Message ID | 20240115181809.885385-16-roberto.sassu@huaweicloud.com (mailing list archive) |
---|---|
State | Superseded |
Delegated to: | Paul Moore |
Headers | show |
Series | security: Move IMA and EVM to the LSM infrastructure | expand |
On Jan 15, 2024 Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huaweicloud.com> wrote: > > In preparation for moving IMA and EVM to the LSM infrastructure, introduce > the inode_post_create_tmpfile hook. > > As temp files can be made persistent, treat new temp files like other new > files, so that the file hash is calculated and stored in the security > xattr. > > LSMs could also take some action after temp files have been created. > > The new hook cannot return an error and cannot cause the operation to be > canceled. > > Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com> > Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> > Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> > --- > fs/namei.c | 1 + > include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h | 2 ++ > include/linux/security.h | 6 ++++++ > security/security.c | 15 +++++++++++++++ > 4 files changed, 24 insertions(+) Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> -- paul-moore.com
On Mon, Jan 15, 2024 at 07:17:59PM +0100, Roberto Sassu wrote: > From: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com> > > In preparation for moving IMA and EVM to the LSM infrastructure, introduce > the inode_post_create_tmpfile hook. > > As temp files can be made persistent, treat new temp files like other new > files, so that the file hash is calculated and stored in the security > xattr. > > LSMs could also take some action after temp files have been created. > > The new hook cannot return an error and cannot cause the operation to be > canceled. > > Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com> > Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> > Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> > --- > fs/namei.c | 1 + Acked-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
On 1/15/24 13:17, Roberto Sassu wrote: > From: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com> > > In preparation for moving IMA and EVM to the LSM infrastructure, introduce > the inode_post_create_tmpfile hook. > > As temp files can be made persistent, treat new temp files like other new > files, so that the file hash is calculated and stored in the security > xattr. > > LSMs could also take some action after temp files have been created. > > The new hook cannot return an error and cannot cause the operation to be > canceled. > > Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com> > Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> > Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com> > --- > fs/namei.c | 1 + > include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h | 2 ++ > include/linux/security.h | 6 ++++++ > security/security.c | 15 +++++++++++++++ > 4 files changed, 24 insertions(+) > > diff --git a/fs/namei.c b/fs/namei.c > index b7f433720b1e..adb3ab27951a 100644 > --- a/fs/namei.c > +++ b/fs/namei.c > @@ -3686,6 +3686,7 @@ static int vfs_tmpfile(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, > inode->i_state |= I_LINKABLE; > spin_unlock(&inode->i_lock); > } > + security_inode_post_create_tmpfile(idmap, inode); > ima_post_create_tmpfile(idmap, inode); > return 0; > } > diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h > index e08b9091350d..5f90914d23e0 100644 > --- a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h > +++ b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h > @@ -121,6 +121,8 @@ LSM_HOOK(int, 0, inode_init_security_anon, struct inode *inode, > const struct qstr *name, const struct inode *context_inode) > LSM_HOOK(int, 0, inode_create, struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, > umode_t mode) > +LSM_HOOK(void, LSM_RET_VOID, inode_post_create_tmpfile, struct mnt_idmap *idmap, > + struct inode *inode) > LSM_HOOK(int, 0, inode_link, struct dentry *old_dentry, struct inode *dir, > struct dentry *new_dentry) > LSM_HOOK(int, 0, inode_unlink, struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry) > diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h > index 977dd9f7f51a..1cb604282617 100644 > --- a/include/linux/security.h > +++ b/include/linux/security.h > @@ -344,6 +344,8 @@ int security_inode_init_security_anon(struct inode *inode, > const struct qstr *name, > const struct inode *context_inode); > int security_inode_create(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode); > +void security_inode_post_create_tmpfile(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, > + struct inode *inode); > int security_inode_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct inode *dir, > struct dentry *new_dentry); > int security_inode_unlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry); > @@ -811,6 +813,10 @@ static inline int security_inode_create(struct inode *dir, > return 0; > } > > +static inline void > +security_inode_post_create_tmpfile(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct inode *inode) > +{ } > + > static inline int security_inode_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, > struct inode *dir, > struct dentry *new_dentry) > diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c > index 750bfe2768d5..5bc7edc22923 100644 > --- a/security/security.c > +++ b/security/security.c > @@ -2013,6 +2013,21 @@ int security_inode_create(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, > } > EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_inode_create); > > +/** > + * security_inode_post_create_tmpfile() - Update inode security of new tmpfile > + * @idmap: idmap of the mount > + * @inode: inode of the new tmpfile > + * > + * Update inode security data after a tmpfile has been created. > + */ > +void security_inode_post_create_tmpfile(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, > + struct inode *inode) > +{ > + if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode))) > + return; > + call_void_hook(inode_post_create_tmpfile, idmap, inode); > +} > + > /** > * security_inode_link() - Check if creating a hard link is allowed > * @old_dentry: existing file
diff --git a/fs/namei.c b/fs/namei.c index b7f433720b1e..adb3ab27951a 100644 --- a/fs/namei.c +++ b/fs/namei.c @@ -3686,6 +3686,7 @@ static int vfs_tmpfile(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, inode->i_state |= I_LINKABLE; spin_unlock(&inode->i_lock); } + security_inode_post_create_tmpfile(idmap, inode); ima_post_create_tmpfile(idmap, inode); return 0; } diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h index e08b9091350d..5f90914d23e0 100644 --- a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h +++ b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h @@ -121,6 +121,8 @@ LSM_HOOK(int, 0, inode_init_security_anon, struct inode *inode, const struct qstr *name, const struct inode *context_inode) LSM_HOOK(int, 0, inode_create, struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode) +LSM_HOOK(void, LSM_RET_VOID, inode_post_create_tmpfile, struct mnt_idmap *idmap, + struct inode *inode) LSM_HOOK(int, 0, inode_link, struct dentry *old_dentry, struct inode *dir, struct dentry *new_dentry) LSM_HOOK(int, 0, inode_unlink, struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry) diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h index 977dd9f7f51a..1cb604282617 100644 --- a/include/linux/security.h +++ b/include/linux/security.h @@ -344,6 +344,8 @@ int security_inode_init_security_anon(struct inode *inode, const struct qstr *name, const struct inode *context_inode); int security_inode_create(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode); +void security_inode_post_create_tmpfile(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, + struct inode *inode); int security_inode_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct inode *dir, struct dentry *new_dentry); int security_inode_unlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry); @@ -811,6 +813,10 @@ static inline int security_inode_create(struct inode *dir, return 0; } +static inline void +security_inode_post_create_tmpfile(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct inode *inode) +{ } + static inline int security_inode_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct inode *dir, struct dentry *new_dentry) diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c index 750bfe2768d5..5bc7edc22923 100644 --- a/security/security.c +++ b/security/security.c @@ -2013,6 +2013,21 @@ int security_inode_create(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_inode_create); +/** + * security_inode_post_create_tmpfile() - Update inode security of new tmpfile + * @idmap: idmap of the mount + * @inode: inode of the new tmpfile + * + * Update inode security data after a tmpfile has been created. + */ +void security_inode_post_create_tmpfile(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, + struct inode *inode) +{ + if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode))) + return; + call_void_hook(inode_post_create_tmpfile, idmap, inode); +} + /** * security_inode_link() - Check if creating a hard link is allowed * @old_dentry: existing file