| Message ID | 20231214170834.3324559-22-roberto.sassu@huaweicloud.com (mailing list archive) |
|---|---|
| State | New |
| Headers | show |
| Series | security: Move IMA and EVM to the LSM infrastructure | expand |
On 12/14/2023 9:08 AM, Roberto Sassu wrote: > From: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com> > > As for IMA, move hardcoded EVM function calls from various places in the > kernel to the LSM infrastructure, by introducing a new LSM named 'evm' > (last and always enabled like 'ima'). The order in the Makefile ensures > that 'evm' hooks are executed after 'ima' ones. > > Make EVM functions as static (except for evm_inode_init_security(), which > is exported), and register them as hook implementations in init_evm_lsm(). > > Unlike before (see commit to move IMA to the LSM infrastructure), > evm_inode_post_setattr(), evm_inode_post_set_acl(), > evm_inode_post_remove_acl(), and evm_inode_post_removexattr() are not > executed for private inodes. > > Finally, add the LSM_ID_EVM case in lsm_list_modules_test.c > > Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> > --- > fs/attr.c | 2 - > fs/posix_acl.c | 3 - > fs/xattr.c | 2 - > include/linux/evm.h | 107 ---------------- > include/uapi/linux/lsm.h | 1 + > security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c | 115 +++++++++++++++--- > security/security.c | 41 ++----- > .../selftests/lsm/lsm_list_modules_test.c | 3 + > 8 files changed, 113 insertions(+), 161 deletions(-) > > diff --git a/fs/attr.c b/fs/attr.c > index 38841f3ebbcb..b51bd7c9b4a7 100644 > --- a/fs/attr.c > +++ b/fs/attr.c > @@ -16,7 +16,6 @@ > #include <linux/fcntl.h> > #include <linux/filelock.h> > #include <linux/security.h> > -#include <linux/evm.h> > > #include "internal.h" > > @@ -502,7 +501,6 @@ int notify_change(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry, > if (!error) { > fsnotify_change(dentry, ia_valid); > security_inode_post_setattr(idmap, dentry, ia_valid); > - evm_inode_post_setattr(idmap, dentry, ia_valid); > } > > return error; > diff --git a/fs/posix_acl.c b/fs/posix_acl.c > index e3fbe1a9f3f5..ae67479cd2b6 100644 > --- a/fs/posix_acl.c > +++ b/fs/posix_acl.c > @@ -26,7 +26,6 @@ > #include <linux/mnt_idmapping.h> > #include <linux/iversion.h> > #include <linux/security.h> > -#include <linux/evm.h> > #include <linux/fsnotify.h> > #include <linux/filelock.h> > > @@ -1138,7 +1137,6 @@ int vfs_set_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry, > if (!error) { > fsnotify_xattr(dentry); > security_inode_post_set_acl(dentry, acl_name, kacl); > - evm_inode_post_set_acl(dentry, acl_name, kacl); > } > > out_inode_unlock: > @@ -1247,7 +1245,6 @@ int vfs_remove_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry, > if (!error) { > fsnotify_xattr(dentry); > security_inode_post_remove_acl(idmap, dentry, acl_name); > - evm_inode_post_remove_acl(idmap, dentry, acl_name); > } > > out_inode_unlock: > diff --git a/fs/xattr.c b/fs/xattr.c > index f891c260a971..f8b643f91a98 100644 > --- a/fs/xattr.c > +++ b/fs/xattr.c > @@ -16,7 +16,6 @@ > #include <linux/mount.h> > #include <linux/namei.h> > #include <linux/security.h> > -#include <linux/evm.h> > #include <linux/syscalls.h> > #include <linux/export.h> > #include <linux/fsnotify.h> > @@ -557,7 +556,6 @@ __vfs_removexattr_locked(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, > > fsnotify_xattr(dentry); > security_inode_post_removexattr(dentry, name); > - evm_inode_post_removexattr(dentry, name); > > out: > return error; > diff --git a/include/linux/evm.h b/include/linux/evm.h > index 437d4076a3b3..cb481eccc967 100644 > --- a/include/linux/evm.h > +++ b/include/linux/evm.h > @@ -21,44 +21,6 @@ extern enum integrity_status evm_verifyxattr(struct dentry *dentry, > void *xattr_value, > size_t xattr_value_len, > struct integrity_iint_cache *iint); > -extern int evm_inode_setattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, > - struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *attr); > -extern void evm_inode_post_setattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, > - struct dentry *dentry, int ia_valid); > -extern int evm_inode_setxattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, > - struct dentry *dentry, const char *name, > - const void *value, size_t size, int flags); > -extern void evm_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, > - const char *xattr_name, > - const void *xattr_value, > - size_t xattr_value_len, > - int flags); > -extern int evm_inode_removexattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, > - struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name); > -extern void evm_inode_post_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, > - const char *xattr_name); > -static inline void evm_inode_post_remove_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, > - struct dentry *dentry, > - const char *acl_name) > -{ > - evm_inode_post_removexattr(dentry, acl_name); > -} > -extern int evm_inode_set_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, > - struct dentry *dentry, const char *acl_name, > - struct posix_acl *kacl); > -static inline int evm_inode_remove_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, > - struct dentry *dentry, > - const char *acl_name) > -{ > - return evm_inode_set_acl(idmap, dentry, acl_name, NULL); > -} > -static inline void evm_inode_post_set_acl(struct dentry *dentry, > - const char *acl_name, > - struct posix_acl *kacl) > -{ > - return evm_inode_post_setxattr(dentry, acl_name, NULL, 0, 0); > -} > - > int evm_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir, > const struct qstr *qstr, struct xattr *xattrs, > int *xattr_count); > @@ -93,75 +55,6 @@ static inline enum integrity_status evm_verifyxattr(struct dentry *dentry, > } > #endif > > -static inline int evm_inode_setattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, > - struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *attr) > -{ > - return 0; > -} > - > -static inline void evm_inode_post_setattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, > - struct dentry *dentry, int ia_valid) > -{ > - return; > -} > - > -static inline int evm_inode_setxattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, > - struct dentry *dentry, const char *name, > - const void *value, size_t size, int flags) > -{ > - return 0; > -} > - > -static inline void evm_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, > - const char *xattr_name, > - const void *xattr_value, > - size_t xattr_value_len, > - int flags) > -{ > - return; > -} > - > -static inline int evm_inode_removexattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, > - struct dentry *dentry, > - const char *xattr_name) > -{ > - return 0; > -} > - > -static inline void evm_inode_post_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, > - const char *xattr_name) > -{ > - return; > -} > - > -static inline void evm_inode_post_remove_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, > - struct dentry *dentry, > - const char *acl_name) > -{ > - return; > -} > - > -static inline int evm_inode_set_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, > - struct dentry *dentry, const char *acl_name, > - struct posix_acl *kacl) > -{ > - return 0; > -} > - > -static inline int evm_inode_remove_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, > - struct dentry *dentry, > - const char *acl_name) > -{ > - return 0; > -} > - > -static inline void evm_inode_post_set_acl(struct dentry *dentry, > - const char *acl_name, > - struct posix_acl *kacl) > -{ > - return; > -} > - > static inline int evm_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir, > const struct qstr *qstr, > struct xattr *xattrs, > diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/lsm.h b/include/uapi/linux/lsm.h > index ee7d034255a9..825339bcd580 100644 > --- a/include/uapi/linux/lsm.h > +++ b/include/uapi/linux/lsm.h > @@ -62,6 +62,7 @@ struct lsm_ctx { > #define LSM_ID_BPF 109 > #define LSM_ID_LANDLOCK 110 > #define LSM_ID_IMA 111 > +#define LSM_ID_EVM 112 > > /* > * LSM_ATTR_XXX definitions identify different LSM attributes > diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c > index ea84a6f835ff..0cd014bfc093 100644 > --- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c > +++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c > @@ -566,9 +566,9 @@ static int evm_protect_xattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, > * userspace from writing HMAC value. Writing 'security.evm' requires > * requires CAP_SYS_ADMIN privileges. > */ > -int evm_inode_setxattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry, > - const char *xattr_name, const void *xattr_value, > - size_t xattr_value_len, int flags) > +static int evm_inode_setxattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry, > + const char *xattr_name, const void *xattr_value, > + size_t xattr_value_len, int flags) > { > const struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_data = xattr_value; > > @@ -598,8 +598,8 @@ int evm_inode_setxattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry, > * Removing 'security.evm' requires CAP_SYS_ADMIN privileges and that > * the current value is valid. > */ > -int evm_inode_removexattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, > - struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name) > +static int evm_inode_removexattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry, > + const char *xattr_name) > { > /* Policy permits modification of the protected xattrs even though > * there's no HMAC key loaded > @@ -649,9 +649,11 @@ static inline int evm_inode_set_acl_change(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, > * Prevent modifying posix acls causing the EVM HMAC to be re-calculated > * and 'security.evm' xattr updated, unless the existing 'security.evm' is > * valid. > + * > + * Return: zero on success, -EPERM on failure. > */ > -int evm_inode_set_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry, > - const char *acl_name, struct posix_acl *kacl) > +static int evm_inode_set_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry, > + const char *acl_name, struct posix_acl *kacl) > { > enum integrity_status evm_status; > > @@ -690,6 +692,24 @@ int evm_inode_set_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry, > return -EPERM; > } > > +/** > + * evm_inode_remove_acl - Protect the EVM extended attribute from posix acls > + * @idmap: idmap of the mount > + * @dentry: pointer to the affected dentry > + * @acl_name: name of the posix acl > + * > + * Prevent removing posix acls causing the EVM HMAC to be re-calculated > + * and 'security.evm' xattr updated, unless the existing 'security.evm' is > + * valid. > + * > + * Return: zero on success, -EPERM on failure. > + */ > +static int evm_inode_remove_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry, > + const char *acl_name) > +{ > + return evm_inode_set_acl(idmap, dentry, acl_name, NULL); > +} > + > static void evm_reset_status(struct inode *inode) > { > struct integrity_iint_cache *iint; > @@ -738,9 +758,11 @@ bool evm_revalidate_status(const char *xattr_name) > * __vfs_setxattr_noperm(). The caller of which has taken the inode's > * i_mutex lock. > */ > -void evm_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name, > - const void *xattr_value, size_t xattr_value_len, > - int flags) > +static void evm_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, > + const char *xattr_name, > + const void *xattr_value, > + size_t xattr_value_len, > + int flags) > { > if (!evm_revalidate_status(xattr_name)) > return; > @@ -756,6 +778,21 @@ void evm_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name, > evm_update_evmxattr(dentry, xattr_name, xattr_value, xattr_value_len); > } > > +/** > + * evm_inode_post_set_acl - Update the EVM extended attribute from posix acls > + * @dentry: pointer to the affected dentry > + * @acl_name: name of the posix acl > + * @kacl: pointer to the posix acls > + * > + * Update the 'security.evm' xattr with the EVM HMAC re-calculated after setting > + * posix acls. > + */ > +static void evm_inode_post_set_acl(struct dentry *dentry, const char *acl_name, > + struct posix_acl *kacl) > +{ > + return evm_inode_post_setxattr(dentry, acl_name, NULL, 0, 0); > +} > + > /** > * evm_inode_post_removexattr - update 'security.evm' after removing the xattr > * @dentry: pointer to the affected dentry > @@ -766,7 +803,8 @@ void evm_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name, > * No need to take the i_mutex lock here, as this function is called from > * vfs_removexattr() which takes the i_mutex. > */ > -void evm_inode_post_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name) > +static void evm_inode_post_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, > + const char *xattr_name) > { > if (!evm_revalidate_status(xattr_name)) > return; > @@ -782,6 +820,22 @@ void evm_inode_post_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name) > evm_update_evmxattr(dentry, xattr_name, NULL, 0); > } > > +/** > + * evm_inode_post_remove_acl - Update the EVM extended attribute from posix acls > + * @idmap: idmap of the mount > + * @dentry: pointer to the affected dentry > + * @acl_name: name of the posix acl > + * > + * Update the 'security.evm' xattr with the EVM HMAC re-calculated after > + * removing posix acls. > + */ > +static inline void evm_inode_post_remove_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, > + struct dentry *dentry, > + const char *acl_name) > +{ > + evm_inode_post_removexattr(dentry, acl_name); > +} > + > static int evm_attr_change(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, > struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *attr) > { > @@ -805,8 +859,8 @@ static int evm_attr_change(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, > * Permit update of file attributes when files have a valid EVM signature, > * except in the case of them having an immutable portable signature. > */ > -int evm_inode_setattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry, > - struct iattr *attr) > +static int evm_inode_setattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry, > + struct iattr *attr) > { > unsigned int ia_valid = attr->ia_valid; > enum integrity_status evm_status; > @@ -853,8 +907,8 @@ int evm_inode_setattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry, > * This function is called from notify_change(), which expects the caller > * to lock the inode's i_mutex. > */ > -void evm_inode_post_setattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry, > - int ia_valid) > +static void evm_inode_post_setattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, > + struct dentry *dentry, int ia_valid) > { > if (!evm_revalidate_status(NULL)) > return; > @@ -964,4 +1018,35 @@ static int __init init_evm(void) > return error; > } > > +static struct security_hook_list evm_hooks[] __ro_after_init = { > + LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setattr, evm_inode_setattr), > + LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_post_setattr, evm_inode_post_setattr), > + LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setxattr, evm_inode_setxattr), > + LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_set_acl, evm_inode_set_acl), > + LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_post_set_acl, evm_inode_post_set_acl), > + LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_remove_acl, evm_inode_remove_acl), > + LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_post_remove_acl, evm_inode_post_remove_acl), > + LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_post_setxattr, evm_inode_post_setxattr), > + LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_removexattr, evm_inode_removexattr), > + LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_post_removexattr, evm_inode_post_removexattr), > + LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_init_security, evm_inode_init_security), > +}; > + > +static const struct lsm_id evm_lsmid = { > + .name = "evm", > + .id = LSM_ID_EVM, > +}; > + > +static int __init init_evm_lsm(void) > +{ > + security_add_hooks(evm_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(evm_hooks), &evm_lsmid); > + return 0; > +} > + > +DEFINE_LSM(evm) = { > + .name = "evm", > + .init = init_evm_lsm, > + .order = LSM_ORDER_LAST, > +}; > + > late_initcall(init_evm); > diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c > index d4ead59fb91f..18a70aa707ad 100644 > --- a/security/security.c > +++ b/security/security.c > @@ -20,13 +20,13 @@ > #include <linux/kernel_read_file.h> > #include <linux/lsm_hooks.h> > #include <linux/integrity.h> > -#include <linux/evm.h> > #include <linux/fsnotify.h> > #include <linux/mman.h> > #include <linux/mount.h> > #include <linux/personality.h> > #include <linux/backing-dev.h> > #include <linux/string.h> > +#include <linux/xattr.h> > #include <linux/msg.h> > #include <net/flow.h> > > @@ -50,7 +50,8 @@ > (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_LOCKDOWN_LSM) ? 1 : 0) + \ > (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_BPF_LSM) ? 1 : 0) + \ > (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK) ? 1 : 0) + \ > - (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IMA) ? 1 : 0)) > + (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IMA) ? 1 : 0) + \ > + (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_EVM) ? 1 : 0)) > > /* > * These are descriptions of the reasons that can be passed to the > @@ -1740,10 +1741,6 @@ int security_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir, > if (!xattr_count) > goto out; > > - ret = evm_inode_init_security(inode, dir, qstr, new_xattrs, > - &xattr_count); > - if (ret) > - goto out; > ret = initxattrs(inode, new_xattrs, fs_data); > out: > for (; xattr_count > 0; xattr_count--) > @@ -2235,14 +2232,9 @@ int security_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask) > int security_inode_setattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, > struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *attr) > { > - int ret; > - > if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry)))) > return 0; > - ret = call_int_hook(inode_setattr, 0, idmap, dentry, attr); > - if (ret) > - return ret; > - return evm_inode_setattr(idmap, dentry, attr); > + return call_int_hook(inode_setattr, 0, idmap, dentry, attr); > } > EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_inode_setattr); > > @@ -2307,9 +2299,7 @@ int security_inode_setxattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, > > if (ret == 1) > ret = cap_inode_setxattr(dentry, name, value, size, flags); > - if (ret) > - return ret; > - return evm_inode_setxattr(idmap, dentry, name, value, size, flags); > + return ret; > } > > /** > @@ -2328,15 +2318,10 @@ int security_inode_set_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, > struct dentry *dentry, const char *acl_name, > struct posix_acl *kacl) > { > - int ret; > - > if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry)))) > return 0; > - ret = call_int_hook(inode_set_acl, 0, idmap, dentry, acl_name, > - kacl); > - if (ret) > - return ret; > - return evm_inode_set_acl(idmap, dentry, acl_name, kacl); > + return call_int_hook(inode_set_acl, 0, idmap, dentry, acl_name, > + kacl); > } > > /** > @@ -2389,14 +2374,9 @@ int security_inode_get_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, > int security_inode_remove_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, > struct dentry *dentry, const char *acl_name) > { > - int ret; > - > if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry)))) > return 0; > - ret = call_int_hook(inode_remove_acl, 0, idmap, dentry, acl_name); > - if (ret) > - return ret; > - return evm_inode_remove_acl(idmap, dentry, acl_name); > + return call_int_hook(inode_remove_acl, 0, idmap, dentry, acl_name); > } > > /** > @@ -2432,7 +2412,6 @@ void security_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name, > if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry)))) > return; > call_void_hook(inode_post_setxattr, dentry, name, value, size, flags); > - evm_inode_post_setxattr(dentry, name, value, size, flags); > } > > /** > @@ -2493,9 +2472,7 @@ int security_inode_removexattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, > ret = call_int_hook(inode_removexattr, 1, idmap, dentry, name); > if (ret == 1) > ret = cap_inode_removexattr(idmap, dentry, name); > - if (ret) > - return ret; > - return evm_inode_removexattr(idmap, dentry, name); > + return ret; > } > > /** > diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/lsm/lsm_list_modules_test.c b/tools/testing/selftests/lsm/lsm_list_modules_test.c > index 17333787cb2f..4d5d4cee2586 100644 > --- a/tools/testing/selftests/lsm/lsm_list_modules_test.c > +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/lsm/lsm_list_modules_test.c > @@ -125,6 +125,9 @@ TEST(correct_lsm_list_modules) > case LSM_ID_IMA: > name = "ima"; > break; > + case LSM_ID_EVM: > + name = "evm"; > + break; > default: > name = "INVALID"; > break;
On Thu, 2023-12-14 at 18:08 +0100, Roberto Sassu wrote: > From: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com> > > As for IMA, move hardcoded EVM function calls from various places in the > kernel to the LSM infrastructure, by introducing a new LSM named 'evm' > (last and always enabled like 'ima'). The order in the Makefile ensures > that 'evm' hooks are executed after 'ima' ones. > > Make EVM functions as static (except for evm_inode_init_security(), which > is exported), and register them as hook implementations in init_evm_lsm(). > > Unlike before (see commit to move IMA to the LSM infrastructure), > evm_inode_post_setattr(), evm_inode_post_set_acl(), > evm_inode_post_remove_acl(), and evm_inode_post_removexattr() are not > executed for private inodes. > Missing is a comment on moving the inline function definitions - evm_inode_remove_acl(), evm_inode_post_remove_acl(), and evm_inode_post_set_acl() - to evm_main.c. > Finally, add the LSM_ID_EVM case in lsm_list_modules_test.c > > Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com> > --- [...] > @@ -2307,9 +2299,7 @@ int security_inode_setxattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, > > if (ret == 1) > ret = cap_inode_setxattr(dentry, name, value, size, flags); > - if (ret) > - return ret; > - return evm_inode_setxattr(idmap, dentry, name, value, size, flags); > + return ret; > } Even though capability will be called after EVM, it doesn't make a difference in this instance. [...] > /** > @@ -2493,9 +2472,7 @@ int security_inode_removexattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, > ret = call_int_hook(inode_removexattr, 1, idmap, dentry, name); > if (ret == 1) > ret = cap_inode_removexattr(idmap, dentry, name); > - if (ret) > - return ret; > - return evm_inode_removexattr(idmap, dentry, name); > + return ret; > } 'security.capability' is one of the EVM protected xattrs. As capability isn't an LSM, it will now be called after EVM, which is a problem.
On 12/26/2023 11:13 PM, Mimi Zohar wrote: > On Thu, 2023-12-14 at 18:08 +0100, Roberto Sassu wrote: >> From: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com> >> >> As for IMA, move hardcoded EVM function calls from various places in the >> kernel to the LSM infrastructure, by introducing a new LSM named 'evm' >> (last and always enabled like 'ima'). The order in the Makefile ensures >> that 'evm' hooks are executed after 'ima' ones. >> >> Make EVM functions as static (except for evm_inode_init_security(), which >> is exported), and register them as hook implementations in init_evm_lsm(). >> >> Unlike before (see commit to move IMA to the LSM infrastructure), >> evm_inode_post_setattr(), evm_inode_post_set_acl(), >> evm_inode_post_remove_acl(), and evm_inode_post_removexattr() are not >> executed for private inodes. >> > > Missing is a comment on moving the inline function definitions - > evm_inode_remove_acl(), evm_inode_post_remove_acl(), and > evm_inode_post_set_acl() - to evm_main.c. Ok. >> Finally, add the LSM_ID_EVM case in lsm_list_modules_test.c >> >> Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com> >> --- > > [...] >> @@ -2307,9 +2299,7 @@ int security_inode_setxattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, >> >> if (ret == 1) >> ret = cap_inode_setxattr(dentry, name, value, size, flags); >> - if (ret) >> - return ret; >> - return evm_inode_setxattr(idmap, dentry, name, value, size, flags); >> + return ret; >> } > > Even though capability will be called after EVM, it doesn't make a > difference in this instance. > > [...] > >> /** >> @@ -2493,9 +2472,7 @@ int security_inode_removexattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, >> ret = call_int_hook(inode_removexattr, 1, idmap, dentry, name); >> if (ret == 1) >> ret = cap_inode_removexattr(idmap, dentry, name); >> - if (ret) >> - return ret; >> - return evm_inode_removexattr(idmap, dentry, name); >> + return ret; >> } > > 'security.capability' is one of the EVM protected xattrs. As > capability isn't an LSM, it will now be called after EVM, which is a > problem. Uhm, according to this comment in security_inode_removexattr() and security_inode_setxattr(): /* * SELinux and Smack integrate the cap call, * so assume that all LSMs supplying this call do so. */ We can add the call to IMA and EVM as well, to be compliant. However, I'm missing why the two cases are different. It seems cap_inode_set/removexattr() are doing just checks. Thanks Roberto
On Tue, 2024-01-02 at 12:56 +0100, Roberto Sassu wrote: > On 12/26/2023 11:13 PM, Mimi Zohar wrote: > > On Thu, 2023-12-14 at 18:08 +0100, Roberto Sassu wrote: > >> From: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com> > >> > >> As for IMA, move hardcoded EVM function calls from various places in the > >> kernel to the LSM infrastructure, by introducing a new LSM named 'evm' > >> (last and always enabled like 'ima'). The order in the Makefile ensures > >> that 'evm' hooks are executed after 'ima' ones. > >> > >> Make EVM functions as static (except for evm_inode_init_security(), which > >> is exported), and register them as hook implementations in init_evm_lsm(). > >> > >> Unlike before (see commit to move IMA to the LSM infrastructure), > >> evm_inode_post_setattr(), evm_inode_post_set_acl(), > >> evm_inode_post_remove_acl(), and evm_inode_post_removexattr() are not > >> executed for private inodes. > >> > > > > Missing is a comment on moving the inline function definitions - > > evm_inode_remove_acl(), evm_inode_post_remove_acl(), and > > evm_inode_post_set_acl() - to evm_main.c. > > Ok. > > >> Finally, add the LSM_ID_EVM case in lsm_list_modules_test.c > >> > >> Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com> > >> --- > > > > [...] > >> @@ -2307,9 +2299,7 @@ int security_inode_setxattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, > >> > >> if (ret == 1) > >> ret = cap_inode_setxattr(dentry, name, value, size, flags); > >> - if (ret) > >> - return ret; > >> - return evm_inode_setxattr(idmap, dentry, name, value, size, flags); > >> + return ret; > >> } > > > > Even though capability will be called after EVM, it doesn't make a > > difference in this instance. > > > > [...] > > > >> /** > >> @@ -2493,9 +2472,7 @@ int security_inode_removexattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, > >> ret = call_int_hook(inode_removexattr, 1, idmap, dentry, name); > >> if (ret == 1) > >> ret = cap_inode_removexattr(idmap, dentry, name); > >> - if (ret) > >> - return ret; > >> - return evm_inode_removexattr(idmap, dentry, name); > >> + return ret; > >> } > > > > 'security.capability' is one of the EVM protected xattrs. As > > capability isn't an LSM, it will now be called after EVM, which is a > > problem. > > Uhm, according to this comment in security_inode_removexattr() and > security_inode_setxattr(): > > /* > * SELinux and Smack integrate the cap call, > * so assume that all LSMs supplying this call do so. > */ > > We can add the call to IMA and EVM as well, to be compliant. SELinux and Smack are the only current LSMs that register the security_inode_removexattr hook. Both enforce mandatory access control, so their calling capabilities to enforce DAC kind of makes sense. I'm not sure it makes sense for IMA and EVM to call capability directly, just because of the comment. > However, I'm missing why the two cases are different. It seems > cap_inode_set/removexattr() are doing just checks. Both IMA and EVM require CAP_SYS_ADMIN to write/remove security.ima and security.evm respectively. In addition, EVM must recalculate security.evm if any protected security xattrs are set or removed. However, security.evm is updated on security_inode_post_setxattr, not security_inode_setxattr. Mimi
diff --git a/fs/attr.c b/fs/attr.c index 38841f3ebbcb..b51bd7c9b4a7 100644 --- a/fs/attr.c +++ b/fs/attr.c @@ -16,7 +16,6 @@ #include <linux/fcntl.h> #include <linux/filelock.h> #include <linux/security.h> -#include <linux/evm.h> #include "internal.h" @@ -502,7 +501,6 @@ int notify_change(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry, if (!error) { fsnotify_change(dentry, ia_valid); security_inode_post_setattr(idmap, dentry, ia_valid); - evm_inode_post_setattr(idmap, dentry, ia_valid); } return error; diff --git a/fs/posix_acl.c b/fs/posix_acl.c index e3fbe1a9f3f5..ae67479cd2b6 100644 --- a/fs/posix_acl.c +++ b/fs/posix_acl.c @@ -26,7 +26,6 @@ #include <linux/mnt_idmapping.h> #include <linux/iversion.h> #include <linux/security.h> -#include <linux/evm.h> #include <linux/fsnotify.h> #include <linux/filelock.h> @@ -1138,7 +1137,6 @@ int vfs_set_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry, if (!error) { fsnotify_xattr(dentry); security_inode_post_set_acl(dentry, acl_name, kacl); - evm_inode_post_set_acl(dentry, acl_name, kacl); } out_inode_unlock: @@ -1247,7 +1245,6 @@ int vfs_remove_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry, if (!error) { fsnotify_xattr(dentry); security_inode_post_remove_acl(idmap, dentry, acl_name); - evm_inode_post_remove_acl(idmap, dentry, acl_name); } out_inode_unlock: diff --git a/fs/xattr.c b/fs/xattr.c index f891c260a971..f8b643f91a98 100644 --- a/fs/xattr.c +++ b/fs/xattr.c @@ -16,7 +16,6 @@ #include <linux/mount.h> #include <linux/namei.h> #include <linux/security.h> -#include <linux/evm.h> #include <linux/syscalls.h> #include <linux/export.h> #include <linux/fsnotify.h> @@ -557,7 +556,6 @@ __vfs_removexattr_locked(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, fsnotify_xattr(dentry); security_inode_post_removexattr(dentry, name); - evm_inode_post_removexattr(dentry, name); out: return error; diff --git a/include/linux/evm.h b/include/linux/evm.h index 437d4076a3b3..cb481eccc967 100644 --- a/include/linux/evm.h +++ b/include/linux/evm.h @@ -21,44 +21,6 @@ extern enum integrity_status evm_verifyxattr(struct dentry *dentry, void *xattr_value, size_t xattr_value_len, struct integrity_iint_cache *iint); -extern int evm_inode_setattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, - struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *attr); -extern void evm_inode_post_setattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, - struct dentry *dentry, int ia_valid); -extern int evm_inode_setxattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, - struct dentry *dentry, const char *name, - const void *value, size_t size, int flags); -extern void evm_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, - const char *xattr_name, - const void *xattr_value, - size_t xattr_value_len, - int flags); -extern int evm_inode_removexattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, - struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name); -extern void evm_inode_post_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, - const char *xattr_name); -static inline void evm_inode_post_remove_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, - struct dentry *dentry, - const char *acl_name) -{ - evm_inode_post_removexattr(dentry, acl_name); -} -extern int evm_inode_set_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, - struct dentry *dentry, const char *acl_name, - struct posix_acl *kacl); -static inline int evm_inode_remove_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, - struct dentry *dentry, - const char *acl_name) -{ - return evm_inode_set_acl(idmap, dentry, acl_name, NULL); -} -static inline void evm_inode_post_set_acl(struct dentry *dentry, - const char *acl_name, - struct posix_acl *kacl) -{ - return evm_inode_post_setxattr(dentry, acl_name, NULL, 0, 0); -} - int evm_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir, const struct qstr *qstr, struct xattr *xattrs, int *xattr_count); @@ -93,75 +55,6 @@ static inline enum integrity_status evm_verifyxattr(struct dentry *dentry, } #endif -static inline int evm_inode_setattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, - struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *attr) -{ - return 0; -} - -static inline void evm_inode_post_setattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, - struct dentry *dentry, int ia_valid) -{ - return; -} - -static inline int evm_inode_setxattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, - struct dentry *dentry, const char *name, - const void *value, size_t size, int flags) -{ - return 0; -} - -static inline void evm_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, - const char *xattr_name, - const void *xattr_value, - size_t xattr_value_len, - int flags) -{ - return; -} - -static inline int evm_inode_removexattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, - struct dentry *dentry, - const char *xattr_name) -{ - return 0; -} - -static inline void evm_inode_post_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, - const char *xattr_name) -{ - return; -} - -static inline void evm_inode_post_remove_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, - struct dentry *dentry, - const char *acl_name) -{ - return; -} - -static inline int evm_inode_set_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, - struct dentry *dentry, const char *acl_name, - struct posix_acl *kacl) -{ - return 0; -} - -static inline int evm_inode_remove_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, - struct dentry *dentry, - const char *acl_name) -{ - return 0; -} - -static inline void evm_inode_post_set_acl(struct dentry *dentry, - const char *acl_name, - struct posix_acl *kacl) -{ - return; -} - static inline int evm_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir, const struct qstr *qstr, struct xattr *xattrs, diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/lsm.h b/include/uapi/linux/lsm.h index ee7d034255a9..825339bcd580 100644 --- a/include/uapi/linux/lsm.h +++ b/include/uapi/linux/lsm.h @@ -62,6 +62,7 @@ struct lsm_ctx { #define LSM_ID_BPF 109 #define LSM_ID_LANDLOCK 110 #define LSM_ID_IMA 111 +#define LSM_ID_EVM 112 /* * LSM_ATTR_XXX definitions identify different LSM attributes diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c index ea84a6f835ff..0cd014bfc093 100644 --- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c +++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c @@ -566,9 +566,9 @@ static int evm_protect_xattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, * userspace from writing HMAC value. Writing 'security.evm' requires * requires CAP_SYS_ADMIN privileges. */ -int evm_inode_setxattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry, - const char *xattr_name, const void *xattr_value, - size_t xattr_value_len, int flags) +static int evm_inode_setxattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry, + const char *xattr_name, const void *xattr_value, + size_t xattr_value_len, int flags) { const struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_data = xattr_value; @@ -598,8 +598,8 @@ int evm_inode_setxattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry, * Removing 'security.evm' requires CAP_SYS_ADMIN privileges and that * the current value is valid. */ -int evm_inode_removexattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, - struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name) +static int evm_inode_removexattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry, + const char *xattr_name) { /* Policy permits modification of the protected xattrs even though * there's no HMAC key loaded @@ -649,9 +649,11 @@ static inline int evm_inode_set_acl_change(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, * Prevent modifying posix acls causing the EVM HMAC to be re-calculated * and 'security.evm' xattr updated, unless the existing 'security.evm' is * valid. + * + * Return: zero on success, -EPERM on failure. */ -int evm_inode_set_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry, - const char *acl_name, struct posix_acl *kacl) +static int evm_inode_set_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry, + const char *acl_name, struct posix_acl *kacl) { enum integrity_status evm_status; @@ -690,6 +692,24 @@ int evm_inode_set_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry, return -EPERM; } +/** + * evm_inode_remove_acl - Protect the EVM extended attribute from posix acls + * @idmap: idmap of the mount + * @dentry: pointer to the affected dentry + * @acl_name: name of the posix acl + * + * Prevent removing posix acls causing the EVM HMAC to be re-calculated + * and 'security.evm' xattr updated, unless the existing 'security.evm' is + * valid. + * + * Return: zero on success, -EPERM on failure. + */ +static int evm_inode_remove_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry, + const char *acl_name) +{ + return evm_inode_set_acl(idmap, dentry, acl_name, NULL); +} + static void evm_reset_status(struct inode *inode) { struct integrity_iint_cache *iint; @@ -738,9 +758,11 @@ bool evm_revalidate_status(const char *xattr_name) * __vfs_setxattr_noperm(). The caller of which has taken the inode's * i_mutex lock. */ -void evm_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name, - const void *xattr_value, size_t xattr_value_len, - int flags) +static void evm_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, + const char *xattr_name, + const void *xattr_value, + size_t xattr_value_len, + int flags) { if (!evm_revalidate_status(xattr_name)) return; @@ -756,6 +778,21 @@ void evm_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name, evm_update_evmxattr(dentry, xattr_name, xattr_value, xattr_value_len); } +/** + * evm_inode_post_set_acl - Update the EVM extended attribute from posix acls + * @dentry: pointer to the affected dentry + * @acl_name: name of the posix acl + * @kacl: pointer to the posix acls + * + * Update the 'security.evm' xattr with the EVM HMAC re-calculated after setting + * posix acls. + */ +static void evm_inode_post_set_acl(struct dentry *dentry, const char *acl_name, + struct posix_acl *kacl) +{ + return evm_inode_post_setxattr(dentry, acl_name, NULL, 0, 0); +} + /** * evm_inode_post_removexattr - update 'security.evm' after removing the xattr * @dentry: pointer to the affected dentry @@ -766,7 +803,8 @@ void evm_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name, * No need to take the i_mutex lock here, as this function is called from * vfs_removexattr() which takes the i_mutex. */ -void evm_inode_post_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name) +static void evm_inode_post_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, + const char *xattr_name) { if (!evm_revalidate_status(xattr_name)) return; @@ -782,6 +820,22 @@ void evm_inode_post_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name) evm_update_evmxattr(dentry, xattr_name, NULL, 0); } +/** + * evm_inode_post_remove_acl - Update the EVM extended attribute from posix acls + * @idmap: idmap of the mount + * @dentry: pointer to the affected dentry + * @acl_name: name of the posix acl + * + * Update the 'security.evm' xattr with the EVM HMAC re-calculated after + * removing posix acls. + */ +static inline void evm_inode_post_remove_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, + struct dentry *dentry, + const char *acl_name) +{ + evm_inode_post_removexattr(dentry, acl_name); +} + static int evm_attr_change(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *attr) { @@ -805,8 +859,8 @@ static int evm_attr_change(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, * Permit update of file attributes when files have a valid EVM signature, * except in the case of them having an immutable portable signature. */ -int evm_inode_setattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry, - struct iattr *attr) +static int evm_inode_setattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry, + struct iattr *attr) { unsigned int ia_valid = attr->ia_valid; enum integrity_status evm_status; @@ -853,8 +907,8 @@ int evm_inode_setattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry, * This function is called from notify_change(), which expects the caller * to lock the inode's i_mutex. */ -void evm_inode_post_setattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry, - int ia_valid) +static void evm_inode_post_setattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, + struct dentry *dentry, int ia_valid) { if (!evm_revalidate_status(NULL)) return; @@ -964,4 +1018,35 @@ static int __init init_evm(void) return error; } +static struct security_hook_list evm_hooks[] __ro_after_init = { + LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setattr, evm_inode_setattr), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_post_setattr, evm_inode_post_setattr), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setxattr, evm_inode_setxattr), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_set_acl, evm_inode_set_acl), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_post_set_acl, evm_inode_post_set_acl), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_remove_acl, evm_inode_remove_acl), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_post_remove_acl, evm_inode_post_remove_acl), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_post_setxattr, evm_inode_post_setxattr), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_removexattr, evm_inode_removexattr), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_post_removexattr, evm_inode_post_removexattr), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_init_security, evm_inode_init_security), +}; + +static const struct lsm_id evm_lsmid = { + .name = "evm", + .id = LSM_ID_EVM, +}; + +static int __init init_evm_lsm(void) +{ + security_add_hooks(evm_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(evm_hooks), &evm_lsmid); + return 0; +} + +DEFINE_LSM(evm) = { + .name = "evm", + .init = init_evm_lsm, + .order = LSM_ORDER_LAST, +}; + late_initcall(init_evm); diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c index d4ead59fb91f..18a70aa707ad 100644 --- a/security/security.c +++ b/security/security.c @@ -20,13 +20,13 @@ #include <linux/kernel_read_file.h> #include <linux/lsm_hooks.h> #include <linux/integrity.h> -#include <linux/evm.h> #include <linux/fsnotify.h> #include <linux/mman.h> #include <linux/mount.h> #include <linux/personality.h> #include <linux/backing-dev.h> #include <linux/string.h> +#include <linux/xattr.h> #include <linux/msg.h> #include <net/flow.h> @@ -50,7 +50,8 @@ (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_LOCKDOWN_LSM) ? 1 : 0) + \ (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_BPF_LSM) ? 1 : 0) + \ (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK) ? 1 : 0) + \ - (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IMA) ? 1 : 0)) + (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IMA) ? 1 : 0) + \ + (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_EVM) ? 1 : 0)) /* * These are descriptions of the reasons that can be passed to the @@ -1740,10 +1741,6 @@ int security_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir, if (!xattr_count) goto out; - ret = evm_inode_init_security(inode, dir, qstr, new_xattrs, - &xattr_count); - if (ret) - goto out; ret = initxattrs(inode, new_xattrs, fs_data); out: for (; xattr_count > 0; xattr_count--) @@ -2235,14 +2232,9 @@ int security_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask) int security_inode_setattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *attr) { - int ret; - if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry)))) return 0; - ret = call_int_hook(inode_setattr, 0, idmap, dentry, attr); - if (ret) - return ret; - return evm_inode_setattr(idmap, dentry, attr); + return call_int_hook(inode_setattr, 0, idmap, dentry, attr); } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_inode_setattr); @@ -2307,9 +2299,7 @@ int security_inode_setxattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, if (ret == 1) ret = cap_inode_setxattr(dentry, name, value, size, flags); - if (ret) - return ret; - return evm_inode_setxattr(idmap, dentry, name, value, size, flags); + return ret; } /** @@ -2328,15 +2318,10 @@ int security_inode_set_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry, const char *acl_name, struct posix_acl *kacl) { - int ret; - if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry)))) return 0; - ret = call_int_hook(inode_set_acl, 0, idmap, dentry, acl_name, - kacl); - if (ret) - return ret; - return evm_inode_set_acl(idmap, dentry, acl_name, kacl); + return call_int_hook(inode_set_acl, 0, idmap, dentry, acl_name, + kacl); } /** @@ -2389,14 +2374,9 @@ int security_inode_get_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, int security_inode_remove_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry, const char *acl_name) { - int ret; - if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry)))) return 0; - ret = call_int_hook(inode_remove_acl, 0, idmap, dentry, acl_name); - if (ret) - return ret; - return evm_inode_remove_acl(idmap, dentry, acl_name); + return call_int_hook(inode_remove_acl, 0, idmap, dentry, acl_name); } /** @@ -2432,7 +2412,6 @@ void security_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name, if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry)))) return; call_void_hook(inode_post_setxattr, dentry, name, value, size, flags); - evm_inode_post_setxattr(dentry, name, value, size, flags); } /** @@ -2493,9 +2472,7 @@ int security_inode_removexattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, ret = call_int_hook(inode_removexattr, 1, idmap, dentry, name); if (ret == 1) ret = cap_inode_removexattr(idmap, dentry, name); - if (ret) - return ret; - return evm_inode_removexattr(idmap, dentry, name); + return ret; } /** diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/lsm/lsm_list_modules_test.c b/tools/testing/selftests/lsm/lsm_list_modules_test.c index 17333787cb2f..4d5d4cee2586 100644 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/lsm/lsm_list_modules_test.c +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/lsm/lsm_list_modules_test.c @@ -125,6 +125,9 @@ TEST(correct_lsm_list_modules) case LSM_ID_IMA: name = "ima"; break; + case LSM_ID_EVM: + name = "evm"; + break; default: name = "INVALID"; break;