued somewhere? > > Wasn't able to find it, also it is not in linux-next. > > > > The maintainer of asymmetric_keys (David Howells) is ignoring this patch, so > you'll need to find someone else to apply it. Herbert Xu, the maintainer of the > crypto subsystem, might be willing to apply it. Or maybe Jarkko Sakkinen, who > is a co-maintainer of the keyrings subsystem (but not asymmetric_keys, for some > reason; should that change?). It is problematic that David isn't replying to this. I have no idea if it will work, but I just reached out to him to see if I can draw his attention back to this ... -- paul-moore.com
On Thu, Feb 09, 2023 at 06:53:37PM +0000, Eric Biggers wrote: > On Thu, Feb 09, 2023 at 11:49:19AM +0100, Roberto Sassu wrote: > > On Fri, 2023-01-27 at 09:27 +0100, Roberto Sassu wrote: > > > On Thu, 2022-12-29 at 14:39 -0800, Eric Biggers wrote: > > > > On Tue, Dec 27, 2022 at 03:27:40PM +0100, Roberto Sassu wrote: > > > > > From: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com> > > > > > > > > > > Commit ac4e97abce9b8 ("scatterlist: sg_set_buf() argument must be in linear > > > > > mapping") checks that both the signature and the digest reside in the > > > > > linear mapping area. > > > > > > > > > > However, more recently commit ba14a194a434c ("fork: Add generic vmalloced > > > > > stack support") made it possible to move the stack in the vmalloc area, > > > > > which is not contiguous, and thus not suitable for sg_set_buf() which needs > > > > > adjacent pages. > > > > > > > > > > Always make a copy of the signature and digest in the same buffer used to > > > > > store the key and its parameters, and pass them to sg_init_one(). Prefer it > > > > > to conditionally doing the copy if necessary, to keep the code simple. The > > > > > buffer allocated with kmalloc() is in the linear mapping area. > > > > > > > > > > Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.9.x > > > > > Fixes: ba14a194a434 ("fork: Add generic vmalloced stack support") > > > > > Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-integrity/Y4pIpxbjBdajymBJ@sol.localdomain/ > > > > > Suggested-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org> > > > > > Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com> > > > > > --- > > > > > crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c | 38 ++++++++++++++++------------- > > > > > 1 file changed, 21 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-) > > > > > > > > Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> > > > > > > Hi David > > > > > > could you please take this patch in your repo, if it is ok? > > > > Kindly ask your support here. Has this patch been queued somewhere? > > Wasn't able to find it, also it is not in linux-next. > > > > The maintainer of asymmetric_keys (David Howells) is ignoring this patch, so > you'll need to find someone else to apply it. Herbert Xu, the maintainer of the > crypto subsystem, might be willing to apply it. Or maybe Jarkko Sakkinen, who > is a co-maintainer of the keyrings subsystem (but not asymmetric_keys, for some > reason; should that change?). I can apply this if no objections? BR, Jarkko
On Thu, Feb 09, 2023 at 05:46:32PM -0500, Paul Moore wrote: > On Thu, Feb 9, 2023 at 1:53 PM Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org> wrote: > > On Thu, Feb 09, 2023 at 11:49:19AM +0100, Roberto Sassu wrote: > > > On Fri, 2023-01-27 at 09:27 +0100, Roberto Sassu wrote: > > > > On Thu, 2022-12-29 at 14:39 -0800, Eric Biggers wrote: > > > > > On Tue, Dec 27, 2022 at 03:27:40PM +0100, Roberto Sassu wrote: > > > > > > From: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com> > > > > > > > > > > > > Commit ac4e97abce9b8 ("scatterlist: sg_set_buf() argument must be in linear > > > > > > mapping") checks that both the signature and the digest reside in the > > > > > > linear mapping area. > > > > > > > > > > > > However, more recently commit ba14a194a434c ("fork: Add generic vmalloced > > > > > > stack support") made it possible to move the stack in the vmalloc area, > > > > > > which is not contiguous, and thus not suitable for sg_set_buf() which needs > > > > > > adjacent pages. > > > > > > > > > > > > Always make a copy of the signature and digest in the same buffer used to > > > > > > store the key and its parameters, and pass them to sg_init_one(). Prefer it > > > > > > to conditionally doing the copy if necessary, to keep the code simple. The > > > > > > buffer allocated with kmalloc() is in the linear mapping area. > > > > > > > > > > > > Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.9.x > > > > > > Fixes: ba14a194a434 ("fork: Add generic vmalloced stack support") > > > > > > Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-integrity/Y4pIpxbjBdajymBJ@sol.localdomain/ > > > > > > Suggested-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org> > > > > > > Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com> > > > > > > --- > > > > > > crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c | 38 ++++++++++++++++------------- > > > > > > 1 file changed, 21 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-) > > > > > > > > > > Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> > > > > > > > > Hi David > > > > > > > > could you please take this patch in your repo, if it is ok? > > > > > > Kindly ask your support here. Has this patch been queued somewhere? > > > Wasn't able to find it, also it is not in linux-next. > > > > > > > The maintainer of asymmetric_keys (David Howells) is ignoring this patch, so > > you'll need to find someone else to apply it. Herbert Xu, the maintainer of the > > crypto subsystem, might be willing to apply it. Or maybe Jarkko Sakkinen, who > > is a co-maintainer of the keyrings subsystem (but not asymmetric_keys, for some > > reason; should that change?). > > It is problematic that David isn't replying to this. I have no idea > if it will work, but I just reached out to him to see if I can draw > his attention back to this ... See my response to Eric. BR, Jarkko
On Thu, Feb 9, 2023 at 10:56 PM Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> wrote: > On Thu, Feb 09, 2023 at 05:46:32PM -0500, Paul Moore wrote: > > On Thu, Feb 9, 2023 at 1:53 PM Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org> wrote: > > > On Thu, Feb 09, 2023 at 11:49:19AM +0100, Roberto Sassu wrote: > > > > On Fri, 2023-01-27 at 09:27 +0100, Roberto Sassu wrote: > > > > > On Thu, 2022-12-29 at 14:39 -0800, Eric Biggers wrote: > > > > > > On Tue, Dec 27, 2022 at 03:27:40PM +0100, Roberto Sassu wrote: > > > > > > > From: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Commit ac4e97abce9b8 ("scatterlist: sg_set_buf() argument must be in linear > > > > > > > mapping") checks that both the signature and the digest reside in the > > > > > > > linear mapping area. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > However, more recently commit ba14a194a434c ("fork: Add generic vmalloced > > > > > > > stack support") made it possible to move the stack in the vmalloc area, > > > > > > > which is not contiguous, and thus not suitable for sg_set_buf() which needs > > > > > > > adjacent pages. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Always make a copy of the signature and digest in the same buffer used to > > > > > > > store the key and its parameters, and pass them to sg_init_one(). Prefer it > > > > > > > to conditionally doing the copy if necessary, to keep the code simple. The > > > > > > > buffer allocated with kmalloc() is in the linear mapping area. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.9.x > > > > > > > Fixes: ba14a194a434 ("fork: Add generic vmalloced stack support") > > > > > > > Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-integrity/Y4pIpxbjBdajymBJ@sol.localdomain/ > > > > > > > Suggested-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org> > > > > > > > Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com> > > > > > > > --- > > > > > > > crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c | 38 ++++++++++++++++------------- > > > > > > > 1 file changed, 21 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-) > > > > > > > > > > > > Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> > > > > > > > > > > Hi David > > > > > > > > > > could you please take this patch in your repo, if it is ok? > > > > > > > > Kindly ask your support here. Has this patch been queued somewhere? > > > > Wasn't able to find it, also it is not in linux-next. > > > > > > > > > > The maintainer of asymmetric_keys (David Howells) is ignoring this patch, so > > > you'll need to find someone else to apply it. Herbert Xu, the maintainer of the > > > crypto subsystem, might be willing to apply it. Or maybe Jarkko Sakkinen, who > > > is a co-maintainer of the keyrings subsystem (but not asymmetric_keys, for some > > > reason; should that change?). > > > > It is problematic that David isn't replying to this. I have no idea > > if it will work, but I just reached out to him to see if I can draw > > his attention back to this ... > > See my response to Eric. Thanks Jarkko.
On Fri, 2023-02-10 at 05:52 +0200, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote: > On Thu, Feb 09, 2023 at 06:53:37PM +0000, Eric Biggers wrote: > > On Thu, Feb 09, 2023 at 11:49:19AM +0100, Roberto Sassu wrote: > > > On Fri, 2023-01-27 at 09:27 +0100, Roberto Sassu wrote: > > > > On Thu, 2022-12-29 at 14:39 -0800, Eric Biggers wrote: > > > > > On Tue, Dec 27, 2022 at 03:27:40PM +0100, Roberto Sassu wrote: > > > > > > From: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com> > > > > > > > > > > > > Commit ac4e97abce9b8 ("scatterlist: sg_set_buf() argument must be in linear > > > > > > mapping") checks that both the signature and the digest reside in the > > > > > > linear mapping area. > > > > > > > > > > > > However, more recently commit ba14a194a434c ("fork: Add generic vmalloced > > > > > > stack support") made it possible to move the stack in the vmalloc area, > > > > > > which is not contiguous, and thus not suitable for sg_set_buf() which needs > > > > > > adjacent pages. > > > > > > > > > > > > Always make a copy of the signature and digest in the same buffer used to > > > > > > store the key and its parameters, and pass them to sg_init_one(). Prefer it > > > > > > to conditionally doing the copy if necessary, to keep the code simple. The > > > > > > buffer allocated with kmalloc() is in the linear mapping area. > > > > > > > > > > > > Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.9.x > > > > > > Fixes: ba14a194a434 ("fork: Add generic vmalloced stack support") > > > > > > Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-integrity/Y4pIpxbjBdajymBJ@sol.localdomain/ > > > > > > Suggested-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org> > > > > > > Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com> > > > > > > --- > > > > > > crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c | 38 ++++++++++++++++------------- > > > > > > 1 file changed, 21 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-) > > > > > > > > > > Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> > > > > > > > > Hi David > > > > > > > > could you please take this patch in your repo, if it is ok? > > > > > > Kindly ask your support here. Has this patch been queued somewhere? > > > Wasn't able to find it, also it is not in linux-next. > > > > > > > The maintainer of asymmetric_keys (David Howells) is ignoring this patch, so > > you'll need to find someone else to apply it. Herbert Xu, the maintainer of the > > crypto subsystem, might be willing to apply it. Or maybe Jarkko Sakkinen, who > > is a co-maintainer of the keyrings subsystem (but not asymmetric_keys, for some > > reason; should that change?). > > I can apply this if no objections? Hi Jarkko I wasn't able to reach David about this patch. Could you please apply it? Thanks Roberto
On 12/27/22 09:27, Roberto Sassu wrote: > From: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com> > > Commit ac4e97abce9b8 ("scatterlist: sg_set_buf() argument must be in linear > mapping") checks that both the signature and the digest reside in the > linear mapping area. > > However, more recently commit ba14a194a434c ("fork: Add generic vmalloced > stack support") made it possible to move the stack in the vmalloc area, > which is not contiguous, and thus not suitable for sg_set_buf() which needs > adjacent pages. > > Always make a copy of the signature and digest in the same buffer used to > store the key and its parameters, and pass them to sg_init_one(). Prefer it > to conditionally doing the copy if necessary, to keep the code simple. The > buffer allocated with kmalloc() is in the linear mapping area. > > Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.9.x > Fixes: ba14a194a434 ("fork: Add generic vmalloced stack support") > Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-integrity/Y4pIpxbjBdajymBJ@sol.localdomain/ > Suggested-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org> > Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com> > Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> I just ran into an issue with OpenBMC on ARM where EVM ECDSA signature verification failed due to invalid hashes being passed to the ECDSA signature verification algorithm. This patch here resolved the issue. Tested-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com> > --- > crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c | 38 ++++++++++++++++------------- > 1 file changed, 21 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-) > > diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c > index 2f8352e88860..49a3f7c01149 100644 > --- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c > +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c > @@ -360,9 +360,10 @@ int public_key_verify_signature(const struct public_key *pkey, > struct crypto_wait cwait; > struct crypto_akcipher *tfm; > struct akcipher_request *req; > - struct scatterlist src_sg[2]; > + struct scatterlist src_sg; > char alg_name[CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME]; > - char *key, *ptr; > + char *buf, *ptr; > + size_t buf_len; > int ret; > > pr_devel("==>%s()\n", __func__); > @@ -400,34 +401,37 @@ int public_key_verify_signature(const struct public_key *pkey, > if (!req) > goto error_free_tfm; > > - key = kmalloc(pkey->keylen + sizeof(u32) * 2 + pkey->paramlen, > - GFP_KERNEL); > - if (!key) > + buf_len = max_t(size_t, pkey->keylen + sizeof(u32) * 2 + pkey->paramlen, > + sig->s_size + sig->digest_size); > + > + buf = kmalloc(buf_len, GFP_KERNEL); > + if (!buf) > goto error_free_req; > > - memcpy(key, pkey->key, pkey->keylen); > - ptr = key + pkey->keylen; > + memcpy(buf, pkey->key, pkey->keylen); > + ptr = buf + pkey->keylen; > ptr = pkey_pack_u32(ptr, pkey->algo); > ptr = pkey_pack_u32(ptr, pkey->paramlen); > memcpy(ptr, pkey->params, pkey->paramlen); > > if (pkey->key_is_private) > - ret = crypto_akcipher_set_priv_key(tfm, key, pkey->keylen); > + ret = crypto_akcipher_set_priv_key(tfm, buf, pkey->keylen); > else > - ret = crypto_akcipher_set_pub_key(tfm, key, pkey->keylen); > + ret = crypto_akcipher_set_pub_key(tfm, buf, pkey->keylen); > if (ret) > - goto error_free_key; > + goto error_free_buf; > > if (strcmp(pkey->pkey_algo, "sm2") == 0 && sig->data_size) { > ret = cert_sig_digest_update(sig, tfm); > if (ret) > - goto error_free_key; > + goto error_free_buf; > } > > - sg_init_table(src_sg, 2); > - sg_set_buf(&src_sg[0], sig->s, sig->s_size); > - sg_set_buf(&src_sg[1], sig->digest, sig->digest_size); > - akcipher_request_set_crypt(req, src_sg, NULL, sig->s_size, > + memcpy(buf, sig->s, sig->s_size); > + memcpy(buf + sig->s_size, sig->digest, sig->digest_size); > + > + sg_init_one(&src_sg, buf, sig->s_size + sig->digest_size); > + akcipher_request_set_crypt(req, &src_sg, NULL, sig->s_size, > sig->digest_size); > crypto_init_wait(&cwait); > akcipher_request_set_callback(req, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_BACKLOG | > @@ -435,8 +439,8 @@ int public_key_verify_signature(const struct public_key *pkey, > crypto_req_done, &cwait); > ret = crypto_wait_req(crypto_akcipher_verify(req), &cwait); > > -error_free_key: > - kfree(key); > +error_free_buf: > + kfree(buf); > error_free_req: > akcipher_request_free(req); > error_free_tfm:
On Thu, 2023-06-01 at 17:00 -0400, Stefan Berger wrote: > > On 12/27/22 09:27, Roberto Sassu wrote: > > From: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com> > > > > Commit ac4e97abce9b8 ("scatterlist: sg_set_buf() argument must be in linear > > mapping") checks that both the signature and the digest reside in the > > linear mapping area. > > > > However, more recently commit ba14a194a434c ("fork: Add generic vmalloced > > stack support") made it possible to move the stack in the vmalloc area, > > which is not contiguous, and thus not suitable for sg_set_buf() which needs > > adjacent pages. > > > > Always make a copy of the signature and digest in the same buffer used to > > store the key and its parameters, and pass them to sg_init_one(). Prefer it > > to conditionally doing the copy if necessary, to keep the code simple. The > > buffer allocated with kmalloc() is in the linear mapping area. > > > > Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.9.x > > Fixes: ba14a194a434 ("fork: Add generic vmalloced stack support") > > Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-integrity/Y4pIpxbjBdajymBJ@sol.localdomain/ > > Suggested-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org> > > Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com> > > Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> > > I just ran into an issue with OpenBMC on ARM where EVM ECDSA signature verification failed due to invalid hashes being passed to the ECDSA signature verification algorithm. This patch here resolved the issue. > > Tested-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com> Thanks, Stefan. I did multiple attempts to have the patch included, but I didn't have any luck with the maintainers (David, Jarkko). It would be awesome if any maintainer picks it. Thanks! Roberto > --- > > crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c | 38 ++++++++++++++++------------- > > 1 file changed, 21 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-) > > > > diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c > > index 2f8352e88860..49a3f7c01149 100644 > > --- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c > > +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c > > @@ -360,9 +360,10 @@ int public_key_verify_signature(const struct public_key *pkey, > > struct crypto_wait cwait; > > struct crypto_akcipher *tfm; > > struct akcipher_request *req; > > - struct scatterlist src_sg[2]; > > + struct scatterlist src_sg; > > char alg_name[CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME]; > > - char *key, *ptr; > > + char *buf, *ptr; > > + size_t buf_len; > > int ret; > > > > pr_devel("==>%s()\n", __func__); > > @@ -400,34 +401,37 @@ int public_key_verify_signature(const struct public_key *pkey, > > if (!req) > > goto error_free_tfm; > > > > - key = kmalloc(pkey->keylen + sizeof(u32) * 2 + pkey->paramlen, > > - GFP_KERNEL); > > - if (!key) > > + buf_len = max_t(size_t, pkey->keylen + sizeof(u32) * 2 + pkey->paramlen, > > + sig->s_size + sig->digest_size); > > + > > + buf = kmalloc(buf_len, GFP_KERNEL); > > + if (!buf) > > goto error_free_req; > > > > - memcpy(key, pkey->key, pkey->keylen); > > - ptr = key + pkey->keylen; > > + memcpy(buf, pkey->key, pkey->keylen); > > + ptr = buf + pkey->keylen; > > ptr = pkey_pack_u32(ptr, pkey->algo); > > ptr = pkey_pack_u32(ptr, pkey->paramlen); > > memcpy(ptr, pkey->params, pkey->paramlen); > > > > if (pkey->key_is_private) > > - ret = crypto_akcipher_set_priv_key(tfm, key, pkey->keylen); > > + ret = crypto_akcipher_set_priv_key(tfm, buf, pkey->keylen); > > else > > - ret = crypto_akcipher_set_pub_key(tfm, key, pkey->keylen); > > + ret = crypto_akcipher_set_pub_key(tfm, buf, pkey->keylen); > > if (ret) > > - goto error_free_key; > > + goto error_free_buf; > > > > if (strcmp(pkey->pkey_algo, "sm2") == 0 && sig->data_size) { > > ret = cert_sig_digest_update(sig, tfm); > > if (ret) > > - goto error_free_key; > > + goto error_free_buf; > > } > > > > - sg_init_table(src_sg, 2); > > - sg_set_buf(&src_sg[0], sig->s, sig->s_size); > > - sg_set_buf(&src_sg[1], sig->digest, sig->digest_size); > > - akcipher_request_set_crypt(req, src_sg, NULL, sig->s_size, > > + memcpy(buf, sig->s, sig->s_size); > > + memcpy(buf + sig->s_size, sig->digest, sig->digest_size); > > + > > + sg_init_one(&src_sg, buf, sig->s_size + sig->digest_size); > > + akcipher_request_set_crypt(req, &src_sg, NULL, sig->s_size, > > sig->digest_size); > > crypto_init_wait(&cwait); > > akcipher_request_set_callback(req, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_BACKLOG | > > @@ -435,8 +439,8 @@ int public_key_verify_signature(const struct public_key *pkey, > > crypto_req_done, &cwait); > > ret = crypto_wait_req(crypto_akcipher_verify(req), &cwait); > > > > -error_free_key: > > - kfree(key); > > +error_free_buf: > > + kfree(buf); > > error_free_req: > > akcipher_request_free(req); > > error_free_tfm:
On Fri, Jun 02, 2023 at 11:17:04AM +0200, Roberto Sassu wrote: > On Thu, 2023-06-01 at 17:00 -0400, Stefan Berger wrote: > > > > On 12/27/22 09:27, Roberto Sassu wrote: > > > From: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com> > > > > > > Commit ac4e97abce9b8 ("scatterlist: sg_set_buf() argument must be in linear > > > mapping") checks that both the signature and the digest reside in the > > > linear mapping area. > > > > > > However, more recently commit ba14a194a434c ("fork: Add generic vmalloced > > > stack support") made it possible to move the stack in the vmalloc area, > > > which is not contiguous, and thus not suitable for sg_set_buf() which needs > > > adjacent pages. > > > > > > Always make a copy of the signature and digest in the same buffer used to > > > store the key and its parameters, and pass them to sg_init_one(). Prefer it > > > to conditionally doing the copy if necessary, to keep the code simple. The > > > buffer allocated with kmalloc() is in the linear mapping area. > > > > > > Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.9.x > > > Fixes: ba14a194a434 ("fork: Add generic vmalloced stack support") > > > Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-integrity/Y4pIpxbjBdajymBJ@sol.localdomain/ > > > Suggested-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org> > > > Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com> > > > Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> > > > > I just ran into an issue with OpenBMC on ARM where EVM ECDSA signature verification failed due to invalid hashes being passed to the ECDSA signature verification algorithm. This patch here resolved the issue. > > > > Tested-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com> > > Thanks, Stefan. > > I did multiple attempts to have the patch included, but I didn't have > any luck with the maintainers (David, Jarkko). > > It would be awesome if any maintainer picks it. > > Thanks! > As the maintainers are ignoring this patch, you could try the "maintainers of last resort" (Andrew Morton or Linus Torvalds). - Eric
On Fri, 2023-06-02 at 06:17 -0700, Eric Biggers wrote: > On Fri, Jun 02, 2023 at 11:17:04AM +0200, Roberto Sassu wrote: > > On Thu, 2023-06-01 at 17:00 -0400, Stefan Berger wrote: > > > On 12/27/22 09:27, Roberto Sassu wrote: > > > > From: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com> > > > > > > > > Commit ac4e97abce9b8 ("scatterlist: sg_set_buf() argument must be in linear > > > > mapping") checks that both the signature and the digest reside in the > > > > linear mapping area. > > > > > > > > However, more recently commit ba14a194a434c ("fork: Add generic vmalloced > > > > stack support") made it possible to move the stack in the vmalloc area, > > > > which is not contiguous, and thus not suitable for sg_set_buf() which needs > > > > adjacent pages. > > > > > > > > Always make a copy of the signature and digest in the same buffer used to > > > > store the key and its parameters, and pass them to sg_init_one(). Prefer it > > > > to conditionally doing the copy if necessary, to keep the code simple. The > > > > buffer allocated with kmalloc() is in the linear mapping area. > > > > > > > > Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.9.x > > > > Fixes: ba14a194a434 ("fork: Add generic vmalloced stack support") > > > > Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-integrity/Y4pIpxbjBdajymBJ@sol.localdomain/ > > > > Suggested-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org> > > > > Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com> > > > > Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> > > > > > > I just ran into an issue with OpenBMC on ARM where EVM ECDSA signature verification failed due to invalid hashes being passed to the ECDSA signature verification algorithm. This patch here resolved the issue. > > > > > > Tested-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com> > > > > Thanks, Stefan. > > > > I did multiple attempts to have the patch included, but I didn't have > > any luck with the maintainers (David, Jarkko). > > > > It would be awesome if any maintainer picks it. > > > > Thanks! > > > > As the maintainers are ignoring this patch, you could try the "maintainers of > last resort" (Andrew Morton or Linus Torvalds). Thanks, will do. Roberto
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c index 2f8352e88860..49a3f7c01149 100644 --- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c @@ -360,9 +360,10 @@ int public_key_verify_signature(const struct public_key *pkey, struct crypto_wait cwait; struct crypto_akcipher *tfm; struct akcipher_request *req; - struct scatterlist src_sg[2]; + struct scatterlist src_sg; char alg_name[CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME]; - char *key, *ptr; + char *buf, *ptr; + size_t buf_len; int ret; pr_devel("==>%s()\n", __func__); @@ -400,34 +401,37 @@ int public_key_verify_signature(const struct public_key *pkey, if (!req) goto error_free_tfm; - key = kmalloc(pkey->keylen + sizeof(u32) * 2 + pkey->paramlen, - GFP_KERNEL); - if (!key) + buf_len = max_t(size_t, pkey->keylen + sizeof(u32) * 2 + pkey->paramlen, + sig->s_size + sig->digest_size); + + buf = kmalloc(buf_len, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!buf) goto error_free_req; - memcpy(key, pkey->key, pkey->keylen); - ptr = key + pkey->keylen; + memcpy(buf, pkey->key, pkey->keylen); + ptr = buf + pkey->keylen; ptr = pkey_pack_u32(ptr, pkey->algo); ptr = pkey_pack_u32(ptr, pkey->paramlen); memcpy(ptr, pkey->params, pkey->paramlen); if (pkey->key_is_private) - ret = crypto_akcipher_set_priv_key(tfm, key, pkey->keylen); + ret = crypto_akcipher_set_priv_key(tfm, buf, pkey->keylen); else - ret = crypto_akcipher_set_pub_key(tfm, key, pkey->keylen); + ret = crypto_akcipher_set_pub_key(tfm, buf, pkey->keylen); if (ret) - goto error_free_key; + goto error_free_buf; if (strcmp(pkey->pkey_algo, "sm2") == 0 && sig->data_size) { ret = cert_sig_digest_update(sig, tfm); if (ret) - goto error_free_key; + goto error_free_buf; } - sg_init_table(src_sg, 2); - sg_set_buf(&src_sg[0], sig->s, sig->s_size); - sg_set_buf(&src_sg[1], sig->digest, sig->digest_size); - akcipher_request_set_crypt(req, src_sg, NULL, sig->s_size, + memcpy(buf, sig->s, sig->s_size); + memcpy(buf + sig->s_size, sig->digest, sig->digest_size); + + sg_init_one(&src_sg, buf, sig->s_size + sig->digest_size); + akcipher_request_set_crypt(req, &src_sg, NULL, sig->s_size, sig->digest_size); crypto_init_wait(&cwait); akcipher_request_set_callback(req, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_BACKLOG | @@ -435,8 +439,8 @@ int public_key_verify_signature(const struct public_key *pkey, crypto_req_done, &cwait); ret = crypto_wait_req(crypto_akcipher_verify(req), &cwait); -error_free_key: - kfree(key); +error_free_buf: + kfree(buf); error_free_req: akcipher_request_free(req); error_free_tfm: