| Message ID | 20241128142532.465176-1-amir73il@gmail.com (mailing list archive) |
|---|---|
| State | New |
| Headers | show |
| Series | fs: don't block write during exec on pre-content watched files | expand |
On Thu, Nov 28, 2024 at 03:25:32PM +0100, Amir Goldstein wrote: > Commit 2a010c412853 ("fs: don't block i_writecount during exec") removed > the legacy behavior of getting ETXTBSY on attempt to open and executable > file for write while it is being executed. > > This commit was reverted because an application that depends on this > legacy behavior was broken by the change. > > We need to allow HSM writing into executable files while executed to > fill their content on-the-fly. > > To that end, disable the ETXTBSY legacy behavior for files that are > watched by pre-content events. > > This change is not expected to cause regressions with existing systems > which do not have any pre-content event listeners. > > + > +/* > + * Do not prevent write to executable file when watched by pre-content events. > + */ > +static inline int exe_file_deny_write_access(struct file *exe_file) > +{ > + if (unlikely(FMODE_FSNOTIFY_HSM(exe_file->f_mode))) > + return 0; > + return deny_write_access(exe_file); > +} > +static inline void exe_file_allow_write_access(struct file *exe_file) > +{ > + if (unlikely(FMODE_FSNOTIFY_HSM(exe_file->f_mode))) > + return; > + allow_write_access(exe_file); > +} > + so this depends on FMODE_FSNOTIFY_HSM showing up on the file before any of the above calls and staying there for its lifetime -- does that hold? I think it would be less error prone down the road to maintain the counters, except not return the error if HSM is on.
On Thu, Nov 28, 2024 at 3:34 PM Mateusz Guzik <mjguzik@gmail.com> wrote: > > On Thu, Nov 28, 2024 at 03:25:32PM +0100, Amir Goldstein wrote: > > Commit 2a010c412853 ("fs: don't block i_writecount during exec") removed > > the legacy behavior of getting ETXTBSY on attempt to open and executable > > file for write while it is being executed. > > > > This commit was reverted because an application that depends on this > > legacy behavior was broken by the change. > > > > We need to allow HSM writing into executable files while executed to > > fill their content on-the-fly. > > > > To that end, disable the ETXTBSY legacy behavior for files that are > > watched by pre-content events. > > > > This change is not expected to cause regressions with existing systems > > which do not have any pre-content event listeners. > > > > + > > +/* > > + * Do not prevent write to executable file when watched by pre-content events. > > + */ > > +static inline int exe_file_deny_write_access(struct file *exe_file) > > +{ > > + if (unlikely(FMODE_FSNOTIFY_HSM(exe_file->f_mode))) > > + return 0; > > + return deny_write_access(exe_file); > > +} > > +static inline void exe_file_allow_write_access(struct file *exe_file) > > +{ > > + if (unlikely(FMODE_FSNOTIFY_HSM(exe_file->f_mode))) > > + return; > > + allow_write_access(exe_file); > > +} > > + > > so this depends on FMODE_FSNOTIFY_HSM showing up on the file before any > of the above calls and staying there for its lifetime -- does that hold? Yes! > > I think it would be less error prone down the road to maintain the > counters, except not return the error if HSM is on. Cannot. The "deny write counter" and "writers counter" are implemented on the same counter, so open cannot get_write_access() if we maintain the negative deny counters from exec. Also, note that there are still calls to {allow,deny}_write_access() that are not bypassed even with HSM, so for example, mixing fsverity and HSM is probably not a good idea... Thanks, Amir.
On Thu, Nov 28, 2024 at 5:57 PM Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com> wrote: > > On Thu, Nov 28, 2024 at 3:34 PM Mateusz Guzik <mjguzik@gmail.com> wrote: > > > > On Thu, Nov 28, 2024 at 03:25:32PM +0100, Amir Goldstein wrote: > > > Commit 2a010c412853 ("fs: don't block i_writecount during exec") removed > > > the legacy behavior of getting ETXTBSY on attempt to open and executable > > > file for write while it is being executed. > > > > > > This commit was reverted because an application that depends on this > > > legacy behavior was broken by the change. > > > > > > We need to allow HSM writing into executable files while executed to > > > fill their content on-the-fly. > > > > > > To that end, disable the ETXTBSY legacy behavior for files that are > > > watched by pre-content events. > > > > > > This change is not expected to cause regressions with existing systems > > > which do not have any pre-content event listeners. > > > > > > + > > > +/* > > > + * Do not prevent write to executable file when watched by pre-content events. > > > + */ > > > +static inline int exe_file_deny_write_access(struct file *exe_file) > > > +{ > > > + if (unlikely(FMODE_FSNOTIFY_HSM(exe_file->f_mode))) > > > + return 0; > > > + return deny_write_access(exe_file); > > > +} > > > +static inline void exe_file_allow_write_access(struct file *exe_file) > > > +{ > > > + if (unlikely(FMODE_FSNOTIFY_HSM(exe_file->f_mode))) > > > + return; > > > + allow_write_access(exe_file); > > > +} > > > + > > > > so this depends on FMODE_FSNOTIFY_HSM showing up on the file before any > > of the above calls and staying there for its lifetime -- does that hold? > > Yes! > ok In this case the new routines should come with a comment denoting it, otherwise the code looks incredibly suspicious. > > > > I think it would be less error prone down the road to maintain the > > counters, except not return the error if HSM is on. > > Cannot. > The "deny write counter" and "writers counter" are implemented on the > same counter, so open cannot get_write_access() if we maintain the > negative deny counters from exec. > I'm aware, in the above suggestion they would have to be split. Not great by any means but would beat the counter suddenly getting modified if the above did not hold.
diff --git a/fs/binfmt_elf.c b/fs/binfmt_elf.c index 106f0e8af177..8054f44d39cf 100644 --- a/fs/binfmt_elf.c +++ b/fs/binfmt_elf.c @@ -1257,7 +1257,7 @@ static int load_elf_binary(struct linux_binprm *bprm) } reloc_func_desc = interp_load_addr; - allow_write_access(interpreter); + exe_file_allow_write_access(interpreter); fput(interpreter); kfree(interp_elf_ex); @@ -1354,7 +1354,7 @@ static int load_elf_binary(struct linux_binprm *bprm) kfree(interp_elf_ex); kfree(interp_elf_phdata); out_free_file: - allow_write_access(interpreter); + exe_file_allow_write_access(interpreter); if (interpreter) fput(interpreter); out_free_ph: diff --git a/fs/binfmt_elf_fdpic.c b/fs/binfmt_elf_fdpic.c index f1a7c4875c4a..c13ee8180b17 100644 --- a/fs/binfmt_elf_fdpic.c +++ b/fs/binfmt_elf_fdpic.c @@ -394,7 +394,7 @@ static int load_elf_fdpic_binary(struct linux_binprm *bprm) goto error; } - allow_write_access(interpreter); + exe_file_allow_write_access(interpreter); fput(interpreter); interpreter = NULL; } @@ -467,7 +467,7 @@ static int load_elf_fdpic_binary(struct linux_binprm *bprm) error: if (interpreter) { - allow_write_access(interpreter); + exe_file_allow_write_access(interpreter); fput(interpreter); } kfree(interpreter_name); diff --git a/fs/exec.c b/fs/exec.c index 98cb7ba9983c..c41cfd35c74c 100644 --- a/fs/exec.c +++ b/fs/exec.c @@ -912,7 +912,7 @@ static struct file *do_open_execat(int fd, struct filename *name, int flags) path_noexec(&file->f_path)) return ERR_PTR(-EACCES); - err = deny_write_access(file); + err = exe_file_deny_write_access(file); if (err) return ERR_PTR(err); @@ -927,7 +927,7 @@ static struct file *do_open_execat(int fd, struct filename *name, int flags) * Returns ERR_PTR on failure or allocated struct file on success. * * As this is a wrapper for the internal do_open_execat(), callers - * must call allow_write_access() before fput() on release. Also see + * must call exe_file_allow_write_access() before fput() on release. Also see * do_close_execat(). */ struct file *open_exec(const char *name) @@ -1471,7 +1471,7 @@ static void do_close_execat(struct file *file) { if (!file) return; - allow_write_access(file); + exe_file_allow_write_access(file); fput(file); } @@ -1797,7 +1797,7 @@ static int exec_binprm(struct linux_binprm *bprm) bprm->file = bprm->interpreter; bprm->interpreter = NULL; - allow_write_access(exec); + exe_file_allow_write_access(exec); if (unlikely(bprm->have_execfd)) { if (bprm->executable) { fput(exec); diff --git a/include/linux/fs.h b/include/linux/fs.h index dd6d0eddea9b..2aeab643f1ab 100644 --- a/include/linux/fs.h +++ b/include/linux/fs.h @@ -3089,6 +3089,23 @@ static inline void allow_write_access(struct file *file) if (file) atomic_inc(&file_inode(file)->i_writecount); } + +/* + * Do not prevent write to executable file when watched by pre-content events. + */ +static inline int exe_file_deny_write_access(struct file *exe_file) +{ + if (unlikely(FMODE_FSNOTIFY_HSM(exe_file->f_mode))) + return 0; + return deny_write_access(exe_file); +} +static inline void exe_file_allow_write_access(struct file *exe_file) +{ + if (unlikely(FMODE_FSNOTIFY_HSM(exe_file->f_mode))) + return; + allow_write_access(exe_file); +} + static inline bool inode_is_open_for_write(const struct inode *inode) { return atomic_read(&inode->i_writecount) > 0; diff --git a/kernel/fork.c b/kernel/fork.c index 1450b461d196..015c397f47ca 100644 --- a/kernel/fork.c +++ b/kernel/fork.c @@ -625,8 +625,8 @@ static void dup_mm_exe_file(struct mm_struct *mm, struct mm_struct *oldmm) * We depend on the oldmm having properly denied write access to the * exe_file already. */ - if (exe_file && deny_write_access(exe_file)) - pr_warn_once("deny_write_access() failed in %s\n", __func__); + if (exe_file && exe_file_deny_write_access(exe_file)) + pr_warn_once("exe_file_deny_write_access() failed in %s\n", __func__); } #ifdef CONFIG_MMU @@ -1424,13 +1424,13 @@ int set_mm_exe_file(struct mm_struct *mm, struct file *new_exe_file) * We expect the caller (i.e., sys_execve) to already denied * write access, so this is unlikely to fail. */ - if (unlikely(deny_write_access(new_exe_file))) + if (unlikely(exe_file_deny_write_access(new_exe_file))) return -EACCES; get_file(new_exe_file); } rcu_assign_pointer(mm->exe_file, new_exe_file); if (old_exe_file) { - allow_write_access(old_exe_file); + exe_file_allow_write_access(old_exe_file); fput(old_exe_file); } return 0; @@ -1471,7 +1471,7 @@ int replace_mm_exe_file(struct mm_struct *mm, struct file *new_exe_file) return ret; } - ret = deny_write_access(new_exe_file); + ret = exe_file_deny_write_access(new_exe_file); if (ret) return -EACCES; get_file(new_exe_file); @@ -1483,7 +1483,7 @@ int replace_mm_exe_file(struct mm_struct *mm, struct file *new_exe_file) mmap_write_unlock(mm); if (old_exe_file) { - allow_write_access(old_exe_file); + exe_file_allow_write_access(old_exe_file); fput(old_exe_file); } return 0;
Commit 2a010c412853 ("fs: don't block i_writecount during exec") removed the legacy behavior of getting ETXTBSY on attempt to open and executable file for write while it is being executed. This commit was reverted because an application that depends on this legacy behavior was broken by the change. We need to allow HSM writing into executable files while executed to fill their content on-the-fly. To that end, disable the ETXTBSY legacy behavior for files that are watched by pre-content events. This change is not expected to cause regressions with existing systems which do not have any pre-content event listeners. Signed-off-by: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com> --- Jan, This patch is on top of your fsnotify_hsm rebased branch. It passed LTP sanity tests, but did not test filling an executable on-the-fly. Josef, can you verify that this works as expected. Also pushed to fsnotify_hsm branch in my github. Thanks, Amir. fs/binfmt_elf.c | 4 ++-- fs/binfmt_elf_fdpic.c | 4 ++-- fs/exec.c | 8 ++++---- include/linux/fs.h | 17 +++++++++++++++++ kernel/fork.c | 12 ++++++------ 5 files changed, 31 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)