| Message ID | 20240411205911.1684763-1-jmattson@google.com (mailing list archive) |
|---|---|
| State | New, archived |
| Headers | show |
| Series | KVM: x86: AMD's IBPB is not equivalent to Intel's IBPB | expand |
On Thu, Apr 11, 2024 at 1:59 PM Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com> wrote: > > From Intel's documention [1], "CPUID.(EAX=07H,ECX=0):EDX[26] > enumerates support for indirect branch restricted speculation (IBRS) > and the indirect branch predictor barrier (IBPB)." Further, from [2], > "Software that executed before the IBPB command cannot control the > predicted targets of indirect branches (4) executed after the command > on the same logical processor," where footnote 4 reads, "Note that > indirect branches include near call indirect, near jump indirect and > near return instructions. Because it includes near returns, it follows > that **RSB entries created before an IBPB command cannot control the > predicted targets of returns executed after the command on the same > logical processor.**" [emphasis mine] > > On the other hand, AMD's "IBPB may not prevent return branch > predictions from being specified by pre-IBPB branch targets" [3]. > > Since Linux sets the synthetic feature bit, X86_FEATURE_IBPB, on AMD > CPUs that implement the weaker version of IBPB, it is incorrect to > infer from this and X86_FEATURE_IBRS that the CPU supports the > stronger version of IBPB indicated by CPUID.(EAX=07H,ECX=0):EDX[26]. AMD's IBPB does apply to RET predictions if Fn8000_0008_EBX[IBPB_RET] = 1. Spot checking, Zen4 sets that bit; and the bulletin doesn't apply there. (Also checking - IA32_SPEC_CTRL and IA32_PRED_CMD are both still available; is there anything in KVM that keys off just X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL? I'm not seeing it...) -- vs;
On Thu, Apr 11, 2024 at 6:32 PM Venkatesh Srinivas <venkateshs@chromium.org> wrote: > > On Thu, Apr 11, 2024 at 1:59 PM Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com> wrote: > > > > From Intel's documention [1], "CPUID.(EAX=07H,ECX=0):EDX[26] > > enumerates support for indirect branch restricted speculation (IBRS) > > and the indirect branch predictor barrier (IBPB)." Further, from [2], > > "Software that executed before the IBPB command cannot control the > > predicted targets of indirect branches (4) executed after the command > > on the same logical processor," where footnote 4 reads, "Note that > > indirect branches include near call indirect, near jump indirect and > > near return instructions. Because it includes near returns, it follows > > that **RSB entries created before an IBPB command cannot control the > > predicted targets of returns executed after the command on the same > > logical processor.**" [emphasis mine] > > > > On the other hand, AMD's "IBPB may not prevent return branch > > predictions from being specified by pre-IBPB branch targets" [3]. > > > > Since Linux sets the synthetic feature bit, X86_FEATURE_IBPB, on AMD > > CPUs that implement the weaker version of IBPB, it is incorrect to > > infer from this and X86_FEATURE_IBRS that the CPU supports the > > stronger version of IBPB indicated by CPUID.(EAX=07H,ECX=0):EDX[26]. > > AMD's IBPB does apply to RET predictions if Fn8000_0008_EBX[IBPB_RET] = 1. > Spot checking, Zen4 sets that bit; and the bulletin doesn't apply there. So, with a definition of X86_FEATURE_AMD_IBPB_RET, this could be: if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AMD_IBPB_RET) && boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBRS)) kvm_cpu_cap_set(X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL); And, in the other direction, if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL)) kvm_cpu_cap_set(X86_FEATURE_AMD_IBPB_RET); But, perhaps all of this cross-vendor equivalence logic belongs in user space. > (Also checking - IA32_SPEC_CTRL and IA32_PRED_CMD are both still > available; is there anything in KVM that keys off just X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL? > I'm not seeing it...) I hope not. It looks like all of the guest_cpuid checks for SPEC_CTRL also check for the AMD bits (e.g. guest_has_spec_ctrl_msr()).
On Thu, Apr 11, 2024 at 7:57 PM Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com> wrote: > > On Thu, Apr 11, 2024 at 6:32 PM Venkatesh Srinivas > <venkateshs@chromium.org> wrote: > > > > On Thu, Apr 11, 2024 at 1:59 PM Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com> wrote: > > > > > > From Intel's documention [1], "CPUID.(EAX=07H,ECX=0):EDX[26] > > > enumerates support for indirect branch restricted speculation (IBRS) > > > and the indirect branch predictor barrier (IBPB)." Further, from [2], > > > "Software that executed before the IBPB command cannot control the > > > predicted targets of indirect branches (4) executed after the command > > > on the same logical processor," where footnote 4 reads, "Note that > > > indirect branches include near call indirect, near jump indirect and > > > near return instructions. Because it includes near returns, it follows > > > that **RSB entries created before an IBPB command cannot control the > > > predicted targets of returns executed after the command on the same > > > logical processor.**" [emphasis mine] > > > > > > On the other hand, AMD's "IBPB may not prevent return branch > > > predictions from being specified by pre-IBPB branch targets" [3]. > > > > > > Since Linux sets the synthetic feature bit, X86_FEATURE_IBPB, on AMD > > > CPUs that implement the weaker version of IBPB, it is incorrect to > > > infer from this and X86_FEATURE_IBRS that the CPU supports the > > > stronger version of IBPB indicated by CPUID.(EAX=07H,ECX=0):EDX[26]. > > > > AMD's IBPB does apply to RET predictions if Fn8000_0008_EBX[IBPB_RET] = 1. > > Spot checking, Zen4 sets that bit; and the bulletin doesn't apply there. > > So, with a definition of X86_FEATURE_AMD_IBPB_RET, this could be: > > if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AMD_IBPB_RET) && > boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBRS)) > kvm_cpu_cap_set(X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL); > > And, in the other direction, > > if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL)) > kvm_cpu_cap_set(X86_FEATURE_AMD_IBPB_RET); > > But, perhaps all of this cross-vendor equivalence logic belongs in user space. In case it wasn't clear, I contend that any cross-vendor equivalence logic *does* belong in userspace. Thoughts? > > (Also checking - IA32_SPEC_CTRL and IA32_PRED_CMD are both still > > available; is there anything in KVM that keys off just X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL? > > I'm not seeing it...) > > I hope not. It looks like all of the guest_cpuid checks for SPEC_CTRL > also check for the AMD bits (e.g. guest_has_spec_ctrl_msr()).
On Tue, May 07, 2024, Jim Mattson wrote: > On Thu, Apr 11, 2024 at 7:57 PM Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com> wrote: > > > > On Thu, Apr 11, 2024 at 6:32 PM Venkatesh Srinivas > > <venkateshs@chromium.org> wrote: > > > > > > On Thu, Apr 11, 2024 at 1:59 PM Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com> wrote: > > > > > > > > From Intel's documention [1], "CPUID.(EAX=07H,ECX=0):EDX[26] > > > > enumerates support for indirect branch restricted speculation (IBRS) > > > > and the indirect branch predictor barrier (IBPB)." Further, from [2], > > > > "Software that executed before the IBPB command cannot control the > > > > predicted targets of indirect branches (4) executed after the command > > > > on the same logical processor," where footnote 4 reads, "Note that > > > > indirect branches include near call indirect, near jump indirect and > > > > near return instructions. Because it includes near returns, it follows > > > > that **RSB entries created before an IBPB command cannot control the > > > > predicted targets of returns executed after the command on the same > > > > logical processor.**" [emphasis mine] > > > > > > > > On the other hand, AMD's "IBPB may not prevent return branch > > > > predictions from being specified by pre-IBPB branch targets" [3]. > > > > > > > > Since Linux sets the synthetic feature bit, X86_FEATURE_IBPB, on AMD > > > > CPUs that implement the weaker version of IBPB, it is incorrect to > > > > infer from this and X86_FEATURE_IBRS that the CPU supports the > > > > stronger version of IBPB indicated by CPUID.(EAX=07H,ECX=0):EDX[26]. > > > > > > AMD's IBPB does apply to RET predictions if Fn8000_0008_EBX[IBPB_RET] = 1. > > > Spot checking, Zen4 sets that bit; and the bulletin doesn't apply there. > > > > So, with a definition of X86_FEATURE_AMD_IBPB_RET, this could be: > > > > if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AMD_IBPB_RET) && > > boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBRS)) > > kvm_cpu_cap_set(X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL); > > > > And, in the other direction, > > > > if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL)) > > kvm_cpu_cap_set(X86_FEATURE_AMD_IBPB_RET); > > > > But, perhaps all of this cross-vendor equivalence logic belongs in user space. > > In case it wasn't clear, I contend that any cross-vendor equivalence > logic *does* belong in userspace. > > Thoughts? Maybe? I generally like punting these sorts of things to userspace, but as evidenced by this patch, all of these mitigation "features" are such a godawful mess that I don't have a problem with KVM doing the heavy lifting. E.g. I suspect that having KVM enumerate both vendor's bits makes it much easier for QEMU to support pre-defined uarch models while still retaining sanity checks that the features being enumerated to the guest are indeed supported by the host.
On Thu, Apr 11, 2024, Jim Mattson wrote: > On Thu, Apr 11, 2024 at 6:32 PM Venkatesh Srinivas > <venkateshs@chromium.org> wrote: > > > > On Thu, Apr 11, 2024 at 1:59 PM Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com> wrote: > > > > > > From Intel's documention [1], "CPUID.(EAX=07H,ECX=0):EDX[26] > > > enumerates support for indirect branch restricted speculation (IBRS) > > > and the indirect branch predictor barrier (IBPB)." Further, from [2], > > > "Software that executed before the IBPB command cannot control the > > > predicted targets of indirect branches (4) executed after the command > > > on the same logical processor," where footnote 4 reads, "Note that > > > indirect branches include near call indirect, near jump indirect and > > > near return instructions. Because it includes near returns, it follows > > > that **RSB entries created before an IBPB command cannot control the > > > predicted targets of returns executed after the command on the same > > > logical processor.**" [emphasis mine] > > > > > > On the other hand, AMD's "IBPB may not prevent return branch > > > predictions from being specified by pre-IBPB branch targets" [3]. > > > > > > Since Linux sets the synthetic feature bit, X86_FEATURE_IBPB, on AMD > > > CPUs that implement the weaker version of IBPB, it is incorrect to > > > infer from this and X86_FEATURE_IBRS that the CPU supports the > > > stronger version of IBPB indicated by CPUID.(EAX=07H,ECX=0):EDX[26]. > > > > AMD's IBPB does apply to RET predictions if Fn8000_0008_EBX[IBPB_RET] = 1. > > Spot checking, Zen4 sets that bit; and the bulletin doesn't apply there. > > So, with a definition of X86_FEATURE_AMD_IBPB_RET, this could be: > > if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AMD_IBPB_RET) && > boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBRS)) > kvm_cpu_cap_set(X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL); > > And, in the other direction, > > if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL)) > kvm_cpu_cap_set(X86_FEATURE_AMD_IBPB_RET); Jim, are you planning on sending a v2 with Venkatesh's suggested solution?
On Fri, Aug 16, 2024 at 7:25 AM Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com> wrote: > > On Thu, Apr 11, 2024, Jim Mattson wrote: > > On Thu, Apr 11, 2024 at 6:32 PM Venkatesh Srinivas > > <venkateshs@chromium.org> wrote: > > > > > > On Thu, Apr 11, 2024 at 1:59 PM Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com> wrote: > > > > > > > > From Intel's documention [1], "CPUID.(EAX=07H,ECX=0):EDX[26] > > > > enumerates support for indirect branch restricted speculation (IBRS) > > > > and the indirect branch predictor barrier (IBPB)." Further, from [2], > > > > "Software that executed before the IBPB command cannot control the > > > > predicted targets of indirect branches (4) executed after the command > > > > on the same logical processor," where footnote 4 reads, "Note that > > > > indirect branches include near call indirect, near jump indirect and > > > > near return instructions. Because it includes near returns, it follows > > > > that **RSB entries created before an IBPB command cannot control the > > > > predicted targets of returns executed after the command on the same > > > > logical processor.**" [emphasis mine] > > > > > > > > On the other hand, AMD's "IBPB may not prevent return branch > > > > predictions from being specified by pre-IBPB branch targets" [3]. > > > > > > > > Since Linux sets the synthetic feature bit, X86_FEATURE_IBPB, on AMD > > > > CPUs that implement the weaker version of IBPB, it is incorrect to > > > > infer from this and X86_FEATURE_IBRS that the CPU supports the > > > > stronger version of IBPB indicated by CPUID.(EAX=07H,ECX=0):EDX[26]. > > > > > > AMD's IBPB does apply to RET predictions if Fn8000_0008_EBX[IBPB_RET] = 1. > > > Spot checking, Zen4 sets that bit; and the bulletin doesn't apply there. > > > > So, with a definition of X86_FEATURE_AMD_IBPB_RET, this could be: > > > > if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AMD_IBPB_RET) && > > boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBRS)) > > kvm_cpu_cap_set(X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL); > > > > And, in the other direction, > > > > if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL)) > > kvm_cpu_cap_set(X86_FEATURE_AMD_IBPB_RET); > > Jim, are you planning on sending a v2 with Venkatesh's suggested solution? I really like the idea of moving all of the cross-vendor capability settings into userspace, but if we want to keep this in the kernel, then I'll send V2.
On Fri, Aug 16, 2024, Jim Mattson wrote: > On Fri, Aug 16, 2024 at 7:25 AM Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com> wrote: > > > > On Thu, Apr 11, 2024, Jim Mattson wrote: > > > On Thu, Apr 11, 2024 at 6:32 PM Venkatesh Srinivas > > > <venkateshs@chromium.org> wrote: > > > > > > > > On Thu, Apr 11, 2024 at 1:59 PM Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com> wrote: > > > > > > > > > > From Intel's documention [1], "CPUID.(EAX=07H,ECX=0):EDX[26] > > > > > enumerates support for indirect branch restricted speculation (IBRS) > > > > > and the indirect branch predictor barrier (IBPB)." Further, from [2], > > > > > "Software that executed before the IBPB command cannot control the > > > > > predicted targets of indirect branches (4) executed after the command > > > > > on the same logical processor," where footnote 4 reads, "Note that > > > > > indirect branches include near call indirect, near jump indirect and > > > > > near return instructions. Because it includes near returns, it follows > > > > > that **RSB entries created before an IBPB command cannot control the > > > > > predicted targets of returns executed after the command on the same > > > > > logical processor.**" [emphasis mine] > > > > > > > > > > On the other hand, AMD's "IBPB may not prevent return branch > > > > > predictions from being specified by pre-IBPB branch targets" [3]. > > > > > > > > > > Since Linux sets the synthetic feature bit, X86_FEATURE_IBPB, on AMD > > > > > CPUs that implement the weaker version of IBPB, it is incorrect to > > > > > infer from this and X86_FEATURE_IBRS that the CPU supports the > > > > > stronger version of IBPB indicated by CPUID.(EAX=07H,ECX=0):EDX[26]. > > > > > > > > AMD's IBPB does apply to RET predictions if Fn8000_0008_EBX[IBPB_RET] = 1. > > > > Spot checking, Zen4 sets that bit; and the bulletin doesn't apply there. > > > > > > So, with a definition of X86_FEATURE_AMD_IBPB_RET, this could be: > > > > > > if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AMD_IBPB_RET) && > > > boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBRS)) > > > kvm_cpu_cap_set(X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL); > > > > > > And, in the other direction, > > > > > > if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL)) > > > kvm_cpu_cap_set(X86_FEATURE_AMD_IBPB_RET); > > > > Jim, are you planning on sending a v2 with Venkatesh's suggested solution? > > I really like the idea of moving all of the cross-vendor capability > settings into userspace, but if we want to keep this in the kernel, > then I'll send V2. Unfortunately, that ship has likely sailed for the existing code, because I suspect userspace has come to rely on KVM's behavior. I do think it makes sense to punt all future cross-vendor stuff to userspace, with exceptions for cases like this where we're fixing existing KVM support.
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c b/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c index bfc0bfcb2bc6..66f2761b2836 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c @@ -677,8 +677,6 @@ void kvm_set_cpu_caps(void) kvm_cpu_cap_set(X86_FEATURE_TSC_ADJUST); kvm_cpu_cap_set(X86_FEATURE_ARCH_CAPABILITIES); - if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBPB) && boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBRS)) - kvm_cpu_cap_set(X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL); if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_STIBP)) kvm_cpu_cap_set(X86_FEATURE_INTEL_STIBP); if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AMD_SSBD))
From Intel's documention [1], "CPUID.(EAX=07H,ECX=0):EDX[26] enumerates support for indirect branch restricted speculation (IBRS) and the indirect branch predictor barrier (IBPB)." Further, from [2], "Software that executed before the IBPB command cannot control the predicted targets of indirect branches (4) executed after the command on the same logical processor," where footnote 4 reads, "Note that indirect branches include near call indirect, near jump indirect and near return instructions. Because it includes near returns, it follows that **RSB entries created before an IBPB command cannot control the predicted targets of returns executed after the command on the same logical processor.**" [emphasis mine] On the other hand, AMD's "IBPB may not prevent return branch predictions from being specified by pre-IBPB branch targets" [3]. Since Linux sets the synthetic feature bit, X86_FEATURE_IBPB, on AMD CPUs that implement the weaker version of IBPB, it is incorrect to infer from this and X86_FEATURE_IBRS that the CPU supports the stronger version of IBPB indicated by CPUID.(EAX=07H,ECX=0):EDX[26]. Stop making this inference. [1] https://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/developer/articles/technical/software-security-guidance/technical-documentation/cpuid-enumeration-and-architectural-msrs.html [2] https://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/developer/articles/technical/software-security-guidance/technical-documentation/speculative-execution-side-channel-mitigations.html#Footnotes [3] https://www.amd.com/en/resources/product-security/bulletin/amd-sb-1040.html Fixes: 0c54914d0c52 ("KVM: x86: use Intel speculation bugs and features as derived in generic x86 code") Signed-off-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com> --- arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c | 2 -- 1 file changed, 2 deletions(-)