Message ID | 20240313233227.56391-1-ebiggers@kernel.org (mailing list archive) |
---|---|
State | New |
Headers | show |
Series | Revert "crypto: pkcs7 - remove sha1 support" | expand |
Context | Check | Description |
---|---|---|
tedd_an/pre-ci_am | fail | error: crypto/asymmetric_keys/mscode_parser.c: does not exist in index error: crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_parser.c: does not exist in index error: crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c: does not exist in index error: crypto/asymmetric_keys/signature.c: does not exist in index error: crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c: does not exist in index error: crypto/testmgr.h: does not exist in index error: include/linux/oid_registry.h: does not exist in index error: kernel/module/Kconfig: does not exist in index hint: Use 'git am --show-current-patch' to see the failed patch |
Eric, Eric Biggers, 2024-03-13T16:32:27-07:00: > From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> > > This reverts commit 16ab7cb5825fc3425c16ad2c6e53d827f382d7c6 because it > broke iwd. iwd uses the KEYCTL_PKEY_* UAPIs via its dependency libell, > and apparently it is relying on SHA-1 signature support. These UAPIs > are fairly obscure, and their documentation does not mention which > algorithms they support. iwd really should be using a properly > supported userspace crypto library instead. Regardless, since something > broke we have to revert the change. > > It may be possible that some parts of this commit can be reinstated > without breaking iwd (e.g. probably the removal of MODULE_SIG_SHA1), but > for now this just does a full revert to get things working again. > > Reported-by: Karel Balej <balejk@matfyz.cz> > Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/r/CZSHRUIJ4RKL.34T4EASV5DNJM@matfyz.cz > Cc: Dimitri John Ledkov <dimitri.ledkov@canonical.com> > Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> thank you very much for the revert. I have compiled 6.8 with this patch and attest that it solves my eduroam connection issue. Tested-by: Karel Balej <balejk@matfyz.cz> May I please ask, though, why you did not Cc stable (and add a Fixes trailer for that matter)? It seems like something that would be nice to see fixed in 6.7.y and 6.8.y too as soon as possible. Kind regards, K. B.
On Thu, Mar 14, 2024 at 09:11:08AM +0100, Karel Balej wrote: > Eric, > > Eric Biggers, 2024-03-13T16:32:27-07:00: > > From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> > > > > This reverts commit 16ab7cb5825fc3425c16ad2c6e53d827f382d7c6 because it > > broke iwd. iwd uses the KEYCTL_PKEY_* UAPIs via its dependency libell, > > and apparently it is relying on SHA-1 signature support. These UAPIs > > are fairly obscure, and their documentation does not mention which > > algorithms they support. iwd really should be using a properly > > supported userspace crypto library instead. Regardless, since something > > broke we have to revert the change. > > > > It may be possible that some parts of this commit can be reinstated > > without breaking iwd (e.g. probably the removal of MODULE_SIG_SHA1), but > > for now this just does a full revert to get things working again. > > > > Reported-by: Karel Balej <balejk@matfyz.cz> > > Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/r/CZSHRUIJ4RKL.34T4EASV5DNJM@matfyz.cz > > Cc: Dimitri John Ledkov <dimitri.ledkov@canonical.com> > > Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> > > thank you very much for the revert. I have compiled 6.8 with this patch > and attest that it solves my eduroam connection issue. > > Tested-by: Karel Balej <balejk@matfyz.cz> > > May I please ask, though, why you did not Cc stable (and add a Fixes > trailer for that matter)? It seems like something that would be nice to > see fixed in 6.7.y and 6.8.y too as soon as possible. I just forgot. Reverts usually get backported without asking anyway, but the following should be added to make it explicit: Fixes: 16ab7cb5825f ("crypto: pkcs7 - remove sha1 support") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org That should just be added when the patch is applied, unless I happen to need to send out a new version anyway. We need to decide who is actually going to apply this revert. Probably Herbert, since he took the commit that's being reverted? - Eric
On Thu Mar 14, 2024 at 1:32 AM EET, Eric Biggers wrote: > From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> > > This reverts commit 16ab7cb5825fc3425c16ad2c6e53d827f382d7c6 because it > broke iwd. iwd uses the KEYCTL_PKEY_* UAPIs via its dependency libell, > and apparently it is relying on SHA-1 signature support. These UAPIs > are fairly obscure, and their documentation does not mention which > algorithms they support. iwd really should be using a properly > supported userspace crypto library instead. Regardless, since something > broke we have to revert the change. > > It may be possible that some parts of this commit can be reinstated > without breaking iwd (e.g. probably the removal of MODULE_SIG_SHA1), but > for now this just does a full revert to get things working again. > > Reported-by: Karel Balej <balejk@matfyz.cz> > Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/r/CZSHRUIJ4RKL.34T4EASV5DNJM@matfyz.cz > Cc: Dimitri John Ledkov <dimitri.ledkov@canonical.com> > Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> > --- > crypto/asymmetric_keys/mscode_parser.c | 3 + > crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_parser.c | 4 ++ > crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c | 3 +- > crypto/asymmetric_keys/signature.c | 2 +- > crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c | 8 +++ > crypto/testmgr.h | 80 +++++++++++++++++++++++ > include/linux/oid_registry.h | 4 ++ > kernel/module/Kconfig | 5 ++ > 8 files changed, 107 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) > > diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/mscode_parser.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/mscode_parser.c > index 05402ef8964e..8aecbe4637f3 100644 > --- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/mscode_parser.c > +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/mscode_parser.c > @@ -73,10 +73,13 @@ int mscode_note_digest_algo(void *context, size_t hdrlen, > char buffer[50]; > enum OID oid; > > oid = look_up_OID(value, vlen); > switch (oid) { > + case OID_sha1: > + ctx->digest_algo = "sha1"; > + break; I fully agree with the change BUT... IMHO it would make sense to e.g either add inline comment about iwd dependency or link to the bug report here. I'd like to think that there is common will to eventually get rid of all of SHA-1, and thus in cases where it is not yet possible it would make sense to guide what to needs to be done to make it happen, right? BR, Jarkko
On Tue, Mar 19, 2024 at 07:20:54PM +0200, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote: > > diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/mscode_parser.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/mscode_parser.c > > index 05402ef8964e..8aecbe4637f3 100644 > > --- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/mscode_parser.c > > +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/mscode_parser.c > > @@ -73,10 +73,13 @@ int mscode_note_digest_algo(void *context, size_t hdrlen, > > char buffer[50]; > > enum OID oid; > > > > oid = look_up_OID(value, vlen); > > switch (oid) { > > + case OID_sha1: > > + ctx->digest_algo = "sha1"; > > + break; > > I fully agree with the change BUT... > > IMHO it would make sense to e.g either add inline comment about iwd > dependency or link to the bug report here. > > I'd like to think that there is common will to eventually get rid of > all of SHA-1, and thus in cases where it is not yet possible it would > make sense to guide what to needs to be done to make it happen, right? > > BR, Jarkko This is supposed to just be a revert, so it's best not to mess around with adding additional stuff that wasn't in the original commit. The sha1 signatures are also not unique; iwd is also forcing the kernel to keep supporting MD4, RC4, KEYCTL_DH_COMPUTE, KEYCTL_PKEY_{QUERY,ENCRYPT,DECRYPT,SIGN,VERIFY}, etc. Probably more than I don't know about. I guess all of this should be documented in the code in appropriate places. Probably the iwd folks should step in to do this, as they know best what they're using and they got a lot of this added to the kernel in the first place. - Eric
On Thu, 21 Mar 2024 at 05:10, Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org> wrote: > On Tue, Mar 19, 2024 at 07:20:54PM +0200, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote: > > I'd like to think that there is common will to eventually get rid of > > all of SHA-1, and thus in cases where it is not yet possible it would > > make sense to guide what to needs to be done to make it happen, right? > > > > BR, Jarkko > > This is supposed to just be a revert, so it's best not to mess around with > adding additional stuff that wasn't in the original commit. The sha1 signatures > are also not unique; iwd is also forcing the kernel to keep supporting MD4, RC4, > KEYCTL_DH_COMPUTE, KEYCTL_PKEY_{QUERY,ENCRYPT,DECRYPT,SIGN,VERIFY}, etc. > Probably more than I don't know about. I guess all of this should be documented > in the code in appropriate places. Probably the iwd folks should step in to do > this, as they know best what they're using and they got a lot of this added to > the kernel in the first place. As far as I know none of these were added specifically for iwd but I could be wrong. RC4 is not in the kernel anymore. With regards to SHA1 it is used by iwd directly through an API but more importantly it's a dependency for x509 support in practice. Outside of module signing most x509 certificates in the wild use SHA1: wifi, https. This thread originally talked about the removal of SHA1 access through some API, not SHA1 in general. Regarding the use of the kernel crypto in iwd, IIRC some of the motivation was: * to avoid duplication. On a small system it's hard to justify having the same algorithms in the kernel and in userspace. openssl is probably larger than all of ell+iwd. * (various arguments can be made about how duplication doesn't help security, but an argument can be made the other way as well) * there is (was?) a plan to use the kernel keys API to abstract passing keys/keyrings between processes to greatly reduce the presence of the actual key contents in memory/filesystem. Network Manager could load a key from file or a PKCS11 device and pass its kernel handle to iwd or other userspace instead of file paths, with the files necessarily being readable by multiple processes and loaded multiple times into memory. The keys could also be loaded once on boot. Or the keys could be in TPM and never be seen in main memory, only their API handles. Best regards
On Thu Mar 21, 2024 at 6:10 AM EET, Eric Biggers wrote: > On Tue, Mar 19, 2024 at 07:20:54PM +0200, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote: > > > diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/mscode_parser.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/mscode_parser.c > > > index 05402ef8964e..8aecbe4637f3 100644 > > > --- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/mscode_parser.c > > > +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/mscode_parser.c > > > @@ -73,10 +73,13 @@ int mscode_note_digest_algo(void *context, size_t hdrlen, > > > char buffer[50]; > > > enum OID oid; > > > > > > oid = look_up_OID(value, vlen); > > > switch (oid) { > > > + case OID_sha1: > > > + ctx->digest_algo = "sha1"; > > > + break; > > > > I fully agree with the change BUT... > > > > IMHO it would make sense to e.g either add inline comment about iwd > > dependency or link to the bug report here. > > > > I'd like to think that there is common will to eventually get rid of > > all of SHA-1, and thus in cases where it is not yet possible it would > > make sense to guide what to needs to be done to make it happen, right? > > > > BR, Jarkko > > This is supposed to just be a revert, so it's best not to mess around with > adding additional stuff that wasn't in the original commit. The sha1 signatures > are also not unique; iwd is also forcing the kernel to keep supporting MD4, RC4, > KEYCTL_DH_COMPUTE, KEYCTL_PKEY_{QUERY,ENCRYPT,DECRYPT,SIGN,VERIFY}, etc. > Probably more than I don't know about. I guess all of this should be documented > in the code in appropriate places. Probably the iwd folks should step in to do > this, as they know best what they're using and they got a lot of this added to > the kernel in the first place. > > - Eric OK, fair point. BR, Jarkko
On Wed, Mar 13, 2024 at 04:32:27PM -0700, Eric Biggers wrote: > From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> > > This reverts commit 16ab7cb5825fc3425c16ad2c6e53d827f382d7c6 because it > broke iwd. iwd uses the KEYCTL_PKEY_* UAPIs via its dependency libell, > and apparently it is relying on SHA-1 signature support. These UAPIs > are fairly obscure, and their documentation does not mention which > algorithms they support. iwd really should be using a properly > supported userspace crypto library instead. Regardless, since something > broke we have to revert the change. > > It may be possible that some parts of this commit can be reinstated > without breaking iwd (e.g. probably the removal of MODULE_SIG_SHA1), but > for now this just does a full revert to get things working again. > > Reported-by: Karel Balej <balejk@matfyz.cz> > Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/r/CZSHRUIJ4RKL.34T4EASV5DNJM@matfyz.cz > Cc: Dimitri John Ledkov <dimitri.ledkov@canonical.com> > Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> > --- > crypto/asymmetric_keys/mscode_parser.c | 3 + > crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_parser.c | 4 ++ > crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c | 3 +- > crypto/asymmetric_keys/signature.c | 2 +- > crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c | 8 +++ > crypto/testmgr.h | 80 +++++++++++++++++++++++ > include/linux/oid_registry.h | 4 ++ > kernel/module/Kconfig | 5 ++ > 8 files changed, 107 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) Patch applied. Thanks.
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/mscode_parser.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/mscode_parser.c index 05402ef8964e..8aecbe4637f3 100644 --- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/mscode_parser.c +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/mscode_parser.c @@ -73,10 +73,13 @@ int mscode_note_digest_algo(void *context, size_t hdrlen, char buffer[50]; enum OID oid; oid = look_up_OID(value, vlen); switch (oid) { + case OID_sha1: + ctx->digest_algo = "sha1"; + break; case OID_sha256: ctx->digest_algo = "sha256"; break; case OID_sha384: ctx->digest_algo = "sha384"; diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_parser.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_parser.c index 5b08c50722d0..231ad7b3789d 100644 --- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_parser.c +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_parser.c @@ -225,10 +225,13 @@ int pkcs7_sig_note_digest_algo(void *context, size_t hdrlen, const void *value, size_t vlen) { struct pkcs7_parse_context *ctx = context; switch (ctx->last_oid) { + case OID_sha1: + ctx->sinfo->sig->hash_algo = "sha1"; + break; case OID_sha256: ctx->sinfo->sig->hash_algo = "sha256"; break; case OID_sha384: ctx->sinfo->sig->hash_algo = "sha384"; @@ -276,10 +279,11 @@ int pkcs7_sig_note_pkey_algo(void *context, size_t hdrlen, switch (ctx->last_oid) { case OID_rsaEncryption: ctx->sinfo->sig->pkey_algo = "rsa"; ctx->sinfo->sig->encoding = "pkcs1"; break; + case OID_id_ecdsa_with_sha1: case OID_id_ecdsa_with_sha224: case OID_id_ecdsa_with_sha256: case OID_id_ecdsa_with_sha384: case OID_id_ecdsa_with_sha512: case OID_id_ecdsa_with_sha3_256: diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c index e5f22691febd..e314fd57e6f8 100644 --- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c @@ -113,11 +113,12 @@ software_key_determine_akcipher(const struct public_key *pkey, * Unfortunately, in practice ECDSA is used with multiple SHAs, * so we have to allow all of them and not just one. */ if (!hash_algo) return -EINVAL; - if (strcmp(hash_algo, "sha224") != 0 && + if (strcmp(hash_algo, "sha1") != 0 && + strcmp(hash_algo, "sha224") != 0 && strcmp(hash_algo, "sha256") != 0 && strcmp(hash_algo, "sha384") != 0 && strcmp(hash_algo, "sha512") != 0 && strcmp(hash_algo, "sha3-256") != 0 && strcmp(hash_algo, "sha3-384") != 0 && diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/signature.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/signature.c index 398983be77e8..2deff81f8af5 100644 --- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/signature.c +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/signature.c @@ -113,11 +113,11 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(decrypt_blob); * @enc: Signature buffer, length params->enc_len * * Sign the specified data blob using the private key specified by params->key. * The signature is wrapped in an encoding if params->encoding is specified * (eg. "pkcs1"). If the encoding needs to know the digest type, this can be - * passed through params->hash_algo (eg. "sha512"). + * passed through params->hash_algo (eg. "sha1"). * * Returns the length of the data placed in the signature buffer or an error. */ int create_signature(struct kernel_pkey_params *params, const void *data, void *enc) diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c index 487204d39426..bb0bffa271b5 100644 --- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c @@ -196,10 +196,14 @@ int x509_note_sig_algo(void *context, size_t hdrlen, unsigned char tag, switch (ctx->last_oid) { default: return -ENOPKG; /* Unsupported combination */ + case OID_sha1WithRSAEncryption: + ctx->cert->sig->hash_algo = "sha1"; + goto rsa_pkcs1; + case OID_sha256WithRSAEncryption: ctx->cert->sig->hash_algo = "sha256"; goto rsa_pkcs1; case OID_sha384WithRSAEncryption: @@ -212,10 +216,14 @@ int x509_note_sig_algo(void *context, size_t hdrlen, unsigned char tag, case OID_sha224WithRSAEncryption: ctx->cert->sig->hash_algo = "sha224"; goto rsa_pkcs1; + case OID_id_ecdsa_with_sha1: + ctx->cert->sig->hash_algo = "sha1"; + goto ecdsa; + case OID_id_rsassa_pkcs1_v1_5_with_sha3_256: ctx->cert->sig->hash_algo = "sha3-256"; goto rsa_pkcs1; case OID_id_rsassa_pkcs1_v1_5_with_sha3_384: diff --git a/crypto/testmgr.h b/crypto/testmgr.h index 986f331a5fc2..12e1c892f366 100644 --- a/crypto/testmgr.h +++ b/crypto/testmgr.h @@ -651,10 +651,34 @@ static const struct akcipher_testvec rsa_tv_template[] = { * ECDSA test vectors. */ static const struct akcipher_testvec ecdsa_nist_p192_tv_template[] = { { .key = + "\x04\xf7\x46\xf8\x2f\x15\xf6\x22\x8e\xd7\x57\x4f\xcc\xe7\xbb\xc1" + "\xd4\x09\x73\xcf\xea\xd0\x15\x07\x3d\xa5\x8a\x8a\x95\x43\xe4\x68" + "\xea\xc6\x25\xc1\xc1\x01\x25\x4c\x7e\xc3\x3c\xa6\x04\x0a\xe7\x08" + "\x98", + .key_len = 49, + .params = + "\x30\x13\x06\x07\x2a\x86\x48\xce\x3d\x02\x01\x06\x08\x2a\x86\x48" + "\xce\x3d\x03\x01\x01", + .param_len = 21, + .m = + "\xcd\xb9\xd2\x1c\xb7\x6f\xcd\x44\xb3\xfd\x63\xea\xa3\x66\x7f\xae" + "\x63\x85\xe7\x82", + .m_size = 20, + .algo = OID_id_ecdsa_with_sha1, + .c = + "\x30\x35\x02\x19\x00\xba\xe5\x93\x83\x6e\xb6\x3b\x63\xa0\x27\x91" + "\xc6\xf6\x7f\xc3\x09\xad\x59\xad\x88\x27\xd6\x92\x6b\x02\x18\x10" + "\x68\x01\x9d\xba\xce\x83\x08\xef\x95\x52\x7b\xa0\x0f\xe4\x18\x86" + "\x80\x6f\xa5\x79\x77\xda\xd0", + .c_size = 55, + .public_key_vec = true, + .siggen_sigver_test = true, + }, { + .key = "\x04\xb6\x4b\xb1\xd1\xac\xba\x24\x8f\x65\xb2\x60\x00\x90\xbf\xbd" "\x78\x05\x73\xe9\x79\x1d\x6f\x7c\x0b\xd2\xc3\x93\xa7\x28\xe1\x75" "\xf7\xd5\x95\x1d\x28\x10\xc0\x75\x50\x5c\x1a\x4f\x3f\x8f\xa5\xee" "\xa3", .key_len = 49, @@ -754,10 +778,36 @@ static const struct akcipher_testvec ecdsa_nist_p192_tv_template[] = { }; static const struct akcipher_testvec ecdsa_nist_p256_tv_template[] = { { .key = + "\x04\xb9\x7b\xbb\xd7\x17\x64\xd2\x7e\xfc\x81\x5d\x87\x06\x83\x41" + "\x22\xd6\x9a\xaa\x87\x17\xec\x4f\x63\x55\x2f\x94\xba\xdd\x83\xe9" + "\x34\x4b\xf3\xe9\x91\x13\x50\xb6\xcb\xca\x62\x08\xe7\x3b\x09\xdc" + "\xc3\x63\x4b\x2d\xb9\x73\x53\xe4\x45\xe6\x7c\xad\xe7\x6b\xb0\xe8" + "\xaf", + .key_len = 65, + .params = + "\x30\x13\x06\x07\x2a\x86\x48\xce\x3d\x02\x01\x06\x08\x2a\x86\x48" + "\xce\x3d\x03\x01\x07", + .param_len = 21, + .m = + "\xc2\x2b\x5f\x91\x78\x34\x26\x09\x42\x8d\x6f\x51\xb2\xc5\xaf\x4c" + "\x0b\xde\x6a\x42", + .m_size = 20, + .algo = OID_id_ecdsa_with_sha1, + .c = + "\x30\x46\x02\x21\x00\xf9\x25\xce\x9f\x3a\xa6\x35\x81\xcf\xd4\xe7" + "\xb7\xf0\x82\x56\x41\xf7\xd4\xad\x8d\x94\x5a\x69\x89\xee\xca\x6a" + "\x52\x0e\x48\x4d\xcc\x02\x21\x00\xd7\xe4\xef\x52\x66\xd3\x5b\x9d" + "\x8a\xfa\x54\x93\x29\xa7\x70\x86\xf1\x03\x03\xf3\x3b\xe2\x73\xf7" + "\xfb\x9d\x8b\xde\xd4\x8d\x6f\xad", + .c_size = 72, + .public_key_vec = true, + .siggen_sigver_test = true, + }, { + .key = "\x04\x8b\x6d\xc0\x33\x8e\x2d\x8b\x67\xf5\xeb\xc4\x7f\xa0\xf5\xd9" "\x7b\x03\xa5\x78\x9a\xb5\xea\x14\xe4\x23\xd0\xaf\xd7\x0e\x2e\xa0" "\xc9\x8b\xdb\x95\xf8\xb3\xaf\xac\x00\x2c\x2c\x1f\x7a\xfd\x95\x88" "\x43\x13\xbf\xf3\x1c\x05\x1a\x14\x18\x09\x3f\xd6\x28\x3e\xc5\xa0" "\xd4", @@ -864,10 +914,40 @@ static const struct akcipher_testvec ecdsa_nist_p256_tv_template[] = { }, }; static const struct akcipher_testvec ecdsa_nist_p384_tv_template[] = { { + .key = /* secp384r1(sha1) */ + "\x04\x89\x25\xf3\x97\x88\xcb\xb0\x78\xc5\x72\x9a\x14\x6e\x7a\xb1" + "\x5a\xa5\x24\xf1\x95\x06\x9e\x28\xfb\xc4\xb9\xbe\x5a\x0d\xd9\x9f" + "\xf3\xd1\x4d\x2d\x07\x99\xbd\xda\xa7\x66\xec\xbb\xea\xba\x79\x42" + "\xc9\x34\x89\x6a\xe7\x0b\xc3\xf2\xfe\x32\x30\xbe\xba\xf9\xdf\x7e" + "\x4b\x6a\x07\x8e\x26\x66\x3f\x1d\xec\xa2\x57\x91\x51\xdd\x17\x0e" + "\x0b\x25\xd6\x80\x5c\x3b\xe6\x1a\x98\x48\x91\x45\x7a\x73\xb0\xc3" + "\xf1", + .key_len = 97, + .params = + "\x30\x10\x06\x07\x2a\x86\x48\xce\x3d\x02\x01\x06\x05\x2b\x81\x04" + "\x00\x22", + .param_len = 18, + .m = + "\x12\x55\x28\xf0\x77\xd5\xb6\x21\x71\x32\x48\xcd\x28\xa8\x25\x22" + "\x3a\x69\xc1\x93", + .m_size = 20, + .algo = OID_id_ecdsa_with_sha1, + .c = + "\x30\x66\x02\x31\x00\xf5\x0f\x24\x4c\x07\x93\x6f\x21\x57\x55\x07" + "\x20\x43\x30\xde\xa0\x8d\x26\x8e\xae\x63\x3f\xbc\x20\x3a\xc6\xf1" + "\x32\x3c\xce\x70\x2b\x78\xf1\x4c\x26\xe6\x5b\x86\xcf\xec\x7c\x7e" + "\xd0\x87\xd7\xd7\x6e\x02\x31\x00\xcd\xbb\x7e\x81\x5d\x8f\x63\xc0" + "\x5f\x63\xb1\xbe\x5e\x4c\x0e\xa1\xdf\x28\x8c\x1b\xfa\xf9\x95\x88" + "\x74\xa0\x0f\xbf\xaf\xc3\x36\x76\x4a\xa1\x59\xf1\x1c\xa4\x58\x26" + "\x79\x12\x2a\xb7\xc5\x15\x92\xc5", + .c_size = 104, + .public_key_vec = true, + .siggen_sigver_test = true, + }, { .key = /* secp384r1(sha224) */ "\x04\x69\x6c\xcf\x62\xee\xd0\x0d\xe5\xb5\x2f\x70\x54\xcf\x26\xa0" "\xd9\x98\x8d\x92\x2a\xab\x9b\x11\xcb\x48\x18\xa1\xa9\x0d\xd5\x18" "\x3e\xe8\x29\x6e\xf6\xe4\xb5\x8e\xc7\x4a\xc2\x5f\x37\x13\x99\x05" "\xb6\xa4\x9d\xf9\xfb\x79\x41\xe7\xd7\x96\x9f\x73\x3b\x39\x43\xdc" diff --git a/include/linux/oid_registry.h b/include/linux/oid_registry.h index 3921fbed0b28..51421fdbb0ba 100644 --- a/include/linux/oid_registry.h +++ b/include/linux/oid_registry.h @@ -15,21 +15,24 @@ * * NOTE! Do not mess with the format of each line as this is read by * build_OID_registry.pl to generate the data for look_up_OID(). */ enum OID { + OID_id_dsa_with_sha1, /* 1.2.840.10030.4.3 */ OID_id_dsa, /* 1.2.840.10040.4.1 */ OID_id_ecPublicKey, /* 1.2.840.10045.2.1 */ OID_id_prime192v1, /* 1.2.840.10045.3.1.1 */ OID_id_prime256v1, /* 1.2.840.10045.3.1.7 */ + OID_id_ecdsa_with_sha1, /* 1.2.840.10045.4.1 */ OID_id_ecdsa_with_sha224, /* 1.2.840.10045.4.3.1 */ OID_id_ecdsa_with_sha256, /* 1.2.840.10045.4.3.2 */ OID_id_ecdsa_with_sha384, /* 1.2.840.10045.4.3.3 */ OID_id_ecdsa_with_sha512, /* 1.2.840.10045.4.3.4 */ /* PKCS#1 {iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-1(1)} */ OID_rsaEncryption, /* 1.2.840.113549.1.1.1 */ + OID_sha1WithRSAEncryption, /* 1.2.840.113549.1.1.5 */ OID_sha256WithRSAEncryption, /* 1.2.840.113549.1.1.11 */ OID_sha384WithRSAEncryption, /* 1.2.840.113549.1.1.12 */ OID_sha512WithRSAEncryption, /* 1.2.840.113549.1.1.13 */ OID_sha224WithRSAEncryption, /* 1.2.840.113549.1.1.14 */ /* PKCS#7 {iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-7(7)} */ @@ -62,10 +65,11 @@ enum OID { OID_IAKerb, /* 1.3.6.1.5.2.5 */ OID_PKU2U, /* 1.3.5.1.5.2.7 */ OID_Scram, /* 1.3.6.1.5.5.14 */ OID_certAuthInfoAccess, /* 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.1.1 */ + OID_sha1, /* 1.3.14.3.2.26 */ OID_id_ansip384r1, /* 1.3.132.0.34 */ OID_sha256, /* 2.16.840.1.101.3.4.2.1 */ OID_sha384, /* 2.16.840.1.101.3.4.2.2 */ OID_sha512, /* 2.16.840.1.101.3.4.2.3 */ OID_sha224, /* 2.16.840.1.101.3.4.2.4 */ diff --git a/kernel/module/Kconfig b/kernel/module/Kconfig index 0ea1b2970a23..28db5b7589eb 100644 --- a/kernel/module/Kconfig +++ b/kernel/module/Kconfig @@ -234,10 +234,14 @@ choice signature generation. This algorithm _must_ be built into the kernel directly so that signature verification can take place. It is not possible to load a signed module containing the algorithm to check the signature on that module. +config MODULE_SIG_SHA1 + bool "Sign modules with SHA-1" + select CRYPTO_SHA1 + config MODULE_SIG_SHA256 bool "Sign modules with SHA-256" select CRYPTO_SHA256 config MODULE_SIG_SHA384 @@ -263,10 +267,11 @@ config MODULE_SIG_SHA3_512 endchoice config MODULE_SIG_HASH string depends on MODULE_SIG || IMA_APPRAISE_MODSIG + default "sha1" if MODULE_SIG_SHA1 default "sha256" if MODULE_SIG_SHA256 default "sha384" if MODULE_SIG_SHA384 default "sha512" if MODULE_SIG_SHA512 default "sha3-256" if MODULE_SIG_SHA3_256 default "sha3-384" if MODULE_SIG_SHA3_384