diff mbox series

[v3,4/7] mm/mremap: Replace can_modify_mm with can_modify_vma

Message ID 20240817-mseal-depessimize-v3-4-d8d2e037df30@gmail.com (mailing list archive)
State New
Headers show
Series mm: Optimize mseal checks | expand

Commit Message

Pedro Falcato Aug. 17, 2024, 12:18 a.m. UTC
Delegate all can_modify checks to the proper places. Unmap checks are
done in do_unmap (et al). The source VMA check is done purposefully
before unmapping, to keep the original mseal semantics.

Signed-off-by: Pedro Falcato <pedro.falcato@gmail.com>
---
 mm/mremap.c | 32 ++++++--------------------------
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 26 deletions(-)

Comments

Liam R. Howlett Aug. 19, 2024, 8:34 p.m. UTC | #1
* Pedro Falcato <pedro.falcato@gmail.com> [240816 20:19]:
> Delegate all can_modify checks to the proper places. Unmap checks are
> done in do_unmap (et al). The source VMA check is done purposefully
> before unmapping, to keep the original mseal semantics.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Pedro Falcato <pedro.falcato@gmail.com>

Reviewed-by: Liam R. Howlett <Liam.Howlett@Oracle.com>

> ---
>  mm/mremap.c | 32 ++++++--------------------------
>  1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 26 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/mm/mremap.c b/mm/mremap.c
> index e7ae140fc640..24712f8dbb6b 100644
> --- a/mm/mremap.c
> +++ b/mm/mremap.c
> @@ -902,19 +902,6 @@ static unsigned long mremap_to(unsigned long addr, unsigned long old_len,
>  	if ((mm->map_count + 2) >= sysctl_max_map_count - 3)
>  		return -ENOMEM;
>  
> -	/*
> -	 * In mremap_to().
> -	 * Move a VMA to another location, check if src addr is sealed.
> -	 *
> -	 * Place can_modify_mm here because mremap_to()
> -	 * does its own checking for address range, and we only
> -	 * check the sealing after passing those checks.
> -	 *
> -	 * can_modify_mm assumes we have acquired the lock on MM.
> -	 */
> -	if (unlikely(!can_modify_mm(mm, addr, addr + old_len)))
> -		return -EPERM;
> -
>  	if (flags & MREMAP_FIXED) {
>  		/*
>  		 * In mremap_to().
> @@ -1052,6 +1039,12 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(mremap, unsigned long, addr, unsigned long, old_len,
>  		goto out;
>  	}
>  
> +	/* Don't allow remapping vmas when they have already been sealed */
> +	if (!can_modify_vma(vma)) {
> +		ret = -EPERM;
> +		goto out;
> +	}
> +
>  	if (is_vm_hugetlb_page(vma)) {
>  		struct hstate *h __maybe_unused = hstate_vma(vma);
>  
> @@ -1079,19 +1072,6 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(mremap, unsigned long, addr, unsigned long, old_len,
>  		goto out;
>  	}
>  
> -	/*
> -	 * Below is shrink/expand case (not mremap_to())
> -	 * Check if src address is sealed, if so, reject.
> -	 * In other words, prevent shrinking or expanding a sealed VMA.
> -	 *
> -	 * Place can_modify_mm here so we can keep the logic related to
> -	 * shrink/expand together.
> -	 */
> -	if (unlikely(!can_modify_mm(mm, addr, addr + old_len))) {
> -		ret = -EPERM;
> -		goto out;
> -	}
> -
>  	/*
>  	 * Always allow a shrinking remap: that just unmaps
>  	 * the unnecessary pages..
> 
> -- 
> 2.46.0
> 
>
Lorenzo Stoakes Aug. 21, 2024, 6:53 a.m. UTC | #2
On Sat, Aug 17, 2024 at 01:18:31AM GMT, Pedro Falcato wrote:
> Delegate all can_modify checks to the proper places. Unmap checks are
> done in do_unmap (et al). The source VMA check is done purposefully
> before unmapping, to keep the original mseal semantics.
>
> Signed-off-by: Pedro Falcato <pedro.falcato@gmail.com>
> ---
>  mm/mremap.c | 32 ++++++--------------------------
>  1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 26 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/mm/mremap.c b/mm/mremap.c
> index e7ae140fc640..24712f8dbb6b 100644
> --- a/mm/mremap.c
> +++ b/mm/mremap.c
> @@ -902,19 +902,6 @@ static unsigned long mremap_to(unsigned long addr, unsigned long old_len,
>  	if ((mm->map_count + 2) >= sysctl_max_map_count - 3)
>  		return -ENOMEM;
>
> -	/*
> -	 * In mremap_to().
> -	 * Move a VMA to another location, check if src addr is sealed.
> -	 *
> -	 * Place can_modify_mm here because mremap_to()
> -	 * does its own checking for address range, and we only
> -	 * check the sealing after passing those checks.
> -	 *
> -	 * can_modify_mm assumes we have acquired the lock on MM.
> -	 */
> -	if (unlikely(!can_modify_mm(mm, addr, addr + old_len)))
> -		return -EPERM;
> -

I'm honestly confused as to why the original implementation felt it
necessary to split the checks. I guess for the purposes of efficiency? But
doesn't seem efficient to me.

>  	if (flags & MREMAP_FIXED) {
>  		/*
>  		 * In mremap_to().
> @@ -1052,6 +1039,12 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(mremap, unsigned long, addr, unsigned long, old_len,
>  		goto out;
>  	}
>
> +	/* Don't allow remapping vmas when they have already been sealed */
> +	if (!can_modify_vma(vma)) {
> +		ret = -EPERM;
> +		goto out;
> +	}
> +

This is much better, and having it be a VMA check is so obviously correct
here. Again confused as to why this implemented at an mm granularity
anyway...

>  	if (is_vm_hugetlb_page(vma)) {
>  		struct hstate *h __maybe_unused = hstate_vma(vma);
>
> @@ -1079,19 +1072,6 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(mremap, unsigned long, addr, unsigned long, old_len,
>  		goto out;
>  	}
>
> -	/*
> -	 * Below is shrink/expand case (not mremap_to())
> -	 * Check if src address is sealed, if so, reject.
> -	 * In other words, prevent shrinking or expanding a sealed VMA.
> -	 *
> -	 * Place can_modify_mm here so we can keep the logic related to
> -	 * shrink/expand together.
> -	 */
> -	if (unlikely(!can_modify_mm(mm, addr, addr + old_len))) {
> -		ret = -EPERM;
> -		goto out;
> -	}
> -
>  	/*
>  	 * Always allow a shrinking remap: that just unmaps
>  	 * the unnecessary pages..
>
> --
> 2.46.0
>

Reviewed-by: Lorenzo Stoakes <lorenzo.stoakes@oracle.com>
diff mbox series

Patch

diff --git a/mm/mremap.c b/mm/mremap.c
index e7ae140fc640..24712f8dbb6b 100644
--- a/mm/mremap.c
+++ b/mm/mremap.c
@@ -902,19 +902,6 @@  static unsigned long mremap_to(unsigned long addr, unsigned long old_len,
 	if ((mm->map_count + 2) >= sysctl_max_map_count - 3)
 		return -ENOMEM;
 
-	/*
-	 * In mremap_to().
-	 * Move a VMA to another location, check if src addr is sealed.
-	 *
-	 * Place can_modify_mm here because mremap_to()
-	 * does its own checking for address range, and we only
-	 * check the sealing after passing those checks.
-	 *
-	 * can_modify_mm assumes we have acquired the lock on MM.
-	 */
-	if (unlikely(!can_modify_mm(mm, addr, addr + old_len)))
-		return -EPERM;
-
 	if (flags & MREMAP_FIXED) {
 		/*
 		 * In mremap_to().
@@ -1052,6 +1039,12 @@  SYSCALL_DEFINE5(mremap, unsigned long, addr, unsigned long, old_len,
 		goto out;
 	}
 
+	/* Don't allow remapping vmas when they have already been sealed */
+	if (!can_modify_vma(vma)) {
+		ret = -EPERM;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
 	if (is_vm_hugetlb_page(vma)) {
 		struct hstate *h __maybe_unused = hstate_vma(vma);
 
@@ -1079,19 +1072,6 @@  SYSCALL_DEFINE5(mremap, unsigned long, addr, unsigned long, old_len,
 		goto out;
 	}
 
-	/*
-	 * Below is shrink/expand case (not mremap_to())
-	 * Check if src address is sealed, if so, reject.
-	 * In other words, prevent shrinking or expanding a sealed VMA.
-	 *
-	 * Place can_modify_mm here so we can keep the logic related to
-	 * shrink/expand together.
-	 */
-	if (unlikely(!can_modify_mm(mm, addr, addr + old_len))) {
-		ret = -EPERM;
-		goto out;
-	}
-
 	/*
 	 * Always allow a shrinking remap: that just unmaps
 	 * the unnecessary pages..