| Message ID | 20231107134012.682009-6-roberto.sassu@huaweicloud.com (mailing list archive) |
|---|---|
| State | New, archived |
| Headers | show |
| Series | security: Move IMA and EVM to the LSM infrastructure | expand |
On 11/7/2023 5:39 AM, Roberto Sassu wrote: > From: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com> > > Change ima_post_read_file() definition, by making "void *buf" a > "char *buf", so that it can be registered as implementation of the > post_read_file hook. > > Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com> > Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> > --- > include/linux/ima.h | 4 ++-- > security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 2 +- > 2 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) > > diff --git a/include/linux/ima.h b/include/linux/ima.h > index 678a03fddd7e..31ef6c3c3207 100644 > --- a/include/linux/ima.h > +++ b/include/linux/ima.h > @@ -30,7 +30,7 @@ extern int ima_post_load_data(char *buf, loff_t size, > enum kernel_load_data_id id, char *description); > extern int ima_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id id, > bool contents); > -extern int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size, > +extern int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, char *buf, loff_t size, > enum kernel_read_file_id id); > extern void ima_post_path_mknod(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, > struct dentry *dentry); > @@ -108,7 +108,7 @@ static inline int ima_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id id, > return 0; > } > > -static inline int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size, > +static inline int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, char *buf, loff_t size, > enum kernel_read_file_id id) > { > return 0; > diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c > index b3f5e8401056..02021ee467d3 100644 > --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c > +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c > @@ -803,7 +803,7 @@ const int read_idmap[READING_MAX_ID] = { > * On success return 0. On integrity appraisal error, assuming the file > * is in policy and IMA-appraisal is in enforcing mode, return -EACCES. > */ > -int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size, > +int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, char *buf, loff_t size, > enum kernel_read_file_id read_id) > { > enum ima_hooks func;
diff --git a/include/linux/ima.h b/include/linux/ima.h index 678a03fddd7e..31ef6c3c3207 100644 --- a/include/linux/ima.h +++ b/include/linux/ima.h @@ -30,7 +30,7 @@ extern int ima_post_load_data(char *buf, loff_t size, enum kernel_load_data_id id, char *description); extern int ima_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id id, bool contents); -extern int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size, +extern int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, char *buf, loff_t size, enum kernel_read_file_id id); extern void ima_post_path_mknod(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry); @@ -108,7 +108,7 @@ static inline int ima_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id id, return 0; } -static inline int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size, +static inline int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, char *buf, loff_t size, enum kernel_read_file_id id) { return 0; diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c index b3f5e8401056..02021ee467d3 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c @@ -803,7 +803,7 @@ const int read_idmap[READING_MAX_ID] = { * On success return 0. On integrity appraisal error, assuming the file * is in policy and IMA-appraisal is in enforcing mode, return -EACCES. */ -int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size, +int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, char *buf, loff_t size, enum kernel_read_file_id read_id) { enum ima_hooks func;