| Message ID | 20240329225835.400662-10-michael.roth@amd.com (mailing list archive) |
|---|---|
| State | New, archived |
| Headers | show |
| Series | Add AMD Secure Nested Paging (SEV-SNP) Hypervisor Support | expand |
On 3/29/24 23:58, Michael Roth wrote: > SEV-SNP builds upon existing SEV and SEV-ES functionality while adding > new hardware-based security protection. SEV-SNP adds strong memory > encryption and integrity protection to help prevent malicious > hypervisor-based attacks such as data replay, memory re-mapping, and > more, to create an isolated execution environment. > > Define a new KVM_X86_SNP_VM type which makes use of these capabilities > and extend the KVM_SEV_INIT2 ioctl to support it. Also add a basic > helper to check whether SNP is enabled. > > Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com> > Signed-off-by: Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@amd.com> > [mdr: commit fixups, use similar ASID reporting as with SEV/SEV-ES] > Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com> > --- > arch/x86/include/asm/svm.h | 3 ++- > arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h | 1 + > arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c | 21 ++++++++++++++++++++- > arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c | 3 ++- > arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h | 12 ++++++++++++ > arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 2 +- > 6 files changed, 38 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) > > diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/svm.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/svm.h > index 728c98175b9c..544a43c1cf11 100644 > --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/svm.h > +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/svm.h > @@ -285,7 +285,8 @@ static_assert((X2AVIC_MAX_PHYSICAL_ID & AVIC_PHYSICAL_MAX_INDEX_MASK) == X2AVIC_ > > #define AVIC_HPA_MASK ~((0xFFFULL << 52) | 0xFFF) > > -#define SVM_SEV_FEAT_DEBUG_SWAP BIT(5) > +#define SVM_SEV_FEAT_SNP_ACTIVE BIT(0) > +#define SVM_SEV_FEAT_DEBUG_SWAP BIT(5) > > struct vmcb_seg { > u16 selector; > diff --git a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h > index 51b13080ed4b..725b75cfe9ff 100644 > --- a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h > +++ b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h > @@ -868,5 +868,6 @@ struct kvm_hyperv_eventfd { > #define KVM_X86_SW_PROTECTED_VM 1 > #define KVM_X86_SEV_VM 2 > #define KVM_X86_SEV_ES_VM 3 > +#define KVM_X86_SNP_VM 4 > > #endif /* _ASM_X86_KVM_H */ > diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c > index 1e65f5634ad3..3d9771163562 100644 > --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c > +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c > @@ -46,6 +46,9 @@ module_param_named(sev, sev_enabled, bool, 0444); > static bool sev_es_enabled = true; > module_param_named(sev_es, sev_es_enabled, bool, 0444); > > +/* enable/disable SEV-SNP support */ > +static bool sev_snp_enabled; > + > /* enable/disable SEV-ES DebugSwap support */ > static bool sev_es_debug_swap_enabled = true; > module_param_named(debug_swap, sev_es_debug_swap_enabled, bool, 0444); > @@ -275,6 +278,9 @@ static int __sev_guest_init(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp, > sev->es_active = es_active; > sev->vmsa_features = data->vmsa_features; > > + if (vm_type == KVM_X86_SNP_VM) > + sev->vmsa_features |= SVM_SEV_FEAT_SNP_ACTIVE; > + > ret = sev_asid_new(sev); > if (ret) > goto e_no_asid; > @@ -326,7 +332,8 @@ static int sev_guest_init2(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp) > return -EINVAL; > > if (kvm->arch.vm_type != KVM_X86_SEV_VM && > - kvm->arch.vm_type != KVM_X86_SEV_ES_VM) > + kvm->arch.vm_type != KVM_X86_SEV_ES_VM && > + kvm->arch.vm_type != KVM_X86_SNP_VM) > return -EINVAL; > > if (copy_from_user(&data, u64_to_user_ptr(argp->data), sizeof(data))) > @@ -2297,11 +2304,16 @@ void __init sev_set_cpu_caps(void) > kvm_cpu_cap_set(X86_FEATURE_SEV_ES); > kvm_caps.supported_vm_types |= BIT(KVM_X86_SEV_ES_VM); > } > + if (sev_snp_enabled) { > + kvm_cpu_cap_set(X86_FEATURE_SEV_SNP); > + kvm_caps.supported_vm_types |= BIT(KVM_X86_SNP_VM); > + } > } > > void __init sev_hardware_setup(void) > { > unsigned int eax, ebx, ecx, edx, sev_asid_count, sev_es_asid_count; > + bool sev_snp_supported = false; > bool sev_es_supported = false; > bool sev_supported = false; > > @@ -2382,6 +2394,7 @@ void __init sev_hardware_setup(void) > sev_es_asid_count = min_sev_asid - 1; > WARN_ON_ONCE(misc_cg_set_capacity(MISC_CG_RES_SEV_ES, sev_es_asid_count)); > sev_es_supported = true; > + sev_snp_supported = sev_snp_enabled && cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_HOST_SEV_SNP); > > out: > if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SEV)) > @@ -2394,9 +2407,15 @@ void __init sev_hardware_setup(void) > pr_info("SEV-ES %s (ASIDs %u - %u)\n", > sev_es_supported ? "enabled" : "disabled", > min_sev_asid > 1 ? 1 : 0, min_sev_asid - 1); > + if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SEV_SNP)) > + pr_info("SEV-SNP %s (ASIDs %u - %u)\n", > + sev_snp_supported ? "enabled" : "disabled", > + min_sev_asid > 1 ? 1 : 0, min_sev_asid - 1); > > sev_enabled = sev_supported; > sev_es_enabled = sev_es_supported; > + sev_snp_enabled = sev_snp_supported; > + > if (!sev_es_enabled || !cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_DEBUG_SWAP) || > !cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_NO_NESTED_DATA_BP)) > sev_es_debug_swap_enabled = false; > diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c > index 0f3b59da0d4a..2c162f6a1d78 100644 > --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c > +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c > @@ -4890,7 +4890,8 @@ static int svm_vm_init(struct kvm *kvm) > > if (type != KVM_X86_DEFAULT_VM && > type != KVM_X86_SW_PROTECTED_VM) { > - kvm->arch.has_protected_state = (type == KVM_X86_SEV_ES_VM); > + kvm->arch.has_protected_state = > + (type == KVM_X86_SEV_ES_VM || type == KVM_X86_SNP_VM); > to_kvm_sev_info(kvm)->need_init = true; > } > > diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h > index 157eb3f65269..4a01a81dd9b9 100644 > --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h > +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h > @@ -348,6 +348,18 @@ static __always_inline bool sev_es_guest(struct kvm *kvm) > #endif > } > > +static __always_inline bool sev_snp_guest(struct kvm *kvm) > +{ > +#ifdef CONFIG_KVM_AMD_SEV > + struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info; > + > + return (sev->vmsa_features & SVM_SEV_FEAT_SNP_ACTIVE) && > + !WARN_ON_ONCE(!sev_es_guest(kvm)); > +#else > + return false; > +#endif > +} > + > static inline void vmcb_mark_all_dirty(struct vmcb *vmcb) > { > vmcb->control.clean = 0; > diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c > index 64eda7949f09..f85735b6235d 100644 > --- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c > +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c > @@ -12603,7 +12603,7 @@ int kvm_arch_init_vm(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned long type) > > kvm->arch.vm_type = type; > kvm->arch.has_private_mem = > - (type == KVM_X86_SW_PROTECTED_VM); > + (type == KVM_X86_SW_PROTECTED_VM || type == KVM_X86_SNP_VM); > > ret = kvm_page_track_init(kvm); > if (ret) Reviewed-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Paolo
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/svm.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/svm.h index 728c98175b9c..544a43c1cf11 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/svm.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/svm.h @@ -285,7 +285,8 @@ static_assert((X2AVIC_MAX_PHYSICAL_ID & AVIC_PHYSICAL_MAX_INDEX_MASK) == X2AVIC_ #define AVIC_HPA_MASK ~((0xFFFULL << 52) | 0xFFF) -#define SVM_SEV_FEAT_DEBUG_SWAP BIT(5) +#define SVM_SEV_FEAT_SNP_ACTIVE BIT(0) +#define SVM_SEV_FEAT_DEBUG_SWAP BIT(5) struct vmcb_seg { u16 selector; diff --git a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h index 51b13080ed4b..725b75cfe9ff 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h @@ -868,5 +868,6 @@ struct kvm_hyperv_eventfd { #define KVM_X86_SW_PROTECTED_VM 1 #define KVM_X86_SEV_VM 2 #define KVM_X86_SEV_ES_VM 3 +#define KVM_X86_SNP_VM 4 #endif /* _ASM_X86_KVM_H */ diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c index 1e65f5634ad3..3d9771163562 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c @@ -46,6 +46,9 @@ module_param_named(sev, sev_enabled, bool, 0444); static bool sev_es_enabled = true; module_param_named(sev_es, sev_es_enabled, bool, 0444); +/* enable/disable SEV-SNP support */ +static bool sev_snp_enabled; + /* enable/disable SEV-ES DebugSwap support */ static bool sev_es_debug_swap_enabled = true; module_param_named(debug_swap, sev_es_debug_swap_enabled, bool, 0444); @@ -275,6 +278,9 @@ static int __sev_guest_init(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp, sev->es_active = es_active; sev->vmsa_features = data->vmsa_features; + if (vm_type == KVM_X86_SNP_VM) + sev->vmsa_features |= SVM_SEV_FEAT_SNP_ACTIVE; + ret = sev_asid_new(sev); if (ret) goto e_no_asid; @@ -326,7 +332,8 @@ static int sev_guest_init2(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp) return -EINVAL; if (kvm->arch.vm_type != KVM_X86_SEV_VM && - kvm->arch.vm_type != KVM_X86_SEV_ES_VM) + kvm->arch.vm_type != KVM_X86_SEV_ES_VM && + kvm->arch.vm_type != KVM_X86_SNP_VM) return -EINVAL; if (copy_from_user(&data, u64_to_user_ptr(argp->data), sizeof(data))) @@ -2297,11 +2304,16 @@ void __init sev_set_cpu_caps(void) kvm_cpu_cap_set(X86_FEATURE_SEV_ES); kvm_caps.supported_vm_types |= BIT(KVM_X86_SEV_ES_VM); } + if (sev_snp_enabled) { + kvm_cpu_cap_set(X86_FEATURE_SEV_SNP); + kvm_caps.supported_vm_types |= BIT(KVM_X86_SNP_VM); + } } void __init sev_hardware_setup(void) { unsigned int eax, ebx, ecx, edx, sev_asid_count, sev_es_asid_count; + bool sev_snp_supported = false; bool sev_es_supported = false; bool sev_supported = false; @@ -2382,6 +2394,7 @@ void __init sev_hardware_setup(void) sev_es_asid_count = min_sev_asid - 1; WARN_ON_ONCE(misc_cg_set_capacity(MISC_CG_RES_SEV_ES, sev_es_asid_count)); sev_es_supported = true; + sev_snp_supported = sev_snp_enabled && cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_HOST_SEV_SNP); out: if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SEV)) @@ -2394,9 +2407,15 @@ void __init sev_hardware_setup(void) pr_info("SEV-ES %s (ASIDs %u - %u)\n", sev_es_supported ? "enabled" : "disabled", min_sev_asid > 1 ? 1 : 0, min_sev_asid - 1); + if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SEV_SNP)) + pr_info("SEV-SNP %s (ASIDs %u - %u)\n", + sev_snp_supported ? "enabled" : "disabled", + min_sev_asid > 1 ? 1 : 0, min_sev_asid - 1); sev_enabled = sev_supported; sev_es_enabled = sev_es_supported; + sev_snp_enabled = sev_snp_supported; + if (!sev_es_enabled || !cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_DEBUG_SWAP) || !cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_NO_NESTED_DATA_BP)) sev_es_debug_swap_enabled = false; diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c index 0f3b59da0d4a..2c162f6a1d78 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c @@ -4890,7 +4890,8 @@ static int svm_vm_init(struct kvm *kvm) if (type != KVM_X86_DEFAULT_VM && type != KVM_X86_SW_PROTECTED_VM) { - kvm->arch.has_protected_state = (type == KVM_X86_SEV_ES_VM); + kvm->arch.has_protected_state = + (type == KVM_X86_SEV_ES_VM || type == KVM_X86_SNP_VM); to_kvm_sev_info(kvm)->need_init = true; } diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h index 157eb3f65269..4a01a81dd9b9 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h @@ -348,6 +348,18 @@ static __always_inline bool sev_es_guest(struct kvm *kvm) #endif } +static __always_inline bool sev_snp_guest(struct kvm *kvm) +{ +#ifdef CONFIG_KVM_AMD_SEV + struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info; + + return (sev->vmsa_features & SVM_SEV_FEAT_SNP_ACTIVE) && + !WARN_ON_ONCE(!sev_es_guest(kvm)); +#else + return false; +#endif +} + static inline void vmcb_mark_all_dirty(struct vmcb *vmcb) { vmcb->control.clean = 0; diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c index 64eda7949f09..f85735b6235d 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c @@ -12603,7 +12603,7 @@ int kvm_arch_init_vm(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned long type) kvm->arch.vm_type = type; kvm->arch.has_private_mem = - (type == KVM_X86_SW_PROTECTED_VM); + (type == KVM_X86_SW_PROTECTED_VM || type == KVM_X86_SNP_VM); ret = kvm_page_track_init(kvm); if (ret)