Message ID | 20230724-nfsd-acl-v2-1-1cfaac973498@kernel.org (mailing list archive) |
---|---|
State | New, archived |
Headers | show |
Series | [v2] nfsd: inherit required unset default acls from effective set | expand |
On Mon, Jul 24, 2023 at 08:13:05AM -0400, Jeff Layton wrote: > A well-formed NFSv4 ACL will always contain OWNER@/GROUP@/EVERYONE@ > ACEs, but there is no requirement for inheritable entries for those > entities. POSIX ACLs must always have owner/group/other entries, even for a > default ACL. > > nfsd builds the default ACL from inheritable ACEs, but the current code > just leaves any unspecified ACEs zeroed out. The result is that adding a > default user or group ACE to an inode can leave it with unwanted deny > entries. > > For instance, a newly created directory with no acl will look something > like this: > > # NFSv4 translation by server > A::OWNER@:rwaDxtTcCy > A::GROUP@:rxtcy > A::EVERYONE@:rxtcy > > # POSIX ACL of underlying file > user::rwx > group::r-x > other::r-x > > ...if I then add new v4 ACE: > > nfs4_setfacl -a A:fd:1000:rwx /mnt/local/test > > ...I end up with a result like this today: > > user::rwx > user:1000:rwx > group::r-x > mask::rwx > other::r-x > default:user::--- > default:user:1000:rwx > default:group::--- > default:mask::rwx > default:other::--- > > A::OWNER@:rwaDxtTcCy > A::1000:rwaDxtcy > A::GROUP@:rxtcy > A::EVERYONE@:rxtcy > D:fdi:OWNER@:rwaDx > A:fdi:OWNER@:tTcCy > A:fdi:1000:rwaDxtcy > A:fdi:GROUP@:tcy > A:fdi:EVERYONE@:tcy > > ...which is not at all expected. Adding a single inheritable allow ACE > should not result in everyone else losing access. > > The setfacl command solves a silimar issue by copying owner/group/other > entries from the effective ACL when none of them are set: > > "If a Default ACL entry is created, and the Default ACL contains no > owner, owning group, or others entry, a copy of the ACL owner, > owning group, or others entry is added to the Default ACL. > > Having nfsd do the same provides a more sane result (with no deny ACEs > in the resulting set): > > user::rwx > user:1000:rwx > group::r-x > mask::rwx > other::r-x > default:user::rwx > default:user:1000:rwx > default:group::r-x > default:mask::rwx > default:other::r-x > > A::OWNER@:rwaDxtTcCy > A::1000:rwaDxtcy > A::GROUP@:rxtcy > A::EVERYONE@:rxtcy > A:fdi:OWNER@:rwaDxtTcCy > A:fdi:1000:rwaDxtcy > A:fdi:GROUP@:rxtcy > A:fdi:EVERYONE@:rxtcy > > Reported-by: Ondrej Valousek <ondrej.valousek@diasemi.com> > Closes: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2136452 > Suggested-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@redhat.com> > Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org> > --- > Changes in v2: > - always set missing ACEs whenever default ACL has any ACEs that are > explicitly set. This better conforms to how setfacl works. > - drop now-unneeded "empty" boolean > - Link to v1: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230719-nfsd-acl-v1-1-eb0faf3d2917@kernel.org > --- > fs/nfsd/nfs4acl.c | 32 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---- > 1 file changed, 28 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) > > diff --git a/fs/nfsd/nfs4acl.c b/fs/nfsd/nfs4acl.c > index 518203821790..b931d4383517 100644 > --- a/fs/nfsd/nfs4acl.c > +++ b/fs/nfsd/nfs4acl.c > @@ -441,7 +441,7 @@ struct posix_ace_state_array { > * calculated so far: */ > > struct posix_acl_state { > - int empty; > + unsigned char valid; > struct posix_ace_state owner; > struct posix_ace_state group; > struct posix_ace_state other; > @@ -457,7 +457,6 @@ init_state(struct posix_acl_state *state, int cnt) > int alloc; > > memset(state, 0, sizeof(struct posix_acl_state)); > - state->empty = 1; > /* > * In the worst case, each individual acl could be for a distinct > * named user or group, but we don't know which, so we allocate > @@ -500,7 +499,7 @@ posix_state_to_acl(struct posix_acl_state *state, unsigned int flags) > * and effective cases: when there are no inheritable ACEs, > * calls ->set_acl with a NULL ACL structure. > */ > - if (state->empty && (flags & NFS4_ACL_TYPE_DEFAULT)) > + if (!state->valid && (flags & NFS4_ACL_TYPE_DEFAULT)) > return NULL; > > /* > @@ -622,9 +621,10 @@ static void process_one_v4_ace(struct posix_acl_state *state, > struct nfs4_ace *ace) > { > u32 mask = ace->access_mask; > + short type = ace2type(ace); > int i; > > - state->empty = 0; > + state->valid |= type; > > switch (ace2type(ace)) { Mechanical issue: the patch adds @type, but uses it just once. The switch here also wants the value of ace2type(ace). > case ACL_USER_OBJ: > @@ -726,6 +726,30 @@ static int nfs4_acl_nfsv4_to_posix(struct nfs4_acl *acl, > if (!(ace->flag & NFS4_ACE_INHERIT_ONLY_ACE)) > process_one_v4_ace(&effective_acl_state, ace); > } > + > + /* > + * At this point, the default ACL may have zeroed-out entries for owner, > + * group and other. That usually results in a non-sensical resulting ACL > + * that denies all access except to any ACE that was explicitly added. > + * > + * The setfacl command solves a similar problem with this logic: > + * > + * "If a Default ACL entry is created, and the Default ACL contains > + * no owner, owning group, or others entry, a copy of the ACL > + * owner, owning group, or others entry is added to the Default ACL." > + * > + * Copy any missing ACEs from the effective set, if any ACEs were > + * explicitly set. > + */ > + if (default_acl_state.valid) { > + if (!(default_acl_state.valid & ACL_USER_OBJ)) > + default_acl_state.owner = effective_acl_state.owner; > + if (!(default_acl_state.valid & ACL_GROUP_OBJ)) > + default_acl_state.group = effective_acl_state.group; > + if (!(default_acl_state.valid & ACL_OTHER)) > + default_acl_state.other = effective_acl_state.other; > + } > + > *pacl = posix_state_to_acl(&effective_acl_state, flags); > if (IS_ERR(*pacl)) { > ret = PTR_ERR(*pacl); > > --- > base-commit: 7bfb36a2ee1d329a501ba4781db4145dc951c798 > change-id: 20230719-nfsd-acl-5ab61537e4e6 > > Best regards, > -- > Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org> >
On Mon, 2023-07-24 at 09:44 -0400, Chuck Lever wrote: > On Mon, Jul 24, 2023 at 08:13:05AM -0400, Jeff Layton wrote: > > A well-formed NFSv4 ACL will always contain OWNER@/GROUP@/EVERYONE@ > > ACEs, but there is no requirement for inheritable entries for those > > entities. POSIX ACLs must always have owner/group/other entries, even for a > > default ACL. > > > > nfsd builds the default ACL from inheritable ACEs, but the current code > > just leaves any unspecified ACEs zeroed out. The result is that adding a > > default user or group ACE to an inode can leave it with unwanted deny > > entries. > > > > For instance, a newly created directory with no acl will look something > > like this: > > > > # NFSv4 translation by server > > A::OWNER@:rwaDxtTcCy > > A::GROUP@:rxtcy > > A::EVERYONE@:rxtcy > > > > # POSIX ACL of underlying file > > user::rwx > > group::r-x > > other::r-x > > > > ...if I then add new v4 ACE: > > > > nfs4_setfacl -a A:fd:1000:rwx /mnt/local/test > > > > ...I end up with a result like this today: > > > > user::rwx > > user:1000:rwx > > group::r-x > > mask::rwx > > other::r-x > > default:user::--- > > default:user:1000:rwx > > default:group::--- > > default:mask::rwx > > default:other::--- > > > > A::OWNER@:rwaDxtTcCy > > A::1000:rwaDxtcy > > A::GROUP@:rxtcy > > A::EVERYONE@:rxtcy > > D:fdi:OWNER@:rwaDx > > A:fdi:OWNER@:tTcCy > > A:fdi:1000:rwaDxtcy > > A:fdi:GROUP@:tcy > > A:fdi:EVERYONE@:tcy > > > > ...which is not at all expected. Adding a single inheritable allow ACE > > should not result in everyone else losing access. > > > > The setfacl command solves a silimar issue by copying owner/group/other > > entries from the effective ACL when none of them are set: > > > > "If a Default ACL entry is created, and the Default ACL contains no > > owner, owning group, or others entry, a copy of the ACL owner, > > owning group, or others entry is added to the Default ACL. > > > > Having nfsd do the same provides a more sane result (with no deny ACEs > > in the resulting set): > > > > user::rwx > > user:1000:rwx > > group::r-x > > mask::rwx > > other::r-x > > default:user::rwx > > default:user:1000:rwx > > default:group::r-x > > default:mask::rwx > > default:other::r-x > > > > A::OWNER@:rwaDxtTcCy > > A::1000:rwaDxtcy > > A::GROUP@:rxtcy > > A::EVERYONE@:rxtcy > > A:fdi:OWNER@:rwaDxtTcCy > > A:fdi:1000:rwaDxtcy > > A:fdi:GROUP@:rxtcy > > A:fdi:EVERYONE@:rxtcy > > > > Reported-by: Ondrej Valousek <ondrej.valousek@diasemi.com> > > Closes: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2136452 > > Suggested-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@redhat.com> > > Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org> > > --- > > Changes in v2: > > - always set missing ACEs whenever default ACL has any ACEs that are > > explicitly set. This better conforms to how setfacl works. > > - drop now-unneeded "empty" boolean > > - Link to v1: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230719-nfsd-acl-v1-1-eb0faf3d2917@kernel.org > > --- > > fs/nfsd/nfs4acl.c | 32 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---- > > 1 file changed, 28 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) > > > > diff --git a/fs/nfsd/nfs4acl.c b/fs/nfsd/nfs4acl.c > > index 518203821790..b931d4383517 100644 > > --- a/fs/nfsd/nfs4acl.c > > +++ b/fs/nfsd/nfs4acl.c > > @@ -441,7 +441,7 @@ struct posix_ace_state_array { > > * calculated so far: */ > > > > struct posix_acl_state { > > - int empty; > > + unsigned char valid; > > struct posix_ace_state owner; > > struct posix_ace_state group; > > struct posix_ace_state other; > > @@ -457,7 +457,6 @@ init_state(struct posix_acl_state *state, int cnt) > > int alloc; > > > > memset(state, 0, sizeof(struct posix_acl_state)); > > - state->empty = 1; > > /* > > * In the worst case, each individual acl could be for a distinct > > * named user or group, but we don't know which, so we allocate > > @@ -500,7 +499,7 @@ posix_state_to_acl(struct posix_acl_state *state, unsigned int flags) > > * and effective cases: when there are no inheritable ACEs, > > * calls ->set_acl with a NULL ACL structure. > > */ > > - if (state->empty && (flags & NFS4_ACL_TYPE_DEFAULT)) > > + if (!state->valid && (flags & NFS4_ACL_TYPE_DEFAULT)) > > return NULL; > > > > /* > > @@ -622,9 +621,10 @@ static void process_one_v4_ace(struct posix_acl_state *state, > > struct nfs4_ace *ace) > > { > > u32 mask = ace->access_mask; > > + short type = ace2type(ace); > > int i; > > > > - state->empty = 0; > > + state->valid |= type; > > > > switch (ace2type(ace)) { > > Mechanical issue: the patch adds @type, but uses it just once. > The switch here also wants the value of ace2type(ace). > > Doh! I had that fixed in one version of the patch, but had to rework the branch and lost that delta. I can respin, or if you just want to fix that in place, then that would be fine too. > > case ACL_USER_OBJ: > > @@ -726,6 +726,30 @@ static int nfs4_acl_nfsv4_to_posix(struct nfs4_acl *acl, > > if (!(ace->flag & NFS4_ACE_INHERIT_ONLY_ACE)) > > process_one_v4_ace(&effective_acl_state, ace); > > } > > + > > + /* > > + * At this point, the default ACL may have zeroed-out entries for owner, > > + * group and other. That usually results in a non-sensical resulting ACL > > + * that denies all access except to any ACE that was explicitly added. > > + * > > + * The setfacl command solves a similar problem with this logic: > > + * > > + * "If a Default ACL entry is created, and the Default ACL contains > > + * no owner, owning group, or others entry, a copy of the ACL > > + * owner, owning group, or others entry is added to the Default ACL." > > + * > > + * Copy any missing ACEs from the effective set, if any ACEs were > > + * explicitly set. > > + */ > > + if (default_acl_state.valid) { > > + if (!(default_acl_state.valid & ACL_USER_OBJ)) > > + default_acl_state.owner = effective_acl_state.owner; > > + if (!(default_acl_state.valid & ACL_GROUP_OBJ)) > > + default_acl_state.group = effective_acl_state.group; > > + if (!(default_acl_state.valid & ACL_OTHER)) > > + default_acl_state.other = effective_acl_state.other; > > + } > > + > > *pacl = posix_state_to_acl(&effective_acl_state, flags); > > if (IS_ERR(*pacl)) { > > ret = PTR_ERR(*pacl); > > > > --- > > base-commit: 7bfb36a2ee1d329a501ba4781db4145dc951c798 > > change-id: 20230719-nfsd-acl-5ab61537e4e6 > > > > Best regards, > > -- > > Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org> > > >
On Mon, Jul 24, 2023 at 09:54:22AM -0400, Jeff Layton wrote: > On Mon, 2023-07-24 at 09:44 -0400, Chuck Lever wrote: > > On Mon, Jul 24, 2023 at 08:13:05AM -0400, Jeff Layton wrote: > > > A well-formed NFSv4 ACL will always contain OWNER@/GROUP@/EVERYONE@ > > > ACEs, but there is no requirement for inheritable entries for those > > > entities. POSIX ACLs must always have owner/group/other entries, even for a > > > default ACL. > > > > > > nfsd builds the default ACL from inheritable ACEs, but the current code > > > just leaves any unspecified ACEs zeroed out. The result is that adding a > > > default user or group ACE to an inode can leave it with unwanted deny > > > entries. > > > > > > For instance, a newly created directory with no acl will look something > > > like this: > > > > > > # NFSv4 translation by server > > > A::OWNER@:rwaDxtTcCy > > > A::GROUP@:rxtcy > > > A::EVERYONE@:rxtcy > > > > > > # POSIX ACL of underlying file > > > user::rwx > > > group::r-x > > > other::r-x > > > > > > ...if I then add new v4 ACE: > > > > > > nfs4_setfacl -a A:fd:1000:rwx /mnt/local/test > > > > > > ...I end up with a result like this today: > > > > > > user::rwx > > > user:1000:rwx > > > group::r-x > > > mask::rwx > > > other::r-x > > > default:user::--- > > > default:user:1000:rwx > > > default:group::--- > > > default:mask::rwx > > > default:other::--- > > > > > > A::OWNER@:rwaDxtTcCy > > > A::1000:rwaDxtcy > > > A::GROUP@:rxtcy > > > A::EVERYONE@:rxtcy > > > D:fdi:OWNER@:rwaDx > > > A:fdi:OWNER@:tTcCy > > > A:fdi:1000:rwaDxtcy > > > A:fdi:GROUP@:tcy > > > A:fdi:EVERYONE@:tcy > > > > > > ...which is not at all expected. Adding a single inheritable allow ACE > > > should not result in everyone else losing access. > > > > > > The setfacl command solves a silimar issue by copying owner/group/other > > > entries from the effective ACL when none of them are set: > > > > > > "If a Default ACL entry is created, and the Default ACL contains no > > > owner, owning group, or others entry, a copy of the ACL owner, > > > owning group, or others entry is added to the Default ACL. > > > > > > Having nfsd do the same provides a more sane result (with no deny ACEs > > > in the resulting set): > > > > > > user::rwx > > > user:1000:rwx > > > group::r-x > > > mask::rwx > > > other::r-x > > > default:user::rwx > > > default:user:1000:rwx > > > default:group::r-x > > > default:mask::rwx > > > default:other::r-x > > > > > > A::OWNER@:rwaDxtTcCy > > > A::1000:rwaDxtcy > > > A::GROUP@:rxtcy > > > A::EVERYONE@:rxtcy > > > A:fdi:OWNER@:rwaDxtTcCy > > > A:fdi:1000:rwaDxtcy > > > A:fdi:GROUP@:rxtcy > > > A:fdi:EVERYONE@:rxtcy > > > > > > Reported-by: Ondrej Valousek <ondrej.valousek@diasemi.com> > > > Closes: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2136452 > > > Suggested-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@redhat.com> > > > Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org> > > > --- > > > Changes in v2: > > > - always set missing ACEs whenever default ACL has any ACEs that are > > > explicitly set. This better conforms to how setfacl works. > > > - drop now-unneeded "empty" boolean > > > - Link to v1: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230719-nfsd-acl-v1-1-eb0faf3d2917@kernel.org > > > --- > > > fs/nfsd/nfs4acl.c | 32 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---- > > > 1 file changed, 28 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) > > > > > > diff --git a/fs/nfsd/nfs4acl.c b/fs/nfsd/nfs4acl.c > > > index 518203821790..b931d4383517 100644 > > > --- a/fs/nfsd/nfs4acl.c > > > +++ b/fs/nfsd/nfs4acl.c > > > @@ -441,7 +441,7 @@ struct posix_ace_state_array { > > > * calculated so far: */ > > > > > > struct posix_acl_state { > > > - int empty; > > > + unsigned char valid; > > > struct posix_ace_state owner; > > > struct posix_ace_state group; > > > struct posix_ace_state other; > > > @@ -457,7 +457,6 @@ init_state(struct posix_acl_state *state, int cnt) > > > int alloc; > > > > > > memset(state, 0, sizeof(struct posix_acl_state)); > > > - state->empty = 1; > > > /* > > > * In the worst case, each individual acl could be for a distinct > > > * named user or group, but we don't know which, so we allocate > > > @@ -500,7 +499,7 @@ posix_state_to_acl(struct posix_acl_state *state, unsigned int flags) > > > * and effective cases: when there are no inheritable ACEs, > > > * calls ->set_acl with a NULL ACL structure. > > > */ > > > - if (state->empty && (flags & NFS4_ACL_TYPE_DEFAULT)) > > > + if (!state->valid && (flags & NFS4_ACL_TYPE_DEFAULT)) > > > return NULL; > > > > > > /* > > > @@ -622,9 +621,10 @@ static void process_one_v4_ace(struct posix_acl_state *state, > > > struct nfs4_ace *ace) > > > { > > > u32 mask = ace->access_mask; > > > + short type = ace2type(ace); > > > int i; > > > > > > - state->empty = 0; > > > + state->valid |= type; > > > > > > switch (ace2type(ace)) { > > > > Mechanical issue: the patch adds @type, but uses it just once. > > The switch here also wants the value of ace2type(ace). > > > > > > Doh! I had that fixed in one version of the patch, but had to rework the > branch and lost that delta. I can respin, or if you just want to fix > that in place, then that would be fine too. I've fixed it in my tree and applied it to nfsd-next. Let me know if I've done something wrong. > > > case ACL_USER_OBJ: > > > @@ -726,6 +726,30 @@ static int nfs4_acl_nfsv4_to_posix(struct nfs4_acl *acl, > > > if (!(ace->flag & NFS4_ACE_INHERIT_ONLY_ACE)) > > > process_one_v4_ace(&effective_acl_state, ace); > > > } > > > + > > > + /* > > > + * At this point, the default ACL may have zeroed-out entries for owner, > > > + * group and other. That usually results in a non-sensical resulting ACL > > > + * that denies all access except to any ACE that was explicitly added. > > > + * > > > + * The setfacl command solves a similar problem with this logic: > > > + * > > > + * "If a Default ACL entry is created, and the Default ACL contains > > > + * no owner, owning group, or others entry, a copy of the ACL > > > + * owner, owning group, or others entry is added to the Default ACL." > > > + * > > > + * Copy any missing ACEs from the effective set, if any ACEs were > > > + * explicitly set. > > > + */ > > > + if (default_acl_state.valid) { > > > + if (!(default_acl_state.valid & ACL_USER_OBJ)) > > > + default_acl_state.owner = effective_acl_state.owner; > > > + if (!(default_acl_state.valid & ACL_GROUP_OBJ)) > > > + default_acl_state.group = effective_acl_state.group; > > > + if (!(default_acl_state.valid & ACL_OTHER)) > > > + default_acl_state.other = effective_acl_state.other; > > > + } > > > + > > > *pacl = posix_state_to_acl(&effective_acl_state, flags); > > > if (IS_ERR(*pacl)) { > > > ret = PTR_ERR(*pacl); > > > > > > --- > > > base-commit: 7bfb36a2ee1d329a501ba4781db4145dc951c798 > > > change-id: 20230719-nfsd-acl-5ab61537e4e6 > > > > > > Best regards, > > > -- > > > Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org> > > > > > > > -- > Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
diff --git a/fs/nfsd/nfs4acl.c b/fs/nfsd/nfs4acl.c index 518203821790..b931d4383517 100644 --- a/fs/nfsd/nfs4acl.c +++ b/fs/nfsd/nfs4acl.c @@ -441,7 +441,7 @@ struct posix_ace_state_array { * calculated so far: */ struct posix_acl_state { - int empty; + unsigned char valid; struct posix_ace_state owner; struct posix_ace_state group; struct posix_ace_state other; @@ -457,7 +457,6 @@ init_state(struct posix_acl_state *state, int cnt) int alloc; memset(state, 0, sizeof(struct posix_acl_state)); - state->empty = 1; /* * In the worst case, each individual acl could be for a distinct * named user or group, but we don't know which, so we allocate @@ -500,7 +499,7 @@ posix_state_to_acl(struct posix_acl_state *state, unsigned int flags) * and effective cases: when there are no inheritable ACEs, * calls ->set_acl with a NULL ACL structure. */ - if (state->empty && (flags & NFS4_ACL_TYPE_DEFAULT)) + if (!state->valid && (flags & NFS4_ACL_TYPE_DEFAULT)) return NULL; /* @@ -622,9 +621,10 @@ static void process_one_v4_ace(struct posix_acl_state *state, struct nfs4_ace *ace) { u32 mask = ace->access_mask; + short type = ace2type(ace); int i; - state->empty = 0; + state->valid |= type; switch (ace2type(ace)) { case ACL_USER_OBJ: @@ -726,6 +726,30 @@ static int nfs4_acl_nfsv4_to_posix(struct nfs4_acl *acl, if (!(ace->flag & NFS4_ACE_INHERIT_ONLY_ACE)) process_one_v4_ace(&effective_acl_state, ace); } + + /* + * At this point, the default ACL may have zeroed-out entries for owner, + * group and other. That usually results in a non-sensical resulting ACL + * that denies all access except to any ACE that was explicitly added. + * + * The setfacl command solves a similar problem with this logic: + * + * "If a Default ACL entry is created, and the Default ACL contains + * no owner, owning group, or others entry, a copy of the ACL + * owner, owning group, or others entry is added to the Default ACL." + * + * Copy any missing ACEs from the effective set, if any ACEs were + * explicitly set. + */ + if (default_acl_state.valid) { + if (!(default_acl_state.valid & ACL_USER_OBJ)) + default_acl_state.owner = effective_acl_state.owner; + if (!(default_acl_state.valid & ACL_GROUP_OBJ)) + default_acl_state.group = effective_acl_state.group; + if (!(default_acl_state.valid & ACL_OTHER)) + default_acl_state.other = effective_acl_state.other; + } + *pacl = posix_state_to_acl(&effective_acl_state, flags); if (IS_ERR(*pacl)) { ret = PTR_ERR(*pacl);
A well-formed NFSv4 ACL will always contain OWNER@/GROUP@/EVERYONE@ ACEs, but there is no requirement for inheritable entries for those entities. POSIX ACLs must always have owner/group/other entries, even for a default ACL. nfsd builds the default ACL from inheritable ACEs, but the current code just leaves any unspecified ACEs zeroed out. The result is that adding a default user or group ACE to an inode can leave it with unwanted deny entries. For instance, a newly created directory with no acl will look something like this: # NFSv4 translation by server A::OWNER@:rwaDxtTcCy A::GROUP@:rxtcy A::EVERYONE@:rxtcy # POSIX ACL of underlying file user::rwx group::r-x other::r-x ...if I then add new v4 ACE: nfs4_setfacl -a A:fd:1000:rwx /mnt/local/test ...I end up with a result like this today: user::rwx user:1000:rwx group::r-x mask::rwx other::r-x default:user::--- default:user:1000:rwx default:group::--- default:mask::rwx default:other::--- A::OWNER@:rwaDxtTcCy A::1000:rwaDxtcy A::GROUP@:rxtcy A::EVERYONE@:rxtcy D:fdi:OWNER@:rwaDx A:fdi:OWNER@:tTcCy A:fdi:1000:rwaDxtcy A:fdi:GROUP@:tcy A:fdi:EVERYONE@:tcy ...which is not at all expected. Adding a single inheritable allow ACE should not result in everyone else losing access. The setfacl command solves a silimar issue by copying owner/group/other entries from the effective ACL when none of them are set: "If a Default ACL entry is created, and the Default ACL contains no owner, owning group, or others entry, a copy of the ACL owner, owning group, or others entry is added to the Default ACL. Having nfsd do the same provides a more sane result (with no deny ACEs in the resulting set): user::rwx user:1000:rwx group::r-x mask::rwx other::r-x default:user::rwx default:user:1000:rwx default:group::r-x default:mask::rwx default:other::r-x A::OWNER@:rwaDxtTcCy A::1000:rwaDxtcy A::GROUP@:rxtcy A::EVERYONE@:rxtcy A:fdi:OWNER@:rwaDxtTcCy A:fdi:1000:rwaDxtcy A:fdi:GROUP@:rxtcy A:fdi:EVERYONE@:rxtcy Reported-by: Ondrej Valousek <ondrej.valousek@diasemi.com> Closes: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2136452 Suggested-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org> --- Changes in v2: - always set missing ACEs whenever default ACL has any ACEs that are explicitly set. This better conforms to how setfacl works. - drop now-unneeded "empty" boolean - Link to v1: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230719-nfsd-acl-v1-1-eb0faf3d2917@kernel.org --- fs/nfsd/nfs4acl.c | 32 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---- 1 file changed, 28 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) --- base-commit: 7bfb36a2ee1d329a501ba4781db4145dc951c798 change-id: 20230719-nfsd-acl-5ab61537e4e6 Best regards,