diff mbox series

[v2] nfsd: inherit required unset default acls from effective set

Message ID 20230724-nfsd-acl-v2-1-1cfaac973498@kernel.org (mailing list archive)
State New, archived
Headers show
Series [v2] nfsd: inherit required unset default acls from effective set | expand

Commit Message

Jeff Layton July 24, 2023, 12:13 p.m. UTC
A well-formed NFSv4 ACL will always contain OWNER@/GROUP@/EVERYONE@
ACEs, but there is no requirement for inheritable entries for those
entities. POSIX ACLs must always have owner/group/other entries, even for a
default ACL.

nfsd builds the default ACL from inheritable ACEs, but the current code
just leaves any unspecified ACEs zeroed out. The result is that adding a
default user or group ACE to an inode can leave it with unwanted deny
entries.

For instance, a newly created directory with no acl will look something
like this:

	# NFSv4 translation by server
	A::OWNER@:rwaDxtTcCy
	A::GROUP@:rxtcy
	A::EVERYONE@:rxtcy

	# POSIX ACL of underlying file
	user::rwx
	group::r-x
	other::r-x

...if I then add new v4 ACE:

	nfs4_setfacl -a A:fd:1000:rwx /mnt/local/test

...I end up with a result like this today:

	user::rwx
	user:1000:rwx
	group::r-x
	mask::rwx
	other::r-x
	default:user::---
	default:user:1000:rwx
	default:group::---
	default:mask::rwx
	default:other::---

	A::OWNER@:rwaDxtTcCy
	A::1000:rwaDxtcy
	A::GROUP@:rxtcy
	A::EVERYONE@:rxtcy
	D:fdi:OWNER@:rwaDx
	A:fdi:OWNER@:tTcCy
	A:fdi:1000:rwaDxtcy
	A:fdi:GROUP@:tcy
	A:fdi:EVERYONE@:tcy

...which is not at all expected. Adding a single inheritable allow ACE
should not result in everyone else losing access.

The setfacl command solves a silimar issue by copying owner/group/other
entries from the effective ACL when none of them are set:

    "If a Default ACL entry is created, and the  Default  ACL  contains  no
     owner,  owning group,  or  others  entry,  a  copy of the ACL owner,
     owning group, or others entry is added to the Default ACL.

Having nfsd do the same provides a more sane result (with no deny ACEs
in the resulting set):

	user::rwx
	user:1000:rwx
	group::r-x
	mask::rwx
	other::r-x
	default:user::rwx
	default:user:1000:rwx
	default:group::r-x
	default:mask::rwx
	default:other::r-x

	A::OWNER@:rwaDxtTcCy
	A::1000:rwaDxtcy
	A::GROUP@:rxtcy
	A::EVERYONE@:rxtcy
	A:fdi:OWNER@:rwaDxtTcCy
	A:fdi:1000:rwaDxtcy
	A:fdi:GROUP@:rxtcy
	A:fdi:EVERYONE@:rxtcy

Reported-by: Ondrej Valousek <ondrej.valousek@diasemi.com>
Closes: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2136452
Suggested-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
---
Changes in v2:
- always set missing ACEs whenever default ACL has any ACEs that are
  explicitly set. This better conforms to how setfacl works.
- drop now-unneeded "empty" boolean
- Link to v1: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230719-nfsd-acl-v1-1-eb0faf3d2917@kernel.org
---
 fs/nfsd/nfs4acl.c | 32 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----
 1 file changed, 28 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)


---
base-commit: 7bfb36a2ee1d329a501ba4781db4145dc951c798
change-id: 20230719-nfsd-acl-5ab61537e4e6

Best regards,

Comments

Chuck Lever July 24, 2023, 1:44 p.m. UTC | #1
On Mon, Jul 24, 2023 at 08:13:05AM -0400, Jeff Layton wrote:
> A well-formed NFSv4 ACL will always contain OWNER@/GROUP@/EVERYONE@
> ACEs, but there is no requirement for inheritable entries for those
> entities. POSIX ACLs must always have owner/group/other entries, even for a
> default ACL.
> 
> nfsd builds the default ACL from inheritable ACEs, but the current code
> just leaves any unspecified ACEs zeroed out. The result is that adding a
> default user or group ACE to an inode can leave it with unwanted deny
> entries.
> 
> For instance, a newly created directory with no acl will look something
> like this:
> 
> 	# NFSv4 translation by server
> 	A::OWNER@:rwaDxtTcCy
> 	A::GROUP@:rxtcy
> 	A::EVERYONE@:rxtcy
> 
> 	# POSIX ACL of underlying file
> 	user::rwx
> 	group::r-x
> 	other::r-x
> 
> ...if I then add new v4 ACE:
> 
> 	nfs4_setfacl -a A:fd:1000:rwx /mnt/local/test
> 
> ...I end up with a result like this today:
> 
> 	user::rwx
> 	user:1000:rwx
> 	group::r-x
> 	mask::rwx
> 	other::r-x
> 	default:user::---
> 	default:user:1000:rwx
> 	default:group::---
> 	default:mask::rwx
> 	default:other::---
> 
> 	A::OWNER@:rwaDxtTcCy
> 	A::1000:rwaDxtcy
> 	A::GROUP@:rxtcy
> 	A::EVERYONE@:rxtcy
> 	D:fdi:OWNER@:rwaDx
> 	A:fdi:OWNER@:tTcCy
> 	A:fdi:1000:rwaDxtcy
> 	A:fdi:GROUP@:tcy
> 	A:fdi:EVERYONE@:tcy
> 
> ...which is not at all expected. Adding a single inheritable allow ACE
> should not result in everyone else losing access.
> 
> The setfacl command solves a silimar issue by copying owner/group/other
> entries from the effective ACL when none of them are set:
> 
>     "If a Default ACL entry is created, and the  Default  ACL  contains  no
>      owner,  owning group,  or  others  entry,  a  copy of the ACL owner,
>      owning group, or others entry is added to the Default ACL.
> 
> Having nfsd do the same provides a more sane result (with no deny ACEs
> in the resulting set):
> 
> 	user::rwx
> 	user:1000:rwx
> 	group::r-x
> 	mask::rwx
> 	other::r-x
> 	default:user::rwx
> 	default:user:1000:rwx
> 	default:group::r-x
> 	default:mask::rwx
> 	default:other::r-x
> 
> 	A::OWNER@:rwaDxtTcCy
> 	A::1000:rwaDxtcy
> 	A::GROUP@:rxtcy
> 	A::EVERYONE@:rxtcy
> 	A:fdi:OWNER@:rwaDxtTcCy
> 	A:fdi:1000:rwaDxtcy
> 	A:fdi:GROUP@:rxtcy
> 	A:fdi:EVERYONE@:rxtcy
> 
> Reported-by: Ondrej Valousek <ondrej.valousek@diasemi.com>
> Closes: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2136452
> Suggested-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@redhat.com>
> Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
> ---
> Changes in v2:
> - always set missing ACEs whenever default ACL has any ACEs that are
>   explicitly set. This better conforms to how setfacl works.
> - drop now-unneeded "empty" boolean
> - Link to v1: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230719-nfsd-acl-v1-1-eb0faf3d2917@kernel.org
> ---
>  fs/nfsd/nfs4acl.c | 32 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----
>  1 file changed, 28 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/fs/nfsd/nfs4acl.c b/fs/nfsd/nfs4acl.c
> index 518203821790..b931d4383517 100644
> --- a/fs/nfsd/nfs4acl.c
> +++ b/fs/nfsd/nfs4acl.c
> @@ -441,7 +441,7 @@ struct posix_ace_state_array {
>   * calculated so far: */
>  
>  struct posix_acl_state {
> -	int empty;
> +	unsigned char valid;
>  	struct posix_ace_state owner;
>  	struct posix_ace_state group;
>  	struct posix_ace_state other;
> @@ -457,7 +457,6 @@ init_state(struct posix_acl_state *state, int cnt)
>  	int alloc;
>  
>  	memset(state, 0, sizeof(struct posix_acl_state));
> -	state->empty = 1;
>  	/*
>  	 * In the worst case, each individual acl could be for a distinct
>  	 * named user or group, but we don't know which, so we allocate
> @@ -500,7 +499,7 @@ posix_state_to_acl(struct posix_acl_state *state, unsigned int flags)
>  	 * and effective cases: when there are no inheritable ACEs,
>  	 * calls ->set_acl with a NULL ACL structure.
>  	 */
> -	if (state->empty && (flags & NFS4_ACL_TYPE_DEFAULT))
> +	if (!state->valid && (flags & NFS4_ACL_TYPE_DEFAULT))
>  		return NULL;
>  
>  	/*
> @@ -622,9 +621,10 @@ static void process_one_v4_ace(struct posix_acl_state *state,
>  				struct nfs4_ace *ace)
>  {
>  	u32 mask = ace->access_mask;
> +	short type = ace2type(ace);
>  	int i;
>  
> -	state->empty = 0;
> +	state->valid |= type;
>  
>  	switch (ace2type(ace)) {

Mechanical issue: the patch adds @type, but uses it just once.
The switch here also wants the value of ace2type(ace).


>  	case ACL_USER_OBJ:
> @@ -726,6 +726,30 @@ static int nfs4_acl_nfsv4_to_posix(struct nfs4_acl *acl,
>  		if (!(ace->flag & NFS4_ACE_INHERIT_ONLY_ACE))
>  			process_one_v4_ace(&effective_acl_state, ace);
>  	}
> +
> +	/*
> +	 * At this point, the default ACL may have zeroed-out entries for owner,
> +	 * group and other. That usually results in a non-sensical resulting ACL
> +	 * that denies all access except to any ACE that was explicitly added.
> +	 *
> +	 * The setfacl command solves a similar problem with this logic:
> +	 *
> +	 * "If  a  Default  ACL  entry is created, and the Default ACL contains
> +	 *  no owner, owning group, or others entry,  a  copy of  the  ACL
> +	 *  owner, owning group, or others entry is added to the Default ACL."
> +	 *
> +	 * Copy any missing ACEs from the effective set, if any ACEs were
> +	 * explicitly set.
> +	 */
> +	if (default_acl_state.valid) {
> +		if (!(default_acl_state.valid & ACL_USER_OBJ))
> +			default_acl_state.owner = effective_acl_state.owner;
> +		if (!(default_acl_state.valid & ACL_GROUP_OBJ))
> +			default_acl_state.group = effective_acl_state.group;
> +		if (!(default_acl_state.valid & ACL_OTHER))
> +			default_acl_state.other = effective_acl_state.other;
> +	}
> +
>  	*pacl = posix_state_to_acl(&effective_acl_state, flags);
>  	if (IS_ERR(*pacl)) {
>  		ret = PTR_ERR(*pacl);
> 
> ---
> base-commit: 7bfb36a2ee1d329a501ba4781db4145dc951c798
> change-id: 20230719-nfsd-acl-5ab61537e4e6
> 
> Best regards,
> -- 
> Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
>
Jeff Layton July 24, 2023, 1:54 p.m. UTC | #2
On Mon, 2023-07-24 at 09:44 -0400, Chuck Lever wrote:
> On Mon, Jul 24, 2023 at 08:13:05AM -0400, Jeff Layton wrote:
> > A well-formed NFSv4 ACL will always contain OWNER@/GROUP@/EVERYONE@
> > ACEs, but there is no requirement for inheritable entries for those
> > entities. POSIX ACLs must always have owner/group/other entries, even for a
> > default ACL.
> > 
> > nfsd builds the default ACL from inheritable ACEs, but the current code
> > just leaves any unspecified ACEs zeroed out. The result is that adding a
> > default user or group ACE to an inode can leave it with unwanted deny
> > entries.
> > 
> > For instance, a newly created directory with no acl will look something
> > like this:
> > 
> > 	# NFSv4 translation by server
> > 	A::OWNER@:rwaDxtTcCy
> > 	A::GROUP@:rxtcy
> > 	A::EVERYONE@:rxtcy
> > 
> > 	# POSIX ACL of underlying file
> > 	user::rwx
> > 	group::r-x
> > 	other::r-x
> > 
> > ...if I then add new v4 ACE:
> > 
> > 	nfs4_setfacl -a A:fd:1000:rwx /mnt/local/test
> > 
> > ...I end up with a result like this today:
> > 
> > 	user::rwx
> > 	user:1000:rwx
> > 	group::r-x
> > 	mask::rwx
> > 	other::r-x
> > 	default:user::---
> > 	default:user:1000:rwx
> > 	default:group::---
> > 	default:mask::rwx
> > 	default:other::---
> > 
> > 	A::OWNER@:rwaDxtTcCy
> > 	A::1000:rwaDxtcy
> > 	A::GROUP@:rxtcy
> > 	A::EVERYONE@:rxtcy
> > 	D:fdi:OWNER@:rwaDx
> > 	A:fdi:OWNER@:tTcCy
> > 	A:fdi:1000:rwaDxtcy
> > 	A:fdi:GROUP@:tcy
> > 	A:fdi:EVERYONE@:tcy
> > 
> > ...which is not at all expected. Adding a single inheritable allow ACE
> > should not result in everyone else losing access.
> > 
> > The setfacl command solves a silimar issue by copying owner/group/other
> > entries from the effective ACL when none of them are set:
> > 
> >     "If a Default ACL entry is created, and the  Default  ACL  contains  no
> >      owner,  owning group,  or  others  entry,  a  copy of the ACL owner,
> >      owning group, or others entry is added to the Default ACL.
> > 
> > Having nfsd do the same provides a more sane result (with no deny ACEs
> > in the resulting set):
> > 
> > 	user::rwx
> > 	user:1000:rwx
> > 	group::r-x
> > 	mask::rwx
> > 	other::r-x
> > 	default:user::rwx
> > 	default:user:1000:rwx
> > 	default:group::r-x
> > 	default:mask::rwx
> > 	default:other::r-x
> > 
> > 	A::OWNER@:rwaDxtTcCy
> > 	A::1000:rwaDxtcy
> > 	A::GROUP@:rxtcy
> > 	A::EVERYONE@:rxtcy
> > 	A:fdi:OWNER@:rwaDxtTcCy
> > 	A:fdi:1000:rwaDxtcy
> > 	A:fdi:GROUP@:rxtcy
> > 	A:fdi:EVERYONE@:rxtcy
> > 
> > Reported-by: Ondrej Valousek <ondrej.valousek@diasemi.com>
> > Closes: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2136452
> > Suggested-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@redhat.com>
> > Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
> > ---
> > Changes in v2:
> > - always set missing ACEs whenever default ACL has any ACEs that are
> >   explicitly set. This better conforms to how setfacl works.
> > - drop now-unneeded "empty" boolean
> > - Link to v1: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230719-nfsd-acl-v1-1-eb0faf3d2917@kernel.org
> > ---
> >  fs/nfsd/nfs4acl.c | 32 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----
> >  1 file changed, 28 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
> > 
> > diff --git a/fs/nfsd/nfs4acl.c b/fs/nfsd/nfs4acl.c
> > index 518203821790..b931d4383517 100644
> > --- a/fs/nfsd/nfs4acl.c
> > +++ b/fs/nfsd/nfs4acl.c
> > @@ -441,7 +441,7 @@ struct posix_ace_state_array {
> >   * calculated so far: */
> >  
> >  struct posix_acl_state {
> > -	int empty;
> > +	unsigned char valid;
> >  	struct posix_ace_state owner;
> >  	struct posix_ace_state group;
> >  	struct posix_ace_state other;
> > @@ -457,7 +457,6 @@ init_state(struct posix_acl_state *state, int cnt)
> >  	int alloc;
> >  
> >  	memset(state, 0, sizeof(struct posix_acl_state));
> > -	state->empty = 1;
> >  	/*
> >  	 * In the worst case, each individual acl could be for a distinct
> >  	 * named user or group, but we don't know which, so we allocate
> > @@ -500,7 +499,7 @@ posix_state_to_acl(struct posix_acl_state *state, unsigned int flags)
> >  	 * and effective cases: when there are no inheritable ACEs,
> >  	 * calls ->set_acl with a NULL ACL structure.
> >  	 */
> > -	if (state->empty && (flags & NFS4_ACL_TYPE_DEFAULT))
> > +	if (!state->valid && (flags & NFS4_ACL_TYPE_DEFAULT))
> >  		return NULL;
> >  
> >  	/*
> > @@ -622,9 +621,10 @@ static void process_one_v4_ace(struct posix_acl_state *state,
> >  				struct nfs4_ace *ace)
> >  {
> >  	u32 mask = ace->access_mask;
> > +	short type = ace2type(ace);
> >  	int i;
> >  
> > -	state->empty = 0;
> > +	state->valid |= type;
> >  
> >  	switch (ace2type(ace)) {
> 
> Mechanical issue: the patch adds @type, but uses it just once.
> The switch here also wants the value of ace2type(ace).
> 
> 

Doh! I had that fixed in one version of the patch, but had to rework the
branch and lost that delta. I can respin, or if you just want to fix
that in place, then that would be fine too.

> >  	case ACL_USER_OBJ:
> > @@ -726,6 +726,30 @@ static int nfs4_acl_nfsv4_to_posix(struct nfs4_acl *acl,
> >  		if (!(ace->flag & NFS4_ACE_INHERIT_ONLY_ACE))
> >  			process_one_v4_ace(&effective_acl_state, ace);
> >  	}
> > +
> > +	/*
> > +	 * At this point, the default ACL may have zeroed-out entries for owner,
> > +	 * group and other. That usually results in a non-sensical resulting ACL
> > +	 * that denies all access except to any ACE that was explicitly added.
> > +	 *
> > +	 * The setfacl command solves a similar problem with this logic:
> > +	 *
> > +	 * "If  a  Default  ACL  entry is created, and the Default ACL contains
> > +	 *  no owner, owning group, or others entry,  a  copy of  the  ACL
> > +	 *  owner, owning group, or others entry is added to the Default ACL."
> > +	 *
> > +	 * Copy any missing ACEs from the effective set, if any ACEs were
> > +	 * explicitly set.
> > +	 */
> > +	if (default_acl_state.valid) {
> > +		if (!(default_acl_state.valid & ACL_USER_OBJ))
> > +			default_acl_state.owner = effective_acl_state.owner;
> > +		if (!(default_acl_state.valid & ACL_GROUP_OBJ))
> > +			default_acl_state.group = effective_acl_state.group;
> > +		if (!(default_acl_state.valid & ACL_OTHER))
> > +			default_acl_state.other = effective_acl_state.other;
> > +	}
> > +
> >  	*pacl = posix_state_to_acl(&effective_acl_state, flags);
> >  	if (IS_ERR(*pacl)) {
> >  		ret = PTR_ERR(*pacl);
> > 
> > ---
> > base-commit: 7bfb36a2ee1d329a501ba4781db4145dc951c798
> > change-id: 20230719-nfsd-acl-5ab61537e4e6
> > 
> > Best regards,
> > -- 
> > Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
> > 
>
Chuck Lever July 24, 2023, 2:02 p.m. UTC | #3
On Mon, Jul 24, 2023 at 09:54:22AM -0400, Jeff Layton wrote:
> On Mon, 2023-07-24 at 09:44 -0400, Chuck Lever wrote:
> > On Mon, Jul 24, 2023 at 08:13:05AM -0400, Jeff Layton wrote:
> > > A well-formed NFSv4 ACL will always contain OWNER@/GROUP@/EVERYONE@
> > > ACEs, but there is no requirement for inheritable entries for those
> > > entities. POSIX ACLs must always have owner/group/other entries, even for a
> > > default ACL.
> > > 
> > > nfsd builds the default ACL from inheritable ACEs, but the current code
> > > just leaves any unspecified ACEs zeroed out. The result is that adding a
> > > default user or group ACE to an inode can leave it with unwanted deny
> > > entries.
> > > 
> > > For instance, a newly created directory with no acl will look something
> > > like this:
> > > 
> > > 	# NFSv4 translation by server
> > > 	A::OWNER@:rwaDxtTcCy
> > > 	A::GROUP@:rxtcy
> > > 	A::EVERYONE@:rxtcy
> > > 
> > > 	# POSIX ACL of underlying file
> > > 	user::rwx
> > > 	group::r-x
> > > 	other::r-x
> > > 
> > > ...if I then add new v4 ACE:
> > > 
> > > 	nfs4_setfacl -a A:fd:1000:rwx /mnt/local/test
> > > 
> > > ...I end up with a result like this today:
> > > 
> > > 	user::rwx
> > > 	user:1000:rwx
> > > 	group::r-x
> > > 	mask::rwx
> > > 	other::r-x
> > > 	default:user::---
> > > 	default:user:1000:rwx
> > > 	default:group::---
> > > 	default:mask::rwx
> > > 	default:other::---
> > > 
> > > 	A::OWNER@:rwaDxtTcCy
> > > 	A::1000:rwaDxtcy
> > > 	A::GROUP@:rxtcy
> > > 	A::EVERYONE@:rxtcy
> > > 	D:fdi:OWNER@:rwaDx
> > > 	A:fdi:OWNER@:tTcCy
> > > 	A:fdi:1000:rwaDxtcy
> > > 	A:fdi:GROUP@:tcy
> > > 	A:fdi:EVERYONE@:tcy
> > > 
> > > ...which is not at all expected. Adding a single inheritable allow ACE
> > > should not result in everyone else losing access.
> > > 
> > > The setfacl command solves a silimar issue by copying owner/group/other
> > > entries from the effective ACL when none of them are set:
> > > 
> > >     "If a Default ACL entry is created, and the  Default  ACL  contains  no
> > >      owner,  owning group,  or  others  entry,  a  copy of the ACL owner,
> > >      owning group, or others entry is added to the Default ACL.
> > > 
> > > Having nfsd do the same provides a more sane result (with no deny ACEs
> > > in the resulting set):
> > > 
> > > 	user::rwx
> > > 	user:1000:rwx
> > > 	group::r-x
> > > 	mask::rwx
> > > 	other::r-x
> > > 	default:user::rwx
> > > 	default:user:1000:rwx
> > > 	default:group::r-x
> > > 	default:mask::rwx
> > > 	default:other::r-x
> > > 
> > > 	A::OWNER@:rwaDxtTcCy
> > > 	A::1000:rwaDxtcy
> > > 	A::GROUP@:rxtcy
> > > 	A::EVERYONE@:rxtcy
> > > 	A:fdi:OWNER@:rwaDxtTcCy
> > > 	A:fdi:1000:rwaDxtcy
> > > 	A:fdi:GROUP@:rxtcy
> > > 	A:fdi:EVERYONE@:rxtcy
> > > 
> > > Reported-by: Ondrej Valousek <ondrej.valousek@diasemi.com>
> > > Closes: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2136452
> > > Suggested-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@redhat.com>
> > > Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
> > > ---
> > > Changes in v2:
> > > - always set missing ACEs whenever default ACL has any ACEs that are
> > >   explicitly set. This better conforms to how setfacl works.
> > > - drop now-unneeded "empty" boolean
> > > - Link to v1: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230719-nfsd-acl-v1-1-eb0faf3d2917@kernel.org
> > > ---
> > >  fs/nfsd/nfs4acl.c | 32 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----
> > >  1 file changed, 28 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
> > > 
> > > diff --git a/fs/nfsd/nfs4acl.c b/fs/nfsd/nfs4acl.c
> > > index 518203821790..b931d4383517 100644
> > > --- a/fs/nfsd/nfs4acl.c
> > > +++ b/fs/nfsd/nfs4acl.c
> > > @@ -441,7 +441,7 @@ struct posix_ace_state_array {
> > >   * calculated so far: */
> > >  
> > >  struct posix_acl_state {
> > > -	int empty;
> > > +	unsigned char valid;
> > >  	struct posix_ace_state owner;
> > >  	struct posix_ace_state group;
> > >  	struct posix_ace_state other;
> > > @@ -457,7 +457,6 @@ init_state(struct posix_acl_state *state, int cnt)
> > >  	int alloc;
> > >  
> > >  	memset(state, 0, sizeof(struct posix_acl_state));
> > > -	state->empty = 1;
> > >  	/*
> > >  	 * In the worst case, each individual acl could be for a distinct
> > >  	 * named user or group, but we don't know which, so we allocate
> > > @@ -500,7 +499,7 @@ posix_state_to_acl(struct posix_acl_state *state, unsigned int flags)
> > >  	 * and effective cases: when there are no inheritable ACEs,
> > >  	 * calls ->set_acl with a NULL ACL structure.
> > >  	 */
> > > -	if (state->empty && (flags & NFS4_ACL_TYPE_DEFAULT))
> > > +	if (!state->valid && (flags & NFS4_ACL_TYPE_DEFAULT))
> > >  		return NULL;
> > >  
> > >  	/*
> > > @@ -622,9 +621,10 @@ static void process_one_v4_ace(struct posix_acl_state *state,
> > >  				struct nfs4_ace *ace)
> > >  {
> > >  	u32 mask = ace->access_mask;
> > > +	short type = ace2type(ace);
> > >  	int i;
> > >  
> > > -	state->empty = 0;
> > > +	state->valid |= type;
> > >  
> > >  	switch (ace2type(ace)) {
> > 
> > Mechanical issue: the patch adds @type, but uses it just once.
> > The switch here also wants the value of ace2type(ace).
> > 
> > 
> 
> Doh! I had that fixed in one version of the patch, but had to rework the
> branch and lost that delta. I can respin, or if you just want to fix
> that in place, then that would be fine too.

I've fixed it in my tree and applied it to nfsd-next. Let me know if
I've done something wrong.


> > >  	case ACL_USER_OBJ:
> > > @@ -726,6 +726,30 @@ static int nfs4_acl_nfsv4_to_posix(struct nfs4_acl *acl,
> > >  		if (!(ace->flag & NFS4_ACE_INHERIT_ONLY_ACE))
> > >  			process_one_v4_ace(&effective_acl_state, ace);
> > >  	}
> > > +
> > > +	/*
> > > +	 * At this point, the default ACL may have zeroed-out entries for owner,
> > > +	 * group and other. That usually results in a non-sensical resulting ACL
> > > +	 * that denies all access except to any ACE that was explicitly added.
> > > +	 *
> > > +	 * The setfacl command solves a similar problem with this logic:
> > > +	 *
> > > +	 * "If  a  Default  ACL  entry is created, and the Default ACL contains
> > > +	 *  no owner, owning group, or others entry,  a  copy of  the  ACL
> > > +	 *  owner, owning group, or others entry is added to the Default ACL."
> > > +	 *
> > > +	 * Copy any missing ACEs from the effective set, if any ACEs were
> > > +	 * explicitly set.
> > > +	 */
> > > +	if (default_acl_state.valid) {
> > > +		if (!(default_acl_state.valid & ACL_USER_OBJ))
> > > +			default_acl_state.owner = effective_acl_state.owner;
> > > +		if (!(default_acl_state.valid & ACL_GROUP_OBJ))
> > > +			default_acl_state.group = effective_acl_state.group;
> > > +		if (!(default_acl_state.valid & ACL_OTHER))
> > > +			default_acl_state.other = effective_acl_state.other;
> > > +	}
> > > +
> > >  	*pacl = posix_state_to_acl(&effective_acl_state, flags);
> > >  	if (IS_ERR(*pacl)) {
> > >  		ret = PTR_ERR(*pacl);
> > > 
> > > ---
> > > base-commit: 7bfb36a2ee1d329a501ba4781db4145dc951c798
> > > change-id: 20230719-nfsd-acl-5ab61537e4e6
> > > 
> > > Best regards,
> > > -- 
> > > Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
> > > 
> > 
> 
> -- 
> Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
diff mbox series

Patch

diff --git a/fs/nfsd/nfs4acl.c b/fs/nfsd/nfs4acl.c
index 518203821790..b931d4383517 100644
--- a/fs/nfsd/nfs4acl.c
+++ b/fs/nfsd/nfs4acl.c
@@ -441,7 +441,7 @@  struct posix_ace_state_array {
  * calculated so far: */
 
 struct posix_acl_state {
-	int empty;
+	unsigned char valid;
 	struct posix_ace_state owner;
 	struct posix_ace_state group;
 	struct posix_ace_state other;
@@ -457,7 +457,6 @@  init_state(struct posix_acl_state *state, int cnt)
 	int alloc;
 
 	memset(state, 0, sizeof(struct posix_acl_state));
-	state->empty = 1;
 	/*
 	 * In the worst case, each individual acl could be for a distinct
 	 * named user or group, but we don't know which, so we allocate
@@ -500,7 +499,7 @@  posix_state_to_acl(struct posix_acl_state *state, unsigned int flags)
 	 * and effective cases: when there are no inheritable ACEs,
 	 * calls ->set_acl with a NULL ACL structure.
 	 */
-	if (state->empty && (flags & NFS4_ACL_TYPE_DEFAULT))
+	if (!state->valid && (flags & NFS4_ACL_TYPE_DEFAULT))
 		return NULL;
 
 	/*
@@ -622,9 +621,10 @@  static void process_one_v4_ace(struct posix_acl_state *state,
 				struct nfs4_ace *ace)
 {
 	u32 mask = ace->access_mask;
+	short type = ace2type(ace);
 	int i;
 
-	state->empty = 0;
+	state->valid |= type;
 
 	switch (ace2type(ace)) {
 	case ACL_USER_OBJ:
@@ -726,6 +726,30 @@  static int nfs4_acl_nfsv4_to_posix(struct nfs4_acl *acl,
 		if (!(ace->flag & NFS4_ACE_INHERIT_ONLY_ACE))
 			process_one_v4_ace(&effective_acl_state, ace);
 	}
+
+	/*
+	 * At this point, the default ACL may have zeroed-out entries for owner,
+	 * group and other. That usually results in a non-sensical resulting ACL
+	 * that denies all access except to any ACE that was explicitly added.
+	 *
+	 * The setfacl command solves a similar problem with this logic:
+	 *
+	 * "If  a  Default  ACL  entry is created, and the Default ACL contains
+	 *  no owner, owning group, or others entry,  a  copy of  the  ACL
+	 *  owner, owning group, or others entry is added to the Default ACL."
+	 *
+	 * Copy any missing ACEs from the effective set, if any ACEs were
+	 * explicitly set.
+	 */
+	if (default_acl_state.valid) {
+		if (!(default_acl_state.valid & ACL_USER_OBJ))
+			default_acl_state.owner = effective_acl_state.owner;
+		if (!(default_acl_state.valid & ACL_GROUP_OBJ))
+			default_acl_state.group = effective_acl_state.group;
+		if (!(default_acl_state.valid & ACL_OTHER))
+			default_acl_state.other = effective_acl_state.other;
+	}
+
 	*pacl = posix_state_to_acl(&effective_acl_state, flags);
 	if (IS_ERR(*pacl)) {
 		ret = PTR_ERR(*pacl);