| Message ID | 20240422150651.2908169-1-stefanb@linux.ibm.com (mailing list archive) |
|---|---|
| Headers | show |
| Series | ima: Fix detection of read/write violations on stacked filesystems | expand |
On Mon, Apr 22, 2024 at 6:07 PM Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com> wrote: > > This series fixes the detection of read/write violations on stacked > filesystems. To be able to access the relevant dentries necessary to > detect files opened for writing on a stacked filesystem a new d_real_type > D_REAL_FILEDATA is introduced that allows callers to access all relevant > files involved in a stacked filesystem while traversing the layers. > Stefan, Both Miklos and myself objected to this solution: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-unionfs/CAJfpeguctirEYECoigcAsJwpGPCX2NyfMZ8H8GHGW-0UyKfjgg@mail.gmail.com/ Not sure what you are hoping to achieve from re-posting the same solution. I stopped counting how many times I already argued that *all* IMA/EVM assertions, including rw-ro violations should be enforced only on the real inode. I know this does not work - so you should find out why it does not work and fix the problem. Enforcing IMA/EVM on the overlayfs inode layer is just the wrong way IMO. Not once have I heard an argument from IMA/EVM developers why it is really needed to enforce IMA/EVM on the overlayfs inode layer and not on the real inode. I am sorry that we are failing to communicate on this matter, but I am not sure how else I can help. Thanks, Amir.
On 4/23/24 02:02, Amir Goldstein wrote: > On Mon, Apr 22, 2024 at 6:07 PM Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com> wrote: >> >> This series fixes the detection of read/write violations on stacked >> filesystems. To be able to access the relevant dentries necessary to >> detect files opened for writing on a stacked filesystem a new d_real_type >> D_REAL_FILEDATA is introduced that allows callers to access all relevant >> files involved in a stacked filesystem while traversing the layers. >> > > Stefan, > > Both Miklos and myself objected to this solution: > https://lore.kernel.org/linux-unionfs/CAJfpeguctirEYECoigcAsJwpGPCX2NyfMZ8H8GHGW-0UyKfjgg@mail.gmail.com/ Thanks, the RFC has achieved its objective now. Stefan
On Tue, 2024-04-23 at 09:02 +0300, Amir Goldstein wrote: > On Mon, Apr 22, 2024 at 6:07 PM Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com> wrote: > > > > This series fixes the detection of read/write violations on stacked > > filesystems. To be able to access the relevant dentries necessary to > > detect files opened for writing on a stacked filesystem a new d_real_type > > D_REAL_FILEDATA is introduced that allows callers to access all relevant > > files involved in a stacked filesystem while traversing the layers. > > > > Stefan, > > Both Miklos and myself objected to this solution: > https://lore.kernel.org/linux-unionfs/CAJfpeguctirEYECoigcAsJwpGPCX2NyfMZ8H8GHGW-0UyKfjgg@mail.gmail.com/ > > Not sure what you are hoping to achieve from re-posting the same solution. > > I stopped counting how many times I already argued that *all* IMA/EVM > assertions, > including rw-ro violations should be enforced only on the real inode. I have hopefully a better idea. We should detect violations at each level of the stack independently. And IMA should be invoked each time overlayfs uses an underlying layer. That is currently not easy, from the IMA policy perspective, because there are filesystem-specific rules, such as fsname= or fsuuid=. At the moment, I'm not planning to solve this, but I'm thinking to use for example FMODE_BACKING to ignore the filesystem-specific keywords and match the rule anyway. For now, I'm only addressing the call to underlying layers. To make sure that IMA evaluates every layer, I added a rule that checks the inode UID: measure fowner=2000 mask=MAY_READ I just investigated a bit, and I made some changes (for now, I'm just making it work, and you tell me what you think). diff --git a/fs/backing-file.c b/fs/backing-file.c index 740185198db3..8016f62cf770 100644 --- a/fs/backing-file.c +++ b/fs/backing-file.c @@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ #include <linux/backing-file.h> #include <linux/splice.h> #include <linux/mm.h> +#include <linux/security.h> #include "internal.h" @@ -40,12 +41,16 @@ struct file *backing_file_open(const struct path *user_path, int flags, if (IS_ERR(f)) return f; + f->f_mode |= OPEN_FMODE(flags); + path_get(user_path); *backing_file_user_path(f) = *user_path; error = vfs_open(real_path, f); if (error) { fput(f); f = ERR_PTR(error); + } else { + security_file_post_open(f, ACC_MODE(flags)); } return f; Setup: # mount -t overlay -olowerdir=a,upperdir=b,workdir=c overlay d open is a tool with the following syntax: open <path> <perm> It performs the open, and waits for user input before closing the file. ToMToU (Time of Measurement - Time of Use): Same fs (overlayfs) # /root/open /root/test-dir/d/test-file r (terminal 1) # /root/open /root/test-dir/d/test-file w (terminal 2) This works: 10 35435d0858d895b90097306171a2e5fcc7f5da9e ima-ng sha256:0e4acf326a82c6bded9d86f48d272d7a036b6490081bb6466ecc2a0e416b244a boot_aggregate 10 cef529d5d1032ffb6d3e2154664c83ba18cf2576 ima-ng sha256:f2ca1bb6c7e907d06dafe4687e579fce76b37e4e93b7605022da52e6ccc26fd2 test-file 10 694277487b9753db78446192231b59b7be7c03ad ima-ng sha256:f2ca1bb6c7e907d06dafe4687e579fce76b37e4e93b7605022da52e6ccc26fd2 /root/test-dir/d/test-file 10 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 ima-ng sha256:0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 test-file 10 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 ima-ng sha256:0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 /root/test-dir/d/test-file This is the result of calling IMA at both layers, and the violation of course happens twice. This is also confirmed in the logs: Apr 23 14:52:45 fedora audit[994]: INTEGRITY_PCR pid=994 uid=0 auid=0 ses=3 subj=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 op=invalid_pcr cause=ToMToU comm="open" name="test-file" dev="sda3" ino=995512 res=1 errno=0 Apr 23 14:52:45 fedora audit[994]: INTEGRITY_PCR pid=994 uid=0 auid=0 ses=3 subj=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 op=invalid_pcr cause=ToMToU comm="open" name="/root/test-dir/d/test-file" dev="overlay" ino=995512 res=1 errno=0 Different fs (overlayfs, btrfs) # /root/open /root/test-dir/d/test-file r (terminal 1) # /root/open /root/test-dir/b/test-file w (terminal 2) Again, this works despite the read is in overlayfs, and the write is in btrfs: 10 35435d0858d895b90097306171a2e5fcc7f5da9e ima-ng sha256:0e4acf326a82c6bded9d86f48d272d7a036b6490081bb6466ecc2a0e416b244a boot_aggregate 10 cef529d5d1032ffb6d3e2154664c83ba18cf2576 ima-ng sha256:f2ca1bb6c7e907d06dafe4687e579fce76b37e4e93b7605022da52e6ccc26fd2 test-file 10 694277487b9753db78446192231b59b7be7c03ad ima-ng sha256:f2ca1bb6c7e907d06dafe4687e579fce76b37e4e93b7605022da52e6ccc26fd2 /root/test-dir/d/test-file 10 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 ima-ng sha256:0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 /root/test-dir/b/test-file The difference from the previous example is that now there is only one violation, which is detected only in the upper layer. The logs have: Apr 23 15:01:15 fedora audit[985]: INTEGRITY_PCR pid=985 uid=0 auid=0 ses=3 subj=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 op=invalid_pcr cause=ToMToU comm="open" name="/root/test-dir/b/test-file" dev="sda3" ino=995512 res=1 errno=0 Different fs (btrfs, overlayfs) # /root/open /root/test-dir/b/test-file r (terminal 2) # /root/open /root/test-dir/d/test-file w (terminal 1) 10 35435d0858d895b90097306171a2e5fcc7f5da9e ima-ng sha256:0e4acf326a82c6bded9d86f48d272d7a036b6490081bb6466ecc2a0e416b244a boot_aggregate 10 d7a692e19158820d2755542a8d31b49ac7ac2729 ima-ng sha256:f2ca1bb6c7e907d06dafe4687e579fce76b37e4e93b7605022da52e6ccc26fd2 /root/test-dir/b/test-file 10 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 ima-ng sha256:0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 test-file Works too. There is only one measurement, since that is done only for the upper layer. Apr 23 15:05:40 fedora audit[982]: INTEGRITY_PCR pid=982 uid=0 auid=0 ses=1 subj=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 op=invalid_pcr cause=ToMToU comm="open" name="test-file" dev="sda3" ino=995512 res=1 errno=0 Open writers Same fs (overlayfs) # /root/open /root/test-dir/d/test-file w (terminal 1) # /root/open /root/test-dir/d/test-file r (terminal 2) 10 35435d0858d895b90097306171a2e5fcc7f5da9e ima-ng sha256:0e4acf326a82c6bded9d86f48d272d7a036b6490081bb6466ecc2a0e416b244a boot_aggregate 10 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 ima-ng sha256:0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 test-file 10 cef529d5d1032ffb6d3e2154664c83ba18cf2576 ima-ng sha256:f2ca1bb6c7e907d06dafe4687e579fce76b37e4e93b7605022da52e6ccc26fd2 test-file 10 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 ima-ng sha256:0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 /root/test-dir/d/test-file 10 694277487b9753db78446192231b59b7be7c03ad ima-ng sha256:f2ca1bb6c7e907d06dafe4687e579fce76b37e4e93b7605022da52e6ccc26fd2 /root/test-dir/d/test-file Apr 23 15:10:46 fedora audit[983]: INTEGRITY_PCR pid=983 uid=0 auid=0 ses=3 subj=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 op=invalid_pcr cause=open_writers comm="open" name="test-file" dev="sda3" ino=995512 res=1 errno=0 Apr 23 15:10:46 fedora audit[983]: INTEGRITY_PCR pid=983 uid=0 auid=0 ses=3 subj=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 op=invalid_pcr cause=open_writers comm="open" name="/root/test-dir/d/test-file" dev="overlay" ino=995512 res=1 errno=0 Different fs (overlayfs, btrfs) # /root/open /root/test-dir/d/test-file w (terminal 1) # /root/open /root/test-dir/b/test-file r (terminal 2) 10 35435d0858d895b90097306171a2e5fcc7f5da9e ima-ng sha256:0e4acf326a82c6bded9d86f48d272d7a036b6490081bb6466ecc2a0e416b244a boot_aggregate 10 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 ima-ng sha256:0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 /root/test-dir/b/test-file 10 d7a692e19158820d2755542a8d31b49ac7ac2729 ima-ng sha256:f2ca1bb6c7e907d06dafe4687e579fce76b37e4e93b7605022da52e6ccc26fd2 /root/test-dir/b/test-file Apr 23 15:12:58 fedora audit[984]: INTEGRITY_PCR pid=984 uid=0 auid=0 ses=3 subj=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 op=invalid_pcr cause=open_writers comm="open" name="/root/test-dir/b/test-file" dev="sda3" ino=995512 res=1 errno=0 Different fs (btrfs, overlayfs) # /root/open /root/test-dir/b/test-file w (terminal 1) # /root/open /root/test-dir/d/test-file r (terminal 2) 10 35435d0858d895b90097306171a2e5fcc7f5da9e ima-ng sha256:0e4acf326a82c6bded9d86f48d272d7a036b6490081bb6466ecc2a0e416b244a boot_aggregate 10 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 ima-ng sha256:0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 test-file 10 cef529d5d1032ffb6d3e2154664c83ba18cf2576 ima-ng sha256:f2ca1bb6c7e907d06dafe4687e579fce76b37e4e93b7605022da52e6ccc26fd2 test-file 10 694277487b9753db78446192231b59b7be7c03ad ima-ng sha256:f2ca1bb6c7e907d06dafe4687e579fce76b37e4e93b7605022da52e6ccc26fd2 /root/test-dir/d/test-file Apr 23 15:16:37 fedora audit[983]: INTEGRITY_PCR pid=983 uid=0 auid=0 ses=3 subj=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 op=invalid_pcr cause=open_writers comm="open" name="test-file" dev="sda3" ino=995512 res=1 errno=0 Roberto > I know this does not work - so you should find out why it does not work and fix > the problem. > > Enforcing IMA/EVM on the overlayfs inode layer is just the wrong way IMO. > Not once have I heard an argument from IMA/EVM developers why it is really > needed to enforce IMA/EVM on the overlayfs inode layer and not on the > real inode. > I am sorry that we are failing to communicate on this matter, but I am not > sure how else I can help. > > Thanks, > Amir.
On Tue, Apr 23, 2024 at 4:21 PM Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huaweicloud.com> wrote: > > On Tue, 2024-04-23 at 09:02 +0300, Amir Goldstein wrote: > > On Mon, Apr 22, 2024 at 6:07 PM Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com> wrote: > > > > > > This series fixes the detection of read/write violations on stacked > > > filesystems. To be able to access the relevant dentries necessary to > > > detect files opened for writing on a stacked filesystem a new d_real_type > > > D_REAL_FILEDATA is introduced that allows callers to access all relevant > > > files involved in a stacked filesystem while traversing the layers. > > > > > > > Stefan, > > > > Both Miklos and myself objected to this solution: > > https://lore.kernel.org/linux-unionfs/CAJfpeguctirEYECoigcAsJwpGPCX2NyfMZ8H8GHGW-0UyKfjgg@mail.gmail.com/ > > > > Not sure what you are hoping to achieve from re-posting the same solution. > > > > I stopped counting how many times I already argued that *all* IMA/EVM > > assertions, > > including rw-ro violations should be enforced only on the real inode. > > I have hopefully a better idea. We should detect violations at each > level of the stack independently. And IMA should be invoked each time > overlayfs uses an underlying layer. > > That is currently not easy, from the IMA policy perspective, because > there are filesystem-specific rules, such as fsname= or fsuuid=. At the > moment, I'm not planning to solve this, but I'm thinking to use for > example FMODE_BACKING to ignore the filesystem-specific keywords and > match the rule anyway. > > For now, I'm only addressing the call to underlying layers. To make > sure that IMA evaluates every layer, I added a rule that checks the > inode UID: > > measure fowner=2000 mask=MAY_READ > > > I just investigated a bit, and I made some changes (for now, I'm just > making it work, and you tell me what you think). I did not examine this up close, but this seems like a change in the right direction. Will need Christian's approval that this does not break any assumptions made on backing files. Thanks, Amir. > > diff --git a/fs/backing-file.c b/fs/backing-file.c > index 740185198db3..8016f62cf770 100644 > --- a/fs/backing-file.c > +++ b/fs/backing-file.c > @@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ > #include <linux/backing-file.h> > #include <linux/splice.h> > #include <linux/mm.h> > +#include <linux/security.h> > > #include "internal.h" > > @@ -40,12 +41,16 @@ struct file *backing_file_open(const struct path > *user_path, int flags, > if (IS_ERR(f)) > return f; > > + f->f_mode |= OPEN_FMODE(flags); > + > path_get(user_path); > *backing_file_user_path(f) = *user_path; > error = vfs_open(real_path, f); > if (error) { > fput(f); > f = ERR_PTR(error); > + } else { > + security_file_post_open(f, ACC_MODE(flags)); > } > > return f; > > > Setup: > > # mount -t overlay -olowerdir=a,upperdir=b,workdir=c overlay d > > open is a tool with the following syntax: > > open <path> <perm> > > It performs the open, and waits for user input before closing the file. > > > > ToMToU (Time of Measurement - Time of Use): > > Same fs (overlayfs) > > # /root/open /root/test-dir/d/test-file r (terminal 1) > # /root/open /root/test-dir/d/test-file w (terminal 2) > > This works: > > 10 35435d0858d895b90097306171a2e5fcc7f5da9e ima-ng sha256:0e4acf326a82c6bded9d86f48d272d7a036b6490081bb6466ecc2a0e416b244a boot_aggregate > 10 cef529d5d1032ffb6d3e2154664c83ba18cf2576 ima-ng sha256:f2ca1bb6c7e907d06dafe4687e579fce76b37e4e93b7605022da52e6ccc26fd2 test-file > 10 694277487b9753db78446192231b59b7be7c03ad ima-ng sha256:f2ca1bb6c7e907d06dafe4687e579fce76b37e4e93b7605022da52e6ccc26fd2 /root/test-dir/d/test-file > 10 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 ima-ng sha256:0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 test-file > 10 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 ima-ng sha256:0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 /root/test-dir/d/test-file > > This is the result of calling IMA at both layers, and the violation of > course happens twice. > > This is also confirmed in the logs: > > Apr 23 14:52:45 fedora audit[994]: INTEGRITY_PCR pid=994 uid=0 auid=0 ses=3 subj=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 op=invalid_pcr cause=ToMToU comm="open" name="test-file" dev="sda3" ino=995512 res=1 errno=0 > Apr 23 14:52:45 fedora audit[994]: INTEGRITY_PCR pid=994 uid=0 auid=0 ses=3 subj=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 op=invalid_pcr cause=ToMToU comm="open" name="/root/test-dir/d/test-file" dev="overlay" ino=995512 res=1 errno=0 > > > Different fs (overlayfs, btrfs) > > # /root/open /root/test-dir/d/test-file r (terminal 1) > # /root/open /root/test-dir/b/test-file w (terminal 2) > > Again, this works despite the read is in overlayfs, and the write is in > btrfs: > > 10 35435d0858d895b90097306171a2e5fcc7f5da9e ima-ng sha256:0e4acf326a82c6bded9d86f48d272d7a036b6490081bb6466ecc2a0e416b244a boot_aggregate > 10 cef529d5d1032ffb6d3e2154664c83ba18cf2576 ima-ng sha256:f2ca1bb6c7e907d06dafe4687e579fce76b37e4e93b7605022da52e6ccc26fd2 test-file > 10 694277487b9753db78446192231b59b7be7c03ad ima-ng sha256:f2ca1bb6c7e907d06dafe4687e579fce76b37e4e93b7605022da52e6ccc26fd2 /root/test-dir/d/test-file > 10 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 ima-ng sha256:0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 /root/test-dir/b/test-file > > The difference from the previous example is that now there is only one > violation, which is detected only in the upper layer. The logs have: > > Apr 23 15:01:15 fedora audit[985]: INTEGRITY_PCR pid=985 uid=0 auid=0 ses=3 subj=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 op=invalid_pcr cause=ToMToU comm="open" name="/root/test-dir/b/test-file" dev="sda3" ino=995512 res=1 errno=0 > > > Different fs (btrfs, overlayfs) > > # /root/open /root/test-dir/b/test-file r (terminal 2) > # /root/open /root/test-dir/d/test-file w (terminal 1) > > 10 35435d0858d895b90097306171a2e5fcc7f5da9e ima-ng sha256:0e4acf326a82c6bded9d86f48d272d7a036b6490081bb6466ecc2a0e416b244a boot_aggregate > 10 d7a692e19158820d2755542a8d31b49ac7ac2729 ima-ng sha256:f2ca1bb6c7e907d06dafe4687e579fce76b37e4e93b7605022da52e6ccc26fd2 /root/test-dir/b/test-file > 10 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 ima-ng sha256:0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 test-file > > Works too. There is only one measurement, since that is done only for > the upper layer. > > Apr 23 15:05:40 fedora audit[982]: INTEGRITY_PCR pid=982 uid=0 auid=0 ses=1 subj=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 op=invalid_pcr cause=ToMToU comm="open" name="test-file" dev="sda3" ino=995512 res=1 errno=0 > > > > Open writers > > Same fs (overlayfs) > > # /root/open /root/test-dir/d/test-file w (terminal 1) > # /root/open /root/test-dir/d/test-file r (terminal 2) > > 10 35435d0858d895b90097306171a2e5fcc7f5da9e ima-ng sha256:0e4acf326a82c6bded9d86f48d272d7a036b6490081bb6466ecc2a0e416b244a boot_aggregate > 10 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 ima-ng sha256:0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 test-file > 10 cef529d5d1032ffb6d3e2154664c83ba18cf2576 ima-ng sha256:f2ca1bb6c7e907d06dafe4687e579fce76b37e4e93b7605022da52e6ccc26fd2 test-file > 10 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 ima-ng sha256:0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 /root/test-dir/d/test-file > 10 694277487b9753db78446192231b59b7be7c03ad ima-ng sha256:f2ca1bb6c7e907d06dafe4687e579fce76b37e4e93b7605022da52e6ccc26fd2 /root/test-dir/d/test-file > > Apr 23 15:10:46 fedora audit[983]: INTEGRITY_PCR pid=983 uid=0 auid=0 ses=3 subj=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 op=invalid_pcr cause=open_writers comm="open" name="test-file" dev="sda3" ino=995512 res=1 errno=0 > Apr 23 15:10:46 fedora audit[983]: INTEGRITY_PCR pid=983 uid=0 auid=0 ses=3 subj=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 op=invalid_pcr cause=open_writers comm="open" name="/root/test-dir/d/test-file" dev="overlay" ino=995512 res=1 errno=0 > > > Different fs (overlayfs, btrfs) > > # /root/open /root/test-dir/d/test-file w (terminal 1) > # /root/open /root/test-dir/b/test-file r (terminal 2) > > 10 35435d0858d895b90097306171a2e5fcc7f5da9e ima-ng sha256:0e4acf326a82c6bded9d86f48d272d7a036b6490081bb6466ecc2a0e416b244a boot_aggregate > 10 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 ima-ng sha256:0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 /root/test-dir/b/test-file > 10 d7a692e19158820d2755542a8d31b49ac7ac2729 ima-ng sha256:f2ca1bb6c7e907d06dafe4687e579fce76b37e4e93b7605022da52e6ccc26fd2 /root/test-dir/b/test-file > > Apr 23 15:12:58 fedora audit[984]: INTEGRITY_PCR pid=984 uid=0 auid=0 ses=3 subj=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 op=invalid_pcr cause=open_writers comm="open" name="/root/test-dir/b/test-file" dev="sda3" ino=995512 res=1 errno=0 > > > Different fs (btrfs, overlayfs) > > # /root/open /root/test-dir/b/test-file w (terminal 1) > # /root/open /root/test-dir/d/test-file r (terminal 2) > > 10 35435d0858d895b90097306171a2e5fcc7f5da9e ima-ng sha256:0e4acf326a82c6bded9d86f48d272d7a036b6490081bb6466ecc2a0e416b244a boot_aggregate > 10 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 ima-ng sha256:0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 test-file > 10 cef529d5d1032ffb6d3e2154664c83ba18cf2576 ima-ng sha256:f2ca1bb6c7e907d06dafe4687e579fce76b37e4e93b7605022da52e6ccc26fd2 test-file > 10 694277487b9753db78446192231b59b7be7c03ad ima-ng sha256:f2ca1bb6c7e907d06dafe4687e579fce76b37e4e93b7605022da52e6ccc26fd2 /root/test-dir/d/test-file > > Apr 23 15:16:37 fedora audit[983]: INTEGRITY_PCR pid=983 uid=0 auid=0 ses=3 subj=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 op=invalid_pcr cause=open_writers comm="open" name="test-file" dev="sda3" ino=995512 res=1 errno=0 > > Roberto > > > I know this does not work - so you should find out why it does not work and fix > > the problem. > > > > Enforcing IMA/EVM on the overlayfs inode layer is just the wrong way IMO. > > Not once have I heard an argument from IMA/EVM developers why it is really > > needed to enforce IMA/EVM on the overlayfs inode layer and not on the > > real inode. > > I am sorry that we are failing to communicate on this matter, but I am not > > sure how else I can help. > > > > Thanks, > > Amir. >
On Tue, 2024-04-23 at 09:02 +0300, Amir Goldstein wrote: > On Mon, Apr 22, 2024 at 6:07 PM Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com> wrote: > > > > This series fixes the detection of read/write violations on stacked > > filesystems. To be able to access the relevant dentries necessary to > > detect files opened for writing on a stacked filesystem a new d_real_type > > D_REAL_FILEDATA is introduced that allows callers to access all relevant > > files involved in a stacked filesystem while traversing the layers. > > > > Stefan, > > Both Miklos and myself objected to this solution: > https://lore.kernel.org/linux-unionfs/CAJfpeguctirEYECoigcAsJwpGPCX2NyfMZ8H8GHGW-0UyKfjgg@mail.gmail.com/ > > Not sure what you are hoping to achieve from re-posting the same solution. > > I stopped counting how many times I already argued that *all* IMA/EVM > assertions, > including rw-ro violations should be enforced only on the real inode. > I know this does not work - so you should find out why it does not work and fix > the problem. > > Enforcing IMA/EVM on the overlayfs inode layer is just the wrong way IMO. > Not once have I heard an argument from IMA/EVM developers why it is really > needed to enforce IMA/EVM on the overlayfs inode layer and not on the > real inode. Ok, I try to provide an example regarding this, and we see if it makes sense. # echo test > test-file # chown 2000 d/test-file # ls -l a/test-file -rw-r--r--. 1 2000 root 25 Apr 25 10:50 a/test-file Initially there is a file in the lower layer with UID 2000. # mount -t overlay -olowerdir=a,upperdir=b,workdir=c,metacopy=on overlay d # chown 3000 d/test-file # ls -l d/test-file -rw-r--r--. 1 3000 root 25 Apr 25 10:50 d/test-file # ls -l a/test-file -rw-r--r--. 1 2000 root 25 Apr 25 10:50 a/test-file # ls -l b/test-file -rw-r--r--. 1 3000 root 25 Apr 25 10:50 b/test-file If I have a policy like this: # echo "measure fsname=overlay fowner=3000" > /sys/kernel/security/ima/policy there won't be any match on the real file which still has UID 2000. But what is observable by the processes through overlayfs is UID 3000. Roberto > I am sorry that we are failing to communicate on this matter, but I am not > sure how else I can help. > > Thanks, > Amir.
On Thu, Apr 25, 2024 at 2:30 PM Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huaweicloud.com> wrote: > > On Tue, 2024-04-23 at 09:02 +0300, Amir Goldstein wrote: > > On Mon, Apr 22, 2024 at 6:07 PM Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com> wrote: > > > > > > This series fixes the detection of read/write violations on stacked > > > filesystems. To be able to access the relevant dentries necessary to > > > detect files opened for writing on a stacked filesystem a new d_real_type > > > D_REAL_FILEDATA is introduced that allows callers to access all relevant > > > files involved in a stacked filesystem while traversing the layers. > > > > > > > Stefan, > > > > Both Miklos and myself objected to this solution: > > https://lore.kernel.org/linux-unionfs/CAJfpeguctirEYECoigcAsJwpGPCX2NyfMZ8H8GHGW-0UyKfjgg@mail.gmail.com/ > > > > Not sure what you are hoping to achieve from re-posting the same solution. > > > > I stopped counting how many times I already argued that *all* IMA/EVM > > assertions, > > including rw-ro violations should be enforced only on the real inode. > > I know this does not work - so you should find out why it does not work and fix > > the problem. > > > > Enforcing IMA/EVM on the overlayfs inode layer is just the wrong way IMO. > > Not once have I heard an argument from IMA/EVM developers why it is really > > needed to enforce IMA/EVM on the overlayfs inode layer and not on the > > real inode. > > Ok, I try to provide an example regarding this, and we see if it makes > sense. > > # echo test > test-file > # chown 2000 d/test-file > # ls -l a/test-file > -rw-r--r--. 1 2000 root 25 Apr 25 10:50 a/test-file > > Initially there is a file in the lower layer with UID 2000. > > > # mount -t overlay -olowerdir=a,upperdir=b,workdir=c,metacopy=on overlay d > # chown 3000 d/test-file > # ls -l d/test-file > -rw-r--r--. 1 3000 root 25 Apr 25 10:50 d/test-file > # ls -l a/test-file > -rw-r--r--. 1 2000 root 25 Apr 25 10:50 a/test-file > # ls -l b/test-file > -rw-r--r--. 1 3000 root 25 Apr 25 10:50 b/test-file > > If I have a policy like this: > > # echo "measure fsname=overlay fowner=3000" > /sys/kernel/security/ima/policy > > there won't be any match on the real file which still has UID 2000. But > what is observable by the processes through overlayfs is UID 3000. > ok, it is simple to write an ima policy that is not respected by overlayfs. My question is: under what circumstances is a policy like the above useful in the real world? Correct me if I am wrong, but AFAIK, the purpose of IMA/EVM is to mitigate attack vectors of tampering with files offline or after the file's data/metadata were measured. Is that a correct description? AFAIK, IMA/EVM policy is system-wide and not namespace aware so the policy has to be set on the container's host and not inside containers. Is that correct? If those statements are true then please try to explain to me what is the thread model for tampering with overlayfs files, without tampering with the real upper and/or lower files. My thesis is that if an IMA/EVM policy is good enough to prevent tampering with the real lower/upper files, then no extra measures are needed to protect the virtual overlayfs files against tampering. Is my thesis flawed? I'm pretty sure that it is, but I never got a satisfying answer why. Thanks, Amir.
On Thu, 2024-04-25 at 15:37 +0300, Amir Goldstein wrote: > > On Thu, Apr 25, 2024 at 2:30 PM Roberto Sassu > > <roberto.sassu@huaweicloud.com> wrote: > > > > > > > > On Tue, 2024-04-23 at 09:02 +0300, Amir Goldstein wrote: > > > > > > On Mon, Apr 22, 2024 at 6:07 PM Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com> wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > This series fixes the detection of read/write violations on stacked > > > > > > > > filesystems. To be able to access the relevant dentries necessary to > > > > > > > > detect files opened for writing on a stacked filesystem a new d_real_type > > > > > > > > D_REAL_FILEDATA is introduced that allows callers to access all relevant > > > > > > > > files involved in a stacked filesystem while traversing the layers. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Stefan, > > > > > > > > > > > > Both Miklos and myself objected to this solution: > > > > > > https://lore.kernel.org/linux-unionfs/CAJfpeguctirEYECoigcAsJwpGPCX2NyfMZ8H8GHGW-0UyKfjgg@mail.gmail.com/ > > > > > > > > > > > > Not sure what you are hoping to achieve from re-posting the same solution. > > > > > > > > > > > > I stopped counting how many times I already argued that *all* IMA/EVM > > > > > > assertions, > > > > > > including rw-ro violations should be enforced only on the real inode. > > > > > > I know this does not work - so you should find out why it does not work and fix > > > > > > the problem. > > > > > > > > > > > > Enforcing IMA/EVM on the overlayfs inode layer is just the wrong way IMO. > > > > > > Not once have I heard an argument from IMA/EVM developers why it is really > > > > > > needed to enforce IMA/EVM on the overlayfs inode layer and not on the > > > > > > real inode. > > > > > > > > Ok, I try to provide an example regarding this, and we see if it makes > > > > sense. > > > > > > > > # echo test > test-file > > > > # chown 2000 d/test-file > > > > # ls -l a/test-file > > > > -rw-r--r--. 1 2000 root 25 Apr 25 10:50 a/test-file > > > > > > > > Initially there is a file in the lower layer with UID 2000. > > > > > > > > > > > > # mount -t overlay -olowerdir=a,upperdir=b,workdir=c,metacopy=on overlay d > > > > # chown 3000 d/test-file > > > > # ls -l d/test-file > > > > -rw-r--r--. 1 3000 root 25 Apr 25 10:50 d/test-file > > > > # ls -l a/test-file > > > > -rw-r--r--. 1 2000 root 25 Apr 25 10:50 a/test-file > > > > # ls -l b/test-file > > > > -rw-r--r--. 1 3000 root 25 Apr 25 10:50 b/test-file > > > > > > > > If I have a policy like this: > > > > > > > > # echo "measure fsname=overlay fowner=3000" > /sys/kernel/security/ima/policy > > > > > > > > there won't be any match on the real file which still has UID 2000. But > > > > what is observable by the processes through overlayfs is UID 3000. > > > > > > > > ok, it is simple to write an ima policy that is not respected by overlayfs. > > > > My question is: under what circumstances is a policy like the above > > useful in the real world? > > > > Correct me if I am wrong, but AFAIK, the purpose of IMA/EVM is to > > mitigate attack vectors of tampering with files offline or after the > > file's data/metadata were measured. Is that a correct description? (For now I would talk about IMA, EVM can be considered separately). The main purpose of IMA is to evaluate files being accessed, and record the access together with a file digest in a measurement list, allow/deny access to the file (appraisal), or add a new event to audit logs. How files are selected depends on the IMA policy. A rule can be subject-based or object-based, depending on whether respectively process or file attributes are matched. It can also be both. A subject-based rule means that you identify a process/set of processes, and you evaluate everything it/they read. An object-based rule means that you identify a file/set of files, and you evaluate any process accessing them. Since processes normally would access the top most layer (overlayfs), the IMA policy should be written in terms of metadata seen in that layer (but not necessarily). This is just for identifying the set of files to measure/appraise/audit, not which file is going to be evaluated, which will be always the persistent one. I have to admit, things are not very clear also to me. Suppose you have a file in the lower filesystem with SELinux label user_t, and then on overlayfs with metadata copy, you change the label of this file to unconfined_t. What will happen exactly? On the overlayfs layer, you will have a permission request with the new label unconfined_t, but when overlayfs calls vfs_open(), there will be another permission request with the old label. It is kind of the same challenge we are facing with IMA, we can observe the file operations at different layers. That is why I think having stacked IMA calls is a good idea (other than really fixing the violations). The current problem, that is very difficult to solve, is that the policy should cover all layers, or some events will be missed. Now we have overlayfs-specific code to detect changes in the backing inode, while with stacked IMA calls, we can detect the change at the layer where it happened (and we can remove the overlayfs-specific code). Ideally, what I would do to cover all layers is that if there is a match at one layer, the lower layers should automatically match too, but it is not that easy since after the vfs_open() recursive calls we start calling IMA in the botton most layer first. (What I did with the stacked IMA calls is just an experiment to see how far we can go, but still we didn't make any decision with Mimi). > > AFAIK, IMA/EVM policy is system-wide and not namespace aware > > so the policy has to be set on the container's host and not inside > > containers. Is that correct? I know that overlayfs is primarily aiming at containers, but I would suggest to not add that complexity yet and just consider the host. > > If those statements are true then please try to explain to me what is > > the thread model for tampering with overlayfs files, without tampering > > with the real upper and/or lower files. I hope at this point is clear that what we care about is that, or the process is reading the content of the file whose digest is recorded in the measurement list, or we must signal to remote verifiers concurrent accesses that make the statement above false. > > My thesis is that if an IMA/EVM policy is good enough to prevent > > tampering with the real lower/upper files, then no extra measures > > are needed to protect the virtual overlayfs files against tampering. What you say is correct, but the way you identify files to measure/appraise/audit can be different. Thanks Roberto > > Is my thesis flawed? > > I'm pretty sure that it is, but I never got a satisfying answer why. > > > > Thanks, > > Amir.
On Tue, Apr 23, 2024 at 05:30:52PM +0300, Amir Goldstein wrote: > On Tue, Apr 23, 2024 at 4:21 PM Roberto Sassu > <roberto.sassu@huaweicloud.com> wrote: > > > > On Tue, 2024-04-23 at 09:02 +0300, Amir Goldstein wrote: > > > On Mon, Apr 22, 2024 at 6:07 PM Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com> wrote: > > > > > > > > This series fixes the detection of read/write violations on stacked > > > > filesystems. To be able to access the relevant dentries necessary to > > > > detect files opened for writing on a stacked filesystem a new d_real_type > > > > D_REAL_FILEDATA is introduced that allows callers to access all relevant > > > > files involved in a stacked filesystem while traversing the layers. > > > > > > > > > > Stefan, > > > > > > Both Miklos and myself objected to this solution: > > > https://lore.kernel.org/linux-unionfs/CAJfpeguctirEYECoigcAsJwpGPCX2NyfMZ8H8GHGW-0UyKfjgg@mail.gmail.com/ > > > > > > Not sure what you are hoping to achieve from re-posting the same solution. > > > > > > I stopped counting how many times I already argued that *all* IMA/EVM > > > assertions, > > > including rw-ro violations should be enforced only on the real inode. > > > > I have hopefully a better idea. We should detect violations at each > > level of the stack independently. And IMA should be invoked each time > > overlayfs uses an underlying layer. > > > > That is currently not easy, from the IMA policy perspective, because > > there are filesystem-specific rules, such as fsname= or fsuuid=. At the > > moment, I'm not planning to solve this, but I'm thinking to use for > > example FMODE_BACKING to ignore the filesystem-specific keywords and > > match the rule anyway. > > > > For now, I'm only addressing the call to underlying layers. To make > > sure that IMA evaluates every layer, I added a rule that checks the > > inode UID: > > > > measure fowner=2000 mask=MAY_READ > > > > > > I just investigated a bit, and I made some changes (for now, I'm just > > making it work, and you tell me what you think). > > I did not examine this up close, but this seems like a change in the right > direction. > Will need Christian's approval that this does not break any assumptions > made on backing files. In principle I don't care if IMA wants to call yet another security hook in the backing file layer. I suspect it will impact performace if IMA is enabled. So that's something to keep in mind. But it's certainly better than blatantly abusing the dcache to achieve this. > > diff --git a/fs/backing-file.c b/fs/backing-file.c > > index 740185198db3..8016f62cf770 100644 > > --- a/fs/backing-file.c > > +++ b/fs/backing-file.c > > @@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ > > #include <linux/backing-file.h> > > #include <linux/splice.h> > > #include <linux/mm.h> > > +#include <linux/security.h> > > > > #include "internal.h" > > > > @@ -40,12 +41,16 @@ struct file *backing_file_open(const struct path > > *user_path, int flags, > > if (IS_ERR(f)) > > return f; > > > > + f->f_mode |= OPEN_FMODE(flags); > > + > > path_get(user_path); > > *backing_file_user_path(f) = *user_path; > > error = vfs_open(real_path, f); > > if (error) { > > fput(f); > > f = ERR_PTR(error); > > + } else { > > + security_file_post_open(f, ACC_MODE(flags)); > > } > > > > return f; > > > > > > Setup: > > > > # mount -t overlay -olowerdir=a,upperdir=b,workdir=c overlay d > > > > open is a tool with the following syntax: > > > > open <path> <perm> > > > > It performs the open, and waits for user input before closing the file. > > > > > > > > ToMToU (Time of Measurement - Time of Use): > > > > Same fs (overlayfs) > > > > # /root/open /root/test-dir/d/test-file r (terminal 1) > > # /root/open /root/test-dir/d/test-file w (terminal 2) > > > > This works: > > > > 10 35435d0858d895b90097306171a2e5fcc7f5da9e ima-ng sha256:0e4acf326a82c6bded9d86f48d272d7a036b6490081bb6466ecc2a0e416b244a boot_aggregate > > 10 cef529d5d1032ffb6d3e2154664c83ba18cf2576 ima-ng sha256:f2ca1bb6c7e907d06dafe4687e579fce76b37e4e93b7605022da52e6ccc26fd2 test-file > > 10 694277487b9753db78446192231b59b7be7c03ad ima-ng sha256:f2ca1bb6c7e907d06dafe4687e579fce76b37e4e93b7605022da52e6ccc26fd2 /root/test-dir/d/test-file > > 10 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 ima-ng sha256:0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 test-file > > 10 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 ima-ng sha256:0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 /root/test-dir/d/test-file > > > > This is the result of calling IMA at both layers, and the violation of > > course happens twice. > > > > This is also confirmed in the logs: > > > > Apr 23 14:52:45 fedora audit[994]: INTEGRITY_PCR pid=994 uid=0 auid=0 ses=3 subj=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 op=invalid_pcr cause=ToMToU comm="open" name="test-file" dev="sda3" ino=995512 res=1 errno=0 > > Apr 23 14:52:45 fedora audit[994]: INTEGRITY_PCR pid=994 uid=0 auid=0 ses=3 subj=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 op=invalid_pcr cause=ToMToU comm="open" name="/root/test-dir/d/test-file" dev="overlay" ino=995512 res=1 errno=0 > > > > > > Different fs (overlayfs, btrfs) > > > > # /root/open /root/test-dir/d/test-file r (terminal 1) > > # /root/open /root/test-dir/b/test-file w (terminal 2) > > > > Again, this works despite the read is in overlayfs, and the write is in > > btrfs: > > > > 10 35435d0858d895b90097306171a2e5fcc7f5da9e ima-ng sha256:0e4acf326a82c6bded9d86f48d272d7a036b6490081bb6466ecc2a0e416b244a boot_aggregate > > 10 cef529d5d1032ffb6d3e2154664c83ba18cf2576 ima-ng sha256:f2ca1bb6c7e907d06dafe4687e579fce76b37e4e93b7605022da52e6ccc26fd2 test-file > > 10 694277487b9753db78446192231b59b7be7c03ad ima-ng sha256:f2ca1bb6c7e907d06dafe4687e579fce76b37e4e93b7605022da52e6ccc26fd2 /root/test-dir/d/test-file > > 10 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 ima-ng sha256:0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 /root/test-dir/b/test-file > > > > The difference from the previous example is that now there is only one > > violation, which is detected only in the upper layer. The logs have: > > > > Apr 23 15:01:15 fedora audit[985]: INTEGRITY_PCR pid=985 uid=0 auid=0 ses=3 subj=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 op=invalid_pcr cause=ToMToU comm="open" name="/root/test-dir/b/test-file" dev="sda3" ino=995512 res=1 errno=0 > > > > > > Different fs (btrfs, overlayfs) > > > > # /root/open /root/test-dir/b/test-file r (terminal 2) > > # /root/open /root/test-dir/d/test-file w (terminal 1) > > > > 10 35435d0858d895b90097306171a2e5fcc7f5da9e ima-ng sha256:0e4acf326a82c6bded9d86f48d272d7a036b6490081bb6466ecc2a0e416b244a boot_aggregate > > 10 d7a692e19158820d2755542a8d31b49ac7ac2729 ima-ng sha256:f2ca1bb6c7e907d06dafe4687e579fce76b37e4e93b7605022da52e6ccc26fd2 /root/test-dir/b/test-file > > 10 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 ima-ng sha256:0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 test-file > > > > Works too. There is only one measurement, since that is done only for > > the upper layer. > > > > Apr 23 15:05:40 fedora audit[982]: INTEGRITY_PCR pid=982 uid=0 auid=0 ses=1 subj=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 op=invalid_pcr cause=ToMToU comm="open" name="test-file" dev="sda3" ino=995512 res=1 errno=0 > > > > > > > > Open writers > > > > Same fs (overlayfs) > > > > # /root/open /root/test-dir/d/test-file w (terminal 1) > > # /root/open /root/test-dir/d/test-file r (terminal 2) > > > > 10 35435d0858d895b90097306171a2e5fcc7f5da9e ima-ng sha256:0e4acf326a82c6bded9d86f48d272d7a036b6490081bb6466ecc2a0e416b244a boot_aggregate > > 10 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 ima-ng sha256:0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 test-file > > 10 cef529d5d1032ffb6d3e2154664c83ba18cf2576 ima-ng sha256:f2ca1bb6c7e907d06dafe4687e579fce76b37e4e93b7605022da52e6ccc26fd2 test-file > > 10 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 ima-ng sha256:0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 /root/test-dir/d/test-file > > 10 694277487b9753db78446192231b59b7be7c03ad ima-ng sha256:f2ca1bb6c7e907d06dafe4687e579fce76b37e4e93b7605022da52e6ccc26fd2 /root/test-dir/d/test-file > > > > Apr 23 15:10:46 fedora audit[983]: INTEGRITY_PCR pid=983 uid=0 auid=0 ses=3 subj=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 op=invalid_pcr cause=open_writers comm="open" name="test-file" dev="sda3" ino=995512 res=1 errno=0 > > Apr 23 15:10:46 fedora audit[983]: INTEGRITY_PCR pid=983 uid=0 auid=0 ses=3 subj=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 op=invalid_pcr cause=open_writers comm="open" name="/root/test-dir/d/test-file" dev="overlay" ino=995512 res=1 errno=0 > > > > > > Different fs (overlayfs, btrfs) > > > > # /root/open /root/test-dir/d/test-file w (terminal 1) > > # /root/open /root/test-dir/b/test-file r (terminal 2) > > > > 10 35435d0858d895b90097306171a2e5fcc7f5da9e ima-ng sha256:0e4acf326a82c6bded9d86f48d272d7a036b6490081bb6466ecc2a0e416b244a boot_aggregate > > 10 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 ima-ng sha256:0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 /root/test-dir/b/test-file > > 10 d7a692e19158820d2755542a8d31b49ac7ac2729 ima-ng sha256:f2ca1bb6c7e907d06dafe4687e579fce76b37e4e93b7605022da52e6ccc26fd2 /root/test-dir/b/test-file > > > > Apr 23 15:12:58 fedora audit[984]: INTEGRITY_PCR pid=984 uid=0 auid=0 ses=3 subj=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 op=invalid_pcr cause=open_writers comm="open" name="/root/test-dir/b/test-file" dev="sda3" ino=995512 res=1 errno=0 > > > > > > Different fs (btrfs, overlayfs) > > > > # /root/open /root/test-dir/b/test-file w (terminal 1) > > # /root/open /root/test-dir/d/test-file r (terminal 2) > > > > 10 35435d0858d895b90097306171a2e5fcc7f5da9e ima-ng sha256:0e4acf326a82c6bded9d86f48d272d7a036b6490081bb6466ecc2a0e416b244a boot_aggregate > > 10 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 ima-ng sha256:0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 test-file > > 10 cef529d5d1032ffb6d3e2154664c83ba18cf2576 ima-ng sha256:f2ca1bb6c7e907d06dafe4687e579fce76b37e4e93b7605022da52e6ccc26fd2 test-file > > 10 694277487b9753db78446192231b59b7be7c03ad ima-ng sha256:f2ca1bb6c7e907d06dafe4687e579fce76b37e4e93b7605022da52e6ccc26fd2 /root/test-dir/d/test-file > > > > Apr 23 15:16:37 fedora audit[983]: INTEGRITY_PCR pid=983 uid=0 auid=0 ses=3 subj=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 op=invalid_pcr cause=open_writers comm="open" name="test-file" dev="sda3" ino=995512 res=1 errno=0 > > > > Roberto > > > > > I know this does not work - so you should find out why it does not work and fix > > > the problem. > > > > > > Enforcing IMA/EVM on the overlayfs inode layer is just the wrong way IMO. > > > Not once have I heard an argument from IMA/EVM developers why it is really > > > needed to enforce IMA/EVM on the overlayfs inode layer and not on the > > > real inode. > > > I am sorry that we are failing to communicate on this matter, but I am not > > > sure how else I can help. > > > > > > Thanks, > > > Amir. > >
On Fri, Apr 26, 2024 at 10:34 AM Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huaweicloud.com> wrote: > > On Thu, 2024-04-25 at 15:37 +0300, Amir Goldstein wrote: > > > On Thu, Apr 25, 2024 at 2:30 PM Roberto Sassu > > > <roberto.sassu@huaweicloud.com> wrote: > > > > > > > > > > On Tue, 2024-04-23 at 09:02 +0300, Amir Goldstein wrote: > > > > > > > On Mon, Apr 22, 2024 at 6:07 PM Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com> wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > This series fixes the detection of read/write violations on stacked > > > > > > > > > filesystems. To be able to access the relevant dentries necessary to > > > > > > > > > detect files opened for writing on a stacked filesystem a new d_real_type > > > > > > > > > D_REAL_FILEDATA is introduced that allows callers to access all relevant > > > > > > > > > files involved in a stacked filesystem while traversing the layers. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Stefan, > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Both Miklos and myself objected to this solution: > > > > > > > https://lore.kernel.org/linux-unionfs/CAJfpeguctirEYECoigcAsJwpGPCX2NyfMZ8H8GHGW-0UyKfjgg@mail.gmail.com/ > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Not sure what you are hoping to achieve from re-posting the same solution. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > I stopped counting how many times I already argued that *all* IMA/EVM > > > > > > > assertions, > > > > > > > including rw-ro violations should be enforced only on the real inode. > > > > > > > I know this does not work - so you should find out why it does not work and fix > > > > > > > the problem. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Enforcing IMA/EVM on the overlayfs inode layer is just the wrong way IMO. > > > > > > > Not once have I heard an argument from IMA/EVM developers why it is really > > > > > > > needed to enforce IMA/EVM on the overlayfs inode layer and not on the > > > > > > > real inode. > > > > > > > > > > Ok, I try to provide an example regarding this, and we see if it makes > > > > > sense. > > > > > > > > > > # echo test > test-file > > > > > # chown 2000 d/test-file > > > > > # ls -l a/test-file > > > > > -rw-r--r--. 1 2000 root 25 Apr 25 10:50 a/test-file > > > > > > > > > > Initially there is a file in the lower layer with UID 2000. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > # mount -t overlay -olowerdir=a,upperdir=b,workdir=c,metacopy=on overlay d > > > > > # chown 3000 d/test-file > > > > > # ls -l d/test-file > > > > > -rw-r--r--. 1 3000 root 25 Apr 25 10:50 d/test-file > > > > > # ls -l a/test-file > > > > > -rw-r--r--. 1 2000 root 25 Apr 25 10:50 a/test-file > > > > > # ls -l b/test-file > > > > > -rw-r--r--. 1 3000 root 25 Apr 25 10:50 b/test-file > > > > > > > > > > If I have a policy like this: > > > > > > > > > > # echo "measure fsname=overlay fowner=3000" > /sys/kernel/security/ima/policy > > > > > > > > > > there won't be any match on the real file which still has UID 2000. But > > > > > what is observable by the processes through overlayfs is UID 3000. > > > > > > > > > > > ok, it is simple to write an ima policy that is not respected by overlayfs. > > > > > > My question is: under what circumstances is a policy like the above > > > useful in the real world? > > > > > > Correct me if I am wrong, but AFAIK, the purpose of IMA/EVM is to > > > mitigate attack vectors of tampering with files offline or after the > > > file's data/metadata were measured. Is that a correct description? > > (For now I would talk about IMA, EVM can be considered separately). > > The main purpose of IMA is to evaluate files being accessed, and record > the access together with a file digest in a measurement list, > allow/deny access to the file (appraisal), or add a new event to audit > logs. > > How files are selected depends on the IMA policy. A rule can be > subject-based or object-based, depending on whether respectively > process or file attributes are matched. It can also be both. > > A subject-based rule means that you identify a process/set of > processes, and you evaluate everything it/they read. > > An object-based rule means that you identify a file/set of files, and > you evaluate any process accessing them. > > Since processes normally would access the top most layer (overlayfs), > the IMA policy should be written in terms of metadata seen in that > layer (but not necessarily). > > This is just for identifying the set of files to > measure/appraise/audit, not which file is going to be evaluated, which > will be always the persistent one. > > I have to admit, things are not very clear also to me. > > Suppose you have a file in the lower filesystem with SELinux label > user_t, and then on overlayfs with metadata copy, you change the label > of this file to unconfined_t. > > What will happen exactly? On the overlayfs layer, you will have a > permission request with the new label unconfined_t, but when overlayfs > calls vfs_open(), there will be another permission request with the old > label. CC Vivek who was involved with ovl+selinux, but I think the answer is that ovl sepolicy is expected to be associated with the mount ctx and not the objects and there was a need to implement the security hook security_inode_copy_up() to be able to compose a safe sepolicy for overlayfs. > > It is kind of the same challenge we are facing with IMA, we can observe > the file operations at different layers. That is why I think having > stacked IMA calls is a good idea (other than really fixing the > violations). > > The current problem, that is very difficult to solve, is that the > policy should cover all layers, or some events will be missed. Now we > have overlayfs-specific code to detect changes in the backing inode, > while with stacked IMA calls, we can detect the change at the layer > where it happened (and we can remove the overlayfs-specific code). > > Ideally, what I would do to cover all layers is that if there is a > match at one layer, the lower layers should automatically match too, > but it is not that easy since after the vfs_open() recursive calls we > start calling IMA in the botton most layer first. > > (What I did with the stacked IMA calls is just an experiment to see how > far we can go, but still we didn't make any decision with Mimi). > > > > AFAIK, IMA/EVM policy is system-wide and not namespace aware > > > so the policy has to be set on the container's host and not inside > > > containers. Is that correct? > > I know that overlayfs is primarily aiming at containers, but I would > suggest to not add that complexity yet and just consider the host. > > > > If those statements are true then please try to explain to me what is > > > the thread model for tampering with overlayfs files, without tampering > > > with the real upper and/or lower files. > > I hope at this point is clear that what we care about is that, or the > process is reading the content of the file whose digest is recorded in > the measurement list, or we must signal to remote verifiers concurrent > accesses that make the statement above false. > > > > My thesis is that if an IMA/EVM policy is good enough to prevent > > > tampering with the real lower/upper files, then no extra measures > > > are needed to protect the virtual overlayfs files against tampering. > > What you say is correct, but the way you identify files to > measure/appraise/audit can be different. > IIUC, the problem as you described it, is similar to the problem of how to display the overlayfs path of mmaped files in /proc/self/maps when the actual inode mapped to memory is the real inode. The solution for this problem was the somewhat awkward "file with fake path" - it was recently changed to use the new file_user_path() helper. I'm not sure how this can help IMA, but in theory, you could always attach iint state to the real inode and only the the real inode but the rules that filter by path/object in the IMA hooks that take a file argument could take file_user_path() into account. For example, if you have security_file_post_open(f) in backing_file_open(), then you can use d_real_inode() in process_measurement to get to the IMA state and check the rules referring to the real inode and you can use file_user_path(file) to check the rules referring to "front object". In case of a nested overlayfs, you should get two post_open hook, both will refer to the same IMA state on the real inode, but each hook with have a different file_user_path(), so you will have an opportunity to apply the path/object based rules on every layer in the nested overlayfs. I hope what I tried to explain is clear and I hope there are not many traps down this road, but you won't know unless you try... Thanks, Amir.
On Sat, 2024-04-27 at 12:03 +0300, Amir Goldstein wrote: > On Fri, Apr 26, 2024 at 10:34 AM Roberto Sassu > <roberto.sassu@huaweicloud.com> wrote: > > > > On Thu, 2024-04-25 at 15:37 +0300, Amir Goldstein wrote: > > > > On Thu, Apr 25, 2024 at 2:30 PM Roberto Sassu > > > > <roberto.sassu@huaweicloud.com> wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > > On Tue, 2024-04-23 at 09:02 +0300, Amir Goldstein wrote: > > > > > > > > On Mon, Apr 22, 2024 at 6:07 PM Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com> wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > This series fixes the detection of read/write violations on stacked > > > > > > > > > > filesystems. To be able to access the relevant dentries necessary to > > > > > > > > > > detect files opened for writing on a stacked filesystem a new d_real_type > > > > > > > > > > D_REAL_FILEDATA is introduced that allows callers to access all relevant > > > > > > > > > > files involved in a stacked filesystem while traversing the layers. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Stefan, > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Both Miklos and myself objected to this solution: > > > > > > > > https://lore.kernel.org/linux-unionfs/CAJfpeguctirEYECoigcAsJwpGPCX2NyfMZ8H8GHGW-0UyKfjgg@mail.gmail.com/ > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Not sure what you are hoping to achieve from re-posting the same solution. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > I stopped counting how many times I already argued that *all* IMA/EVM > > > > > > > > assertions, > > > > > > > > including rw-ro violations should be enforced only on the real inode. > > > > > > > > I know this does not work - so you should find out why it does not work and fix > > > > > > > > the problem. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Enforcing IMA/EVM on the overlayfs inode layer is just the wrong way IMO. > > > > > > > > Not once have I heard an argument from IMA/EVM developers why it is really > > > > > > > > needed to enforce IMA/EVM on the overlayfs inode layer and not on the > > > > > > > > real inode. > > > > > > > > > > > > Ok, I try to provide an example regarding this, and we see if it makes > > > > > > sense. > > > > > > > > > > > > # echo test > test-file > > > > > > # chown 2000 d/test-file > > > > > > # ls -l a/test-file > > > > > > -rw-r--r--. 1 2000 root 25 Apr 25 10:50 a/test-file > > > > > > > > > > > > Initially there is a file in the lower layer with UID 2000. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > # mount -t overlay -olowerdir=a,upperdir=b,workdir=c,metacopy=on overlay d > > > > > > # chown 3000 d/test-file > > > > > > # ls -l d/test-file > > > > > > -rw-r--r--. 1 3000 root 25 Apr 25 10:50 d/test-file > > > > > > # ls -l a/test-file > > > > > > -rw-r--r--. 1 2000 root 25 Apr 25 10:50 a/test-file > > > > > > # ls -l b/test-file > > > > > > -rw-r--r--. 1 3000 root 25 Apr 25 10:50 b/test-file > > > > > > > > > > > > If I have a policy like this: > > > > > > > > > > > > # echo "measure fsname=overlay fowner=3000" > /sys/kernel/security/ima/policy > > > > > > > > > > > > there won't be any match on the real file which still has UID 2000. But > > > > > > what is observable by the processes through overlayfs is UID 3000. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > ok, it is simple to write an ima policy that is not respected by overlayfs. > > > > > > > > My question is: under what circumstances is a policy like the above > > > > useful in the real world? > > > > > > > > Correct me if I am wrong, but AFAIK, the purpose of IMA/EVM is to > > > > mitigate attack vectors of tampering with files offline or after the > > > > file's data/metadata were measured. Is that a correct description? > > > > (For now I would talk about IMA, EVM can be considered separately). > > > > The main purpose of IMA is to evaluate files being accessed, and record > > the access together with a file digest in a measurement list, > > allow/deny access to the file (appraisal), or add a new event to audit > > logs. > > > > How files are selected depends on the IMA policy. A rule can be > > subject-based or object-based, depending on whether respectively > > process or file attributes are matched. It can also be both. > > > > A subject-based rule means that you identify a process/set of > > processes, and you evaluate everything it/they read. > > > > An object-based rule means that you identify a file/set of files, and > > you evaluate any process accessing them. > > > > Since processes normally would access the top most layer (overlayfs), > > the IMA policy should be written in terms of metadata seen in that > > layer (but not necessarily). > > > > This is just for identifying the set of files to > > measure/appraise/audit, not which file is going to be evaluated, which > > will be always the persistent one. > > > > I have to admit, things are not very clear also to me. > > > > Suppose you have a file in the lower filesystem with SELinux label > > user_t, and then on overlayfs with metadata copy, you change the label > > of this file to unconfined_t. > > > > What will happen exactly? On the overlayfs layer, you will have a > > permission request with the new label unconfined_t, but when overlayfs > > calls vfs_open(), there will be another permission request with the old > > label. > > CC Vivek who was involved with ovl+selinux, but I think the answer is > that ovl sepolicy is expected to be associated with the mount ctx and > not the objects and there was a need to implement the security hook > security_inode_copy_up() to be able to compose a safe sepolicy for > overlayfs. > > > > > It is kind of the same challenge we are facing with IMA, we can observe > > the file operations at different layers. That is why I think having > > stacked IMA calls is a good idea (other than really fixing the > > violations). > > > > The current problem, that is very difficult to solve, is that the > > policy should cover all layers, or some events will be missed. Now we > > have overlayfs-specific code to detect changes in the backing inode, > > while with stacked IMA calls, we can detect the change at the layer > > where it happened (and we can remove the overlayfs-specific code). > > > > Ideally, what I would do to cover all layers is that if there is a > > match at one layer, the lower layers should automatically match too, > > but it is not that easy since after the vfs_open() recursive calls we > > start calling IMA in the botton most layer first. > > > > (What I did with the stacked IMA calls is just an experiment to see how > > far we can go, but still we didn't make any decision with Mimi). > > > > > > AFAIK, IMA/EVM policy is system-wide and not namespace aware > > > > so the policy has to be set on the container's host and not inside > > > > containers. Is that correct? > > > > I know that overlayfs is primarily aiming at containers, but I would > > suggest to not add that complexity yet and just consider the host. > > > > > > If those statements are true then please try to explain to me what is > > > > the thread model for tampering with overlayfs files, without tampering > > > > with the real upper and/or lower files. > > > > I hope at this point is clear that what we care about is that, or the > > process is reading the content of the file whose digest is recorded in > > the measurement list, or we must signal to remote verifiers concurrent > > accesses that make the statement above false. > > > > > > My thesis is that if an IMA/EVM policy is good enough to prevent > > > > tampering with the real lower/upper files, then no extra measures > > > > are needed to protect the virtual overlayfs files against tampering. > > > > What you say is correct, but the way you identify files to > > measure/appraise/audit can be different. > > > > IIUC, the problem as you described it, is similar to the problem > of how to display the overlayfs path of mmaped files in /proc/self/maps > when the actual inode mapped to memory is the real inode. > > The solution for this problem was the somewhat awkward > "file with fake path" - it was recently changed to use the new > file_user_path() helper. > > I'm not sure how this can help IMA, but in theory, you could > always attach iint state to the real inode and only the the real inode > but the rules that filter by path/object in the IMA hooks that take a file > argument could take file_user_path() into account. Sorry, it took some time to elaborate this proposal, but I think it is mostly correct. I even tried it (as an experiment, we didn't make any decision yet). So, the basic idea is to use the stacked IMA calls I proposed (by adding security_file_post_open() in backing-file.c, and evaluate each layer independently. The policy match on each IMA call will be on the overlayfs inode, so that we see the same metadata as the process opening the file, but we attach the state to the real inode (regardless of the layer). Violations are going to work because there is no layer mismatch (write on one layer, read on a different layer), they are checked always on the real inode. Since overlayfs has to always open the real inode, i_write/readcount will be always incremented. If there is a match at one layer, IMA is not going to process the file again, since the result is cached from the previous IMA call. i_version comparison will also be on the real inode, no need to provide one on overlayfs. Invalidation (like by setting security.ima) will happen on the real inode. I went even further, to think that when we check the authenticity of security.ima with EVM we can pass the real inode, but we are not sure yet. We will continue to validate this proposal. Thanks Roberto > For example, if you have security_file_post_open(f) in > backing_file_open(), then you can use d_real_inode() > in process_measurement to get to the IMA state and check the > rules referring to the real inode and you can use file_user_path(file) > to check the rules referring to "front object". > > In case of a nested overlayfs, you should get two post_open > hook, both will refer to the same IMA state on the real inode, but > each hook with have a different file_user_path(), so you will have > an opportunity to apply the path/object based rules on every layer > in the nested overlayfs. > > I hope what I tried to explain is clear and I hope there are not > many traps down this road, but you won't know unless you try... > > Thanks, > Amir.