| Message ID | 20240425115119.813384-10-Quirin.Gylstorff@siemens.com (mailing list archive) |
|---|---|
| State | Superseded |
| Headers | show |
| Series | Add option to encrypt the rootfs | expand |
On Thu, 2024-04-25 at 13:50 +0200, Quirin Gylstorff wrote: > From: Quirin Gylstorff <quirin.gylstorff@siemens.com> > > Signed-off-by: Quirin Gylstorff <quirin.gylstorff@siemens.com> > --- > doc/README.swupdate.md | 19 +++++++++++++++++++ > 1 file changed, 19 insertions(+) > > diff --git a/doc/README.swupdate.md b/doc/README.swupdate.md > index b7e13f7..defaba6 100644 > --- a/doc/README.swupdate.md > +++ b/doc/README.swupdate.md > @@ -7,6 +7,25 @@ Start with cloning the isar-cip-core repository: > ``` > host$ git clone > https://gitlab.com/cip-project/cip-core/isar-cip-core.git > ``` > + > +## Update Partition selector(swupdate-handler-roundrobin) > + > +SWUpdate uses the handler [swupdate-handler- > roundrobin](https://gitlab.com/cip-project/cip-sw-updates/swupdate- > handler-roundrobin) to select the update partition. > +The hanlder uses the following information to select the update -------^ typo > partition: > + - by efibootguard selected unified kernel file. In the cip-core > provided images > + the boot partitions are labeled BOOT0 and BOOT1, see [ebg- > sysparts.inc](../wic/ebg-sysparts.inc). True, but the loader does not care about the partition labels. It just probes all vfat partitions for EBG envs. The labels should (and do) have no relevance for the efibootguard EFI part. However, they are used in the sw-description in swupdate, and by that are relevant for the userspace part (as you documented below as well). Maybe we could make this more clear in the documentation. Felix > + > +The [sw-description](recipes-core/images/swu/sw-description.tmpl) > contains the mapping from boot > +partition to rootfs partition, e.g.: > +``` > +device = "C:BOOT0:linux.efi- > >${ABROOTFS_PART_ID_A},C:BOOT1:linux.efi->${ABROOTFS_PART_ID_B}"; > +``` > +The variables `ABROOTFS_PART_ID_A` and `ABROOTFS_PART_ID_B` describe > the rootfs file system and > +can contain an path to a partition device(e.g. /dev/sdaX), label or > uuid. The handler searches > +for the matching device and SWUpdate writes the image to the > selected device. > + > +The default values for `ABROOTFS_PART_ID_A`/`ABROOTFS_PART_ID_B` is > the content of `ABROOTFS_PART_UUID_A`/`ABROOTFS_PART_UUID_B` which > are defined in [swupdate.bbclass](classes/swupdate.bbclass). > + > ## SWUpdate Efibootguard update > > :warning: **If the efibootguard binary is corrupted the system can > no longer boot**
diff --git a/doc/README.swupdate.md b/doc/README.swupdate.md index b7e13f7..defaba6 100644 --- a/doc/README.swupdate.md +++ b/doc/README.swupdate.md @@ -7,6 +7,25 @@ Start with cloning the isar-cip-core repository: ``` host$ git clone https://gitlab.com/cip-project/cip-core/isar-cip-core.git ``` + +## Update Partition selector(swupdate-handler-roundrobin) + +SWUpdate uses the handler [swupdate-handler-roundrobin](https://gitlab.com/cip-project/cip-sw-updates/swupdate-handler-roundrobin) to select the update partition. +The hanlder uses the following information to select the update partition: + - by efibootguard selected unified kernel file. In the cip-core provided images + the boot partitions are labeled BOOT0 and BOOT1, see [ebg-sysparts.inc](../wic/ebg-sysparts.inc). + +The [sw-description](recipes-core/images/swu/sw-description.tmpl) contains the mapping from boot +partition to rootfs partition, e.g.: +``` +device = "C:BOOT0:linux.efi->${ABROOTFS_PART_ID_A},C:BOOT1:linux.efi->${ABROOTFS_PART_ID_B}"; +``` +The variables `ABROOTFS_PART_ID_A` and `ABROOTFS_PART_ID_B` describe the rootfs file system and +can contain an path to a partition device(e.g. /dev/sdaX), label or uuid. The handler searches +for the matching device and SWUpdate writes the image to the selected device. + +The default values for `ABROOTFS_PART_ID_A`/`ABROOTFS_PART_ID_B` is the content of `ABROOTFS_PART_UUID_A`/`ABROOTFS_PART_UUID_B` which are defined in [swupdate.bbclass](classes/swupdate.bbclass). + ## SWUpdate Efibootguard update :warning: **If the efibootguard binary is corrupted the system can no longer boot**