diff mbox series

[v9,02/12] landlock: Allow filesystem layout changes for domains without such rule type

Message ID 20230116085818.165539-3-konstantin.meskhidze@huawei.com (mailing list archive)
State Not Applicable
Delegated to: Netdev Maintainers
Headers show
Series Network support for Landlock | expand

Checks

Context Check Description
netdev/tree_selection success Not a local patch, async

Commit Message

Konstantin Meskhidze (A) Jan. 16, 2023, 8:58 a.m. UTC
From: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>

Allow mount point and root directory changes when there is no filesystem
rule tied to the current Landlock domain.  This doesn't change anything
for now because a domain must have at least a (filesystem) rule, but
this will change when other rule types will come.  For instance, a
domain only restricting the network should have no impact on filesystem
restrictions.

Add a new get_current_fs_domain() helper to quickly check filesystem
rule existence for all filesystem LSM hooks.

Remove unnecessary inlining.

Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
---

Changes since v8:
* Refactors get_handled_fs_accesses().
* Adds landlock_get_raw_fs_access_mask() helper.

---
 security/landlock/fs.c       | 73 ++++++++++++++++++------------------
 security/landlock/ruleset.h  | 25 +++++++++++-
 security/landlock/syscalls.c |  6 +--
 3 files changed, 62 insertions(+), 42 deletions(-)

Comments

Mickaël Salaün Feb. 10, 2023, 5:34 p.m. UTC | #1
Hi Konstantin,

I think this patch series is almost ready. Here is a first batch of 
review, I'll send more next week.


I forgot to update the documentation. Can you please squash the 
following patch into this one?


diff --git a/Documentation/userspace-api/landlock.rst 
b/Documentation/userspace-api/landlock.rst
index 980558b879d6..fc2be89b423f 100644
--- a/Documentation/userspace-api/landlock.rst
+++ b/Documentation/userspace-api/landlock.rst
@@ -416,9 +416,9 @@ Current limitations
  Filesystem topology modification
  --------------------------------

-As for file renaming and linking, a sandboxed thread cannot modify its
-filesystem topology, whether via :manpage:`mount(2)` or
-:manpage:`pivot_root(2)`.  However, :manpage:`chroot(2)` calls are not 
denied.
+Threads sandboxed with filesystem restrictions cannot modify filesystem
+topology, whether via :manpage:`mount(2)` or :manpage:`pivot_root(2)`.
+However, :manpage:`chroot(2)` calls are not denied.

  Special filesystems
  -------------------


On 16/01/2023 09:58, Konstantin Meskhidze wrote:
> From: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
> 
> Allow mount point and root directory changes when there is no filesystem
> rule tied to the current Landlock domain.  This doesn't change anything
> for now because a domain must have at least a (filesystem) rule, but
> this will change when other rule types will come.  For instance, a
> domain only restricting the network should have no impact on filesystem
> restrictions.
> 
> Add a new get_current_fs_domain() helper to quickly check filesystem
> rule existence for all filesystem LSM hooks.
> 
> Remove unnecessary inlining.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
> ---
> 
> Changes since v8:
> * Refactors get_handled_fs_accesses().
> * Adds landlock_get_raw_fs_access_mask() helper.
>
Konstantin Meskhidze (A) Feb. 14, 2023, 8:51 a.m. UTC | #2
2/10/2023 8:34 PM, Mickaël Salaün пишет:
> Hi Konstantin,
> 
> I think this patch series is almost ready. Here is a first batch of
> review, I'll send more next week.
> 
   Hi Mickaёl.
   thnaks for the review.

> 
> I forgot to update the documentation. Can you please squash the
> following patch into this one?

   No problem. I will squash.
   Can I download this doc patch from your repo or I can use the diff below?
> 
> 
> diff --git a/Documentation/userspace-api/landlock.rst
> b/Documentation/userspace-api/landlock.rst
> index 980558b879d6..fc2be89b423f 100644
> --- a/Documentation/userspace-api/landlock.rst
> +++ b/Documentation/userspace-api/landlock.rst
> @@ -416,9 +416,9 @@ Current limitations
>    Filesystem topology modification
>    --------------------------------
> 
> -As for file renaming and linking, a sandboxed thread cannot modify its
> -filesystem topology, whether via :manpage:`mount(2)` or
> -:manpage:`pivot_root(2)`.  However, :manpage:`chroot(2)` calls are not
> denied.
> +Threads sandboxed with filesystem restrictions cannot modify filesystem
> +topology, whether via :manpage:`mount(2)` or :manpage:`pivot_root(2)`.
> +However, :manpage:`chroot(2)` calls are not denied.
> 
>    Special filesystems
>    -------------------
> 
> 
> On 16/01/2023 09:58, Konstantin Meskhidze wrote:
>> From: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
>> 
>> Allow mount point and root directory changes when there is no filesystem
>> rule tied to the current Landlock domain.  This doesn't change anything
>> for now because a domain must have at least a (filesystem) rule, but
>> this will change when other rule types will come.  For instance, a
>> domain only restricting the network should have no impact on filesystem
>> restrictions.
>> 
>> Add a new get_current_fs_domain() helper to quickly check filesystem
>> rule existence for all filesystem LSM hooks.
>> 
>> Remove unnecessary inlining.
>> 
>> Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
>> ---
>> 
>> Changes since v8:
>> * Refactors get_handled_fs_accesses().
>> * Adds landlock_get_raw_fs_access_mask() helper.
>> 
> .
Mickaël Salaün Feb. 14, 2023, 12:07 p.m. UTC | #3
On 14/02/2023 09:51, Konstantin Meskhidze (A) wrote:
> 
> 
> 2/10/2023 8:34 PM, Mickaël Salaün пишет:
>> Hi Konstantin,
>>
>> I think this patch series is almost ready. Here is a first batch of
>> review, I'll send more next week.
>>
>     Hi Mickaёl.
>     thnaks for the review.
> 
>>
>> I forgot to update the documentation. Can you please squash the
>> following patch into this one?
> 
>     No problem. I will squash.
>     Can I download this doc patch from your repo or I can use the diff below?

You can take the diff below.

>>
>>
>> diff --git a/Documentation/userspace-api/landlock.rst
>> b/Documentation/userspace-api/landlock.rst
>> index 980558b879d6..fc2be89b423f 100644
>> --- a/Documentation/userspace-api/landlock.rst
>> +++ b/Documentation/userspace-api/landlock.rst
>> @@ -416,9 +416,9 @@ Current limitations
>>     Filesystem topology modification
>>     --------------------------------
>>
>> -As for file renaming and linking, a sandboxed thread cannot modify its
>> -filesystem topology, whether via :manpage:`mount(2)` or
>> -:manpage:`pivot_root(2)`.  However, :manpage:`chroot(2)` calls are not
>> denied.
>> +Threads sandboxed with filesystem restrictions cannot modify filesystem
>> +topology, whether via :manpage:`mount(2)` or :manpage:`pivot_root(2)`.
>> +However, :manpage:`chroot(2)` calls are not denied.
>>
>>     Special filesystems
>>     -------------------
>>
>>
>> On 16/01/2023 09:58, Konstantin Meskhidze wrote:
>>> From: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
>>>
>>> Allow mount point and root directory changes when there is no filesystem
>>> rule tied to the current Landlock domain.  This doesn't change anything
>>> for now because a domain must have at least a (filesystem) rule, but
>>> this will change when other rule types will come.  For instance, a
>>> domain only restricting the network should have no impact on filesystem
>>> restrictions.
>>>
>>> Add a new get_current_fs_domain() helper to quickly check filesystem
>>> rule existence for all filesystem LSM hooks.
>>>
>>> Remove unnecessary inlining.
>>>
>>> Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
>>> ---
>>>
>>> Changes since v8:
>>> * Refactors get_handled_fs_accesses().
>>> * Adds landlock_get_raw_fs_access_mask() helper.
>>>
>> .
Konstantin Meskhidze (A) Feb. 14, 2023, 12:57 p.m. UTC | #4
2/14/2023 3:07 PM, Mickaël Salaün пишет:
> 
> On 14/02/2023 09:51, Konstantin Meskhidze (A) wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> 2/10/2023 8:34 PM, Mickaël Salaün пишет:
>>> Hi Konstantin,
>>>
>>> I think this patch series is almost ready. Here is a first batch of
>>> review, I'll send more next week.
>>>
>>     Hi Mickaёl.
>>     thnaks for the review.
>> 
>>>
>>> I forgot to update the documentation. Can you please squash the
>>> following patch into this one?
>> 
>>     No problem. I will squash.
>>     Can I download this doc patch from your repo or I can use the diff below?
> 
> You can take the diff below.

   Ok. Will be done.
> 
>>>
>>>
>>> diff --git a/Documentation/userspace-api/landlock.rst
>>> b/Documentation/userspace-api/landlock.rst
>>> index 980558b879d6..fc2be89b423f 100644
>>> --- a/Documentation/userspace-api/landlock.rst
>>> +++ b/Documentation/userspace-api/landlock.rst
>>> @@ -416,9 +416,9 @@ Current limitations
>>>     Filesystem topology modification
>>>     --------------------------------
>>>
>>> -As for file renaming and linking, a sandboxed thread cannot modify its
>>> -filesystem topology, whether via :manpage:`mount(2)` or
>>> -:manpage:`pivot_root(2)`.  However, :manpage:`chroot(2)` calls are not
>>> denied.
>>> +Threads sandboxed with filesystem restrictions cannot modify filesystem
>>> +topology, whether via :manpage:`mount(2)` or :manpage:`pivot_root(2)`.
>>> +However, :manpage:`chroot(2)` calls are not denied.
>>>
>>>     Special filesystems
>>>     -------------------
>>>
>>>
>>> On 16/01/2023 09:58, Konstantin Meskhidze wrote:
>>>> From: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
>>>>
>>>> Allow mount point and root directory changes when there is no filesystem
>>>> rule tied to the current Landlock domain.  This doesn't change anything
>>>> for now because a domain must have at least a (filesystem) rule, but
>>>> this will change when other rule types will come.  For instance, a
>>>> domain only restricting the network should have no impact on filesystem
>>>> restrictions.
>>>>
>>>> Add a new get_current_fs_domain() helper to quickly check filesystem
>>>> rule existence for all filesystem LSM hooks.
>>>>
>>>> Remove unnecessary inlining.
>>>>
>>>> Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
>>>> ---
>>>>
>>>> Changes since v8:
>>>> * Refactors get_handled_fs_accesses().
>>>> * Adds landlock_get_raw_fs_access_mask() helper.
>>>>
>>> .
> .
diff mbox series

Patch

diff --git a/security/landlock/fs.c b/security/landlock/fs.c
index 0d57c6479d29..0ae54a639e16 100644
--- a/security/landlock/fs.c
+++ b/security/landlock/fs.c
@@ -150,16 +150,6 @@  static struct landlock_object *get_inode_object(struct inode *const inode)
 	LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE)
 /* clang-format on */
 
-/*
- * All access rights that are denied by default whether they are handled or not
- * by a ruleset/layer.  This must be ORed with all ruleset->fs_access_masks[]
- * entries when we need to get the absolute handled access masks.
- */
-/* clang-format off */
-#define ACCESS_INITIALLY_DENIED ( \
-	LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER)
-/* clang-format on */
-
 /*
  * @path: Should have been checked by get_path_from_fd().
  */
@@ -179,8 +169,7 @@  int landlock_append_fs_rule(struct landlock_ruleset *const ruleset,
 
 	/* Transforms relative access rights to absolute ones. */
 	access_rights |= LANDLOCK_MASK_ACCESS_FS &
-			 ~(landlock_get_fs_access_mask(ruleset, 0) |
-			   ACCESS_INITIALLY_DENIED);
+			 ~landlock_get_fs_access_mask(ruleset, 0);
 	object = get_inode_object(d_backing_inode(path->dentry));
 	if (IS_ERR(object))
 		return PTR_ERR(object);
@@ -287,14 +276,15 @@  static inline bool is_nouser_or_private(const struct dentry *dentry)
 		unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry))));
 }
 
-static inline access_mask_t
-get_handled_accesses(const struct landlock_ruleset *const domain)
+static access_mask_t
+get_raw_handled_fs_accesses(const struct landlock_ruleset *const domain)
 {
-	access_mask_t access_dom = ACCESS_INITIALLY_DENIED;
+	access_mask_t access_dom = 0;
 	size_t layer_level;
 
 	for (layer_level = 0; layer_level < domain->num_layers; layer_level++)
-		access_dom |= landlock_get_fs_access_mask(domain, layer_level);
+		access_dom |=
+			landlock_get_raw_fs_access_mask(domain, layer_level);
 	return access_dom & LANDLOCK_MASK_ACCESS_FS;
 }
 
@@ -331,13 +321,8 @@  init_layer_masks(const struct landlock_ruleset *const domain,
 
 		for_each_set_bit(access_bit, &access_req,
 				 ARRAY_SIZE(*layer_masks)) {
-			/*
-			 * Artificially handles all initially denied by default
-			 * access rights.
-			 */
 			if (BIT_ULL(access_bit) &
-			    (landlock_get_fs_access_mask(domain, layer_level) |
-			     ACCESS_INITIALLY_DENIED)) {
+			    landlock_get_fs_access_mask(domain, layer_level)) {
 				(*layer_masks)[access_bit] |=
 					BIT_ULL(layer_level);
 				handled_accesses |= BIT_ULL(access_bit);
@@ -347,6 +332,24 @@  init_layer_masks(const struct landlock_ruleset *const domain,
 	return handled_accesses;
 }
 
+static access_mask_t
+get_handled_fs_accesses(const struct landlock_ruleset *const domain)
+{
+	/* Handles all initially denied by default access rights. */
+	return get_raw_handled_fs_accesses(domain) | ACCESS_FS_INITIALLY_DENIED;
+}
+
+static const struct landlock_ruleset *get_current_fs_domain(void)
+{
+	const struct landlock_ruleset *const dom =
+		landlock_get_current_domain();
+
+	if (!dom || !get_raw_handled_fs_accesses(dom))
+		return NULL;
+
+	return dom;
+}
+
 /*
  * Check that a destination file hierarchy has more restrictions than a source
  * file hierarchy.  This is only used for link and rename actions.
@@ -519,7 +522,7 @@  static bool is_access_to_paths_allowed(
 		 * a superset of the meaningful requested accesses).
 		 */
 		access_masked_parent1 = access_masked_parent2 =
-			get_handled_accesses(domain);
+			get_handled_fs_accesses(domain);
 		is_dom_check = true;
 	} else {
 		if (WARN_ON_ONCE(dentry_child1 || dentry_child2))
@@ -648,11 +651,10 @@  static inline int check_access_path(const struct landlock_ruleset *const domain,
 	return -EACCES;
 }
 
-static inline int current_check_access_path(const struct path *const path,
+static int current_check_access_path(const struct path *const path,
 					    const access_mask_t access_request)
 {
-	const struct landlock_ruleset *const dom =
-		landlock_get_current_domain();
+	const struct landlock_ruleset *const dom = get_current_fs_domain();
 
 	if (!dom)
 		return 0;
@@ -815,8 +817,7 @@  static int current_check_refer_path(struct dentry *const old_dentry,
 				    struct dentry *const new_dentry,
 				    const bool removable, const bool exchange)
 {
-	const struct landlock_ruleset *const dom =
-		landlock_get_current_domain();
+	const struct landlock_ruleset *const dom = get_current_fs_domain();
 	bool allow_parent1, allow_parent2;
 	access_mask_t access_request_parent1, access_request_parent2;
 	struct path mnt_dir;
@@ -1050,7 +1051,7 @@  static int hook_sb_mount(const char *const dev_name,
 			 const struct path *const path, const char *const type,
 			 const unsigned long flags, void *const data)
 {
-	if (!landlock_get_current_domain())
+	if (!get_current_fs_domain())
 		return 0;
 	return -EPERM;
 }
@@ -1058,7 +1059,7 @@  static int hook_sb_mount(const char *const dev_name,
 static int hook_move_mount(const struct path *const from_path,
 			   const struct path *const to_path)
 {
-	if (!landlock_get_current_domain())
+	if (!get_current_fs_domain())
 		return 0;
 	return -EPERM;
 }
@@ -1069,14 +1070,14 @@  static int hook_move_mount(const struct path *const from_path,
  */
 static int hook_sb_umount(struct vfsmount *const mnt, const int flags)
 {
-	if (!landlock_get_current_domain())
+	if (!get_current_fs_domain())
 		return 0;
 	return -EPERM;
 }
 
 static int hook_sb_remount(struct super_block *const sb, void *const mnt_opts)
 {
-	if (!landlock_get_current_domain())
+	if (!get_current_fs_domain())
 		return 0;
 	return -EPERM;
 }
@@ -1092,7 +1093,7 @@  static int hook_sb_remount(struct super_block *const sb, void *const mnt_opts)
 static int hook_sb_pivotroot(const struct path *const old_path,
 			     const struct path *const new_path)
 {
-	if (!landlock_get_current_domain())
+	if (!get_current_fs_domain())
 		return 0;
 	return -EPERM;
 }
@@ -1128,8 +1129,7 @@  static int hook_path_mknod(const struct path *const dir,
 			   struct dentry *const dentry, const umode_t mode,
 			   const unsigned int dev)
 {
-	const struct landlock_ruleset *const dom =
-		landlock_get_current_domain();
+	const struct landlock_ruleset *const dom = get_current_fs_domain();
 
 	if (!dom)
 		return 0;
@@ -1208,8 +1208,7 @@  static int hook_file_open(struct file *const file)
 	layer_mask_t layer_masks[LANDLOCK_NUM_ACCESS_FS] = {};
 	access_mask_t open_access_request, full_access_request, allowed_access;
 	const access_mask_t optional_access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE;
-	const struct landlock_ruleset *const dom =
-		landlock_get_current_domain();
+	const struct landlock_ruleset *const dom = get_current_fs_domain();
 
 	if (!dom)
 		return 0;
diff --git a/security/landlock/ruleset.h b/security/landlock/ruleset.h
index e900b84d915f..c6db528817c5 100644
--- a/security/landlock/ruleset.h
+++ b/security/landlock/ruleset.h
@@ -15,10 +15,21 @@ 
 #include <linux/rbtree.h>
 #include <linux/refcount.h>
 #include <linux/workqueue.h>
+#include <uapi/linux/landlock.h>
 
 #include "limits.h"
 #include "object.h"
 
+/*
+ * All access rights that are denied by default whether they are handled or not
+ * by a ruleset/layer.  This must be ORed with all ruleset->access_masks[]
+ * entries when we need to get the absolute handled access masks.
+ */
+/* clang-format off */
+#define ACCESS_FS_INITIALLY_DENIED ( \
+	LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER)
+/* clang-format on */
+
 typedef u16 access_mask_t;
 /* Makes sure all filesystem access rights can be stored. */
 static_assert(BITS_PER_TYPE(access_mask_t) >= LANDLOCK_NUM_ACCESS_FS);
@@ -196,11 +207,21 @@  landlock_add_fs_access_mask(struct landlock_ruleset *const ruleset,
 }
 
 static inline access_mask_t
-landlock_get_fs_access_mask(const struct landlock_ruleset *const ruleset,
-			    const u16 layer_level)
+landlock_get_raw_fs_access_mask(const struct landlock_ruleset *const ruleset,
+				const u16 layer_level)
 {
 	return (ruleset->access_masks[layer_level] >>
 		LANDLOCK_SHIFT_ACCESS_FS) &
 	       LANDLOCK_MASK_ACCESS_FS;
 }
+
+static inline access_mask_t
+landlock_get_fs_access_mask(const struct landlock_ruleset *const ruleset,
+			    const u16 layer_level)
+{
+	/* Handles all initially denied by default access rights. */
+	return landlock_get_raw_fs_access_mask(ruleset, layer_level) |
+	       ACCESS_FS_INITIALLY_DENIED;
+}
+
 #endif /* _SECURITY_LANDLOCK_RULESET_H */
diff --git a/security/landlock/syscalls.c b/security/landlock/syscalls.c
index 71aca7f990bc..d35cd5d304db 100644
--- a/security/landlock/syscalls.c
+++ b/security/landlock/syscalls.c
@@ -310,6 +310,7 @@  SYSCALL_DEFINE4(landlock_add_rule, const int, ruleset_fd,
 	struct path path;
 	struct landlock_ruleset *ruleset;
 	int res, err;
+	access_mask_t mask;
 
 	if (!landlock_initialized)
 		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
@@ -348,9 +349,8 @@  SYSCALL_DEFINE4(landlock_add_rule, const int, ruleset_fd,
 	 * Checks that allowed_access matches the @ruleset constraints
 	 * (ruleset->access_masks[0] is automatically upgraded to 64-bits).
 	 */
-	if ((path_beneath_attr.allowed_access |
-	     landlock_get_fs_access_mask(ruleset, 0)) !=
-	    landlock_get_fs_access_mask(ruleset, 0)) {
+	mask = landlock_get_raw_fs_access_mask(ruleset, 0);
+	if ((path_beneath_attr.allowed_access | mask) != mask) {
 		err = -EINVAL;
 		goto out_put_ruleset;
 	}