Message ID | 20230313235845.61029-3-alexei.starovoitov@gmail.com (mailing list archive) |
---|---|
State | Accepted |
Commit | 3e30be4288b31702d4898487a74e80ba14150a9f |
Delegated to: | BPF |
Headers | show |
Series | bpf: Allow helpers access ptr_to_btf_id. | expand |
On Mon, Mar 13, 2023 at 04:58:44PM -0700, Alexei Starovoitov wrote: > From: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> > > The verifier rejects the code: > bpf_strncmp(task->comm, 16, "my_task"); > with the message: > 16: (85) call bpf_strncmp#182 > R1 type=trusted_ptr_ expected=fp, pkt, pkt_meta, map_key, map_value, mem, ringbuf_mem, buf > > Teach the verifier that such access pattern is safe. > Do not allow untrusted and legacy ptr_to_btf_id to be passed into helpers. > > Reported-by: David Vernet <void@manifault.com> > Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: David Vernet <void@manifault.com> > --- > kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 15 +++++++++++++++ > 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+) > > diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c > index 883d4ff2e288..2bbd89279070 100644 > --- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c > +++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c > @@ -6303,6 +6303,9 @@ static int check_helper_mem_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno, > env, > regno, reg->off, access_size, > zero_size_allowed, ACCESS_HELPER, meta); > + case PTR_TO_BTF_ID: > + return check_ptr_to_btf_access(env, regs, regno, reg->off, > + access_size, BPF_READ, -1); > case PTR_TO_CTX: > /* in case the function doesn't know how to access the context, > * (because we are in a program of type SYSCALL for example), we > @@ -7014,6 +7017,7 @@ static const struct bpf_reg_types mem_types = { > PTR_TO_MEM, > PTR_TO_MEM | MEM_RINGBUF, > PTR_TO_BUF, > + PTR_TO_BTF_ID | PTR_TRUSTED, > }, > }; > > @@ -7145,6 +7149,17 @@ static int check_reg_type(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno, > if (base_type(reg->type) != PTR_TO_BTF_ID) > return 0; > > + if (compatible == &mem_types) { > + if (!(arg_type & MEM_RDONLY)) { > + verbose(env, > + "%s() may write into memory pointed by R%d type=%s\n", > + func_id_name(meta->func_id), > + regno, reg_type_str(env, reg->type)); > + return -EACCES; > + } > + return 0; > + } > + > switch ((int)reg->type) { > case PTR_TO_BTF_ID: > case PTR_TO_BTF_ID | PTR_TRUSTED: > -- > 2.34.1 >
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c index 883d4ff2e288..2bbd89279070 100644 --- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c +++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c @@ -6303,6 +6303,9 @@ static int check_helper_mem_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno, env, regno, reg->off, access_size, zero_size_allowed, ACCESS_HELPER, meta); + case PTR_TO_BTF_ID: + return check_ptr_to_btf_access(env, regs, regno, reg->off, + access_size, BPF_READ, -1); case PTR_TO_CTX: /* in case the function doesn't know how to access the context, * (because we are in a program of type SYSCALL for example), we @@ -7014,6 +7017,7 @@ static const struct bpf_reg_types mem_types = { PTR_TO_MEM, PTR_TO_MEM | MEM_RINGBUF, PTR_TO_BUF, + PTR_TO_BTF_ID | PTR_TRUSTED, }, }; @@ -7145,6 +7149,17 @@ static int check_reg_type(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno, if (base_type(reg->type) != PTR_TO_BTF_ID) return 0; + if (compatible == &mem_types) { + if (!(arg_type & MEM_RDONLY)) { + verbose(env, + "%s() may write into memory pointed by R%d type=%s\n", + func_id_name(meta->func_id), + regno, reg_type_str(env, reg->type)); + return -EACCES; + } + return 0; + } + switch ((int)reg->type) { case PTR_TO_BTF_ID: case PTR_TO_BTF_ID | PTR_TRUSTED: